^f Ml«8»ll€#^' •' 












fU-0^ 




.-'^^fr: 



^^%' '^ -^ V' 

.. <^^- =-^ A^ 



-v. 



^of" 












,4q,. 






•?• 









,-J\ r.';, A, <■ <^, 






"> '''^.<. h^l\>j,\' -.^ 









O > 
,0 -j- 












0^ 









^J^^ 



^\ 



i5> * o , ' 



^"■^■^^ "All . .. , 










.\^' 



.•^' q^ 









THE CAMPAIGN 

OF 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 



7 - 

THE CAMPAIGN 

OF 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 



A STRATEGIC AND 
TACTICAL STUDY 



BY 

JOHN BIGELOW, Jr. 

MAJOR XI. S. ARMY, RETIRED 

AUTHOR OF "MARS-LATOUR AND GRAVELOTTE," "THE PRINCIPLES 

OF STRATEGY," AND "REMINISCENCES OF THE 

SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN " 



WITH MAPS AND PLANS 




NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

LONDON: HENRY FROWDE 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 



JQ?3! 



Copyright, 1910, by 
Yale University Press 



©CI.A271h9r. 



CONTENTS 

PART I 

PERIOD OF PREPARATION 



CHAPTER 



PAGE 



I The general situation. A change of commanders. Certain 

PROMINENT OFFICERS 3 

II Organization and equipment 15 

III The MILITARY situation 29 

IV Changes in the Army of the Potomac. The abolition of grand 
DIVISIONS. The introduction of pack-trains. The formation op 
artillery battalions in the Army of Northern Virginu.. Dis- 
cipline in both armies. Adoption of corps badges. Sigel relieved 39 

V Movement of a detachment to Rappahannock Bridge. The IX 
Corps and Hood's and Pickett's divisions detached. Lee's and 
Hooker's conjectures 52 

VI The skirmish at Hartwood Church. Changes in the Federal 
OUTPOSTS. Correspondence between Averell and Fitzhugh Lee. 
"Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" 59 

vn MosBY and his men. Capture of General Stoughton. Transfer 
of General Stahel 75 

vm The battle op Kelley's Ford 89 

IX Preparations for a general movement. Plans of operation. 
Bread riot in Richmond. The Jones and Imboden expedition . 106 

X Minor preparations. Lincoln visits the Army of the Potomac. 
Numbers of both armies. Hooker's second plan of operation 126 

XI General movement attempted and suspended. Naval demonstra- 
tion. Rumors and conjectures 1-42 

XII Hooker's third plan of operation 157 



PART II 

PERIOD OF EXECUTION 

XIII April 27. . .The Army of the Potomac in motion 173 

XIV J.pn7 58. . .The right wing commences, and the left wing pre- 
pares, TO CROSS the Rappahannock 183 

XV Apn7 ;?9. . .Manceuvering 194 



viii CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAQE 

XVI April 30. . .Arrival of the Army op the Potomac at Chancellors- 
viLLE. Demonstration by left wing ordered and suspended. Line 
OP defence at Chancellorsville. Ill Corps in motion. Advance 
PROM Chancellorsville countermanded. Hooker's congratula- 
tory order. Averell marches to Rapidan Station. Stuart in- 
tercepted AT Todd's Tavern 213 

xvn May 1. . . Advance toward Fredericksburg. Sedgwick ordered to 
demonstrate. Return to Chancellorsville. Demonstration 
countermanded. Artillery at Banks' Ford 237 

xvin Dispositions for the night. Plans. Care of the wounded. Gains 

AND LOSSES. ThE FEDERAL LEFT WING. AvERELL RECALLED. COM- 
MENTS , 256 

XIX May 2. . .Jackson's flank march and deployment for attack . . 271 

XX Jackson's attack. Sickles' night attack 295 

XXI The left wing. Comments 329 

XXII May 3. . . Battle of Chancellorsville until 9 a.m 339 

xxin Battle op Chancellorsville after 9 a.m. Averell ordered re- 
lieved from command 361 

XXIV Second battle op Fredericksburg. Engagement at Salem 

Church 382 

XXV May 4... Sedgwick palls back to Scott 's Ford. Averell relieved 406 

XXVI May 5. . . Hooker recrosses the Rappahannock 419 

xxvn Return to Stafford Heights. Death op Jackson 428 

xxviii Operations op independent cavalry. Mosby and Stoneman . . 440 

XXIX Operations op independent cavalry {continued). Jones and Im- 

boden 460 

XXX Losses in the opposing armies. Comments 473 

Appendices 489 

Bibliography 513 

Index 515 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



MAPS 

1 Theater of operation : 

Eastern Section (sheet A) — showing Stoneman's raid . . at end of book 
Western Section (sheet B) — showing Jones and Imboden's 

raid 

(TIte txco sheets may be joined to form one map.) 

2 Skirmish at Hartwood Church. Positions of opposing arm- 

ies, February 25 

3 Engagement at Kelley's Ford, March 17, first position . . facing page 98 

4 Ih., second position " " 100 

5 lb., third position " " 101 

6 Stoneman's project for a passage of the Rappahannock, April 

14 and 15 " " 1*6 

7 Positions of opposing armies, 12:00 p.m., April 27 ... . at end of book 

8 Positions of opposing ai-mies, 12:00 p.m., April 28 ... . " " 

9 Positions of opposing ai-mies, 12:00 m., April 29 ... . " " 

10 Positions of opposing armies, 12:00 p.m., April 29 ... . " " 

11 Positions of main forces, 12:00 p.m., April 30 facing page 224 

12 Positions of active forces, 11:40 a.m., May 1 " " 245 

13 Positions of active forces, 11:30 p.m., May 1 " "246 

14 Positions of active forces, 1:30 p.m., May 1 « " 247 

15 Positions of main forces, 12:00 p.m., May 1 " "262 

16 Positions of main forces, 8:00 a.m.. May 2 " "274 

17 Positions of main forces, 2:00 p.m.. May 2 " " 280 

18 Positions of main forces, 5:00 p.m., May 2 " "292 

19 Positions of active forces, 6:20 p.m., May 2 " "301 

20 Positions of active forces, 6:50 p.m.. May 2 " "304 

21 Positions of main forces, 7:15 p.m.. May 2 " " 308 

22 Positions of main forces, 9:00 p.m., May 2 " "314 

23 Positions of Stuart's corps and forces opposing it, 12:00 p.m.. 

May 2 " "327 

24 Positions of main forces, 5:00 a.m.. May 3 " " 34^ 

25 Positions of active forces, 7:00 a.m.. May 3 " "350 

26 Positions of active forces, 7:30 a.m., May 3 " "352 

27 Positions of active forces, 7:45 a.m.. May 3 . . . . " " 352 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



28 Positions of active forces, 8:15 a.m., May 3 

29 Positions of active forces, 8:45 a.m., May 3 

30 Positions of active forces, 9:00 a.m., May 3 

31 Positions of active forces, 9:30 a.m., May 3 

32 Positions of active forces, 9:45 a.m., May 3 

33 Positions of active forces, 10:00 a.m., May 3 

34 Assault of Fredericksburg, May 3 . . . . 

35 Engagement at Salem Church, May 3 . . 

36 Positions of main forces, 12:00 p.m.. May 3 

37 Engagement at Banks' Ford, May 4 . . . 

38 Positions on Sedgwick's left, 6:45 p.m.. May 4 

39 Positions of main forces, 5:00 a.m., May 6 . 



facing jxige 356^ 
" " 357 
" " 358 
" " 362 
" " 365 
" " 366 
at end of book 

facing page 400 

" " 404 

nt end of book 

facing page 'il4: 
" " 428 



SKETCHES 

1 Engagement in Wright's manceuvei-, 5:30 p.m.. May 1 . . facing page 2'iS 

2 Jackson's attack, 5:45 p.m.. May 2 " "297 

3 Lane's brigade, and forces confronting it, about 8:00 p.m., 

May 2 " "312 



PLANS 

1 Rugei-'s brigade advancing on Germanna Ford, April 29 . . facing page 196 

2 Formation of Berry's and Hays' commands, May 2 . . . . " " 314 

3 Formation of Jackson's corps and opposing forces, 5:00 a.m.. 

May 3 " "344 

4 Stone Wall at Fredericksburg " "385 

5 Dispositions at Fredericksburg, May 3 " " 387 



PREFACE 

In the summer of 1894 I was assigned by the government to serve as 
Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Massachusetts Insti- 
tute of Technology. In the discharge of this duty I selected the cam- 
paign of Chancellorsville as the theme for a course of lectures to my 
classes. I made this selection because that campaign presented a 
greater variety of military problems and experiences than any other in 
which an army of the United States had taken part. In no other was 
there so rapid a succession of critical situations. Moreover, no other 
one, approaching it in importance, has been so imperfectly apprehended 
and described. 

Its richness in military lessons warranted, in my judgment, a certain 
minuteness of detail in describing it ; and the wealth of original matter 
rendered available by the oflBcial publication of the records of the Civil 
War has enabled me to realize this feature of the work. It is safe to 
say that no war that has been fought admits of such thorough investiga- 
tion as our Civil War, for on no other has the light of such a mass of 
contemporaneous dispatches, orders, reports, and other documents, been 
shed. My object in describing the campaign has been not only to tell 
what was done, but also to show how it was done, to present a charac- 
teristic, or typical, view of the conditions and methods of troop-leading 
that obtained during our Civil War. By its variety of problems and 
solutions this single campaign affords the instruction of several cam- 
paigns, without requiring the reader to learn the organization, names of 
commanders, etc., of more than two opposing armies, or to familiarize 
himself with more than one theater of operations. 

It is a common fault of military narration to fail to give the mental 
point of view and field of vision of the opposing commanders. I have 
sought especially to keep the reader informed as to how much or how 
little each commander knew about the tactical or strategic situation. In 
giving a commander's impressions, expectations, or intentions, I have, 
as far as possible, used his own words written or spoken at the time. 



xii PREFACE 

well knowing how difiBcult it is to paraphrase with absolute fidelity, 
and how unreliable are the commander's own words after the event. 
Military dispatches conjure up the mental impressions of the com- 
manders. They reveal the working of minds under the trying condi- 
tions of the march and battle, and so present a realistic view of the 
intellectual side of war. Those that I have cited in this work are not all 
models of their kind. Many of them are examples to be shunned rather 
than copied. But as studies in form and style as well as in matter, they 
may prove a help to any one trying to perfect himself in the art of mili- 
tary correspondence. 

One of the most important qualifications of a commander is the ability 
to sift the truth from conflicting rumors and reports, and deduce there- 
from the dispositions, movements, and intentions of the enemy. The 
reader who may wish to test or perfect himself in this regard should 
occasionally pause to put his own construction on bits of information 
about the enemy, and consider what he would have done in the position 
of a particular commander. As a rule, he should not criticize without 
amending. Purely analytical criticism is easy, but comparatively un- 
profitable. Criticism should be positive rather than negative, syn- 
thetical rather than analytical. Where a plan or a movement seems 
faulty, a correct one should be substituted for it. 

My work is divided into two parts. Part I, entitled The Period of 
Preparation, covers the time from the appointment of General Hooker 
as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, January 25, 1863, to the 
issuing of orders for the movement of the army, April 26, 1863. It 
treats of the reorganization and general improvement of the army 
preparatory to the campaign ; of the scouts, raids, and forays of Mosby 
and Fitzhugh Lee; of the first battle of Kelley's Ford, and of other 
minor operations. Part II, entitled The Period of Operation, describes 
the march to Chancellorsville ; the marching and fighting in the Wilder- 
ness; Sedgwick's attempt to march to Chancellorsville, including the 
battles of Marye's Heights and Salem Church; Stoneman's raid against 
Lee's communications; and Jones and Imboden's raid against the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 

Account is taken of the operations on and near the Peninsula of Vir- 
ginia, so far as they seem to affect the situation of the main armies, and 
of the services of the navy in supporting the army on the Rappahannock, 
the James, and the York Rivers. From the issuing of the first order for 



PREFACE xiii 

the movement of the Army of the Potomac, April 26, to the recrossing 
of the Rappahannock, May 6, the operations of the forces on both sides 
are described and discussed day by day. 

In the Civil War the term picket was applied to a sentinel on outpost 
and to portions of an outpost in general; a section of artillery com- 
prised two pieces instead of one as at present ; a rifle-pit was what is 
now called a shelter trench. I have made some use of these terms, re- 
taining for them, unless otherwise indicated, the meaning that they had 
in the Civil War. Certain geographical names of the theater of opera- 
tions are variously spelled. To avoid the ambiguity that might result 
from such variety, I have adopted an orthography of my own, and have 
taken the liberty in my quotations of making the geographical names 
conform thereto. In doing this I make no pretension of determining 
the most correct form of spelling considered etymologically, histor- 
ically, or otherwise. 

I have tried to provide the reader with such maps as he will need, 
but am aware that I have not made his way a royal road. There is no 
comfortable way of reading military history. Whoever expects to fol- 
low a campaign reclining in an easy chair with a book in one hand and 
a cigar in the other is doomed to disappointment. 

Should the map illustration seem anywhere insufficient, I 
would recommend that the reader represent the troop units by 
pieces of paper with pins put through them (fig. 1), and move 
them about on the map to correspond to the changes of posi- 
tion. Steel pins with glass heads seem to be the best for this 
purpose. Similar contrivances may be used for the repre- 
sentation of signal stations and military bridges, which should ^ig. i. 
be moved about or put down and taken up in accordance with the nar- 
rative. 

Map 1, The Theater of Operation, is traced and compiled from the 
Atlas of the published records of the war. Maps 2-5 and 7-10 are simi- 
larly obtained from maps of the Geological Survey, corrected according 
to contemporary maps for roads and other artificial features. Maps 
11-39 are traced from the maps of General Michler made in 1867, as 
originally published in separate sheets entitled Fredericksburg, Chan- 
cellorsville, The Wilderness. My maps are amplified according to 
various others, but especially those of Captain Hotchkiss as published 
in Chancellor svUle, by Hotchkiss and Allan. 



xiv PREFACE 

The correspondence of the campaign of Chancellorsville comprised in 
the oflScial publication of the Records is contained for the greater part 
in Volume 40 (serial number). For documents taken from the body of 
this volume I usually give no references. For those taken from the sup- 
plement, or from other volumes, or from other works, I have tried to 
refer the reader to book and page. The ofBcial reports of the com- 
manders are contained in Volume 39 of the Records. Other volumes of 
the Records which may interest students of the campaign of Chancel- 
lorsville are Nos. 26, 107, and 108. For the operations of the navy, 
Volmnes 5 and 8 of the Naval War Records have been largely drawn 
upon. 

The following illustrations will serve to explain a system of notation 
which I have used in the test and on the maps : 

"^ 143d (Pennsylvania) Regiment, 2d Brigade, 3d Division, 1st 
Corps.* 

270 1st Brigade, 2d Division, Cavalry Corps (Federal). 

_!_ 3d (Virginia) Regiment, 2d Brigade, Cavalry Division (Confed- 
erate).* 

rn 2d and 3d Brigades, 1st Division, 2d Corps. 
I 2.^x11 7th (Ohio) Regiment, 1st Brigade, 2d Division, 12th Corps.* 
2. Ill Belonging to 2d Division, 3d Corps. 

j7^ 2d Brigade (or battery), 1st Division, 6th Corps. 

g 2d Division (or battery. Corps Artillery), 11th Corps.^' 

A General Artillery Reserve. 

In giving references, I use the following abbreviations : 

W. i?.— The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, War Department. Vol- 
umes of this work are designated by their serial numbers. 

Naval W. i?.— Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies 
in the War of the Rebellion, Navy Department. 

Rep. of Com.— Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the 
War at the Second Session, Thirty-eighth Congress. 

B. and L.— Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (The Century Com- 
pany). 

' The regiments are designated by nnm- ^ The batteries are designated by the 
ber only. The state may be detemiined by nnmbers given them serially in the State- 
referring to the Statement of Organization ments of Artillery, Appendix 11, to which 
published in the War Records, Vol. 39, the reader is referred for states and other 
pp. 156, 7S9. designations. 



PREFACE XV 

Besides the works above mentioned, I have freely consulted the his- 
tories of the campaign of Chancellorsville by Hotchkiss and Allan, T. A. 
Dodge, S. P. Bates, and A. C. Hamlin. Other sources of information, 
including periodicals and manuscripts, will be found recognized in the 
body of the work. 

My acknowledgments for courtesies and assistance are due to Major- 
General George B. Davis, Judge- Advocate-General of the Army, and to 
his successor in charge of the War Records of the Army, Major-General 
George W. Davis, and to Professor E. K. Rawson, U. S. Navy, Superin- 
tendent of the Naval War Records. 

I wish to express my deep obligation to Mr. J. W. Kirkley of the Army 
Board of Publication, for providing me with documents, extracts, and 
compilations, and especially for giving me the benefit of his expert 
knowledge in interpreting obscure passages and doubtful figures. My 
labors were the lighter for privileges accorded me by the late Justin 
Winsor, librarian of Harvard University, and for free access to the 
valuable collection of books, manuscripts, maps, etc., relating to the 
Civil War, contained in the libraries of the Military Historical Society 
of Massachusetts and of the Boston Commandery of the Loyal Legion 
of the United States. Valuable suggestions and information were fur- 
nished me by General Luther Stephenson of Hingham Center and 
Colonel T. L. Livermore of Boston. For important data on the artillery 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, I am indebted to the following officers 
of that army : Colonel T. H. Carter, General E. P. Alexander, Captain 
W. G. McCabe, Major Robert Stiles, Colonel H. P. Jones, Captain S. V. 
Southall, Colonel R. P. Chew, Colonel D. G. Mcintosh, Colonel D. M. 
Cardwell, Colonel John C. Haskell, and Colonel J. B. Richardson. 

As a stranger in Fredericksburg I was assisted in familiarizing myself 
with the theater of operations, and enlightened on the operations them- 
selves, by Colonel Charles Richardson and Captain S. J. Quinn. Among 
the other officers of the Confederate army to whom I am indebted for 
suggestion and information are : General John Gill, Colonel T. T. Mun- 
ford. Colonel W. H. Taylor, Captain F. M. Colston, Captain W. W. 
Chamberlaine, Captain R. E. Park, and Captain R. J. Barton. 

With the highest appreciation of the services rendered me by each of 
these gentlemen, I would express my particular indebtedness to Colonel 
W. R. Livermore of the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, for invaluable 
suggestions on the plan, and comments on my execution, of this work ; 



xvi PREFACE 

for accommodating me with copies of the Mfchler maps, now quite rare, 
as well as the Geological Survey maps ; and for placing at my disposal 
his notes on the campaign, and a series of drawings, the result of his 
painstaking research and masterly calculation, showing the positions of 
troops at successive stages of the operations that I describe. 

Las Delicias, 
Newport, September 19, 1909. 



PART I 

PERIOD OF PREPARATION 



THE CAMPAIGN 
OF CHANCELLORSYILLE 



CHAPTER I 

THE GENERAL SITUATION. A CHANGE OF COMMANDERS. 
CERTAIN PROMINENT OFFICERS 

BY the end of the year 1862 onr Civil War had lasted a year and 
nearly nine months. In this time the North had wrested from the 
South the border states of Kentucky and Tennessee, and secured the 
possession of the Mississippi River. But while these advantages were 
gained in the West no corresponding progress was made by the Federal 
forces in the East. The Army of the Potomac, under General Burnside, 
lay checkmated by the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee, 
on the bank of the Rappahannock, not a good day's march across the 
frontier formed by the Potomac River. The Federal navy had the 
whole seacoast of the Confederacy under blockade, but on the high seas 
the Confederate cruisers were making havoc of the Northern merchant 
marine; and beyond the seas the agents of the Confederate government 
had anticipated the North in enlisting the sympathies of the ruling and 
influential classes of European countries. At the same time a formida- 
ble anti-war or peace party in the North was causing serious embar- 
rassment to the Federal administration. Such was the situation when, 
on the 1st of January, 1863, Abraham Lincoln, as commander-in-chief of 
the army and navy of the United States, issued his Proclamation of 
Emancipation, giving freedom to the slaves of secession masters. Al- 
though officially a war measure, this act was generally hailed in Europe 
and in America as a philanthropic one, and made for the President and 
his administration a small number of enemies or critics and myriads of 
friends. Its influence abroad was decisive in turning the tide of sym- 
pathy from South to North. 

In the prosecution of the war each section had both a political and a 
military end to attain. Secession being an accomplished fact, the politi- 
cal object of the South was the vindication of its sovereignty, or the 
securing of recognition as a nation; that of the North was the restora- 



4 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

tion of the Union. The military object of the South was the defence of 
its territory, and that of the North the conquest of the South. The 
South, and perhaps the North, did not realize what a blow at European 
recognition was struck by the Emancipation Proclamation. The popu- 
lar sympathy which it awakened for the North made it practically im- 
possible for any European government openly to side with the South. 
But there was danger of individuals, with the connivance perhaps of 
their governments, fitting out and manning Confederate vessels of war, 
and subscribing to Confederate loans. During the month of January 
the Confederate government conceived the plan of supplying means of 
carrying on the war by floating a European loan of about $15,000,000. 
This plan depended for its success upon the military prestige of the 
Confederacy. 

Burnside's bloody repulse at Fredericksburg and the criticism which 
it evoked led him to tender his resignation as commander of the Army 
of the Potomac. The President accepted it, and charged himself with 
the task of appointing as Burnside's successor a commander who should 
retrieve the disaster of Fredericksburg, and give confidence to people 
both at home and abroad whose hearts were with the North. After 
carefully considering all the eligible officers and thoroughly discussing, 
with his cabinet, their military and political records, he settled upon one 
of them as apparently the best qualified to meet these requirements ; on 
the 25th of January, 1863, a general order from the War Department 
announced to the armies of the United States that Major-General A. E. 
Burnside was, at his own request, relieved from command of the Army 
of the Potomac, and Major-General "J. Hooker" appointed in his stead. 
Joseph Hooker was born of old Puritan stock in Hadley, Mass., on the 
13th of November, 1814. His youth gave no indications of a military 
destiny. It is said that he was intended for the church. Graduating 
from the U. S. Military Academy at West Point in 1837, he became a 
commissioned officer in the artillery. He served with distinction in the 
Mexican War from 1846 to 1848. For a period of about two years 
(1850, 1851) he was in California as assistant adjutant-general of the 
Pacific Division. He afterward received a two years' leave of absence; 
at the end of that time, or in 1853, being unable to reconcile his energetic 
and ambitious nature to inactive service and slow promotion, and ex- 
periencing perhaps an attack of the "California fever," he resigned his 
eommission as an officer of the army, purchased a mile of land in 
Sonoma County, improved it by substantial inclosures, and tilled the 
soil, laboring with his own hands. In this enterprise he was not very 
successful. The living that he made by it was a precarious one. In 
1853 he was appointed road overseer of the county, and for two years 
he held the office of superintendent of military roads in Oregon. In 
1859, expecting the war cloud soon to burst, he became the colonel of a 



GENERAL HOOKER 5 

regiment of California militia. When in 1861 Ms expectation of war 
was realized, he found himself pecuniarily involved through his in- 
dorsement of notes for friends, and reduced to such poverty that he 
could not pay his way to the Atlantic coast. As he expressed an earnest 
desire to resume his connection with the army, his friends subscribed the 
necessary funds, to the amount of $1000, and sent him to Washington. 

Hooker was no politician and was addicted to criticizing his military 
superiors. This propensity had nearly caused his dismissal from the 
Military Academy at West Point. In the Mexican War he had allowed 
himself to criticize General Winfield Scott, which brought upon him that 
general's lifelong enmity. Scott being now in command of the army, 
Hooker was allowed to kick his heels in the anterooms of the War 
Department. 

He witnessed the first battle of Bull Run without participating in it. 
In an interview which he had soon afterward with President Lincoln, 
having been presented to him as Captain Hooker, he said : 

"Mr. President, I am not 'Captain' Hooker, but was once Lieutenant- 
Colonel Hooker of the regular army. I was lately a farmer in Cali- 
fornia, but since the Rebellion broke out I have been here trying to get 
into the sei'vice, and I find that I am not wanted. I am about to return 
home, but before going I was anxious to pay my respects to you, and to 
express my wishes for your personal welfare and success in quelling 
this Rebellion. And I want to say one word more," seeing that the 
President was about to speak. "I was at Bull Run the other day, ]\Ir. 

President, and it is no vanity in me to say that I am a d sight better 

general than any you had on that field." 

Hooker was at once made a brigadier-general of volunteers. He was 
one of the first appointments to that grade, his commission dating from 
May 17, 1861. In 1862 he was given the command of the Second Division, 
III Army Corps, Army of the Potomac. He fought as division com- 
mander through the Peninsula campaign ; as corps commander, in the 
Antietam campaign ; and as commander of the Center Grand Division, 
constituting about one third of the Army of the Potomac, in the Fred- 
ericksburg campaign.' 

In person Hooker was about six feet tall, well proportioned, and 
soldierly in bearing. His features were clear cut, and handsome, but 
for a rather weak chin. He had a slight fringe of side whiskers, a rosy 
complexion, as delicate as a woman's, abundant blond or sandy hair, 
and great speaking gray or steel-blue eyes. He was spoken of as 
the handsomest man in the army." Though of Puritan stock, he had 

^ San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 1, 1879 ; - Memoirs of Henry Villard, I, 347, 348 ; 

Appletons' Cyclopcedia of American Biog- Obituary of J. W. de Peyster, by "Anchor," 

raphy; Circular No. 16, 1903, Thirteenth New York. 1881 : General Hancock, by Gen- 

Mass. Beffimetit Assoc. eral Francis A. Walker, p. 73. 



6 THE CAJVIPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

in his temperament more of the cavalier than of the roundhead. He 
at times precipitated an engagement when he should not have done 
so, and had not the great qualities necessary to lead or direct an army 
of over 100,000 men. Up to a certain point of responsibility which he 
had not yet reached, he was capable of brilliant achievement, but at that 
point, if he reached it, he would break down. He was more mortified 
than gratified at being known both in and out of the army as Fighting 
Joe Hooker. "It sounds to me like Fighting Fool," he once said. 
* ' People, ' ' he used to say, ' ' will think I am a highwayman or a bandit. ' ' ^ 
How he came by this distasteful sobriquet is thus told by one of the 
chief actors in the incident, the proof-reader of the New York Courier 
and Enquirer: 

It was three o'clock in the morning . . . McClellan had come to grips with 
the Confederate forces, and was pressing them back upon Richmond. Every two 
or three hours through the night had come from the Associated Press Reporters' 
Agency sheets of manifold, that is, tissue paper upon which a dozen sheets (by 
the use of carbon sheets interleaved) could be written at once— one for each 
newspaper. Tliese sheets told of desperate fighting all along McClellan 's line. 
Among his Corps Commanders was General Hooker, whose command had been 
perhaps too gravely engaged. 

Just as the forms— indeed the last form, was being locked, that is, the type 
firmly held together in a great frame that the impression might be taken for 
printing, came another dispatch from the reporters with the Union army. It 
was a continuation of the report of the fighting in which General Hooker's 
Corps had been so gravely involved. At the top was vn-itten " Fighting— Joe 
Hooker." I knew that this was so written to indicate that it should be added 
to what we had had before. The compositor (typesetter) who had set it up 
(put it in type) had known nothing about the previous matter, however, and had 
set it up as a heading, "FIGHTING JOE HOOKER." 

I rapidly considered what to do ; as if it were yesterday I can remember the 
responsibility I felt and how the thing struck me. Well, I said to myself, it 
makes a good heading— let it go. I fully realized that if a few other proof-readers 
beside myself acted as I did it woidd mean that Hooker would thenceforth live 
and die as "Fighting Joe Hooker." Some did and some did not, but enough did 
as I did to do the business. (Sidney V. Lowell, Brooklyn, N. Y.) = 

Hooker's reputation for courage and his soldierly appearance made 
him more or less of a hero to the rank and file, but among the higher 
officers who had grown up in the service with him, and judged him 
critically, he was not generally admired. He had bitterly denounced 
Lincoln as an incompetent, and suggested that the safety of the govern- 
ment required a military dictator, and he was accused of having failed 

1 Circular No. 16, 1903, Thirteenth Mass. and L., Ill, 217. This and other incidents 

Reg. Assoc; 3Ien and Things I .Saw in of Hooker's career will be found in Har- 

Civil War Days, by J. F. Rnsling:, p. 54; per's Monthly, Vol. 31, pp. 639-645. 

Hooker's Comments on Chancellorsville, B. - Manuscript in possession of the author. 



GENERAL HOOKER 7 

to give Buruside honest support in the Fredericksburg campaign.' His 
appointment was not received with enthusiasm except by the men of 
his old division.^ The day before his appointment his predecessor rec- 
ommended him to the President for dismissal from the army on the 
grounds set forth in the following draft of an order to be issued 
from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac : 

General Joseph Hooker, major-general of volunteers and brigadier-general 
U. S. Army, having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary criticism of the actions 
of his superior officers, and of the authorities, and having by the general tone of 
his conversation endeavored to create distrust in the minds of officers who have 
associated with him, and having, by omissions and otherwise, made reports and 
statements which were calculated to create incorrect impressions, and for habit- 
ually speaking in disparaging terms of other officers, is hereby dismissed the 
service of the United States as a man unfit to hold an important commission dui-- 
ing a crisis like the present, when so much patience, charity, confidence, consid- 
eration, and patriotism are due from every soldier in the field. This order is 
issued subject to the approval of the President of the United States. 

The remainder of the order disposes in an equally summary manner 
of a number of other officers of high rank who, in Burnside's judgment, 
had proved themselves unworthy of the honor of being officers in the 
army of the United States or had outlived their usefulness in the 
Army of the Potomac. Burnside was competent to issue this order on 
his own responsibility, and would doubtless have done so, but for the 
judicious advice of his associates to submit it to the President for ap- 
proval. The President disapproved of it. His selection of Hooker to 
succeed Burnside was due not so much to his estimate of Hooker's mili- 
tary qualities as to the preference of his cabinet for Hooker as the only 
eligible general who was free from political aspirations, and therefore 
not a possible rival candidate for the Presidency .» The President had 
his misgivings as to the consequences of the appointment. So accom- 
panying the order making it, or close on its heels, went the following dis- 
patch from Halleck, General-in-Chief, to the new commander of the 
Army of the Potomac. It was dated January 25 : 

The President directs me to say that he wishes an interview with you at the 
Executive Mansion as early as possible. 

In compliance with this request Hooker repaired on the following day 
to Washington. But before doing so he formally assumed his new com- 
mand. 

It may interest the reader to observe how Burnside acquitted himself 

1 Recollections of Half a Century, by A. ^ poi. details of Burnside's removal see 
K. MeClure, p. 347. B. and L., Ill, 239 ; Mag. of American His- 

2 The 20th Regt. of Mass. Vol. Infantry, tory, XV. 52-54. 
by G. A. Bruce, p. 229. 



8 THE CAilPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

of the delicate task of saying something appropriate to the army that he 
was about to leave, which in its two years of campaigning had known 
nothing but failure except when defending its own soil, and which was 
now to be commanded by an officer whom Bum side deemed unworthy of 
holding a commission in the army of the United States. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Falmouth, Va., January 26, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 9 : 

By direction of the President of the United States, the commanding general 
this day transfers the command of this army to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker. 

The short time that he has directed your movements has not been fruitful of 
victory, or any considerable advancement of our lines, but it has again demon- 
strated an amount of courage, patience, and endurance that under more favor- 
able circumstances would have accomplished great results. Continue to exercise 
these virtues; be true to your country, and the principles you have sworn to 
maintain; give to the brave and skilful general wJio has so long ieen identified 
with your organization, and who is now to command you, your full and cordial 
support and cooperation, and you will deserve success^ 

In taking an affectionate leave of the entire army, from which he separates 
with so much regret, he may be pardoned if he bids an especial farewell to his 
long-tried associates of the Ninth Corps." 

His prayers are that God may be with you and grant you continual success 
until the rebellion is crushed. 

By command of Major-General BuRNsros: 
Lewis Richmond, 

Assistant Adjutant^General. 

Hooker replied, with his first order: 

By direction of the President of the United States, the undersigned assumes 
command of the Army of the Potomac. He enters upon the discharge of the 
duties imposed by this trust with a just appreciation of their responsibility. 
Since the formation of this army he has been identified witli its history. He has 
shared with you its glories and reverses with no other desire than that these rela- 
tions might remain unchanged until its destiny should be accomplished. In the 
record of your achievements there is much to be proud of, and with the blessing 
of God, we will contribute something to the renown of our arms and the success 
of our cause. To secure these ends, your commander will require the cheerful 
and zealous cooperation of every officer and soldier in this army. 

In equipment, intelligence, and valor the enemy is our inferior; let us never 
hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him. 

The undersigned only gives expression to the feelings of this army when he 
conveys to our late commander, Major-General Burnside, the most cordial good 
wishes for his future." 

My staff will be announced as soon as organized. 

^ The italics are mine. J. B. Jr. ^ Buruside's former eommand. 

^ The italics are mine. J. B. .Jr. 



HOOKER ASSUMES COMMAND 9 

Bumside tells the army how it may deserve success under its new 
commander, but does not promise its realization ; and Hooker says noth- 
ing about Bumside 's efforts in the past, but wishes him success in the 
future. 

On the morning of the 27th, Hooker reported in person to the Secre- 
tary of War and the President. In the meantime the following letter 
from the general commanding the defences of Washington had been re- 
ceived at the headquarters of the army : 

Heintzelman to Halleck, January 26 
There does not appear to be much connection between the Army of the Poto- 
mac and the troops for the defence of Washington. Scarcely an order issued 
from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac applies here. On the con- 
trary the commander acts under orders from the General-in-Chief or from the 
War Department. The duties being so different, cannot the defences be made 
into a separate department, with such limits as may be convenient ? 

Hooker was asked by the Secretary of War whether he desired to 
have command of the troops in and about Washington, and declined, 
assigning as his reason that it would require all his time to place the 
Army of the Potomac in proper condition for field service before the 
coming of spring. 

His experience the previous winter under Bumside had satisfied him 
that a winter campaign would be unwise and more likely to be ruinous 
to himself than to the enemy. Accordingly on the 2d of February the 
garrison of Washington with its dependencies was constituted a sepa- 
rate department and designated the Department of Washington, with 
Major-General S. P. Heintzelman in command. 

In his interview with the President, Hooker said that he hoped to 
succeed, provided the President would stand between him and Halleck, 
the commanding general of the army. He stated that he deemed this 
necessary for various reasons. The commanding general had, to a 
limited extent, been identified with the army of the West and seemed to 
think that there was no other army in the republic. He wrote and spoke 
freely of the army he had commanded at the expense of one he had 
never seen. His disparaging comparisons and reflections had been 
communicated to the Army of the Potomac, and neither it, nor its com- 
mander, expected justice at his hands. Besides, he continued, he had 
been reliably informed that Halleck had opposed his appointment to 
the command of the army on two occasions when the removal of Major- 
General McClellan from command was in contemplation, and again on 
the removal of General Burnside.* „ 

What the President said to all this is not known. But it appears that 

' Bep. of Com., lY, 112. 



10 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Hooker went away satisfied that he would be fully supported by the 
President and the War Department, including the general-in-chief . On 
his return to the Army of the Potomac he received from the President 
an expression of his mind in the form of the following characteristic 
letter: 

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C, 
January 26, 1863. 
Major-General Hooker. 
General: 

I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I 
have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think 
it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not 
quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which, 
of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in 
which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if 
not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable 
bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's 
command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted 
him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to 
a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way 
as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government 
needed a dictator. Of course it is not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given 
you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dicta- 
tors. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. 
The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither 
more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that 
the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticizing their com- 
mander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall 
assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were 
alive again, could get any good out of an army wliile such a spirit prevails in it. 
And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless 
vigilance, go forward and give us victories. 

Yours very truly, 

A. Lincoln. 

Hooker was deeply impressed by the tone and spirit of this communi- 
cation. To a group of officers who were with him when he read it, he 
said,— "He talks to me like a father. I shall not answer this letter until 
I have won him a great victory. ' ' ^ 

His choice for chief of staff was General Charles P. Stone, one of the 
few officers in the IT. S. Army who were well qualified to perform the 
duties of that office. 

Charles Pomeroy Stone was a graduate of West Point with a record 
of varied and efficient service as a staff officer. In 1861 he was ap- 
pointed Colonel and Inspector-General of the District of Columbia 

^ Abraham Lincoln, by Nicolay and Hay, VII, 88. 



HOOKER APPOINTS HIS STAFF 11 

Militia, and later, Colonel of the 14 U. S. Infantry, and given charge 
of the outposts and defences of Washington. Being ordered by General 
McClellan to make a feint of crossing the Potomac at Ball's Bluff, he 
naturally caused a part of his command to cross. This fraction was at- 
tacked in force, and pushed into the river with great loss. Among the 
killed was Colonel Baker, who had been an influential member of Con- 
gress. On the 9th of February, 1862, Colonel Stone was suddenly ar- 
rested, and without trial or charges, confined in Fort Lafayette, where 
he was kept until the 16th of August. He was then released, and placed 
on waiting orders, in which status he remained until the campaign of 
Chancellorsville was practically over.^ The simple justice of an inves- 
tigation by a court of inquiry was denied him on grounds of political 
expediency. Secretary of War Stanton, who doubted General Stone's 
loyalty, was strongly opposed to his being Chief of Staff of the Army of 
the Potomac. So Hooker took as his second choice Major-General 
Daniel Butterfield, then commanding the V Army Corps. Butterfield 
was not a graduate of West Point, nor had he, like Stone, studied the art 
of war in Europe, but he had done good service before and during the 
Civil War. Entering the militia early, he obtained the command of a 
regiment at the age of twenty-eight. His regiment was among the first 
to enlist for three months; at the expiration of this term of service he 
was appointed a lieutenant-colonel in the regular army and a brigadier- 
general of volunteers. In 1862 he was made a major-general of volun- 
teers. He took part in the Peninsula campaign, the second Bull Run 
campaign, and the campaign of Fredericksburg, in which he com- 
manded the V Corps. Hooker's entire staff was announced to the army 
in his second general order, dated January 29 : 

MaJ. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, chief of staff. 

Brig. Gen. Seth Williams,- assistant adjutant-general. 

Lieut. Col. Joseph Dickinson, assistant adjutant-general. 

Brig. Gen. James A. Hardie, judge-advocate-general. 

Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery. 

Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick, provost-marshal-general. 

Col. Rufus Ingalls, chief quartermaster. 

Lieut. Col. F. Myers, deputy chief quartermaster. 

Col. H. F. Clarke, chief commissary. 

Surg. Jonathan Letterman, medical director. 

Capt. Samuel T. Gushing, chief signal ofScer. 

Lieut. D. W. Flagler, chief ordnance officer. 

Maj. William H. Lawi-ence," 



Capt. William L. Candler 
Capt. Alexander Moore, 
Capt. Harry Russell, 



■ aides-de-camp. 



1 Appletons' Cyclopcedia of American Biography. 
- Adjutant-General of the Army of the Potomac. 



12 THE CAIVIPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

There was an oflBcer practically holding a very important position on 
Hooker's staff who is not named in the foregoing order. This was 
Brigadier-General Herman Haupt, Chief of Construction and Trans- 
portation, U. S. Military Railroads, who was nominally in charge of all 
the military railroads of the United States, but really only of those 
used by the Army of the Potomac. He wrote to Hooker on the 27th of 
January : 

... It will be my effort, so far as the Department of Military Railroads is eon- 
eemed, to cooperate efSciently in your movements, and I am well aware that the 
success or failure of a movement is often a question of prompt supply. 

The existing organization and arrangements work very satisfactorily. J. H. 
Devgreiix is Superintendent of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; William 
"W. Wright, Superintendent of the Fredericksburg Railroad; Adna Anderson, 
engineer of construction on both roads. I have directed ]\Ir. Anderson, who is a 
very efficient and experienced civil engineer, to report to you and keep you ad- 
vised of his whereabouts, so that in the event of any movement, you can communi- 
cate with him. Colonel McCallum attends to the routine and red tape business of 
the Department. 

For myself I am generally present when active operations are in progress, 
organizing and directing where my presence seems essential. 

I may be absent for some weeks during the present session of the Massachusetts 
Legislature, but my arrangements are such that nothing will suffer in my ab- 
sence. In everything pertaining to railroad transportation consult with or direct 
Mr. Wright, and in all that pertains to construction, Mr. Anderson.^ 

In Robert E. Lee, Hooker had as opponent one of the world's great 
military leaders. McClellan, Pope, and Burnside had in turn recoiled 
from him in failure or defeat. No other commander, North or South, 
at this or any later stage of the war, had such a creditable military 
record as his. Lee was seven years older than Hooker. If he had not 
as fresh a complexion as the latter, he had equally regular, handsome 
features, not only free from every suggestion of weakness, but telling 
unmistakably of strength. An erect, muscular iigure, and a graceful, 
dignified bearing, united with his noble countenance to give him a 
pleasing, distinguished, and commanding appearance. 

He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy second in his 
class, in 1829. During his whole four years' course he never received a 
demerit mark for any breach of rules or neglect of duty.- But in those 
days the rules of the Military Academy were less numerous and exact- 
ing than they have been of late years. This is said not in derogation, 
but in vindication of Lee's military character. "Throughout his whole 
life he never used tobacco, and though in rare cases he would drink a 

^ Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, pp. 184, 185. 
2 Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, by A. L. Long, p. 29. 



GENERAL LEE 13 

glass of wine, he strictly avoided whisky or brandy, and did his utmost 
to favor temperance in others. The intemperate habits of many of the 
persons under his command were always a source of pain to him."^ 

Upon graduation he was appointed a lieutenant in the U. S. Corps of 
Engineers. He served on the staff of General Wool and of General 
Scott in Mexico, distinguishing himself especially by his daring and 
skilful reconnaissances. Perhaps his most notable performance was 
his determination and preparation of the line of march by which Scott 
turned the position of Cerro Gordo. 

In 1852 he was appointed superintendent of the U. S. Military Acad- 
emy. He filled this position with eminent success for three years, when 
under the law of that day he was forced to reUnquish it by accepting an 
appointment in the line. He became lieutenant-colonel of the newly 
created 2d regiment of cavalry, of which Albert Sidney Johnston was 
colonel, and joLoing it in 1856, spent, with intervals of leave and de- 
tached service, five years in the rough practical school of frontier ser- 
vice, pursuing and fighting Apaches, Comanches, and kindred tribes of 
Indians in northern Texas. In 1859, being in Washington on leave of 
absence, he was designated to arrest John Brown and his fellow agi- 
tators, which he accomplished with the assistance of Lieutenant (later 
Major-General) J. E. B. Stuart. 

He was opposed to secession, but also to the coercion of the Southern 
states. He refused to allow his name to be proposed for appointment 
to the command of the Northern armies, and the first call of the North 
for troops determined him to resign his commission. Had his own 
state not seceded, and been permitted to remain neutral, he would prob- 
ably have remained neutral himself. On his resignation he wrote to his 
sister,—" . . . save in the defence of my native state, with the sincere 
hope that my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may never be 
called on to draw my sword." But if it came to the defence of his native 
state, he was resolved to take part in it. A month before the people of 
Virginia ratified the ordinance of secession that was passed by its con- 
vention, Lee had accepted from the governor a commission as major- 
general and commander-in-chief of the naval and military forces of the 
state. In this capacity he superintended the organization, equipment, 
and instruction of the first levies of Virginia soldiery, and sent some 
50,000 more or less trained troops to the front. This force, known as 
the Virginia State Line, was still nominally in existence in the spring of 
1863. But the Confederacy having passed a conscription law, it became 
advisable for Virginia to transfer her state army to the Confederacy, 
that she might be credited with it in the determination of her quota for 
future drafts. This transfer was effected by an act of the Virginia 
legislature passed February 28, 1863. 

1 Memoirs of Bobert E. Lee, by A. L. Long. p. 29. 



14 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

On the 25th of May, 1861, Lee was appointed a brigadier-general in 
the army of the Confederate States and assigned to the command of the 
Department of Virginia. In this position he conducted an unsuccessful 
campaign against Eosecrans. He was afterward transferred to the 
Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, in which he 
directed the construction of the coast defences. 

About the middle of March, 1862, he repaired under orders to Rich- 
mond, where he remained as military adviser to the President until the 
1st of June, when, by order of the President, he assumed command of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. In the few months between this date 
and that of Hooker's appointment as army commander he had caused 
McClellan's withdrawal from the Peninsula, defeated Pope's army at 
Bull Run, and repulsed Bumside's at Fredericksburg. 

The principal officers on Lee's staff were the following: 

Colonel R. H. Chilton, assistant adjutant and inspector general, chief of staff. 

Lieutenant-Colonel E. Murray, assistant adjutant and inspector general. 

Major H. E. Peyton, assistant adjutant and inspector general. 

Major W. E. Taylor,^ assistant adjutant and inspector general. 

Captain H. E. Young, assistant adjutant and inspector general. 

Captain A. P. Mason, assistant adjutant and inspector general. 

Brigadier-General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery. 

Lieutenant-Colonel B. G. Baldwin, chief of ordnance. 

Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Corley, chief quartermaster. 

Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Cole, chief commissary of subsistence. 

Surgeon L. Guild, medical director. 

Lieutenant-Colonel W. P. Smith, engineer officer. 

Captain S. R. Johnston, engineer officer. 

Colonel A. L. Long, military secretary. 

Major T. M. R. Talcott, "| 

Major Charles Marshall, V aides-de-camp. 

Major C. S. Venable, ) 

1 Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia. 



CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 

BOTH in the North and in the South there was a regular or standing 
army, and a temporary army, or army for the war only. The lat- 
ter was called in the North the Volunteer Army, or Volunteers, and this 
designation was retained throughout the war, although many of the 
men composing it were drafted into it, and in the latter part of the war 
most of those who volunteered did so only to escape being drafted. The 
Confederates avoided this anomaly by designating their temporary 
establishment as the Provisional Army. 

The Confederate army was, on the whole, better organized than the 
Federal. Judicious appointments of officers were made early in the war, 
and at the same time rigorous conscription laws put in force. As a 
consequence the Army of Northern Virginia was made up of seasoned 
soldiers and competent officers, welded together by a common experience 
of hard marching and desperate fighting. The Army of the Potomac, 
on the other hand, had suffered repeated and radical changes in its 
organization and personnel. It depended for recruits upon volunteer- 
ing. Men served in it for comparatively short periods. The officers had 
not so firm a hold of their men, nor so perfect a grasp of their duties as 
the Confederate officers. With the Confederates, military instruction 
was perhaps as little of an art as it was with the Federals. But the 
Confederates did not stand so much in need of it. They came into the 
army with more of the qualifications of officers and soldiers than the 
Federals. 

The relative amount of military spirit in the North and in the South 
appears in the comparative attendance at the national Military Acad- 
emy at West Point. Between the foundation of the Military Academy 
in 1802 and the outbreak of the Civil AVar in 1861, the number of cadets 
admitted from the South was from two and one half to three times as 
great in proportion to the white male population of the South as the 
number admitted from the North in proportion to the white male popu- 
lation of the North. 

It should not be inferred therefrom that the proportion of West 
Point graduates in the Northern and Southern armies bore any such 
relation to each other. One hundred and sixty-two— nearly half— of 





ABMYOF 




THE POTOMAC 


Corps commanders .... 


71% 


Division commanders . . 


63% 


Brigade commanders . . . 


32% 


Corps, division, and brigade 




commanders 


42% 



16 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

the Southern graduates in the U. S. Army in 1861 remained loyal to the 
North. Only nineteen of the Northern graduates went with the South. 
The proportion of West Pointers among the officers of the Northern 
armies was from once and a half to twice as great as among the officers 
of the Southern armies. In the Army of the Potomac and in the Ai-my 
of Northern Virginia, the commanding general, the chief of artillery, 
chief of cavalry, chief quartermaster, chief commissary, and chief 
engineer officer were West Pointers. 

In the Army of the Potomac the adjutant-general and the chief of 
ordnance were West Pointers ; in the Army of Northern Virginia they 
were not, but they were both graduates of the Virginia Military Insti- 
tute, appropriately called the West Point of the South. Among the 
corps, division, and brigade commanders the proportion of West Point- 
ers was as follows : 

ARMY OF 

NORTHERN VIRGINIA 

100% 

83% 
18% 

31% 

The advantage of the South in respect to officers was due only indi- 
rectly to the national Academy at West Point. It was due directly to 
its own institutions, particularly its military schools and militia. Dis- 
regarding West Point and Annapolis, the military schools in the United 
States in 1860 were distributed as follows : * 

NORTH SOUTH 

Vermont 1 Alabama 1 

Kentucky 1 

Louisiana 1 

Mississippi 1 

South Carolina 2 

Tennessee 1 

Virginia 2 

"9 

The South, as the originator of secession, had an earlier and clearer 
apprehension of the "irrepressible conflict" than the North. In this 
conception, and the fear of an uprising among the blacks, it had two 
potent stimuli to the organization and training of its militia that were ■ 
almost totally lacking in the North. As a consequence the militia of the 

' Census of 18C0, Miscellaneous Statistics, p. 510. 



THE OPPOSING ARMIES 17 

South was in a higher state of efficiency, and, in proportion to the popu 
lation, more numerous than that of the North. 

The South had a military advantage in the comparative homogeneous- 
ness of its population. The census of 1890 divides the surviving white 
soldiers and sailors of the Civil War into native-born (of native or of 
foreign parents) and foreign-born, as follows : 

FEDERAL CONFEDERATE 

Native 82% Native 97% 

Foreign 18% Foreign 3% 

According to this indication the proportion of foreigners in the 
Federal army was about six times as great as it was in the Confederate. 

The moving spirit of each anny was loyalty to the section of country 
in which it grew up, and with which its destiny was cast. Each side 
considered the other as the aggressor. The North looked upon the 
South as a political renegade, aiming or working directly or indirectly 
for the destruction of the Union ; the South looked upon the North as a 
military invader and would-l)e conqueror and oppressor. 

Now that the North and the South, having fought their fight and 
shaken hands, know each other again as friends and brothers, it is 
hardly possible to realize the animosity with which they then clutched 
and held each other by the throat. Each side believed in the perfect jus- 
tice of its cause, and could hardly find terms opprobrious enough with 
which to express its abhorrence of that of the other, and its hatred of 
those who upheld and defended it. It was Yankees, hirelings, and mud- 
sills on one side, and rebels, traitors, and slave-drivers on the other. 

The political and the military situations combined to relieve the 
South of the responsibility of the initiative and impose it upon the 
North. To secure recognition and preserve its territory, with the pos- 
sible exception of strips along the border actually occupied by Federal 
troops, all that the Confederacy had to do was to hold its own. Every 
day that passed without a military success for the North was an en- 
couragement to the friends of secession abroad, and a discouragement 
to the war party in the North. 

While the Federals were still dependent for recruits upon volunteer- 
ing, the Confederates were enforcing a conscription law, so stringent 
that it necessarily provided for the exemption of a portion of the 
military population for work in certain important industries, such as 
mining, railroading, farming, etc. These details, as such exemptions 
were called, gave rise to differences of opinion between the civil and 
military authorities, and between the administrative and combatant 
branches of the military establishment. A case in point is the following 
communication from Seddon to Lee, dated February 10 : 



18 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The applications for details sent you through the Department have been 
rarely allowed, but on the contrary have been generally returned disapproved. 
. . . Such applications are not transmitted incautiously, but are sent by me 
reluctantly and stintingly, and only when, on large considerations of public in- 
terest, the requirements of the general service, in my judgment, demand them. 
I have preferred, instead of exercising the privilege of the Department to order 
such details, to submit them in the first instance to the consideration of the mili- 
tary authorities in the field. This course I wish to continue, and [I] feel satis- 
fied that on this frank exposition of the course and views of the Department, its 
judgment will hereafter have more consideration and deference on the part of 
the officers . . . 

In reply Lee expressed himself on the 21st as follows : 

I know and feel the necessity of keeping up to the highest point of excellence 
and efficiency all the various works which furnish the army with material, cloth- 
ing, and transportation. But there is an equal and absolute necessity for every 
man liable to military duty to be held in the army, for, as you know, the odds 
against us are very great. I have hoped, therefore, that persons having govern- 
ment contracts, or employed in government agencies, would endeavor to find fit 
workmen and agents among the thousands who in town and country are for one 
cause or another exempted from military service, or among those who, though 
liable to military service, contrive in some way to keep out of the army. . . . 

All details which the Department may order from this army will be made at 
once, but if referred to my judgment, I fear 1 will be unable to recommend them, 
unless compatible with my views of the necessities of the service, both here and 
elsewhere. 

The Army of the Potomac was organized as follows : 

Right Grand Division (Major-General Couch) .- 

II Corps (Major-General Howard). 
IX Corps (Major-General Sedgwick). 

Two brigades of cavalry, with a battery of horse artillery (Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Pleasonton). 
Center Grand Division (Major-General Meade) : 

III Corps (Brigadier-General Sickles). 

V Corps (Major-General Sykes). 

Six regiments of cavalry, with a battery of horse artillery (Colonel Kerr). 
Left Grand Division (Major-General Smith) : 
I Corps (Major-General Reynolds). 

VI Corps (Brigadier-General Newton). 

Five regiments and one company of cavalry, with one battery of horse 
artillery (Brigadier-General Gregg). 
Grand Reserve Division (Major-General Sigel) : 

XI Corps (Brigadier-General Stahel).* 

XII Corps (Major-General Slocum).^ 

' Five regiments of cavalry were inchuled in this oorps. 
" Four companies of cavalry were included in this corps. 



ARMY ORGANIZATION 19 

General Artillery Reserve. 

Signal Corps. 

Engineers. 

Ordnance Detachment. 

Provost Guard. 

Defences of Washington. 

These forces, exclusive of the defences of Washington, aggregated, 
on the 31st of January, about 149,000 officers and men present for duty. 
The grand divisions averaged about 35,900 officers and men present for 
duty. 

Following is the organization of the Army of Northern Virginia : 

First Army Corps (Longstreet) : 

Anderson's division. 

McLaws' division. 

Pickett's division. 

Hood's division. 
Second Army Corps (Jackson) : 

A. P. Hill's division. 

D. H. HiU's division. 

Early's division. 

Trimble's division. 
General Artillery Reserve (Pendleton). 
Cavalry Division (Stnart). 

In each army the Signal Corps used electric as well as visual signal- 
ing. For electric telegraphy the Army of the Potomac relied princi- 
pally upon the U. S. Military Telegraph Service, which was entirely 
independent of the Signal Corps. The Military Telegraph Corps was 
nominally a branch of the quartermaster's department. About a dozen 
quartermasters were included in it for the receipt and disbursement of 
funds, but it was practically a separate organization. It reported directly 
to, and received orders directly from, the Secretary of War, and was not 
generally considered as an integral part of the U. S. Army. It com- 
prised all the telegraph lines and officers in the United States. Men of 
loyalty and executive ability in whom Stanton, the Secretary of War, 
had implicit confidence, were in control of the whole system, inventing 
and using a cipher code which the Confederates were never able to un- 
lock, and which the operators and translators never betrayed. Its chief 
was Major T. T. Eckert. By means of this corps the War Department 
was placed in direct commimication with every arsenal, general military 
depot, military prison, barracks, rendezvous, camp, and fort in the 
Union, and, by Stanton's order, every message to, from, and between 
them passed through the department and was therein deciphered. A 
recorded duplicate was in every case placed upon the Secretary's desk. 



20 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCBLLORSVILLE 

President Lincoln visited the War Department frequently to get the 
latest news from the front. His tall form could be seen crossing the 
lawn between the White House and the War Department regularly- 
morning, noon, and evening. He often walked around among the 
cipher operators, looking over their shoulders, as they translated from 
or into cipher, and asking questions about the messages.' 

The Federal Signal Corps was a part of the regular army. For 
service in the field, signal troops were formed into parties usually of 
four officers and eight men, one such party being assigned to a division 
of infantry. The code was given to the officers only, and when they 
had memorized the characters it was destroyed. A soldier worked the 
flag while an officer called the numbers indicating the letters. There 
was a cipher disk by means of which all messages were sent in cipher. 
The countersign, or the cipher, was changed daily, sometimes oftener. 
In sending a long message it would be changed a number of times. 

Lines of flag and torch communication were often gotten up from one 
part of an army to another 20 or 30 miles long, and maintained day and 
night for months, except during a fog, when neither flag nor torch could 
be seen. U-sually a line longer than 10 miles had repeating-stations by 
which messages were received and transmitted. Regular reliefs were 
taken at the telescope by the officers and men watching the next sta- 
tions, and two minutes would not pass without an eye at the glass. 

The Army of the Potomac made use of three stationary balloons 
for purposes of observation. Under each one was a detail of men 
who had charge of the cables that held the balloon in position, and a 
number of couriers, all under the command of an officer. Written mes- 
sages from a balloon were dropped, with a stone or other weight 
wrapped up in them, to the officer below, who sent them on to their 
destinations. 

The Confederate War Department had an Engineer Bureau, and 
there were engineer officers in the several Confederate armies, but among 
these officers there was a lack of training ia field work and of the organ- 
ization and direction necessary to the efficient coordination of effort. 
On the 27th of March Lee wrote to the Chief Engineer, C. S. A.: 
"If I had an experienced engineer capable of conducting the profes- 
sional operations of that department in this army, young officers could 
be advantageously employed, but as I am now situated, they give no 
assistance. ..." 

In the Army of Noi'thern Virginia there was no battalion or cor- 
responding organization of engineers at general headquarters. The 
duties of such troops were performed by staff officers at the various 
other headquarters and by officers and men detailed from the line, and 

^E. M. Stanton, by F. A. Flower, pp. 216, 217; Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, 
by D. H. Bates, in the Century, May, 1907. 



ARMY ORGANIZATION 21 

civilian labor hired or impressed. In the Army of the Potomac the 
engineer force was divided into three parts, all attached to the head- 
quarters of the army: the Topographical Engineers; the Engineers, 
including the Engineer Battalion (a regular force) ; and the Engineer 
Brigade (a volunteer force). The Chief of Topographical Engineers 
was Brigadier-General Gouverneur K. Warren, U. S. Volunteers. The 
Engineers were commanded by Lieutenant (later Captain) Cyrus B. 
Comstock, U. S. Engineers; and the Engineer Brigade, by Brigadier- 
General D. P. Woodbury, U. S. Volunteers. These separate branches 
had no common head. General Warren, in his report of the campaign, 
says that he was placed in charge of the Topographical Engineers on 
the 2d of February.^ It appears, however, that he was not announced 
to the army as serving on Hooker's staff until the 30th of March. ^ In 
the Federal, as well as in the Confederate army, the work of pioneers 
of the ordnance department, Signal Corps, train guards, and ambulance 
corps was done largely by troops of the line serving with their regi- 
ments or attached to higher headquarters. As a rule each regiment 
had its corps of pioneers or axemen, whose work it was to open up and 
corduroy roads, to clear or "slash" the front of a position, to construct 
or repair bridges, barricades, log works, etc. 

The Army of Northern Virginia numbered 62,800 officers and men 
present for duty. An army corps numbered about 30,000 officers and 
men present for duty. 

It will be observed that in the Federal army the cavalry was assigned 
to grand divisions or army corps. There was no independent cavalry. 
In the Confederate army the cavalry was all independent, constituting 
Stuart's cavalry division. 

In the Confederate army the grade of commander might be said to be 
commensurate with his responsibility. Lee had the rank of general; 
his corps commanders, of lieutenant-general ; his division commanders, 
of major-general; and his brigade commanders, of brigadier-general. 
In the Federal army there was no grade above that of major-general. 
Three army corps and thirteen divisions ivere commanded hy brigadier- 
generals. 

In each army the artillery was assigned for the greater part to divi- 
sions. In the Army of the Potomac two batteries were assigned, as a 
corps reserve or corps artillery, to the II Corps ; the remainder of the 
artillery was organized as a general artillery reserve for the army. 
In the Army of Northern Virginia there was no corps artillery. Bat- 
teries not assigned to divisions constituted a sort of general artillery 
reserve without being regularly organized as such. This force was 
officially referred to as "artillery in the rear.''^* 

1 W. JR., 39, p. 194. = lb., 40, p. 167. 

=> lb., 40, pp. 602, 650. 



22 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

In the Army of the Potomac the senior artillery officer of each corps 
was required by law, "in addition to his other duties," to act "as chief 
of artillery and ordnance at the headquarters of the corps. "^ This 
required a captain to command his battery while acting as chief of artil- 
lery and ordnance, a practical impossibility, which was not attempted. 
By order or custom, the senior artillery officers of divisions acted as 
chiefs of artillery and ordnance for their divisions. 

The General Artillery Reserve was commanded, in the Army of 
Northern Virginia, by the chief of artillery of the army, Brigadier- 
General William N. Pendleton, and in the Army of the Potomac by a 
special chief.- The artillery had practically no regimental organization 
in either army. The pieces were muzzle-loading, and made of wrought 
or cast iron or brass. There was not a steel or a breech-loading piece 
in either army.^ 

The principal varieties used are given in the following table : 



DESCRIPTION OP PIECE 


BANGE IN YARDS 


USED IN 


Rifles 






20-pounder Parrott gun 


4,500 


Both armies 


10-pounder Parrott gun 


6,200 


Both armies 


3-inch ordnance gun . 


4,180 


Both armies 


Smooth-lores 






12-pounder gun . . . 


1,660 


Army of the Potomac 


Light 12-pounder gun 






(Napoleon) . . . 


1,300 


Both armies 


6-pounder gun . . . 


1,525 


Army of Northern Virginia 


12-pounder howitzer 


1.070 


Army of Northern "Virginia 



In addition to the guns above mentioned there were in the Army of 
the Potomac a few 4y2-inch "ordnance" guns, and in the Army of 
Northern Virginia a few Whitworth guns. 

The proportion of rifles to smooth-bores was in the Army of the 
Potomac about as 7 to 3 and in the Army of Northern Virginia about 
as 2 to 3. To fully appreciate the consequent advantage of the Federal 
artillery, one must consider, not only that the effective range of a rifle 
was from twice to three times that of a smooth-bore, but also that the 
Federal smooth-bore artillery was more homogeneous, and on an 
average heavier, than the Confederate (see foregoing table). The Con- 
federate ammunition, moreover, was largely defective, while that of the 
Federals was generally good. In personnel the Federals had an 
advantage in the superiority of their men as artisans or mechanics. 

' Act of July 17, 1862. ' At this time the Prussian artillery was 

- In Vol. 40 of the War Records this chief partially armed with breech-loading rifled 

is given on page 15 as Captain G. A. de steel pieces of Krupp's manufacture. 

Russy, and on page 16 as Brigadier-General 

William Havs. 



THE ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY 23 

""Wliilst the South had at the beginning of the war a better raw material 
for infantry and cavalry, the North had the best for artillery. It has 
been well said that 'a battery carries with it all that goes to make up 
civilization.' It requires many mechanics with their tools and stores, 
and also what are called 'handy men,' intelligent and self-reliant, for 
no two men at a gun do the same work. No coimtry furnishes better 
men for the artillery proper than our Northern, and particularly our 
New England States, and if, as in other armies, the best fitted for this 
service were assigned to it, we would lead the world in this arm."^ 

The principal projectiles used were the solid shot— which has been 
discarded in recent years by field artillery— percussion shell, shrapnel, 
and canister. The time shell was used with rifled pieces. A piece could 
be loaded and fired from twice to three times a minute. The 3-inch 
field-piece in the U. S. Army to-day has fired fifteen aimed shots a 
minute. 

In the formation of cavalry from raw material, the North and the 
South had each its peculiar advantages and disadvantages. The North 
was rich in men, money, and draft-horses, but comparatively poor in 
riding-horses, riders, and marksmen. During the first year of the war 
the Confederate cavalry surpassed the Federal in nearly everything 
that went to make good soldiers. The Confederate cavalrymen came 
mostly from the best families in the South, were nearly all accomplished 
horsemen, and more or less accustomed to the use of firearms. It took 
but little drilling to convert the Confederate cavalry recruit into an 
efiScieut trooper. The Federal cavalry was recruited from offices, mines, 
and workshops, many of the men having never been on a horse or 
handled a firearm. The Confederate cavalry was mounted for the 
greater part on well-bred horses, well broken to the saddle; the Federal, 
on indifferent horses imperfectly broken. Time worked a change in 
both of the opposing services which brought them in the course of the 
war to a practical equality. But as late as January 15, 1863, General 
Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, wrote to 
General Meigs, Quartermaster-General : 

The cavalry and artillery horses are in fair condition, considering that the 
quality of the animals never was first-rate. First-class horses have never yet 
foimd their way into this army. Many of them have been "doctored up" by 
contractors, and sold into our hands, and the first service has discovered their 
unfitness.^ 

While the horses of the Confederate cavalry were generally better 
blooded than those of the Federal, they began early in the war to fall 
behind the latter in number and condition. 

' Our Experience in Artillery Administration, by Brevet Major-General Heiirv J. Hunt. 

in Journal of Military Service Institution, XII, 214. 

= W. B., 31, p. 983. 



24 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

At the beginning of the war, the Confederate government, charged as 
it was with the creation of an army and of war material of all kinds, 
felt itself unable to provide horses for the numerous cavalry companies 
which offered their services, especially from the state of Virginia. 
Many companies organized as cavalry were rejected. With those that 
were enrolled the government entered into a contract, the substance of 
which was that the cavalrymen should supply and own their horses, 
which would be mustered into service at a fair valuation ; that the gov- 
ernment should provide feed, shoes, and a smith to do the shoeing, and 
should pay the men a per diem of forty cents for the use of their 
horses. Should a horse be hilled in action, the government agreed to 
pay to the owner the muster valuation. Should the horse be captured 
in battle, worn out or disabled by any of the many other causes which 
were incident to the service, the loss fell upon the owner, who was com- 
pelled to furnish another horse under the same conditions, or be trans- 
ferred to some other arm of the service. 

"That the government should have adopted such a policy at the be- 
ginning of the war was a misfortune ; that it should have adhered to it 
to the very end was a calamity against which no amount of zeal or 
patriotism could successfully contend. ' ' ' 

In no case was the sum paid for a horse killed in action sufficient to 
replace it, for the price of horses constantly advanced as the demand 
for them increased. To replace a horse that was only wounded or 
otherwise disabled without losing the disabled one, it was usually neces- 
sary to get the latter home, for only one horse could be kept by a soldier 
at the public expense. Taking a horse home involved the rider's lead- 
ing it there from the point where his regiment might be stationed, not 
unfrequently a hundred miles or more, at his own expense. Many 
Confederate troopers mortgaged their land on accoimt of their horses. 
Not uncommonly it appeared to the men that their only chance of supply- 
ing themselves with horses lay in taking them from the enemy, and in- 
stead of getting a furlough, they obtained permission to scout. If a 
stray picket or straggler could then be captured, it was done. This 
accounts for much of the small war carried on by the Confederate 
cavalry against the Federal outposts. 

Each Confederate trooper had to take care of the horse which he 
hired to the government, and in case the soldier was disabled, unless 
some friend looked after the riderless horse, the chances were that it 
would fall a victim to starvation and want of care, or become a total 
loss to the owner.2 

1 Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, by H. Confederate cavalry are drawn from an 
B. McClellan, late Major and Chief of article by Thomas T. Munford, Esq., of 
Staff of the Cavalry Corps, Army of North- Lynchburg, Va., late colonel 2 Va. Cavalry, 
ern Virginia, pp. 257, 258. in the Journal of the V. S. Cavalry Asso- 

- These particulars of the service in the elation for June, 1891. 



THE CAVALRY 25 

The Federal cavalry was generally armed with the Smith's and the 
Sharp's carbines, both breech-loading, the Colt's revolver, and the 
saber. The Confederate cavalry had tried, but unsuccessfully, to pro- 
vide itself with the same arms. It was generally armed with the 
pistol, many troopers carrying two or three. Not so large a proportion 
had a carbine in addition to a pistol. The carbines and pistols were not 
of uniform pattern as in the Federal service. Many troopers for lack 
of a carbine carried an infantry rifle or musket. A small number only 
were armed with a pistol, carbine, and saber. The Colt's revolver held 
its place to the end of the war, and although seldom used as a charging 
weapon was invaluable in the melee, and as a defensive arm for patrols 
and couriers. The confidence which the regulars had long felt in the 
saber was shared by the volunteers as soon as some training and ex- 
perience in its use had rendered its grasp familiar. ^ 

In connection with the cavalry, notice should be taken of the irregular 
mounted troops of the Confederacy, which were generally called Parti- 
san Eangers. The several Partisan bands were recruited mainly among 
men who could not be compelled or induced to serve in the line. They 
were attracted to the Partisan service chiefly by the reward in money 
guaranteed them for whatever plunder they might secure. It was prac- 
tically the application of the prize principle of nautical warfare to war 
on land. The Partisan Ranger Act, which was passed April 21, 1862, 
contained the following provisions : 

289. That the President be and he is hereby authorized to commission such 
officers as lie may deem proper, with authority to form bands of partisan rangers 
in companies, battalions, or regiments, either as infantry or [as] cavalry, the 
companies, battalions, or regiments to be composed each of such numbers as the 
President may approve. 

290. That such partisan rangers, after being regularly received into service, 
shall be entitled to the same pay, rations, and quarters during their term of ser- 
vice, and be subject to the same regulations, as other soldiers. 

291. That for any arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy by 
any body of partisan rangers, and delivered to any quartermaster at such place 
or places as may be designated by a commanding general, the rangers shall be 
paid their full value in such manner as the Secretary of War may prescribe. 

Prize money, varied and exciting service, comparative freedom from 
the restraints of discipline, frequent and lengthy sojourns at home, 
these advantages could not but attract men already enlisted in the 
cavalry of the line. They caused considerable dissatisfaction, lead- 
ing to more or less desertion among Stuart's troops. Stuart, while 

1 Captain Moses Harris, U. S. A., in War Papers of Commandery of Wise, 
Mil Order Loyal Legion, I, 354. 



26 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCBLLORSVILLE 

wishing success to the Partisans, was anxious to put a stop to their 
evil influence upon his command. The problem in his mind was to take 
from the Partisan service as many as possible of the attractions which 
it possessed for men of the line without depriving it of the attractions 
necessary for its recruitment among men not available for the line. 
Both Lee and Stuart wanted the Partisans to remain continuously in 
service, going into camp instead of disbanding and returning to their 
homes between operations; in other words, they wanted the so-called 
Partisans to cease being guerillas and be Partisans. But this they 
were never able to bring about. 

When General Hunt was appointed the first Chief of Artillery of the 
Army of the Potomac, General Stoneman was appointed the first Chief 
of Cavalry; the functions of each at that time were purely adminis- 
trative.^ 

Under General Pope and General Burnside, however, Hunt had been 
intrusted with the command as well as with the administration of the 
artillery. 

The Federal infantry was armed generally with the Springfield 
muzzle-loading rifled musket, caliber 59; with here and there a regi- 
ment with breech-loaders, and more rarely one with smooth-bores. The 
Confederate infantry was armed in a heterogeneous fashion. Many of 
the men had smooth-bore muskets, caliber 69. Others had rifled mus- 
kets, caliber 54; and others still the Springfield rifled musket of the 
Federals. The latter could be loaded and fired from once to twice a 
minute. In 1863 the Prussian infantry was armed throughout with the 
breech-loading needle-gun, firing six aimed shots a minute. The rifle 
with which the U. S. infantry is armed to-day will fire thirty-three 
aimed shots a minute.- 

In the Army of Northern Virginia the brigades were formed, as a 
rule, of regiments of the same state. In the Army of the Potomac there 
were a number of brigades similarly formed, or state brigades— for in- 
stance, Phelps ', Revere 's, O'Eorke's, and Greene's New York ; Rowley's, 
Stone's, Owen's, Graham's, Tyler's, Allabach's, and Kane's Pennsyl- 
vania. But, as a rule, the brigades were formed of regiments of dif- 
ferent states. In the Army of Northern Virginia the infantry of every 

1 "Headquarters Army of the Potomac. that they are properly equipped and sup- 

"March 26, 1862. plied. They will not exercise command of 

"General Orders, No. 110. the troops of their arms unless specially 

"1. The duties of the chief of artilleiy ordered by the commanding general, but 

and [chief of] cavahry are exclusively ad- they will, when practicable, be selected to 

ministrative, and these ofBcers will be at- communicate the orders of the general to 

tached to the headquarters of the Army of their respective corps. ..." 
the Potomac. They will be required to in- - The U. S. infantry was not armed 

spect the artillery and cavalry whenever it throughout with breech-loaders until 1869. 
may be necessary, and will be responsible 



THE INFANTRY 27 

division comprised brigades of different states; in the Army of the 
Potomac there were two divisions in which the infantry was all of one 
state. These were Doubleday's and Humphreys' of Pennsylvania. 
Sykes' division, which was known as the regular division, consisted of 
two regular brigades (parts of ten regular regiments) and two bat- 
teries (one regular and one volunteer). 

The Fourth Division of the VI Corps (Burnham's) consisted of one 
brigade of five regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery.^ 
With this exception, the Federal divisions consisted on an average of 
three brigades of infantry with from two to four batteries of artillery. 
In this narrative the batteries will be designated generally by the names 
of their respective commanders at the beginning of the campaign. 

In both armies the infantry regiments were formed of ten companies 
and the cavalry regiments generally of ten or twelve companies.^ The 
average regiment of infantry numbered in the Army of the Potomac 
about 433 and in the Army of Northern Virginia about 409 officers and 
men present for duty equipped, or effectives.* The average brigade of 
infantry consisted in the Army of the Potomac of about 4.7 regiments, 
aggregating about 2000 effectives, and in the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia of about 4.5 regiments, aggregating about 1850 effectives. In the 
latter army each brigade of infantry and cavalry had its battalion of 
sharpshooters. In the Army of the Potomac there was a brigade of 
sharpshooters named after its commander "Berdan's sharpshooters"; 
a company known as the "1st Company, Massachusetts Sharpshoot- 
ers," attached to Gibbon's division; and other organizations of the 
kind. But the Federal sharpshooters were not so regularly organized 
as the Confederate. The average Federal division comprised about 
6200 and the average Confederate division about 8700 infantry. In the 
Army of the Potomac the average corps, numbering about 16,000. was 
about equivalent to two Confederate divisions. 

The reader may need to be informed or reminded of the difference in 
power between the firearms of 1861-1865 and those of the present day. 
Modern field artillery has a maximum effective range of 6000 yards; it 
will rarely seek a shorter range than 1500 yards, except in accompany- 

1 On the 3d of February. 1863, the 61 Pa. In the Confederate army A. P. Hill's 

was chosen, together with four other regi- division (f,) was known as the Light Di- 

ments, the 31 and 43 N. Y., 6 Me., .5 Wise, vision. 

and Ham's light battery, 3 N. Y., to form = A number of the Federal regiments were 

the Light Division of the "\T: Corps, organ- formed of squadrons of two companies 

ized for special service, and designed to act each, others were formed of battalions of 

in emergencies with great celerity (History four companies each. 

of Pennsylvania Volunteers, by S. P. Bates, => These and the following figures of 

11,410). After the campaign this di\dsion, strength are based upon the returns for 

greatly crippled, was broken up, and its March and April, 1863 (see Chapter X. 

regiments were distributed among other or- post, and W. B.. 40, pp. 696, 320). 
ganizations. 



28 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ing victorious infantry or pursuing a beaten enemy. In our Civil War 
the greatest effective range of field artillery was about 2500 yards, and 
this was attained only with rifled pieces. For smooth-bores the maxi- 
mum effective range was about 1500 yards, or the minimum artillery 
range of the present day. Solid shot was used from 350 yards out; 
shrapnel from 500 yards to 1000 yards out, and canister from 500 
yards in. 

Modern infantry fire is annoying at 2000 yards, effective at 1200, and 
decisive at 600. In our Civil War the fire of lines of battle usually com- 
menced at a range of about 300 yards, although skirmishers and sharp- 
shooters would not uncommonly try their skill at 500 and even 1000 
yards. 



CHAPTER III 

THE MILITAEY SITUATION 

THE Army of the Potomac was at this time substantially in the 
position it occupied before and immediately after the battle of 
Fredericksburg— on the Stafford Heights, on the left bank of the 
Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg (Map 1, sheet A). The rail- 
road to Aquia Creek Station, together with the Potomac River between 
that point and Washington, constituted its main line of communication. 
Its supplies came mainly from Washington. At Alexandria the loaded 
cars were run on floats, which carried them to Aquia Creek Station, 
where they took the tracks on which they proceeded to Falmouth. ^ The 
army communicated with Washington overland by the Telegraph Road, 
which went through Stafford Court-House, Aquia, Dumfries, Occoquan, 
and Alexandria. Its advance depots were at Falmouth, Brooke's Sta- 
tion, Stafford Court-House, Aquia Creek Station, Belle Plain, and 
Dumfries ; its headquarters were at Falmouth. 

The Army of Northern Virginia confronted the Army of the Poto- 
mac, as it did at the battle of Fredericksburg, on the heights back of 
that town. Lee's line of supply was the Richmond, Fredericksburg and 
Potomac Railroad, together with the Virginia Central Railroad. The 
latter, running almost across the theater of operations, constituted a 
sort of advanced base. Lee might retire upon it practically at any 
point, and find or procure supplies. But there were only two points on 
this base from which he could further retire and keep on a line of rail- 
road connecting him with the interior of the Confederacy. These two 
points were Hanover Junction and Gordonsville. If compelled to re- 
treat he must fall back, if possible, upon the former in order to cover 
Richmond, which the Confederate government was determined to hold 
to the last extremity. In this case the North and South Anna Rivers 
were to be used as lines of defence. Should he be severed from Rich- 
mond he would make for Gordonsville. He had advanced depots at 
Hamilton's Crossing and Guiney's Station. His headquarters were 
about three miles below Fredericksburg. 

A Confederate force under Brigadier-General W. E. Jones occupied 

^ Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, pp. 165, 179. 180. 
29 



30 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

the upper part of the Shenandoah Valley, known as the Valley District, 
with headquarters at Newmarket (Map 1, sheet B) ; and a Federal 
force imder Brigadier-General E. H. Milroy held the lower part, with 
headquarters at Winchester. Brigadier-General B. F. Kelley com- 
manded the defences of the Upper Potomac, with headquarters at Har- 
per's Ferry. He and Milroy reported to Major-General E. C. Schenck, 
commanding the Middle Department, with headquarters at Baltimore. 
West of the Shenandoah Valley, the Confederates held a section of 
country designated as the Department of Northwestern Virginia, which 
was commanded by Brigadier-General J. D. Imboden, with headquarters 
at Staunton, Va., on the Virginia Central Eailroad (Map 1, sheet B). 
Brigadier-Generals Imboden and W. E. Jones reported to Major-Gen- 
eral Samuel Jones, commanding the Trans-Alleghany Department, or 
Department of Western Virginia, with headquarters at Dublin, Va., on 
the Virginia and Tennessee Eailroad. The Federals constituted West 
Virginia a district in the Department of the Ohio, and gave the com- 
mand of this district to Brigadier-General J. D. Cox, whose headquar- 
ters were at Marietta, 0., on the Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad and the 
Ohio Eiver. 

On the 17th of March AVest Virginia was transferred from the De- 
partment of the Ohio to the Middle Department, Schenck 's; and on the 
28th this state was announced by the department commander to con- 
stitute a separate district of the department under the command of 
Brigadier-General B. S. Eoberts. The first headquarters of the new 
district were established at Clarksburg.^ 

The Federals commanded the whole line of the Potomac Eiver and 
the sea. The approaches to Hooker's army by water were guarded by 
the Potomac Flotilla, under direction of Commodore A. A. Harwood, 
commanding the Washington Navy Yard. The flotilla consisted of two 
divisions. The first division, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander 
Magaw, was stationed in the Potomac Eiver off Aquia Creek. The 
second, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander McCrea, was stationed 
at the mouth of the Eappahannock Eiver {Appendix 1). The Potomac 
is navigable to Washington ; the Eappahannock, to Fredericksburg ; the 
York, which is formed by the junction of the Pamunkey and the Matta- 
pony, is navigable to West Point, whence vessels proceed under excep- 
tional conditions up the Pamunkey to White House. The James is navi- 
gable to Eiehmond, which is connected by the James Eiver Canal with 
Buchanan, on the James Eiver, about 40 miles above Lynchburg. 

The Federals had posts at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, Suffolk, Yorktown, 
Gloucester, and Williamsburg. 

Fort Monroe was regarded as the Gibraltar of the Chesapeake, the 
key to the bay and its tributaries. 

> W. B., 40, pp. 159, 163. 



POSTS AND TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENTS 31 

Norfolk was held chiefly to keep the enemy from using it as a naval 
base. 

Suffolk was held to cover Norfolk, insure the inland communication 
to Albemarle Sound, and to keep the enemy at a distance.^ 

Yorktown gave control of the Peninsula up to that point, keeping the 
enemy at a distance from Fort Monroe, and commanded the York 
River in case it were needed for the movement of troops. 

Gloucester, though commanded by Yorktown, might in the hands of 
an enemy have proved an annoyance to that post or to vessels on the 
river. It was regarded as auxiliary to Yorktown in controlling the 
navigation of the river. 

Williamsburg was an advance post for watching movements of the 
enemy up the Peninsula. Though 13 miles from Yorktown, it was used 
as an outpost of the latter. 

Fort Monroe was connected by cable with Sewell's Point, on the 
south shore of the James River, and with Cape Charles, on the north 
shore of Chesapeake Bay. All the Federal troops in this quarter were 
under the command of Major-General John A. Dis, commanding the 
Department of Virginia, with headquarters at Fort Monroe. The adja- 
cent waters were guarded by the North Atlantic blockading squadron, 
under the command of Acting Rear- Admiral S. P. Lee, whose flag-ship 
was in Hampton Roads. 

Generals Dix, Schenck, and Hooker reported to Major-General W. H. 
Halleck, General-in-Chief, whose headquarters were at Washington. 
The relations between Hooker and Halleck grew so unpleasant that 
Hooker ceased to consult Halleck regarding plans of operation, and 
conferred on them almost exclusively with the President." The Confed- 
erates had no general-in-chief, but all the troops in Virginia and North 
Carolina were under the command of General Robert E. Lee. In both 
armies the commander-in-chief was the President. The Federal Sec- 
retary of War was E. M. Stanton ; the Confederate was J. S. Seddon. 

The plateau of the Stafford Heights is broken by numerous gullies 
in which streams, called hx the people of the country runs, make their 
way on one side toward the Potomac and on the other toward the Rap- 
pahannock. By one of these gullies the railroad from Aquia ascends to 

^ Situated at the head of the Nansemond him to have added to the embaiTassment he 

Kiver, with the railroads to Petersburg and caused Hooker from the moment he took 

Weldon, Suffolk was regarded as the key to command of the Army of the Potomac to 

all the approaches to the mouth of the the time when he surrendered it. "It was 

James River on the north of the Dismal often remarked." he said, "that it was no 

Swamp (TF. E., 26, p. 275). use for me to make a request, as that of 

^ Testifying. March 11, 1865, before the itself would be sufficient cause for General 

Committee on the Conduct of the War, Halleck to refuse it." See also Halleck to 

Hooker stated as his conviction that if the Stanton, W. R., 39, p. 156, and 40, pp. 506, 

general-in-chief had been in the rebel in- 516 : and to Dix, ih., 26, pp. 730, 731. 
terest, it would h.ave been impossible for 



32 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Falmouth, and by another a road descends from that point to the river, 
where it appears at a ford, to reappear on the opposite side leading to 
Fredericksburg. 

This place, at the head of tide- water as well as of the navigation 
of the Rappahannock, was once the shipping-point of a considerable 
coasting trade, but had been gradually reduced to comparative inac- 
tivity by railroads diverting its trade to Richmond. Its genteel colonial 
houses, with their shining white door-steps, suggested Philadelphia and 
Baltimore to persons acquainted with these cities. It had been almost 
abandoned by its population since the Federals in 1862 threatened to 
bombard it. 

The site of the city of Fredericksburg rises but slightly near the 
river, but a mile south of it there are considerable heights, forming a 
curve like the arc of a circle, with the river as a chord. The intervening 
lowland, about a mile wide and two miles long, was traversed by several 
highways, the Richmond Railroad, and three streams, of which the 
Massaponax, the farthest down the Rappahannock, was the largest. 

The Stafford Heights command the hills back of Fredericksburg as 
well as the low ground between them and the river. But here and there 
they stand so close to the river that the Federal guns on their crest 
can not be sufficiently depressed to fire into the water. 

The position of the Army of the Potomac on these heights was con- 
sidered impregnable.^ That of the Army of Northern Virginia was 
hardly inferior to it in natural and artificial strength. But Lee was 
compelled by the proximity of his powerful opponent to maintain a 
defensive line about 25 miles long and correspondingly thin. His I 
Corps (Long-street's) held a range of hills back of Fredericksburg and 
one below as far as Hamilton's Crossing, also the crossings above at 
Banks' Ford and United States Ford. His II Corps (Jackson's) occu- 
pied a position extending from Hamilton's Crossing to Port Royal. 
Above the United States Ford the crossings of the Rappahannock were 
watched by cavalry. On the day on which Hooker assumed command 
of the Army of the Potomac, orders were issued in Longstreet's corps 
for Pickett's division to take position at Salem Church, about 6 miles 
back of Fredericksburg, and intrench itself. Pickett was to form a 
position on which the troops along the river might rally in case of their 
being forced to abandon that line. A position was prepared facing 
Fredericksburg, on what was destined to be the battle-field of Salem 
Church.^ The winter, although the inhabitants called it mild, proved 
to the Southern soldiers, and even to the Northern, quite severe. Until 
the latter part of January the cold was not particularly intense, nor 

^ The topography is shown in its main features on Map 2. The position of the troops at 

this time is indicated approximately on Map 1 (sheet A). 

- W. R.. 108, pp. 673, 674. 



GENERAL SITUATION 33 

was snow or rain frequent, but at that time the snow fell often and once 
or twice to the depth of a foot. The rains became continual and heavy. 
The Confederates were generally quartered in log huts daubed with 
mud. Most of these were too close to one another and damp. As the 
spring set in they were ventilated by knocking out the daubing. The 
clothing of Lee's soldiers was insufficient in quantity and poor in qual- 
ity. Men would rub out a jacket in two or three months— a pair of 
trousers in one. Sometimes even cotton trousers were offered them in 
midwinter. Scarcely a particle of flannel was to be had. Shoes were 
scarce, blankets were curiosities and overcoats phenomena. 

In the Confederate army there was little drilling, and that was done 
carelessly. Picket duty was light. 

Amusements were rare in number and of very mild quality. The 
principal one was snow fighting between regiments and brigades.^ 

The condition of the Confederate commissariat may be judged from 
the following correspondence : 

Lee to Seddon, Secretary of War. January 26 
Sir: 

... As far as I can learn, we have now about one week's supply, four days' 
fresli beef and four days' salt meat, of the reduced ration.^ After that is ex- 
hausted, I know not whence further supplies can be drawn. The question of 
provisioning the army is becoming one of greater difficulty every day. The 
country north of us is pretty weU drained of everything the people are willing 
to part with, except some grain and hay in Loudon [County],^ nor can impress- 
ment be resorted to with advantage, inasmuch as any provisions retained for 
domestic use are concealed. A resort to impressment would, in my opinion, in 
this region, produce aggravation and suffering among the people without much 
benefit to the army. But I think if the citizens in the whole county were ap- 
pealed to, they would be willing to restrict themselves and furnish what they 
have to the army. 

I am more than usually anxious about the supplies of the army, as it will be 
impossible to keep it together without food. 

Indorsement on Lee to Seddon, January 26 

Subsistence Department, January 28. 1863. 
Fifteen months ago this Bureau foresaw that the supply of cattle in Virginia 
would be exhausted. . . . The meat has held out longer than was expected. . . . 
Last winter the Commissary-General of Subsistence urged that the necks and 
shanks of beeves, usually excluded by regulations, should be used so as to make 
the most of what was obtained. . . . The order of the War Department, dated 
April 28, reducing the rations [sic] of meat and increasing that of flour, as above 
referred to, has not been observed in the Army of [Northern] Virginia for a 

^ History of MeGowan's Brigade, by J. F. J. Caldwell, p. 71. 

- 1/4 pound. Lee to Seddon, April 17, 1863. 

^ Between Lee's position and the Shenandoah Valley. 



34 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

period of between three and four months, by order of General Lee, and the use 
of the whole beef (necks and shanks included), which was attempted to be insti- 
tuted by the Commissary-General of Subsistence, has not been observed in that 
army, the discontent and other obstacles being urged as insurmountable in the 
field. . . . Supplies can not be gathered in the country southwest of General 
Lee's army. It has been or is being drained already. Nor can they be had on 
the south side of James River. That country is held tributary in commissary 
supplies to Petersburg [Map 1, sheet A] and the south (except in hogs), and 
even if they were there (as they are not) in quantity to feed General Lee's army 
they could not be had; neither time nor transportation will allow it. All the 
transportation that can be begged will be needed to get wheat to be converted 
into flour for the same army that now wants meat. General Lee's suggestion that 
an appeal be made to the citizens to forward supplies is noted by this Bureau, 
and is not approved. . . . 

Respectfully, 

L. B. NOETHROP, 
Commissary-General of Subsistence, i 

The Federals, while in many respects better off than the Confeder- 
ates, had also to endure discomforts and privation. Uncertainty as 
to how long the army would remain inactive prevented the troops from 
being properly protected from the inclemencies of the weather. The 
army was considered as in the field, and not as in winter quarters. 
The only shelter provided by the government was the shelter tent.* The 
men were left to burrow and shelter themselves as well as they were 
able. In some cases they occupied the log huts constructed by the 
enemy when he held and occupied the site of the camp ; in others they 
excavated the earth from six to eighteen inches, built a pen of logs two 
or three feet high, and on this inclosure as the walls, set up their 
shelter tents as roofs, or built roofs of brush and dirt. Many regi- 
mental commanders took little interest in the welfare of their men. 

As the weather in the latter part of the winter turned cold, the timber, 
which had been abundant, became scarce and difficult to obtain by rea- 
son of the sea of mud and mire with which the camp was surrounded. 
On the 22d of February Major James F. Kusling, Assistant Quarter- 
master, of the Second Division of Sickles' (III) corps, wrote home 
from Falmouth : 

This morning there was a foot of snow everywhere. It has snowed ever since ; 
and as I write, 2 p.m., the storm still continues. Woke up this morning with my 
blanket covered with snow that had drifted in under my tent, and altogether felt 
rather blue. . . . 

It is a gay ""Wa.shington's birthday" here. We would have had a great time 

' TF. R.. 108, pp. 674, 675. 

= In general form the same as is used in the army to-day. Each man carries a half of 
one in his kit. Two men combine to make and occupy a tent. 



QUARTERS AND SUPPLIES 35 

had it not snowed so savagely. His "Farewell Address" was to have been read 
at tlie heads of the regiments, and salutes fired at noon. The salutes were duly 
fired, the hoarse voice of the cannon roaring in all directions. But the reading 
of the "Address" will have to be postponed until another year. 

Washington's birthday was celebrated also in the Army of Northern 
Virginia. General Lee wrote to his wife : 

[The snow] was nearly up to my knees as I stepped out this morning [22d] , 
and our poor horses were enveloped. We have dug them oiit, and opened our 
avenues a little, but it will be terrible, and the roads impassable. No cars from 
Richmond yesterday. I fear our short rations for man and horse will have to be 
curtailed. 

The subsistence of the Army of the Potomac was not deficient in 
quantity, but it was ia quality. The soldier regularly received a full 
field ration, which was more than he could eat. The portion not con- 
sumed was wasted or went to form a regimental fund.^ But there was 
suffering among the oflScers as well as among the men for lack of fresh 
food and sufficient variety. The law provided for variety as well as 
quantity, but it was not carried out.^ 

Supplies that belonged to the regiments were disposed of to cash 
customers and itinerant purchasers, and the money thus obtained was 
appropriated by the commissaries. The system enriched many a "cap- 
tain and assistant commissary" for the rest of his life.^ 

During the latter part of January diarrhoea and a fever of a typhoid 
tj^e prevailed to a greater extent than was warranted by the situation 
of the army. Symptoms of scurvy also began to appear. The patients, 
moreover, did not recover as rapidly as the medical director of the 
army thought that they should. The low vitality of the army was 
caused, in his opinion, by the want of fresh vegetables. Large quanti- 
ties of potatoes issued at the principal depot of commissary supplies 
for the army were not drawn by the corps commissaries. 

In both armies there was a dearth of forage, due mainly to bad roads 
and broken-dovm or inefficient transportation, and, as a result, the 
horses and mules were generally poor.'* 

A considerable portion of the Federal army was dissatisfied with 
President Lincoln's proclamation emancipating the slaves in Southern 

1 About a year later the ration was re- * "The roads are in so bad a condition 
duced on the ground that it was greater that hay can not be procured. The mules 
than was necessary. are suffering badly. They will eat the hair 

2 Section 13 of "An act for the better off each other, and devour paper and rags" 
organization of the miUtary establishment," (Letter of Nathan Haywood, M.D., Sur- 
approved August 3, 1861. geon 20 Mass. Volunteers, manuscript, Mil. 

^History of the 9 Mass. Vol. Inf., by Hist. Soc. of Mass.). 
D. G. Macnamara, p. 276. 



36 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE 

territory, issued January 1, 1863. The Army of the Potomac had not 
been paid for six months. Men who had enUsted under the conviction 
that their pay would enable them to support their families were daily 
receiving letters from the latter representing their destitution and dis- 
tress. Friends and relatives of these men sent them packages of civilian 
clothing and did everything else that they could to assist them in escap- 
ing from the service and returning to their homes. The troops were 
deserting at an alarming rate. 

On the 15th of February Hooker wrote to Army Headquarters, 
Washington, inclosing a statement of the absentees based upon the re- 
turns rendered him under his general order No. 3, copies of which he 
inclosed : 

I would respectfully request that these returns may be placed in the hands of 
some bureau at Washington, with a view of informing the provost-marshals of 
the different states, or the proper authorities, of the names of all parties absent, 
and where they are likely to be found, in order that they may be returned to duty. 

This return shows a total of 85,123 officers and men absent from this conunand 
when first placed in my charge. 

The inclosure has never been published, but is on file in the War 
Depa- i:ment. The totals show that about one man in every ten on the 
rolls was in desertion or absent without leave.^ The several corps, ar- 
ranged inversely to their ratios of desertion, made the following show- 
ing. The commanders are those of January 31. 

CORPS DESERTERS PER 1000 

1. XI Corps (Stahel) 43 

2. II " (Howard) 90 

3. V " (Sykes) 91 

4. I " (Reynolds) 108 

5. HI " (Sickles) 119 

6. VI '• (Newton) 122 

7. XII " (Slocum) 136 

Unauthorized intercourse between the pickets of the opposing armies 
had grown into a "custom of the service." Soldiers would cross the 
river to visit one another and trade, the usual exchange being Federal 
coffee for Confederate tobacco, or Northern for Southern newspapers. 
Such transactions were carried on, too, without crossing in person. 
The men would keep boats that they had fitted with square-rigged 
sails, and having loaded them, would head them for the opposite shore, 
and let them make their voyages alone. 

' Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War : "At the time the 

army was turned over to me desertions were at the rate of about 200 a day" 

(Bep. o/(7om,, IV, 112). 



DESERTION. INTERCOURSE WITH THE ENEMY 37 

On the 20th of January the Eichmond Enquirer published the follow- 
ing epistle as received by a Confederate picket : 

Jcanuary 17, 1863. 
Gents on Confederate States duty: 

We had the pleasure to receive your letter, and were very glad to find you in 
good spirits. We are sorry not to have any newspapers on hand, but will get 
some as soon as possible. We send you coffee whenever the wind permits us to 
do so. Can 't one of you come over this evening in that little boat you have there ? 
—we will not keep you. In the hope that Jeff Davis and Abe Lincoln will soon 
give us peace, we send best respects. 

Co. A, 46th Reg't, N. Y. S. V. 

It may be that between armies as between nations trade is productive 
of mutual good will, and that messages more or less friendly passed 
between the opposing pickets, but the gemiineness of this one is open 
to doubt for the reason that there was no such regiment in the Army of 
the Potomac as the 46th New York Volunteers. 

A typical instance of how the racial kinship of the armies responded 
to touches of nature is here presented in the poetic form in which it has 
been happily commemorated: 

MUSIC IN CAMP (DECEMBER 15-31, 1862) 



A Federal band, which eve and morn 
Played measures brave and nimble, 

Had just struck up with flute and horn 
And lively clash of cymbal. 

Down flocked the soldiers to the bank, 

TiU margined by its pebbles 
One wooded shore was blue with ' ' Yanks, ' ' 

And one was gray with "Rebels." 

Then all was still ; and then the band. 
With movements light and tricksy. 

Made stream and forest, hill and strand, 
Reverberate with ' ' Dixie. ' ' 

The conscious stream, with burnished glow, 
Went proudly o'er its pebbles. 

But thrilled throughout its deepest flow 
With yelling of the Rebels. 

Again a pause, and then again 

The trumpet pealed sonorous. 
And ' ' Yankee Doodle ' ' was the strain 

To which the shore gave chorus. 



38 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The laughing ripple shoreward flew 

To kiss the shining pebbles — 
Loud shrieked the crowding Boj-s in Blue 

Defiance to the Rebels. 

And yet once more the bugle sang 

Above the stormy riot; 
No shout upon the evening rang, 

There reigned a holy quiet. 

The sad, lone stream its noiseless tread 

Spread o'er the glistening pebbles; 
All silent now the Yankees stood ; 

All silent stood the Rebels : 

For each responsive soul had heard 

That plaintive note's appealing, 
So deeply "Home, Sweet Home" had stirred 

The hidden founts of feeling.^ 

^ Poems of American Patriotism, chosen by J. Brander Matthews, p. 211. 



CHAPTER IV 

CHANGES IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. THE ABOLITION OF GRAND DIVI- 
SIONS. THE INTRODXTCTION OF PACK-TRAINS. THE FORMATION OF ARTIL- 
LERY BATTALIONS IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. DISCIPLINE IN 
BOTH ARMIES. ADOPTION OF CORPS BADGES. SIGEL RELIEVED 

HOOKER and his chief of staff applied themselves energetically to 
the improvement of the army in organization, equipment, and 
morale; they commenced by altering its organization as indicated in the 
following order issued February 5 : 

I. The division of the army into grand divisions, impeding rather than facili- 
tating the dispatch of its current business ; and the character of the service it is 
liable to be called upon to perfoiTa being adverse to the movement and operations 
of heavy columns, it is discontinued, and the corps organization is adopted in its 
stead. They will be commanded as follows : ^ 

First Corps, Major-General John F. Reynolds. 

Second Corps, Major-General D. N. Couch. 

Third Corps, Brigadier-General D. E. Sickles (temporarily). 

Fifth Corps, Major-General George G. Meade. 

Sixth Corps, Major-General -John Sedgwick. 

Eleventh Corps, Major-General Franz Sigel. 

Twelfth Corps, Major-General H. W. Slocum. 

II. Hereafter the corps will be considered as a unit for the organization of the 
artillery, and no transfers of batteries will be made from one corps or division to 
others except for purposes of equalization, and then only under the authority of 
the chief of artillery. 

III. The cavalry of the army will be consolidated into one corps, under the 
command of Brigadier-General Stoneman, who will make the necessary assign- 
ments for detached duty. 

The most noteworthy of these changes was the multiplication of the 
strategic or grand tactical units, the substitution of seven corps (eight, 
including the cavalry corps) for four grand divisions. If rightly viewed 
and interpreted, it augured ill for Hooker's generalship. The two rea- 
sons which he assigns for the change may be distinguished as adminis- 

1 These assignments to the command of the several corps were, by law, subject to approval 
by the President, and had yet to receive such approval. 



40 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

trative and tactical. The administrative reason would have been a 
good one if administration were alone to be considered in the organiza- 
tion of an army, which it never is. Administration should not be per- 
mitted seriously to interfere with tactics. When administrative 
convenience and tactical efficiency conflict, administrative convenience 
should give way. Hooker's tactical reason for the change was an ex- 
cellent one for not making it. The smaller the columns, the larger must 
be their number, and the greater the need of grouping them and having 
them directed by the group commanders rather than directly by the 
army commander. While Hooker's army was to be resolved into 
seven corps, Lee's comprised but two. It was but half as numerous 
as Hooker's, yet one of its corps was about twice as numerous as 
one of Hooker's.' One of the first principles of strategy and tactics 
as well as of drawing, painting, sculpture, etc., of the military art as 
well as of the fine arts, is to secure the effect of masses. This simple, 
fundamental truth is easy to grasp, but hard to apply. With great 
soldiers, and perhaps with great men generally, it is an instinct, or 
second nature. Grant and Lee and Jackson showed that they possessed 
it in a high degree. When Grant in the spring of 1864 joined the Army 
of the Potomac as Commander of all the armies of the United States, 
one of his first official acts was to reduce the number of his army corps 
by consolidating the five corps of the Army of the Potomac into three, 
which increased their average strength from 15,646 to 26,077 officers 
and men present for duty equipped, or "available for the line of bat- 
tle." The average grand division numbered about 35,000 men, or, de- 
ducting cavalry, about 31,800 men present for duty equipped. Grant's 
annihilation of two historic organizations, with all their prestige and 
esprit de corps, would have been unnecessary had the grand divisions 
been preserved. It may be doubted whether the reason given in 
Hooker's order was the real, or the whole reason, for his abolition of 
them. He probably distrusted the ability of their commanders, and 
was unable to replace them by better ones or indisposed to offend them 
by so doing. 

Major-General Franz Sigel, who had commanded the Grand Reserve 
Division, and on its abolition was given the command of the XI Corps, 
lately a part of that grand division, was not satisfied with the size of 
his command. He tried to have the XI Corps made larger, and not suc- 
ceeding, asked on the 12th of February to be relieved from the com- 
mand of it, expressing, however, a desire to remain in the service of the 
United States. He fought in the German revolution in 1848 and 1849, 
commanding bodies of volunteers varying in numbers from 4000 to 

' Further particulars as to the strength and composition of the opposing armies 
will be found in Chapter X. 



ABOLITION OF GRAND DIVISIONS. SIGEL 41 

15,000. In 1852 he came to the United States, and became a teacher and 
the editor of a military magazine, first in New York and then in St. 
Louis. 

At the outbreak of the war he was the rallying-point of the Germans 
of Missouri and the Northwest, raising the first German regiment. He 
was commissioned a brigadier-general in 1861, and major-general in 
1862 ; participated in the fighting for the possession and control of Mis- 
souri, and commanded a corps under Pope in the second Bull Run 
campaign.^ 

General Sigel was popular, not only in the large German element of 
the XI Corps and of the Army of the Potomac, bvit among Germans in all 
the armies and throughout the country. "I fights mit Sigel" was a 
shibboleth of German-Americans. 

Hooker indorsed Sigel 's request with the remarks: 

Respectfully forwarded and reluctantly approved, as Major-General Sigel 
requests it. This officer is my senior, and feels that he should have the largest 
corps to command. In breaking up the grand divisions, I preserved the corps 
organizations, for in that seemed to be strength. The officers knew the men, and 
the men their officers. 

The Jlajor-General commanding the Eleventh Corps desires that the action of 
the proper authorities may be telegraphed as soon as made. 

On the 19th this paper was referred by Halleck to the Secretary of 
War, and submitted by him to the President. His action thereon was 
telegraphed to Hooker in the form of the statement: "He has given 
General Sigel as good a command as he can, and desires him to do the 
best he can with it."^ Sigel was not satisfied. He left the army on 
leave, and the command of his corps devolved temporarily upon Briga- 
dier-General Julius Stahel, who had held it under him in the grand 
division. 

The assignment of Brigadier-General Sickles, though ' ' temporarily, ' ' 
to the command of the III Corps, gave offence to Major-General How- 
ard, who commanded the Second Division of the II Corps. He wrote to 
Hooker requesting that he be assigned to command according to his 
rank. Sickles and Howard were both commissioned as major-generals 
on the 29th of November, 1862. Howard accepted his commission, thus 
becoming a major-general on that date; Sickles did not accept his, and 
so did not become a major-general until March 29, 1863. Not wishing 
to relieve Sickles, Hooker telegraphed on the 20th to the Secretary of 
War: 

Has the resignation of Major-General Sigel been accepted, or is that officer to 
he removed from command of the XI Corps? I desire to ascertain in order that. 

^ Appletons' Cyclopadia of American Biography. 
~ W. R., 40. pp. 70. 71. 



42 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

if so, Major-General Howard, the liighest in rank in this army for advancement 
to corps commander, may be assigned to it. 

General Howard is an oiiBcer of uncommon merit, is favorably known to this 
army, and is fully identified with its history. It is highly important that the 
commander of the XI Corps should be named and that he should be on duty 
with it. 

This inquiry had not been answered when, on the 31st of March, 
Hooker issued the following order: 

II. Maj. Gen. 0. 0. Howard, U. S. Volunteers, being the senior major-general 
not in command of a corps, is temporarily assigned to the command of the 
Eleventh Corps, and will assume the duties pertaining to it without delay. 

Oliver Otis Howard was born in Leeds, Me., on the 8th of November, 
1830, and graduated from West Point in 1854. He commanded a 
brigade at the first battle of Bull Run, and for gallantry in that engage- 
ment was made brigadier-general of volunteers ; he was twice wounded 
at Fair Oaks, where he lost an arm; he participated in the battle of 
Antietam; and as brigadier-general, commanded the Second Division 
of the II Corps at the battle of Fredericksburg. * Though his military 
record was better than Sigel's, he was to the XI Corps persona non 
grata, principally because he was thought to have displaced their coun- 
tryman and favorite. The Germans regarded Howard's appointment 
as a blow at their nationality, a reflection on German generalship. They 
"knew little and cared less about Howard's reputation as a great 
Biblical soldier, the Havelock of the army, as he was called, owing to 
his having studied for the ministry in the Presbyterian Church. "- 

Having learned that the recommendations of the corps commanders 
for appointments on their respective staffs, authorized by law, could 
not be favorably considered by the President until the corps com- 
manders themselves had been designated by the President, Hooker 
wrote on the 10th of April to the Adjutant-General of the Army, re- 
questing that his selections of corps commanders be confirmed with as 
little delay as practicable. These, including Howard, were accordingly 
published from the War Department on the 15th of April, as assign- 
ments made by the President.^ 

Couch, Sickles, Slocum, and Stoneman were born in the state of New 
York; Sedgwick in Connecticut; Reynolds in Pennsylvania, where he 
was to die on the field of Gettysburg ; Meade, who was to command the 
Army of the Potomac on that field and to the end of the war, was born 
at Cadiz, Spain. The oldest corps commander was Sedgwick, number- 

^Appletons' Cyclopedia of American Biography. 

^ Chaneellorsville and Gettysburg , by Abner Doubleday, p. 3. 

=! W. R., 40, pp. 195, 211. 212. 



CORPS COMMANDERS 43 

ing fifty years, one yeai* more than Hooker ; the youngest was Howard, 
numbering but thirty-three. All were graduates of West Point, except 
Sickles, who was a well-known Democratic politician and member of 
Congress from New York. No two of these West Pointers were class- 
mates, but Sedgwick was a classmate of Hooker's. Reynolds, Couch, 
Meade, and Sedgwick had served in the war with Mexico, and fought 
Indians either in Florida or on the Plains. Sickles, Howard, and 
Slocum had not the advantage of such experience. Stoneman was not 
in the Mexican War, but had served in the field against Indians. As 
commanding officer of Fort Brown, on the Lower Rio Grande, he re- 
fused to obey the order of his department commander, General Twiggs, 
to surrender the government property to the secessionists. He evacu- 
ated the fort, and went to New York by steamer. Meade, Couch, and 
Slocum had resigned from the army. Meade returned to it, however, 
in 1842. At the outbreak of the war Couch had been in civil life six 
years, and Slocum five. All were in the military service of the United 
States or came into it in 1861, and had participated in various cam- 
paigns of the Civil War.^ 

Lee's two corps commanders, Jackson and Longstreet, were both 
graduates of West Point, and both served with distinction in the 
Mexican War. Longstreet served on the Plains before and after the 
Mexican War. Jackson had no such experience. In 1851, after a few 
years of garrison duty in the East, Jackson resigned from the army to 
accept a professorship of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, or 
Physics, at the Virginia Military Institute. He filled this position until 
1861, when he exchanged it for a colonelcy in the Virginia State Line. 
The same year he was appointed a brigadier-general in the Provisional 
Army of the Confederacy. For distinguished service at the first Bull 
Run, where he won the name of Stonewall, he was promoted to major- 
general and given the independent command of the Valley District, 
comprising the Shenandoah Valley. His brilliant operations in this 
region, his masterly march from the Valley to the railroad north of 
Richmond and from the Rappahannock to the rear of Pope's army, and 
his able handling of a wing of Lee's army in the campaign of Antietam, 
brought him in October, 1862, promotion to lieutenant-general and 
appointment to the command of the II Army Corps. With this com- 
mand he held the right of Lee's line at Fredericksburg. At the begin- 
ning of the Civil War he had less military experience than most, if not 
all, of the commanders on either side who had served in the ' ' old army. ' ' 
But there were few, if any, who had mastered so much of the theory of 
war, and so perfectly disciplined their minds by the study of military 
and mathematical problems. By 1863 he had gained more war ex- 

^Appletons' Cyclopedia of American Biography. 



44 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

perieuce than any of them, with the single exception of R. E. Lee, and 
was second only to the latter in the hearts of the people and the soldiers 
of the South. 

Longstreet, on resigning from the army in 1861, was appointed a 
brigadier-general in the Provisional Army of the Confederacy. He 
commanded a brigade at the first Bull Run. In 1862 he was made major- 
general. He commanded a division in the Peninsula campaign, a wing 
of Lee's army— Jackson commanding the other— in the second Bull Run 
campaign, and in the Antietam campaign. He was promoted to lieu- 
tenant-general and given command of a corps at the same time as 
Jackson, and with his corps held the left of Lee's line at Fredericksburg. 
In 1863 Longstreet was forty-two and Jackson thirty-nine years of age. 

J. E. B. Stuart, Lee's chief of cavalry, was at this time but thirty 
years of age. Graduating from West Point six years after the Mexican 
War, he had no experience in regular warfare, but had served on the 
Plains and been wounded in an encounter with Indians. Resigning 
when his native state, Virginia, passed its ordinance of secession, he 
was appointed a lieutenant-colonel of infantry in the Virginia State 
Line. In July, 1861, he was appointed a colonel of cavalry in the Pro- 
visional Army of the Confederacy, and in September of the same year, 
a brigadier-general of cavalry. In July, 1862, he was promoted to 
major-general of cavalry. He had proved himself a master of the art 
of screening and reconnoitering, and had distinguished himself espe- 
cially in two raids, one on the Peninsula, the Chickahominy raid, and 
one in Pennsylvania, the Chambersburg raid, in each of which he 
marched completely around McClellan's army. 

General Hooker was the first commander of the Army of the Potomac, 
and the last one, to substitute pack-mules for army wagons extensively 
in that army. The coming of the pack-mule was announced by a special 
order, March 19, providing for the distribution of 2000 pack-saddles 
{Appendix 2). It made no mention of the cavalry corps or the artillery 
reserve, from which it was inferred that these commands were not to 
march with the army. 

As compared with wagons, pack-mules require more men, and more 
animals to a given freight, take up more room on a road (if kept on it), 
and by leakage and drainage waste more of the freight. At every halt, 
wagon-mules can rest without being unharnessed or even unhitched— 
not perfectly, but far better than pack-mules can without being un- 
packed. To unpack a train of mules and afterward repack them, con- 
simaes so much time that it does not pay in halts of less than an hour's 
duration. It is harder on pack-mules to make the ordinary halts of five 
or ten minutes per hour than to keep going. Pack-trains are capable 
of traveling faster than wagon-trains, but to do this for any length of 
time without hardship they must be allowed to travel their own gait ; 



PACK-MULES. ARTILLERY BATTALIONS 45 

the troops must conform to the movements of the train or allow the 
train to travel independently, which in active campaigning is often in- 
convenient or unsafe. In a country covered with woods and under- 
brush, pack-mules straying off the roads will rub their loads loose and 
the packers exhaust themselves running after them. To obviate this, 
the mules in this campaign were tied together in strings of two or three, 
and led. Thus secured, they did not stray away, but instead of rubbing 
against trees, they rubbed against each other, with about the same effect 
upon the loads, and a worse effect upon their poor bodies. This ar- 
rangement must have been a cause of many of the sore backs engen- 
dered during the campaign.^ The abolition of the grand divisions was 
unfortunate, but perhaps necessary. The introduction of the pack- 
trains was unfortunate and unnecessary, or ill advised. Another 
change made by Hooker to the detriment of the efficiency of his army 
was to strip his chief of artillery of all executive functions and so re- 
duce him to his original purely administrative usefulness. He was not 
to take command of the troops, or to give any orders to the artillery, 
unless specially authorized to do so, and all such authority would "ex- 
pire with the occasion. "- 

In the Army of Northern Virginia the only material change of organ- 
ization took place in the artillery. The batteries were grouped into 
battalions generally of four batteries each, and these battalions assigned 
to corps. It was provided that all the artillery in both corps should "be 
superintended by, and report to, the general chief of artillery."* 

There was no express provision for a general reserve of artillery, 
but one was formed of the batteries not assigned to an army corps or 
to the cavalry division. 

The chiefs of artillery of the several corps assigned battalions to the 
divisions and to the reserves of the corps ; that is, they determined the 
composition of the divisional artillery and corps artillery, and could 
change it by the transfer of battalions at their discretion. They had 
tactical as well as administrative control of the artillery ; in the absence 
of specific instructions from the army commander, or their corps com- 
manders, they were in action to direct the posting and firing of their 
batteries or battalions, as well as at all times to keep them properly 
sujjplied and instructed, and generally serviceable and efficient. 

The Federals had no unit corresponding exactly to the artillery bat- 
talion of the Confederates, but the groups of batteries attached to the 
Federal corps and divisions served the purpose of battalions. They 
were, however, considerably weaker than the latter. The corps and 
divisional groups (including the single divisional batteries) of the Army 

1 For a full discussion of the transporta- - Hunt's testimony, Rep. of Com., IV, 

tion of the Army of the Potomac, the reader 01-93. 
is referred to W. R., 40, pp. 544-563. " TT. R., 40. p. 625. 



46 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

of the Potomac numbered, on an average, but two batteries, or twelve 
pieces. 

In the Army of Northern Virginia each corps had its reserve, or 
corps artillery; in the Army of the Potomac, corps artillery existed 
only in the 11 and XI Corps. The Federal drill regulations for artillery 
issued March 1, 1863, contained the following statement: "The artillery 
reserve is commanded by a superior officer of artillery, and constitutes 
a distinct arm of battle under the immediate orders of the general com- 
manding." This artillery was to be kept in rear of the infantry until 
the enemy's force had been fully developed, then to be brought up and 
its fire concentrated upon the point selected for the decisive attack. 

In the cavalry the Smith's carbines were condemned at this time, and 
replaced by the Sharp's. The latter had not the range and penetration 
of the infantry rifle^ nor the rapidity of fire of the Spencer repeating 
carbine, which was later to take its place, but its fire was so much more 
rapid than that of the infantry rifle that the Federal cavalry dismounted 
would confidently withstand the attacks of much more numerous forces 
of infantry. 

Under Hooker the inspector-general's department was not so much 
reorganized as created.' Vacancies were filled by competent officers, 
and the corps increased so as liberally to provide inspectors for all 
arms. Colonel E. Schriner was announced as inspector-general and 
Lieutenant-Colonel N. H. Davis as assistant inspector-general. There 
were inspectors of infantry, inspectors of cavalry, and inspectors of ar- 
tillery. Each brigade had an inspector, and the inspectors themselves 
were organized thoroughly under the head of the inspector-general of 
the Army of the Potomac. There were frequent formal inspections of 
the regiments, and these inspections were extended to the outposts and 
pickets, which up to this time had been under the supervision simply of 
the officers commanding the troops {Appendix 3). 

A proclamation of President Lincoln issued on the 10th of March held 
out a promise of complete amnesty to all absentees who should rejoin 
their regiments before the 1st of April. The President had relinquished 
his right to review the sentences of courts-martial. It was with his 
approval that Hooker, on the 14th of March, issued the following order : 

III. Officers reviewing the proceedings of court-martial will hereafter withhold 
their approval from sentences which cannot be carried into effect within the 
limits of this army. When such [sentences] are awarded the court will be di- 
rected to reconsider its action." 

There were no more delays in the execution of military law, no more 
appeals to Washington, which Lincoln's humanity always terminated 

' History of the II Army Corps, by F. A. Walker, pp. 202, 203. 
- W. R., 40, p. 137. 



DISCIPLINE. INFORMATION 47 

by a commutation of penalty. Deserters were arrested, and promptly 
tried, sentenced, and punished accordingly. The spectacle of a few of 
them shot to death in the presence of the troops produced a most salu- 
tary effect.' 

Capital punishment was at this time familiar also to the Army of 
Northern Virginia. General Paxton, commanding the "Stonewall" 
brigade, wrote home on the 15th : 

To-day I had a visit from the father and mother of a poor fellow who has 
been tried by a court-martial for cowardice. She was in great distress and said 
it would be bad enough to have her boy shot by the enemy, but she did not think 
she could survive his being shot by our own men. ... I have about twenty of 
my men in close confinement, whose sentences have not been published, many 
of whom are condemned to death. It is for General Lee to determine what shall 
be done with them.- 

A creation of Hooker's hardly less important than the inspector- 
general's department was his service of information. 

When General Hooker assumed command of the army there was not a record 
or document of any kind at headquarters of the army that gave any information 
at all in regard to the enemy. There was no means, no organization, and no 
apparent effort, to obtain sucli information. Aaid we were almost as ignorant of 
the enemy in our immediate front as if they had been in China. An efficient 
organization for that purpose was established, by which we were soon enabled 
to get correct and proper information of the enemy, their strength, and their 
movements. ... I called Colonel [G. H.] Sharpe, commanding a regiment of 
New York troops [120th], to headquarters, and put him in charge of that bureau 
[Military Information] as a separate and special bureau." 

Colonel Sharpe was appointed deputy provost-marshal-general. This 
appointment, together with a number of others, was published to the 
army in a general order on the 30th of March. 

Flags were prescribed for the designation of army-corps headquar- 
ters, and badges to be worn on the caps of officers and soldiers to indi- 
cate the corps and division to which they belonged {Appendix 4). 

The provision regarding flags to designate corps headquarters was 
not generally carried out, but the badges became popular among both 
officers and men. They may be said to have originated with General 
Kearney on the Peninsula in 1862. That officer, experiencing the disad- 
vantage of not being able readily to recognize the men and officers of his 
corps, required them to wear for their identification a patch of red cloth 

' History of the Civil War in America, General E. F. Paxton. by his son J. G. 

bv Comte de Paris, III. 3, 4; Mag. of Am. Paxton, pp. 92, 93. 

liist., XV, 193. " Bep. of Com., IV, 74. 

2 Memoir and Memorials of Brigadier- 



48 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

on their caps, which came to be known as ' ' Kearney 's patch. ' ' The idea 
of corps badges to be worn throughout the army was suggested to 
Hooker by Butterfield, who devised the badges in detail. 

How the vitally important problem of supplying ammunition was to 
be solved was prescribed in an order issued on the 25th of March. ^ We 
shall see that it did not prove an effective solution. 

The evils of discomfort and disease among the men, due largely to 
neglect and ignorance on the part of their regimental officers, were 
remedied pursuant to recommendations made by the medical director.* 

On the 7th of February the following order was issued at the request 
of the chief commissary : 

Flour or soft bread will be issued at the depots to commissaries for at least 
four issues per week to the troops. Fresh potatoes or onions, if practicable, for 
two issues per week. Desiccated mixed vegetables or potatoes for one issue per 
week. 

Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and separate commands will 
require any commissary under their orders who fails to issue the above-named 
stores to the command to which he is attached, and as often as stated, to produce 
written statement of his supplies to the effect that they were not on hand at the 
depot for issue to him, or otherwise to satisfactorily account for his failure. 

The soldiers' fare was further improved by an act of Congress pro- 
viding for the supervision of the cooking by both medical and line 
officers; for the detailing of privates as cooks, and the enlistment, in 
each company, of "two under-cooks of African descent," who should 
receive for their compensation ten dollars per month and one ration per 
day. The same act provided for the issue of pepper in the proportion 
of four ounces to every hundred rations.* 

By these measures and others the health of the army was improved 
(Appendix 5). 

^ W. B., 40, pp. 156 et seq. Extracts not compelled to report sick. I strongly 

from this order will be found in foot-note, recommend that all troops that are using 

pp. 375, 376, post. such huts be directed at once to discontinue 

their use, and that they be moved to new 

= Letterman to Hooker, March 9 ground, and either build new huts or Uve 

"I have the honor to invite the attention in tents. I also recomiuend that, in huts 

of the Commanding General to a practice covered by canvas, the covering be removed 

quite prevalent in this army: that of exca- at least twice a week, if the weather will 

rating the earth, building a hut over the hole, permit, and that the men throughout the 

and covering it over with brush and dirt or Army be compelled to hang their bedding 

canvas. This system is exceedingly perni- in the open air every clear day" (Medical 

cious and must have a deleterious effect Recollections of the Army of the Potomac, 

upon the health of the troops occupying pp. 103, 104). 

these abominable habitations. They are ^ "An act to improve the efficiency of the 

hotbeds for low forms of fever, and when corps of engineers and of the ordnance de- 

not productive of such diseases, the health partment, and for other purposes, ap- 

of the men is undermined, even if they are proved March 3, 1863," Sections 8-11. 



REFORMATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 



49 



Tobacco, the soldier's solace, was regularly issued, and an occasional 
issue of whisky was made upon return from severe exposure on picket 
or fatigue duty. The clothing, often before of shoddy material, was 
carefully inspected and furnished of better quality.* 

The general state of the opposing armies as to numbers and efficiency 
at the end of the first month of spring is shown in the following table : - 



State of the Army of the Potomac and of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
Officers and Men, March 31, 1863 





PRESENT 










FOR DUTY 


SPECIAL 

EXTRA OR 

DAILY DUTY 


SICK 


IN ARREST 

OR 

CONFINEMENT 


AGGRE- 
GATE 


Army of the Potomac . . 
Army of Northern Virginia 


. 136,724 
. 64.799 


13,000 

5,050 


11,936 
6,308 


1,345 

1,222 


163,005 

77,379 




ABSENT 










DETACHED 
SERVICE 


WITH 
LEAVE 


SICK 


WITHOUT 
LEAVE 


AGGRE- 
GATE 


Army of the Potomac . . 
Army of Northern Virginia 


. 20,188 

. 6,251 


3,058 
4,140 


26,575 
16,136 


1,941 
5,953 


51,762 

32,480 



PRESENT AND ABSENT 

Army of the Potomac 214,767 

Army of Northern Virginia 109,859 

The figures for the Army of Northern Virginia include Hampton's 
brigade, which was absent recruiting and remounting, and Jones' troops 
in the Valley District. They do not include the artillery of Jackson's 
corps,* but on the whole they are somewhat larger than they should be 
for the army confronting Hooker. They show, however, that the ratio of 
sickness, the ratio of absence (with and without leave), and the ratio of 
punishment were smaller in the Federal army than in the Confederate. 

One of the most potent causes of desertion in the Army of the Poto- 
mac was the scarcity of furloughs and leaves of absence. Hooker, 
under some difficulties, did much to satisfy the natural desire of officers 
and men for such privileges {Appendix 6)^ 

One of his chief measures for reforming the Army of the 
Potomac was the institution of regular theoretical and practical in- 
struction. Both seem, however, to have been conducted on narrow 
lines, the theoretical instruction being limited to recitations on the drill 
regulations, or tactics, as they were then called; and the practical in- 
struction, to drills in the school of the company, battalion, regiment, and 
brigade.* Field exercises, it seems, were few and' far between, and on 



1 Mag. of Am. Hist., XV. 190. 
- Unpublished record of the War De- 
partment. 



' W. B., 39, p. 695. 

* Reminiscences of Service in the 1 B. I. 
Cavalrii. by G. N. Bliss, p. 14. 



50 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

a small scale. There was practically nothing done for the training of 
corps and division commanders and their staffs under conditions of 
battle; no manceuvering of large imits in the presence of a marked or 
represented enemy. The author can find nothing corroborative of 
Hooker's testimony on this point before the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War : 

Believing idleness to be the great evil of all armies, every effort was made to 
keep the troops employed ; and whenever the weather would permit it, they were 
engaged in field exercises, and whenever the state of the roads and the river 
would admit of a movement, expeditions were fitted out to attack the enemy's 
pickets and outposts, and gather supplies from the country in their possession ; 
my object being to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our men, by suc- 
cesses, however small, a feeling of superiority over our adversaries. 

Both Hooker and Lee attended to fostering and developing the mar- 
tial spirit of their armies by the bestowing of medals, the inscription of 
the names of battles on the flags, etc. {Appendix 7). 

A weak point of the Army of the Potomac, to which Hooker and his 
chief of staff gave special attention, was the performance of outpost 
duty. Its improvement was slow and difficult of achievement (Ap- 
pendix 8). 

The boundary line between Maryland and Virginia, commencing on 
the seacoast, divides a peninsula into two parts, known as the "East- 
ern Shore" of Maryland and the "Eastern Shore" of Virginia. The 
latter region, which would seem geographically to belong to Maryland, 
was included in the act of secession by which Virginia joined the Con- 
federacy. A portion of its population carried on regular traffic in con- 
traband goods with people of the mainland of Virginia. By a system 
of daily communication between the Confederate commanders and their 
allies in Baltimore, full information was obtained of the disposition and 
movement of the Federal forces and the designs of the Federal govern- 
ment. To put a stop to these practices a Federal force marched into the 
Eastern Shore of Virginia in 1861. Though the country was occupied 
by Federal troops from that time on, it was not so controlled but that 
the Confederates whom it continued to harbor could ply their hostile 
vocation, as the following correspondence shows : 

Haupt to Wells, Secretary of the Navy, January 31 

I am informed that an extensive smuggling business is done near the mouth of 
the Potomac, opposite St. George's Island, in small boats, which are secreted in 
the creeks or drawn up in the bushes and used at night ; that in this way mails 
are carried and many wagon-loads of shoes and other necessaries transported to 
Richmond. The trade could be broken up, or seriously interfered with, by 



TKADING ACROSS THE POTOMAC 51 

searching for and seizing all the boats and by the establishment of an efficient 
river patrol.^ 

Butterfield to Magaw, February 1 

General Hooker desires that you should use every exertion to stop the passage 
of small boats conveying deserters from the army across the Potomac. It is be- 
lieved that large numbers cross the Potomac in small boats above and below 
Aquia Creek. Any person detected in this occupation by your efforts, he re- 
quests be turned over to the provost-marshal at Aquia Creek, with written memo- 
randa of the circumstances attending their capture. 

I believe that spies and contraband information are conveyed across the 
Rappahannock below the lines of our army. 

1 Naval W. E., Series I. Vol. V, p. 226. 



CHAPTER V 

MOVEMENT OF A DETACHMENT TO RAPPAHANNOCK BRIDGE. THE IX CORPS 
AND hood's and PICKETT 'S DIVISIONS DETACHED. LEE's AND HOOKER 'S 
CONJECTURES 

ON the 5th of February a Federal force of three regiments of cavalry 
and a battery of artillery, supported by a division of infantry 
(altogether about 15,800 men), started from Falmouth under orders to 
go up the river and destroy the Rappahannock Bridge. The purpose of 
this destruction was probably a twofold one— to check the enterprises 
of the Confederate cavalry against the Federal outposts, and to sever 
one of the lines of communication between Lee's army and the Shenan- 
doah Valley. The bridge had been destroyed by Federal troops the 
smnmer before and been rebuilt by the enemy. 

The weather was exceedingly bad. Snow, hail, and rain succeeded 
one another all day and all night, and half of the next day. The expe- 
dition camped the first night at Grove Church in a rain which froze as 
it fell. 

The following day, while the infantry and artillery guarded the 
lower fords, the cavalry pushed on to the bridge. A vigorous fire was 
opened on the enemy in rifle-pits on the south side of the river. Under 
cover of this fire and of a stone pier near the north side, a party got 
under the bridge and cut a number of the posts. Its attempt to fire the 
bridge failed on account of the dampness of the timber, together with 
the fact that the troops were not provided with combustibles, or incen- 
diary material. To make a success it was necessary to drive the enemy 
away from his position on the south bank and gain at least temporary 
possession of the bridge. This was more than the cavalry alone was 
equal to, and it was not attempted. The work of destruction having 
been thus imperfectly accomplished, the whole expedition returned to 
Falmouth, where it arrived on the 8th. The causes of its failure were 
the bad weather, the lack of combustibles, and the resistance offered or 
threatened at the crossing by Wade Hampton's brigade of cavalry, 
which the Federals thought to be two brigades and to number about 
4800 men.^ The little damage done to the bridge was soon repaired. 

^ For reports, see W. R., 39, pp. 7-9 ; for orders and correspondence, 
ib.. 40, pp. 45-49. 
52 



THE IX CORPS DETACHED 53 

The Confederate horsemen continued to prowl about the Federal out- 
posts and made occasional dashes at them, but the progress which 
Hooker made in the instruction of his army and the improvement of its 
morale caused a diminution in the frequency and effectiveness of such 
enterprises. General Lee found increasing difiSculty in keeping himself 
posted as to what was going on in the Federal camp. 

When Burnside resigned his position as army commander he went 
North on leave of absence. The following order was issued February 4 : 

II. The Ninth Corps, under Major-General William F. Smith, will embark for 
Fort Monroe without delay. . . . On arriving at Fort Monroe, Major-General 
Smith will report to ]\Iajor-General Dix for further orders. . . . 

It was not until after the movement was well under way that Dix 
received the following communication from Halleck, dated the 9th 
instant : 

The Ninth Army Corps, ordered to your command, will be used as you may 
deem proper. It, however, should be kept together as much as possible. A por- 
tion of it may be ordered farther south immediately. 

By the 11th most of the corps, numbering about 15,000 men, arrived 
and disembarked at Newport News. Lee wrote as follows : 

To Seddon, February 14 

This evening I received information from scouts on the enemy's right up to 
the 12th instant. Two report that the Ninth Army Corps of General Hooker's 
army had embarked at Belle Plain, and sailed for Suffolk; that a large fleet of 
transports was at Aquia Creek, and there was other evidence of a general move. 
I have directed General Pickett's division^ to march to-morrow for Richmond, 
and General Hood's division^ to be held in readiness. One of the scouts reported 
that it was the Second Army Corps which had embarked for Suffolk. Although 
it is stated that their destination is Suffolk [Virginia], should no other troops 
follow, I think it probable that this corps is intended to reenforce their army in 
South Carolina. . . . 

February 15 

. . . demonstrations by the enemy upon points of our communications 
through North Carolina are to be expected, to prevent reenforeements reaching 
Charleston [South Carolina].' 

It seems to me to be the policy of the enemy now to apply his whole strength 
to take Charleston, and it is proper for us to expect him to do what he ought to 
do. Unless therefore his conduct enables us to draw a different conclusion, we 
ought, if possible, to be prepared for him there.* 

^ Longstreet's corps. * The Federals were in fact preparing an 

2 7b. operation against Charleston to be executed 

' The principal port of entry of Confed- by Admiral Dupont. It was afterward 

erate blockade-runners. known as the Dupont expedition. 



54 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

On the 15th he ordered Hood's division to follow Pickett's, and 
wrote to Stuart that, if on his arrival at Culpeper he should find that the 
opportunity of striking a damaging blow was greater on the Potomac 
than in the Shenandoah Valley, he should "give precedence to the for- 
mer, and take measures accordingly." 

The movement of the Federal IX Corps south had, perhaps naturally, 
given more apprehension to Davis than to Lee. It was only to comply 
with Davis' wish expressed in a letter from Seddon dated and received 
to-day that Lee ordered the movement of Hood's division.' While Lee 
was responsible for detaching one of his divisions at this time, Davis 
was responsible for his detaching two. 

Following is the composition and organization of these detachments 
as given in field returns of March 9 and 10.- The numbers stand for 
officers and men Present for Duty. 

Hood 's division (^y) 6,965 

Pickett's division (i) 6,169 

Lane's battery, unattached 133 

Grand total 13,267 

Thus the departure of the IX Corps from the Anny of the Potomac 
had caused the departure of about an equal force, but a considerably 
larger portion, from the Army of Northern Virginia. Would the IX 
Corps keep this detachment from rejoining Lee's army? It was too 
soon for Hooker to be forming conjectures in this regard, as he had not 
yet learned that the detachment was made. 

The serious question in Lee's mind was how much, if any, of the 
remainder of Hooker's army was to withdraw from his front. Was 
the IX Corps only an advance-guard to be followed by the main body 
of the Army of the Potomac, or was the remainder of the army to go 
elsewhere! On these points he kept up an active correspondence with 
the authorities in Richmond. 

It appears therefrom that both Lee and Seddon were in doubt as to 
how much of Hooker 's army was in front of Lee, and what it was doing 
or preparing to do {Appendix 9). Reconnoitering below Fredericks- 
l^urg was obstructed by the broad Rappahannock and the Federal ves- 
sels that occasionally patrolled it. On the 21st Brigadier-General W. H. 
F. Lee, with his brigade of cavalry, appeared opposite a couple of gun- 
boats and cannonaded them with two pieces of horse artillery. One of 
the vessels was hit twice and injured beyond repair outside of a navy 
yard.* But the affair yielded no information of any value to General 

^ Lee to Seddon and to Da\-is, February ■'' Naval W. R., Series I, Vol. V, p. 235 ; 

16. 1863, TF. R.. 40, p. 627. " 3Iag. of Am. Hist., XV, 193; W. R., 39. 

' lb., 26, pp. 915. 916. p. 20. 



LEE'S CONJECTURES 55 

Lee. An attempt made to force the Federal picket at United States 
Ford with the cavalry posted opposite to it failed. Spies did not fur- 
nish the information wanted; there was nothing left but to make a 
vigorous dash through the Federal outposts. This operation was in- 
trusted to General Fitzhugh Lee. His execution of it, which will be 
described under the title The Skirmish at Hartwood Church, was so far 
successful that it satisfied Lee as to the presence of Hooker's army in 
his front and the general disposition of its masses, but it did not set 
him right as to the force that had been detached.^ 

On the 26th of February, Lee heard unofficially of the result of Fitz- 
hugh Lee's reconnaissance and wrote to President Davis: 

... I have only learned positively of three array corps of the enemy having 
descended the Potomac. . . . Franklin 's former grand division, detached to New- 
port News, is probably intended for Burnside, and I see it announced in Northern 
papers that he is to repair immediately to his new command without stating 
where. I think the scene of his operations will be south of James River. ... I 
believe for the present the purpose on the part of Hooker of crossing the Rappa- 
hannock is abandoned, and that the late storms or other causes have suspended 
the movements recently in progress down the river. The disposition I have de- 
scribed may be intended to continue the remainder of the winter, or until their 
conscript law becomes operative. - 

With better information, he wrote on the 28th to the Secretary of 
War: 

One of my scouts, who has been on the Potomac for the past ten days, reports 
on the 26th that everything has been quiet on the river for the past week, only 
three or four steamers passing up and down during the day. A great many 
sail-vessels and a great deal of hay descending. Prom the number of transports 
and their capacity, he estimates that 15,000 or 20,000 troops have passed down 
since the 9th.^ I think it probable this is Burnside 's command, with which he 
will endeavor to advance south of James River, while General Hooker pursues 
this route. The army in front of us at present is certainly very large. . . . 

The design, which Lee attributes to Burnside, of pushing into Vir- 
ginia to the south of the James River, does not appear to have been 
entertained by any Federal commander. Hooker knew that the Army 
of Northern Virginia had been weakened by detachments, but was de- 
ceived as to the strength and purposes of the detachments, and as to the 

1 Only the IX Corps had been detached. ' Lee refers here doubtless to the draft. 

It had been reported to Lee that, in addi- the law for which was not passed until 

tion to Bumside's corps, FranUin's former March 3, and did not go into effect until 

grand division, which consisted of the I October 17. 

and VI Cori^s, had moved down the Poto- " The IX Corps actuaUy numbered about 

mac. Burnside had no command at this 15,000 men (TF. E., 40, p. 538). 
time. 



56 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLOESVILLE 

impression made upon Lee by the transfer of the IX Corps. He tele- 
graphed 

To Kelton, about 2:30 p.m., Fehruary 25 

Information from deserters, contraband, and citizens, received within the past 
two or three days, when compared and collated, seems to corroborate the follow- 
ing statement : That the enemy have decreased their forces in our front ; that two 
or more divisions of Longstreet's corps have gone to Tennessee and South Caro- 
lina; that the enemy are under the impression that we are evacuating from 
Aquia, leaving a sufficient force to keep Lee 's army in front of us. . . . Jackson 's 
corps is left to guard the passage of the river. Ransom's division, of Long- 
street's corps, is one mentioned as gone to Tennessee or South Carolina.' 
Pickett's division is one gone to Charleston, commencing their departure Feb- 
ruary 17.^ . . . 

Lee had now a fairly correct estimate of the detachment made from 
Hooker's army and knew where the detachment was. Hooker had 
greatly overestimated the detachment made from Lee's army, and had 
very erroneous ideas as to its location or distribution. But neither Lee 
nor Hooker doubted that he would have to do with his opponent's main 
force on the Rappahannock. 

The officers and men present for duty at this time in the Southern 
Section of the theater of war were disposed as follows:* 

FEDERAL 

Department of Virginia, under Dix, headquarters Fort Monroe, Va. . . 35,187 
Department of North Carolina, under Foster, headquarters New Berne, 
N. C 15,808 

50,995 
CONFEDERATE 

Department of Virginia and North Carolina, under Longstreet, head- 
quarters Petersburg, Va 43,239 

While 50,995 Federals were divided between two separate depart- 
ments, powerless to move from one to the other without permission or 
orders from Washington, the 43,239 Confederates were included in a 
single department, within which the department commander could 
move them at his discretion. 

On the 1st of April the command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet 
was reorganized as three departments, all under the supervision and 
general direction of General Lee: the Department of Richmond, under 

^ Ransom's division was in North Carolina. 

'-' Pickett's division and Hood's were in front of Suffolk, Va., under Longstreet. 

" TV. R., 26, pp. 546, 547, 898, 900, 901, 915, 916. 



LEE'S CONJECTURES 57 

Major-General Elzey, headquarters Richmond; the Department of 
Southern Virginia, under Major-General French, headquarters at some 
central point near Blackwater ; and the Department of North Carolina, 
under Major-General D. H. Hill, headquarters Goldsboro.^ 

General Longstreet was authorized to transfer troops from any one 
of these new departments to another. 

Lee's conviction as to the location of the IX Corps was probably not 
disturbed until he received the following communication from Long- 
street, dated March 17 : 

The force at Newport News is reported to-day as moving to reenforce Suffolk. 
I fear that the real object is to join Foster at New Berne. If this is the intention 
I shall be obliged to move all of Pickett's division down to Goldsboro. 

At this time the First and Second Divisions of the IX Corps were at 
Newport News, and the Third Division had been sent by General Dix to 
Suffolk.^ The divisions at Nevrport News were ordered to move to the 
Department of the Ohio, to the command of which General Burnside 
was assigned on the 16th. 

On the 30th Lee wrote to Longstreet : 

One of our scouts reports, under date of 29th instant, that he was in Washing- 
ton and Baltimore the first of last week, and that Burnside 's corps left Newport 
News at that time for the West. . . . The New York Times of the 25th and the 
Washington Chronicle of the 26th state that Burnside was in Cincinnati on the 
24th and is charged with the defence of Kentucky, but do not mention his 
troops. Can you not ascertain definitely whether these statements are correct?^ 

Longstreet replied the same day : 

The troops have left Newport News; embarked on Friday and Saturday [27th 
and 28th] ; supposed to have gone to North Carolina. My informant says they 
sailed for North Carolina.* 

Longstreet 's informant was mistaken; there was no such movement. 
Lee seems to have known it, for he wrote to Davis on the 2d of April : 
I believe General Burnside with his corps has gone to Kentucky.^ 

On the 4th Longstreet wrote to Lee : 

All my information is to the effect that half at least of Burnside 's command is 
still at Suffolk." 

^ TF. R., 26, p. 953. Kentucky, and so mueh of eastern Ten- 

^ lb., 26, pp. 558, 562. nessee as the Federals had possession of. 

^ lb., 26, pp. 949, 950. Two divisions of his corps were moving 

* lb., 26, p. 948. from Newport News, Va., to serve under 

' Burnside was at this time in command him. His headquarters were at Cincin- 

of the Department of the Oliio, which com- nati, O. 

prised, besides the state of Ohio, the states " W. R., 26, pp. 959, 960. 

of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, eastern 



58 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Lee replied on the 6th : 

I think you will find none of Burnside's corps opposed to you. . . . Burnside's 
corps has certainly gone west.^ 

Here Longstreet was nearer right than Lee, as one of Burnside's 
divisions was still in Virginia, in front of Longstreet. 
^W.R.. 26, pp. 966, 967. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE SKIRMISH AT HAETWOOD CHURCH. CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL OUTPOSTS. 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN AVERELL AND FITZHUGH LEE. ' ' WHO EVER SAW 
A DEAD CAVALRYMAN t ' ' 

THIS cliapter is devoted for the greater part to an affair of outposts, 
which had no effect upon either army as a whole, but which throws 
light upon the morale and the tactical efficiency of the cavalry in each 
one. For this reason the operation is described in some detail. 

On the 2.3d of February Lee telegraphed to Fitzhugh Lee at Culpeper 
Court-House to take his brigade and break through the Federal out- 
posts on the Falmouth Road, and ascertain what was occurring behind 
them (Map 2). The Federal outposts were of extra strength. On the 
right and rear a double cordon, formed of an inner one of infantry and 
an outer one of cavalry, extended from west of Dumfries to west of 
Falmouth; along the front a cordon of infantry connected the double 
cordon on the right with another double cordon on the left; the latter 
covered the left flank of the army from the Rappahannock to the Poto- 
mac. Each cordon was formed in three lines. The outer or picket line 
consisted of sentinels or videttes (mounted sentinels) backed up at a 
distance of a few hundred yards by picket posts or picket reliefs. The 
sentinels or videttes were commonly spoken of as pickets. The second 
or middle line, stationed one to two miles in rear of the picket line, con- 
sisted of the main reserves, called supports, or line of resistance. The 
third line was formed of the Grand or General Reserve, now called the 
Reserve. The pickets were changed every three days, or, including a 
day for going and coming, every four days. The sentinels were posted 
mounted— in other words, as videttes— and relieved every two hours, be- 
ing two hours on post and four hours off. The posts were single or 
double. The videttes were instructed to keep their revolvers or car- 
bines always in liand, prepared to fire instantly, if necessary. The 
officers of the picket \nsited the line frequently by day and by night, 
and a visiting patrol passed up and down the line every hour. The sup- 
ports were posted in deep hollows or other concealed places where fires 
were allowed, the men remaining dismounted, wdth the privilege of 
making themselves as comfortable as possible, but always keeping them- 
selves ready for action. The horses were not allowed to be un- 
saddled except a few at a time, for the purpose of being cleaned, and 
when this was done the saddles were at once replaced. 

39 



60 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The general cordon of outposts was divided into sections and as- 
signed by section to particular commands to guard. The cavalry out- 
posts were assigned by General Stoneman to divisions as follows : 

From the Occoquan Eiver and Cedar Run (Map 1, sheet A) to Aquia 
Creek, to the First Division (Pleasonton). 

From Aquia Creek to the vicinity of Falmouth, to the Second Division 
(Averell). 

From Corbin, on the Rappahannock, to the Potomac, to the Third 
Division ( Gregg). ^ 

These division sections were subdivided into minor sections which 
were assigned to brigades. 

Describing the cavalry outposts. Captain Frank W. Hess, 3 Artillery, 
U. S. Army, formerly first lieutenant, 3 Pa. Cavalry, says : 

Much of this line was through a densely wooded country. These forests had 
once been cidtivated land, but had been abandoned as such, and were now 
thickly studded with a dense growth of small pines, the foliage of which was so 
dense as to prevent one from seeing for more than a rod or two through them, 
and they were threaded by innumerable paths. The enemy's cavalry was on 
the opposite bank of the Rappahannock— right bank— which in the low stage of 
the water could be forded in many places. From these camps it was an easy 
matter for him to detach commands of from two to five hundred men, send them 
across the river at various places ; and, by the hidden roads which his men knew 
so well, concentrate on any given point on the line, and drive in or capture our 
pickets. These forays were numerous during the winter and very annoying to 
our people. Every inhabitant in this country was in full sympathy with the 
enemy, and no matter how frequently the posts of our videttes were changed and 
the reserves moved, it was but a short time until the precise location was known 
at the headquarters on the other side of the river. Women and children as well as 
men took a patriotic pride in giving information as to our movements, and vied 
with each other in schemes and ruses by which to discover and convey to the 
enemy facts which we strove to conceal. On the other hand, information of the 
enemy's position and intentions could be procured by us only by personal obser- 
vation, and for this purpose frequent reconnaissances were made in considerable 
force, before which he always gave way, retiring to his own side of the river.^ 

In compliance with his instructions, Fitzhugh Lee set out at 9 a.m. 
on the 24th with detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments of Vir- 
ginia Cavalry, numbering together about 400 men, provided with three 
days' rations and as much corn as the men could well carry on their 
horses, marched through Stevensburg, and crossed the Rappahannock 
atKelley'sFord.3 

^ W. B., 40, pp. 62, 72, 79, 91, 96, 97. At least one other regimeut of bis brigade 

2 First Maine Bugle, 1893. (4 Va.) probably supported the brigade by 

^ The strength given above of Fitzhugh covering its flank or rear. One of the com- 

Lee's command is taken from his report to panies of this regiment (the Black Horse 

R. E. Lee (TF. B., 39, p. 25). Cavalry) participated in the attack which 



SKIRMISH AT HARTWOOD CHURCH 61 

The river was so high as to swim low horses; the ground covered 
with about fifteen inches of snow; and the roads almost impassable. 
But there was no opposition. Confederate scouts pushed on to the 
Federal outposts. About noon there was some firing between them and 
the Federal pickets. The commander of the outpost near Hartwood 
Church, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones of the 3 Pa. Cavalry, reported to 
Averell at brigade headquarters that he felt satisfied that the enemy 
would attack at some point on his line (some 10 or 11 miles long) and 
asked for reenforeements. Averell's reply was: "If the enemy attack, 
whip him. ' ' Jones directed the utmost care and vigilance to be observed 
during the night, and only lay down himself two or three hours, giving 
orders that he be waked before daylight.' Fitzhugh Lee bivouacked at 
Morrisville. About S a.m. on the 25th he resumed his march by the 
Warrenton Post Eoad. About 9 :30 four of his troopers were seen at 
the Federal outposts and fired on.^ After the usual breakfast hour at 
Jones' headquarters a report was brought to him, probably in the 
vicinity of Berea Church, that the left of his line had been attacked^ 
and had repulsed the attacking force. He detailed a party of 2 officers 
and 20 men of the support to go out beyond the picket line, follow the 
enemy, and bring back a report of what his force was. The party came 
upon a company of the enemy and had a slight skirmish with him in a 
ra^^ne. It narrowly escaped being surrounded and captured, but 
slipped away and returned toward the support. On the way, marching 
by file along a narrow path through mud and snow, it fell in with six 
companies of the 4 Va. Cavalry, and was captured to a man. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, after detaching this party, ordered the 
support to form line, standing to horse, and await developments. With 
one or two orderlies he rode out toward Hartwood Church. 

Lee's column, approaching by the Warrenton Post Road, passed 
Grove Church and Hartwood Church without incident worth mention- 
ing. About 11:30 a.m., not far from Hartwood Church, his advance 
came upon three of Jones' videttes (probably forming what is now 
called a Cossack post). Three of his own men, wearing Federal over- 
coats, approached them without being required to dismount. Imme- 
diately these videttes were themselves made to dismount and march off 
as prisoners.-* This was all done without the discharge of a firearm. 
Through the opening thus quietly made the column dashed down the road, 
past or over the picket reserve, or picket post, without drawing its fire. 

Jones was in the vicinity of Hamet when he was met by an officer 

was made on the Federal outposts (Letter ^Sabres and ,S'?>Mrs, by Chaplain Frederic 

of Lieutenant-Colonel Carter in McClellan's Denison, p. 204. 

Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, p. 205). ^ History of the 3 Pa. Cav., by Commit- 

1 History of the 3 Pa. Cav., by Commit- tee, p. 190. 

tee. pp. 189, 190. > lb. 



62 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

shouting that the enemy was charging down the road. Immediately a 
squad came toward him at full speed, filling the road, and commenced 
firing at him. 

It was now about noon. The outpost was about to be changed. The 
new detail was with the General Reserve. Portions were being told off 
for the supports, when firing was heard in the direction of Hartwood 
Church, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones came in from the front with the 
report that his line was being driven in. 

Lee's command was pushing on in two columns after the fleeing 
pickets: one column, consisting of the 1 and part of the 2 Va., by the 
Ridge Road ; the other, consisting of the 3 Va. and the remainder of the 
2, by the Warrenton Road. The new detail for this part of the Federal 
outpost consisted of six squadrons of various regiments, numbering 
about 600 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson of the 1 R. I. The 
colonel at once forwarded a squadron, about 100 men, to the relief of 
the old pickets. With the remainder of his force he moved forward 
about half a mile by the Ridge Road and rapidly formed line. He had 
hardly done so when Lee's right column was heard charging with loud 
yells past his left. Seeing his rear thus threatened, he detached two 
squadrons, about 200 men, by the Warrenton Road, against the charg- 
ing column, retaining in hand three squadrons, one of the 4 N. Y. and 
two of the 16 Pa., altogether about 300 men. The two squadrons which 
he last detached had hardly gotten under way when Lee's left column 
came dashing upon his (Thompson's) three squadrons. 

Two of the squadrons [those of the 16 Pa.] had never been under fire; the 
other [the 4 N. Y., a German regiment] had been, but had not been known to 
stay long iinder such circumstances ; and the present occasion did not seem to be 
the one upon which to vary the rule. Accordinglj-, with the greatest alacrity, 
they [of the 4 N. Y.] broke by individuals to run to the rear. The other two 
squadrons [16 Pa.], after firing a few shots from their carbines, instead of obey- 
ing Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson's order to charge, followed the example of the 
departed squadron, and, considering the condition of the roads, made very good 
time to the rear.' 

The two squadrons detached to the Warrenton Road were also driven 
back. Lee penetrated with his right column to a i^oint about a mile be- 
yond Hamet, where he was repulsed by the infantry outpost of the III 
Corps; and with his left as far as Wallace, where he was checked by a 
dismounted party of the 3 Pa. Cavalry.- Thereupon, finding himself as- 
sailed by mounted troops and apprehending an attack in force, he rallied 
his columns and commenced retiring by echelon, making occasional 

' Sabres and Spurs, by F. Denison, p. Fitzhugh Lee's memorandum of the infor- 

202. mation which he obtained, inclosed in his 

'^ McClellan, in his Campaigns of Stuart's report to Robert E. Lee, can not be found 

Cavalry (p. 204), says that Fitzhugh Lee {W. R., 39, p. 25). 
came in sight of the camp of the V Corps. 



SKIRMISH AT HARTWOOD CHURCH 63 

counter-attacks upon his pursuers. About 7 p.m., having shaken off the 
Federal cavalry, he took up the march for Morrisville. 

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon Averell received a report that the 
enemy was in force in front of his line of videttes, and in the vicinity of 
Hartwood Church. Boots and saddles was immediately sounded in his 
camp. He transmitted the report by courier to Stoneman, with the 
statement that he had sent to find out what was happening, and would 
let him know the result. He also reported by telegraph to Williams, 
Hooker's adjutant-general, and in reply was instructed to send a 
brigade to the point attacked. At 3:30 his 2d brigade was on the 
march for Hartwood Church. ^ 

Stoneman forwarded the report which he received to Williams by 
courier, and before he heard from Averell as to "the result of his inves- 
tigation," was called to Hooker's headquarters. When he arrived 
there Hooker had received further information, among which was the 
following from Sickles, commanding the III Corps : 

About 2 o'clock [this p.m.] the enemy's cavalry in force drove in our videttes 
and approached vnthin twenty yards of my infantry sentinels. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Cummins, 124 New York, opened fire on the assailants, and drove them 
back with loss. The attack was not renewed. Considerable firing was heard on 
the right of Colonel Bailey [general officer of Sickles' outposts]. It was re- 
ported that a considerable detachment of our cavalry, estimated from 60 to 100, 
was cut of? by the enemy and made prisoners. 

General Whipple, commanding 3 Division, III Corps, informs me that Colonel 
Bailej' has taken a prisoner who states that lie belongs to Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, 
five regiments of which crossed the river this morning and made this attack. 
This man will be sent immediately to headquarters as soon as he arrives. Shall I 
go out with a brigade or so. to support my line ?" 

The reports received at general headquarters created the impression 
that the enemy was not confining his operations to the vicinity of Hart- 
wood Church; that he was aiming, and perhaps more seriously, at Staf- 
ford Court-House and Dumfries. Averell was directed to assemble his 
division at Hartwood Church, and the following exaggerated statement 
with accompanying instructions was sent to Williams, commanding 
the XII Corps, at Stafford Court-House : 

Telegraphic advices report three brigades of the enemy's cavalry moving in 
the vicinity of your front. Advise the force at Dumfries to be vigilant. Our 
infantrj^ there can whip the cavalry if they come. 

The cautioning of the force at Dumfries was hardly necessary, judg- 
ing from a communication of this date from the commanding ofiScer at 
Dumfries to the Adjutant-General of the XII Corps.* 

^ History of the 3 Pa. Cav., by Commit- ^ "Onr scout brought iu information this 

tee, p. 165. evening: that he was told by a citizen that 

' TF. B., 39, p. 21. the enemy's cavalry intend making a raid 



64 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Hooker telegraphed to Heintzelman at 6 :30 p.m. : 

A large cavalry force has made its appearance in front of our right, said now 
to be moving toward Stafford Court-House. We send out up the river to try and 
get between them and the Rappahannock. Can you send out from Catlett's and 
Rappahannock Stations to intercept them if they move tliat way ? . . . 

There were no troops at this time at Catlett's or Rappahannock Sta- 
tion. 

To the Commander of the 11 Corps Butterfield wrote at 7 :30 p.m. : 

. . . send a good brigade of infantry up to Berea Church. The enemy have 
a force of cavalry in front of our picket lines on the right. General Stoneman 
will endeavor to capture them. Averell is following them up, and a cavalry 
force from here will move to get between them and the river. 

By Hooker's direction, Stoneman directed Pleasonton to hold his 
command in readiness at daylight to move from his camp, and sent for 
Captain Cram, commanding the reserve brigade, in order to issue the 
same instructions to him. Before the latter arrived, Stoneman was 
directed to have his whole available force ( Pleasonton 's and Averell 's 
divisions and Cram's reserve brigade) in readiness to move at 1 a.m. 
Further instructions were issued to Averell on Potomac Run at 7:45 
p.m., as follows : 

The commanding general directs that you follow the enemy's force; that you 
do not come in until the force which General Stoneman is directed to send out at 
1 a.m. gets up with the enemy, and you have captured him or found it utterly 
impossible to do so. Stoneman will endeavor to get between them and the river. 

Shortly afterward, on the receipt, it would seem, of a dispatch from 
Stafford Court-House transmitting the foi-equoted message from the 
commanding officer at Dumfries, the order to Stoneman was changed to 
' ' Move at once. ' ' 

Stoneman telegraphed to Pleasonton, commanding First Division: 

Move with the whole of your division, and be in position on the Telegraph 
road, near Aquia Church, as soon as you can. . . . 

Inform General Butterfield the hour you wiU be in the position indicated. . . . 

This dispatch was duly received. Captain Cram was directed by 
Stoneman in person to push his brigade on to Hartwood Church. 

on this place, to capture the commissary [place]. . . . We will be on the alert, and 

stores, etc., supposLng that the new picket are able to repel any attack from their eav- 

line established last Saturday was simply airy." 
a ruse, and supposing that we have left this 



FEDERAL PURSUIT 65 

Butterfield telegraphed to Averell : 

8 p.m. 

Stoneman has been instructed to move the forces from here at once. Pleas- 
onton to be in position at Aquia Church to cooperate., or execute any order. 

About 8 p.m. 

. . . General Hooker says that a major-general's commission is staring some- 
body in the face in this affair, and that the enemy should not be allowed to get 
away from us/ 

Hooker telegraphed to Stanton : 

. . . The rebels have a cavalry force on this side of the river outside of my 
exterior line of pickets, which I hope to hive before morning. 

This dispatch was received at 9 p.m. At this hour Butterfield trans- 
mitted to Heintzelman information received from Dumfries, through 
Stafford Court- House, and added : 

We are pushing our forces from here up the Rappahannock and toward War- 
renton. Answer what cooperation we may expect from above. 

Before this dispatch was I'eceived Heintzelman telegraphed to Butter- 
field in reply to Hooker's dispatch of 6 :30 : 

I have sent out a force of cavalry 2000 strong, toward Catlett's and Rappa- 
hannock Stations, by the way of Fairfax [Court-House] to intercept the enemy. 
This force will leave by 8 o'clock [a.m.] February 26; if possible, sooner. . . . 

The necessity of concentrating somewhat scattered forces accounts 
for the tardiness of the hour (8 a.m. on the 26th) when the promised 
movement was to commence. 

Averell arrived with his division near Hartwood Church and went into 
bivouac about 9 p.m.^ Butterfield telegraphed to the commander of the 
XII Corps : 

9 p.m. 

Dispatch from Colonel Creighton [Dumfries] received. Inform General 
Pleasonton of its contents. Averell has gone up with a division of cavalry toward 
Hartwood. The division [brigade] of Regulars will go up the river road. 
Pleasonton will be in position within a few hours at Aquia Church. A brigade 
of infantry has gone up to Berea Church." Inform Pleasonton of all these 
arrangements. . . . Send a brigade of infantry to Aquia Church to support 
Pleasonton. if desired. 

1 Copies of this dispatch were furnished ^ This movement had not commenced, 

to Greneral Pleasonton and Captain Cram. The order prescribing it had not come down 

- Sabres and Spurs, by Chaplain F. Deni- through corps and division headquartei-s to 

son, p. 205. brigade headquarters. 



66 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

9:10 p.m. 

. . . Prisoners captured and brought in report the force as Fitzhugh Lee's 
and Hampton's brigades.' Marched from 12 miles the other side of the Rappa- 
hannock last night, made a long circuit to-day, and horses very tired. We ought 
to capture every one of them. . . . 

The 2d brigade, Second Division, II Corps (Couch's) got under arms 
at 9 :30 p.m., and started for Berea Church at 10 p.m. It had just about 
21/2 miles to march, but, owing to the darkness of the night and the bad 
condition of the roads, did not reach its destination until about 11 :15, 
nor complete its dispositions for holding the cross-roads until about 
12 p.m. Guards were placed over the surrounding houses to prevent 
communication with the enemy ; an escort of cavalry which was attached 
to the brigade was used for patrolling the roads and establishing and 
maintaining communication with the main body and the outposts.^ 

After these measures were taken, Stoneman left Hooker's headquar- 
ters for Hartford Church. At Falmouth he overtook the rear of the re- 
serve brigade and sent forward to direct Captain Cram to push on as 
fast as the state of the roads would permit, getting through, if possible, 
to Hartwood Church before daylight, and if Stoneman should not be 
there, to report to General Averell. By daylight Averell was to be up 
the river as far possibly as Deep Eun— thus, it was thought, effectually 
cutting off the enemy's retreat by the way that he had come by, and ren- 
dering his escape very difficult, if not impossible; Pleasonton was to be 
on the enemy's trail. 

Learning that Averell had arrived with his division at Hartwood 
Church, Stoneman, at 11 p.m., wrote and telegraphed to Pleasonton : 

... It is very possible the enemy is making for Dumfries. Get off at once, 
and if you can find out where the enemy is, push him to the utmost of your 
ability wherever he may go. Be sure to get between the enemy and the river. 

Pleasonton had not yet started for Aquia Church. This dispatch was 
probably carried there, and from there back to Hooker's headquarters. 
At any rate, it was not delivered to Pleasonton. Soon apprehending 
that it would be too late on the following day for Heintzelman's cavalry 
to cooperate to any purpose, Butterfield telegraphed to Heintzelman at 
11 :15 p.m. : 

The force is F. Lee's and Hampton's brigades. . . . Their horses are well 
tired. We are pushing all out to-night. Can not you push out to-night and 
push this side of the railroad and Rappahannock Station ? . . . 

' Hampton's brigade was south of the James River, recruiting. 

It did not return during the campaign. 

^ Report of brigade commander, W. R., 107, p. 175. 



FEDERAL PURSUIT <57 

This dispatch was received at midnight.' At this time Pleasonton's 
adjutant-general wrote to the commander of the XII Corps declining 
the support of a brigade of infantry and stating: 

This division lias been ordered to move at daylight to Aquia Church, by the 
Telegraph road. . . . 

While these preparations were going on for the interception and 
hiving of Fitzhugh Lee, that chieftain, with his exultant troopers and a 
string of about 150 prisoners, marched back to Morrisville, and again 
went into camp there for the night. He left behind him 14 killed, 
woimded, and missing, and a surgeon to take care of his wounded. The 
Federals lost 36 killed, wounded, and missing. 

About midnight, Butterfield telegraphed to Couch : 

1 

. . . The enemy are supposed to be lying around the vicinity of Hartwood. . . . 

2 

General Stoneman will be at Hartvpood at daylight. Let the commanding 
officer [of the brigade at Berea Church] communicate with him and take his 
orders from him. . . . 

At 3 a.m. on the 26th Pleasonton wrote to Butterfield : 

General Stoneman directed me to inform you when I should leave for Aquia 
Church.^ I have therefore the honor to report that the Second Brigade left its 
camp at 2 :30 this morning and the First is about leaving. I shall move with the 
latter. One regiment of the Second is already at the Church, which is some 
8 miles from here by the road which can now be traveled. ... I sliall not move 
beyond Aquia Church until I hear further concerning the rebel movements. I 
have requested General Williams to keep me informed. 

This dispatch, it seems, was not received. The reserve cavalry 
brigade commenced passing through Berea Church about 3 : 30 a.m. The 
head of the column arrived at a point in the vicinity of Hartwood, 
where Averell was in bivouac, about 4:30. The rear was closed up 
about 6. Soon afterward Averell started out with his division and the 
greater part of the reserve brigade in search of the enemy. Stoneman 
himself remained at Hartwood Church with the remainder of the re- 
serve brigade. About 7 a.m. he ordered the infantry brigade at Berea 
Church to march about 2 miles further up the Warrenton Road and 
take a position at that point, which it did. The rain which commenced 
falling about midnight, and continued all night, was coming down in 
torrents. 

Stoneman sent a squadron to Richards Ferry and learned that a 

^ Rep. of Com., TV, 196. he would be there, or "in position on the 

''He was directed to report, not when he Telegraph Road, near Aquia Church" (see 
would leave for Aquia Church, but when Stoneman's first order to Pleasonton). 



68 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCBLLORSVILLE 

party of the enemy had crossed there by swimming. This party was 
perhaps the scouts that had felt the left of Averell's line on the morning 
of the 25th. Another squadron was sent out on the road to Warrenton 
to see whether any parties had gone directly from Kelley's Ford 
toward Dumfries. Having gone beyond Spotted TaN'ern, it returned 
without finding any trail, which it would easily have found had any 
troops passed that way, the ground being covered with snow. Having 
learned from undoubted authority that the enemy had recrossed the 
river and that the river was swimming and rising fast, Stoneman de- 
cided to abandon the pursuit. He sent out three officers with small 
parties to intercept Pleasonton and order him to return to his camp, 
supposing that ho had received and acted on the orders sent him last 
night. At this time the following dispatch of lO :15 to-day from Butter- 
field to Stoneman was probably on its way : 

The accompanying dispatch just received from Pleasonton. His brilliant dash 
and rapid movements will undoubtedly immortalize him. 

"8 a.m. In position at Aquia Church." 

It is fair to presume that he failed to receive your orders to push on, otherwise 
I cannot account for his movements at aU. I sent him a dispatch, of which I 
inclose a copy [following]. General Couch has been ordered to withdraw his 
infantry. 

Inclosure 
Butterfield to Pleasonton, Aquia Church, February 26, 10:15 a.m. 

I don't know what you are doing there. Orders were sent you at 11 p.m. last 
night, by telegraph and orderlies, to push for the enemy without delay, and to 
communicate with General Stoneman at Hartwood. The enemy have recrossed 
the river, at Kelley's Ford probably, and Averell is pursuing them. Get your 
orders from Stoneman. 

Stoneman intended, with General Hooker's permission, to resort to 
the miserable protective measui-e of destroying the Rappahannock 
Railroad Bridge. He sent to General Couch, commanding the II Corps, 
for axes, which were promptly forwarded, but before they arrived, he 
received the following order from Butterfield, dated 6 :30 a.m. : 

... in the event of your inability to cut off the enemy's cavalry, you will 
follow them to their camp and destroy them.' 

He moved with all the force that he had at Hartwood, except 500 men, 
to the vicinity of Kelley's Ford, determined to cross the river, if possi- 
ble, the following morning. On the march he learned from Pleasonton 
that he and Averell were at Morrisville with their divisions. About 
4 :45 he was freed of the unpleasant prosi^ect of a morning swim in the 
Rappahannock by the receipt of the following order dated 12 :30 p.m. : 

1 W. R., 39, p. 23. 



FEDERAL PURSUIT 69 

Tlie major-general commanding directs that in case the enemy lias recrossed 
the Rappahannock and are [sic] on the other side, yon will return with all yonr 
command to eamp.^ 

He communicated this order to Pleasontou and Averell, with instruc- 
tions to carry it into effect after it had been ascertained beyond a doubt 
that "the enemy had recrossed the river and was on the other side." 
On receiving a note from Pleasonton assuring him that there was no 
doubt on that point, he ordered all the troops to return at once to camp. 

A correspondent of the New York Herald wrote from Falmouth with 
reference to these operations : 

. . . enough is known, Feb. 26, to establish tlie opinion that it was the deter- 
mination of General Stuart to make his way to Potomac Creek, and destroy the 
expensive railroad bridge over which the supplies of this army are now conveyed 
in most part. 

In tliis he was successfully foiled, and his retreat across the river was accom- 
plished just in time to save his force from destruction, inasmuch as the rain of 
last niglit had caused a rise in the stream, rendering it impossible to ford. 

Whether or not such a view was generally held in the Army of the 
Potomac, it does not appear to have been justified. Fitzhugh Lee's ob- 
ject was to locate the masses of Hooker's troops. In this he seems to 
have been successful. 

The following dispatch of 12 m. from the commander of the III Corps 
to the Adjutant-General of the Army of the Potomac throws an interest- 
ing light on the fight made by the Federal outposts : 

Colonel Bailey, commanding outposts, reports that after examining the dragoons 
whom he arrested yesterday for shamefully passing through his lines to the rear 
when attacked by the enemy, and finding some of them hurt by falling from their 
horses and one wounded, he let them go. The orders received last night will be 
strictly observed in the case of other stampeders who fall into Colonel Bailey's 
hands. - 

Probably before daylight Butterfield was in receipt of the following 
dispatch from Heintzelman : 

I have ordered the cavalry at Fairfax Court-House, about 600 strong, to leave 
camp immediately for Rappahannock Station, to be supported by the force leav- 
ing camp to-morrow [8 a.m., 26th]. 

What this cavalry, 600 strong, did is not known. The main force of 
2000, which was to start this morning, consumed the day getting to- 
gether at Centreville and rebuilding a bridge across Bull Eun.^ This 

1 iy j}_^ 39^ p. 24. Va., W. R., 39, pp. 38-40; Ilistoric Records 

2 /6., 107, p. 988. of the 5 N. T. Cavalry, by Rev. L. N. Bou- 

3 Scout from Centreville to Falmonth, di-ye, p. 51. 



70 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

force, whicli was placed under the command of Colonel Wjaidham, 
started from Centreville (Map 1, sheet A) about 6 a.m. on the 27th, or 
about twenty- four hours after Fitzhugh Lee recrossed the Rappahan- 
nock. Wyndham was ordered ' ' to move toward Catlett 's and Rappahan- 
nock Stations for the purpose of intercepting the enemy.'" He fol- 
lowed the Warrenton Road across Bull Run and then halted until 10 
o 'clock to await the arrival of the remainder of his force. On account 
of the flooded state of the country he kept on by the Warrenton Road, 
a much better one than any leading to the railroad. He arrived 
at Warrenton about 3:30 p.m., and met a small squad of the enemy's 
cavalry, who dispersed after exchanging a few shots with his advance. 
Taking the Falmouth Stage Road, he pushed on to the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad, and turning to the right, followed the railroad 
for about a mile, which brought him to Licking Creek (Map 6). This 
stream being too deep to be forded, he went into camp for the night, 
and shortly afterward noticed squads and videttes of the enemy on the 
opposite side of it. In the course of the night he heard that there was 
a force of the enemy at Elkton and Spotted Tavern, but did not learn 
that Fitzhugh Lee had recrossed the Rappahannock. So at 6 o'clock 
on the morning of the 28th he took up the march for Elkton. On the 
way there he learned "that the main force of the enemy had already 
crossed the Rappahannock, taking with them 100 prisoners,"- and that 
therefore the accomplishment of the object prescribed to him, the 
interception of the enemy, was impossible. He did not think, it 
would seem, of following the enemy across the Rappahannock. His 
forage had given out. a portion of his command not having brought 
any with it. So instead of returning directly to Fairfax Court-House, 
he continued his march to Falmouth, where he arrived about 2 p.m., 
having marched about 90 miles over roads heavy with mud and snow.^ 
Later in the day the following report of his movements and intentions 
was telegraphed by Butterfield to Heintzelman : 

Colonel "Wyndham arrived liere this morning with his force, via Warrenton, 
Rappahannock Station, and the Post road. Reports his command in good con- 
dition. Has a few prisoners — a corporal and 6 privates. Lost 1 horse only, by 
accident. He has been provided with rations and forage. Proposes to rest to- 
morrow, and return on Monday [March 2]. Please inform General Hooker, if 
he is still in Washington.* 

With reference to certain statements in this dispatch, it may be 
remarked that Wyndham did not go within 7 miles of Rappahannock 

1 TF. E., 107, p. 988. nel Gray, 6 Mich. Cavalry, W. R., 39, pp. 

2 lb., 39, p. 38. 39, 40. 

^ Wyndham's rejiort. and report of Colo- * Hooker went to Washington on the 27tb. 



WYNDHAM MARCHES TO FALMOUTH 71 

Station, and that when he reached Falmouth, his command could not 
have been ' ' in good condition. ' ' 

On the 1st of March he sent the following report to Heintzelraan's 
adjutant-general from Falmouth: 

Having marched 90 miles in less than 48 hours' in endeavoring to accomplish 
the object for which I was sent out, it would be advisable to let my command 
rest for the day, where they have plenty of forage, at Falmouth -Station. Will 
march at 6 o'clock to-morrow. If absolutely necessary can start immediately. If 
so, please telegraph. Roads very bad.^ 

About 7 : 30 a.m. on the 2d the command started on the return march. 
It proceeded through Stafford Court-House and halted for the night 
about 4 miles south of Wolf Shoals (Map 1, sheet A). 

The next day, March 3, Wyndham crossed the Occoquan at Wolf 
Shoals, and returned to his camp, having broken down many horses 
and accomplished nothing. 

This dash of Confederate cavalry, designated in the War Records 
as the Skirmish at Hartwood Church, and the manner in which it 
was met, are interesting evidence as to the relative efficiency of the two 
opposing cavalries. They show that Hooker's and Heintzelman's 
horsemen, and their commanders, had something to learn before tjiey 
would be up to the standard of Lee's. It is plain that the country be- 
yond the Federal outposts was not adequately patrolled, and that the 
troops were not proficient in turning out suddenly and promptly and 
getting on the march. There appeared, too, to be something wrong 
about the ways and means of transmitting orders and intelligence. 
This circumstance accounts for the issuing of the following order : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Falmouth, Va., March 3, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 18 : 

III. Citizens, non-residents, will not be allowed to remain within the lines of 
this army without a permit from the provost-marshal-general. 

XIII. Important information from the outposts or advices regarding move- 
ments of the enemy must not be delayed in transmission. All reports of this 
character must be marked upon the envelope "important," and exertions made 
to hasten their arrival at headquarters. While the telegraph must be made use 

1 In his final report, Wyiidham gives the to be 96 miles. The time occupied was less 

distance marched as 80 miles and the time than 30 hours, allowinar for the halt at Bull 

as 31 hours {W. R., 39, p. 39). Colonel Run, Friday moming (27th), and includins: 

Gray. 6 Mich. Cavalry, says regarding this about 12 hours' halt on the Orange and 

part of the operation: "During the march Alexandria Railroad, Friday night. . . . 

from Centreville to Falmouth Station, we On Saturday morning (28th) we marched 

made frequent deviations from the direct 25 miles without any halt." 

road. The distance thus marched was said - W. R., 107. p. 988. 



72 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

of to transmit such intelligence, dispatching duplicates by couriers nnist not be 
omitted where the sliglitest possible doubt exists as to certain and correct trans- 
mission by telegraph. 

The recent operations elicited from Stoneman on the 28th the follow- 
ing representation and suggestion to the Adjutant-General of the Army 
of the Potomac : 

There are now in the cavalry corps about 12,000 men and 13,000 horses 
present for duty. The last return showed 11,955 enlisted men and 13,875 horses. 
The line this force has to guard is but little less than 100 miles. One third on 
duty at one time gives 40 men to the mile on post at one time, and one third of 
these gives 13 to the mile on post at one time. Considering the condition of the 
roads, it is a good day's march to get out to the line and another to return, so 
that actually the horses are out one half the time or more. Added to this the 
fact that frequently the whole cavalry force is in the saddle for several days 
together, and it will be perceived that but little more than one third of the time 
is allowed tlie horses in which to recruit. 

I consider it my duty to call these facts to the attention of the general com- 
manding for his information, which I should have done before, perhaps, but for 
the thought that I might possibly be considered as complaining. 

The above communication brought about changes in the cavalry 
outposts. A new line was taken up, as indicated in the following let- 
ters, which, it will be seen, provide for a more frequent use of ex- 
ploring or reeonnoitering patrols: 

Stoneman to Averell, March 2 

Your picket line will, imtil further orders, be as follows : Its left commencing 
with the infantry pickets on the Rappahannock River, and extending up the 
river to a point near Rocky Pen Creek; thence in front of Berea Church to 
Guy's Old Tavern, and thence to a point near the headwaters of Accakeek 
Creek, where you will connect with the left of the First Division. 

. . . Patrols, mounted on the best horses, will be sent out on all the main ap- 
proaches sufficiently often to keep you well informed of what is going on in your 
front. These patrols will not only watch all the main approaches, but will 
examine and thoroughly inspect the intervening country between these ap- 
proaches. 

To Pleasonton 

. . . Your left will connect with the right of the Second Division at a point 
near the headwaters of Accakeek Creek, and from thence northward to some 
point some 2 or 3 miles in front of the outposts of the force at Dumfries, and as 
much farther northward as you may think safety requires. . . . 

Stoneman was called upon for an exact report of the forces en- 
gaged and the losses sustained in the recent operations; of the 
movements in full of each portion of the command, "and the delay 
of any portion to execute promptly and completely the part assigned 



CONSEQUENCES 73 

it, together with the reasons therefor.'" In compliance with these 
instructions he submitted a report on the 4th of March, inclosing a 
report by General Averell, which has disappeared from the ofiScial 
records. Stoneman says: 

The movements of General Averell, until I found him near Hartwood Church, 
were made in accordanee witli instructions received from headquarters, and I 
presumed there was no delay. 

The movements of Captain Cram, commanding Reserve Brigade, were ex- 
tremely prompt and satisfactory. Those of General Pleasonton were delayed, as 
he reports, by the non-arrival of the telegram directing him to push forward, 
though the two previous telegrams reached him with dispatch." 

Fitzhugh Lee and Averell had been at West Point together three 
years and were warm personal friends. When Lee withdrew he left 
with his surgeon a note to Averell, which the surgeon, as he recrossed 
the Federal lines, delivered to a picket. It read about as follows : 

I wisli you would put up your sword, leave my state, and go home. You ride 
a good horse, I ride a better. Yours can beat mine running.^ If you won't go 
home, return my visit, and bring me a sack of coffee.* 

Fitzhugh Lee's note was promptly delivered, and General Averell 
determined to answer it at the first opportunity. Hooker heard of 
this note being sent to Averell, and rode over to the latter 's head- 
quarters to pay him a visit. The conversation turned upon the dash 
made by the enemy's cavalry against Hartwood Church, and Averell, 
somewhat nettled by it, asked Hooker for an order to cross the river 
and settle accounts with Fitzhugh Lee. Hooker realized that no system 
of outposts would prove efficient protection against an aggressive 
and enterprising enemy who was determined to penetrate them, and 
that the only way to put a stop to the harassing of his pickets, and 
alarming of his camps, was to retaliate by vigorously attacking the 
enemy's cavalry. He assured Averell that his request would be granted, 
and that very soon. How far Hooker sympathized with Averell's 
impatience to get even with Fitzhugh Lee, and how much he desired 
on his own part to settle the question of relative prowess and efficiency 
between his newly created cavalry corps and Stuart's veteran cavalry 
division, or to inform himself regarding the terrain and the enemy 
south of the Upper Rappahannock, are debatable questions. It may 
be asserted, however, that not one of these objects was viewed by 
Hooker as an end in itself, and that so far as he considered any of 
them he regarded them as means to giving rest to his pickets and 
security to his army. 

1 W. B., 39, p. 22. = lb., 39, p. 24. 

3 Referring to the speed with which the Federal pickets gave way when attacked. 

* Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle, 2d Series, pp. 38-44. 



74 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

It was on the occasion of this interview between Averell and Hooker 
that Hooker made the remark which was reported and circulated as 
"Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" What he said was something 
to the effect that there had not been many dead cavalrymen lying 
aroimd lately, and that if Averell should meet and defeat Lee there 
would be. He did not mean to cast any reflection on the cavalry nor 
to give rise to a standing joke on that arm of the service. 



CHAPTER Vn 

MOSBY AND HIS MEN. CAPTURE OF GENERAL STOUGHTON. TRANSFER OF 
GENERAL STAHEL 

IN the minor operations attending tlie preparation for a general 
movement no one played a more prominent part than John S. 
Mosby, who came upon the theater of war as a commander a few weeks 
before Hooker. At the commencement of the war Mosby was a prac- 
tising lawyer. He entered the army as a private of cavalry, and rose 
to the position of adjutant of his regiment. Being thrown out of that 
ofiSce by the reorganization of the regiment, he was selected by J. E. 
B. Stuart as an independent scout. He was the first Confederate to 
make the circuit of McClellan's army while in front of Richmond, and 
by the information thus acquired he enabled Stuart to make his cele- 
brated Chickahominy raid, accompanying him as a guide. 

The independent scout of the American Civil War had no counter- 
part in European warfare. He seems to have done most of the service 
which in European armies devolved, and still devolves, upon the 
officers' patrol. He was not uncommonly dressed in the uniform of 
the enemy, and consequently when caught plying his vocation, a spy 
to all intents and purposes.' Mosby says in his War Reminiscences 
(p. 24) that he always wore the Confederate uniform with the insignia 
of his rank. If such was the case, he wore that uniform when he was 
not entitled to wear it. 

During the autumn of 1862, not holding any commission in the 
Confederate service, he asked Stuart from time to time to let him have 
a few men with whom to operate against the enemy's communications. 
His request was not granted imtil Stuart was about going into winter 
quarters after the campaign of Fredericksburg, when he gave him 
nine troopers. To these Mosby afterward added three or four civilian 
volunteers. This mongrel squad (a guerilla chief, a few guerilla fol- 
lowers, and nine soldiers) commenced on the 10th of January operating 
against the outposts of Washington. In a few days it succeeded in 
making a capture of half a dozen men and sixteen horses. These were 

1 "Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised within, or lurking about, the lines of the 
in the dress of the country, or in the uni- captor, are treated as spies, and suffer 
form of the army hostile to their own, em- death" (General Orders, No. 100, War De- 
ployed in obtaining information, if found partment, Washington, April 24, 1863). 

75 



76 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

sent to General Fitzliugh Lee, who was stationed with his brigade at 
Culpeper Court- House. Mosby then reported to Stuart in the vicinity 
of Fredericksburg, and obtained from him a detail of 15 men, with 
whom and a few guerillas he started again on the 15th of January to 
harry the Federal pickets. He succeeded again in taking a number of 
prisoners, and caused the commander of the outposts. Colonel Percy 
Wyndham, to advance with 200 men against him before he retired.^ 

Hereafter Mosby 's men were habitually recruited by himself from 
the country. They wore as uniform when on duty "something gray,"^ 
but when off duty they lived at or near their homes, wearing usually 
the dress of the country or a semi-uniform that could hardly be dis- 
tinguished from it. Their homes were known to Mosby, and generally 
to one another. When a meet was desired that had not been appointed 
at the last disbanding, word of the time and place was sent to one 
house, and the men who were there would bear it to others. In this 
way a hundred men could be gathered together in a few hours. 

As to arms, each of Mosby 's men habitually carried two Colt's revol- 
vers. None carried a carbine, and very few a saber. They were expert 
pistol-shots, but had practically no training in the use of the saber. They 
natiarally had the greatest confidence in the former weapon, and little 
or none in the latter. Their expertness with the pistol gave them, 
especially in the early part of the war, a great advantage over their 
enemies. Their irregular tactics, too, had peculiar advantages. "Dur- 
ing the twelve months of my service," writes a Mosby veteran, "I 
learned but four commands— fall in and count off by fours, march, 
close up, and charge. There was another movement which we were 
not altogether unfamiliar with, an order technically known as the 
'skedaddle,' but I never heard the command given. The rangers 
seemed to know instinctively when that movement was appropriate ; . . . 
when the Yankees broke they would always run in a bunch, and all 
we had to do was to follow and pick them up. . . . But when we found 
it necessary to leave the scene of action, each man found his own salva- 
tion, and 'struck for home and fireside' by his own particular path."^ 
When Mosby 's men were routed they would dissolve, leaving nothing 
to follow. 

On his last expedition, Mosby had a number of men who had accom- 
panied him on his first raid and in the meantime had lived as peaceful 

'For "Wyndham's and Mosby's reports, (p. 50) Chaplain L. N. Boudrye gives the 

see W. a., 39, p. 5. Wyndham says that number of Federals captured as 11, and 

he captured 24 of Mosby's men. Mosby the number of Confederates as 25. 

says that he lost but 3. According to - Reminiscences of a Mosby Guerilla, by 

Mosby, he inflicted a loss on Wyndham of J. W. Munson, p. 25. 

1 killed and 12 captured. Wyndham gives ^ Mosby's Men, by .John H. Alexander, 

his loss as 1 wounded and 9 captured. In pp. 19, 20. 
Historical Records of the 5 N. T. Cavalry 



MOSBY'S COMMAND 77 

citizens at their homes. Such combatants are not Partisans, but gueril- 
las. Mosby himself, not holding any commission from the Confederate 
government, nor being enrolled in any Confederate army, had no right, 
if captured, to the treatment due to a prisoner of war.' 

Against a mode of warfare such as he was instituting there was 
no defence but devastation; and the Federal commander. Colonel 
Wyndham, naturally, and proj^erly, threatened to resort to it. As a 
consequence, a numlier of prominent Southern citizens united in pre- 
senting to Mosby a petition requesting him to depart from their section 
of country, but it only drew from him the following reply: 

Fauquier County, February 4, 1863. 
Gentlemen: 

I have just received your petition requesting me to discontinue my warfare on 
the Yankees, because they have threatened to burn your town and destroy your 
property in retaliation for my acts. Not being prepared for any such degrading 
compromise with the Yankees, I unhesitatingly refuse to comply. My attacks on 
scouts, pati'ols, and pickets, which have provoked this threat, are sanctioned 
both by the custom of war and the practice of the enemy, and you are at liberty 
to inform them that no such clamors shall deter me from employing whatever 
legitimate weapon I can most efficiently use for their annoyance.^ 

There was no sanction either in a "custom of war" or in a "practice 
of the enemy" for disbanding to live in the guise of civilians between 
operations or for serving without a commission. But Wyndham did 
not carry his threat into execution, and Mosby pursued his career with 
impunity. 

About 4 'clock on the morning of the 26th of February, with 27 men, 
he drove in a Federal outpost at Thompson's Corner, about 5 miles 
from Fairfax Court-House (Map 1, sheet A), capturing about 50 men. 
He was driven off and pursued as far as Middleburg, but not punished.* 

1 "81. Partisans are soldiers armed and soldiers— such men or squads of men are 
wearing the uniform of their ai-my, but be- not public enemies, and therefore, if cap- 
longing to a corps which acts detached from tured, are not entitled to the privilege of 
the main body for the purpose of making prisoners of war, but shall be treated sum- 
inroads into the temtoi-y occupied by the marily as highway robbers or pirates" 
enemy. If captured, they are entitled to (General Orders, No. 100, War Depart- 
all the privileges of the prisoners of war. ment, Washington, April 24, 1863). 

"Men or squads of men who commit hos- ^ Partisan Life with Colonel John S. 

tilities, whether by fighting or inroads for Mosby, by Major John Scott, p. 27. This 

destruction or plunder, or by raids of any letter is not published in the War Records, 

kind, without commission, without being but is apparently referred to along with 

part and portion of the organized hostile other documents in Mosby's report, W. E., 

anny, and without sharing continuously in 39, p. 5. 

the war, but who do so with intennitting ^ TT'. B., 39, p. 37; Partisan Life with 

returns to their homes and avocations or Colonel John S. Mosby, by Major John 

with the occasional assumption of the sem- Scott, p. 35; Camp and Field Life of the 

blance of peaceful pursuits, divesting them- 5 2V. Y. Volunteer Infantry, Dtm/ee Zou- 

selves of the character or appearance of aves, by Alfred Davenport, p. 371. 



78 THE CA3IPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

On the 2d of March two companies of the 1 Vermont Cavah-j', which 
had gone in search of Mosby, were surprised by their intended captive 
at Aldie while they were feeding their horses. The captains of both 
companies and about 200 horses and men were captured.^ Mosby re- 
lieved himself of his prisoners and booty by sending them to Culpeper 
Court-House, where they were turned over to Fitzhugh Lee, and then 
proceeded to an enterprise which was to prove the most remarkable 
foray of the war. 

Between Centreville and Fairfax Court-House was a brigade of Fed- 
eral infantry, with artillery and cavalry. At Centreville was the 
extreme outpost of Washington. From this point the line extended to 
the right by Frying Pan and Dranesville to the Potomac, and to the 
left to Union Mills and Fairfax Station. The force manning and 
supporting it was under the command of Brigadier-General Henry 
E. Stoughton, U. S. Volunteers. This officer was not twenty-five years 
old. He graduated from West Point in 1859 and served in the 6 U. S. 
Infantry until 1861, when he resigned from the regular army and be- 
came colonel of the 4 Vt. Volunteers. He won his brigadier-generalcy 
in the Peninsula campaign. His appointment dated from the 5th of 
November, 1862, but not being confirmed by the Senate, it was to 
expire by constitutional limitation on the 4th of March. His head- 
quarters were at Fairfax Station, his quarters at Fairfax Court- 
House. Both were about 2 miles in rear of the main body of his com- 
mand and about 8 miles in rear of his outer line of sentinels, or pickets. 
The line of the Federal pickets was not continuous. As if under a pre- 
sentiment of what was going to happen, Stoughton wrote to Heintzel- 
man's adjutant-general March 1 : 

I have discovered that our cavalry pickets do not keep up a connected line on 
our right. Thus, the right picket of Colonel Wyndhani's right rests on the Ox 
road ; then there is an opening of a mile or two before reaching the left picket of 
the command at Dranesville. This should be remedied, as it gives free ingress and 
egress to any wishing to give intelligence to the enemy. If anything transpires 
I will inform you. Last night about 9 o'clock, while I was at headquarters, at 
the station, a man, undoubtedly a spy, was at the court-house, dressed as a cap- 
tain. He interrogated all my servants minutely respecting the troops in the 
vicinity, asking if I kept my horse saddled in the night, and other suspicious 
questions. 

And again at 9 : 55 p.m. the same day : 

... it is absolutely essential to the entire security of the commands in this 

vicinity that the women and otlier irresponsible persons in this neighborhood be 

compelled to take the oath, or placed outside the lines. I cannot fix upon any 

person or persons who are culpable, yet I am perfectly satisfied that there are 

' W. R., 39, pp. 41. 42, 1121. 



START FOR FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE 79 

those here who, by means known to themselves, keep the enemy informed of all 
our movements. Soldiers in the Southern service have even gone so far as to pay 
their families in the vicinity visits, for a week at a time, without its being dis- 
covered ; and the few Union people there fear to give the intelligence they would 
like to, lest the rebels should be informed of it, should they again get possession 
of this country, by their neighbors, who are watchful spies, notwithstanding they 
have subscribed to the oath. 

No attention, it seems, was paid to these representations; at any 
rate, the changes which they suggested, or called for, were not made. 
Stoughton was perhaps imprudent under the circumstances in not 
taking quarters further within his lines. 

On the 8th of March Mosby was joined at Aldie, his appointed ren- 
dezvous, by 29 men, and with this force he started late in the afternoon 
and in a drizzling rain for Fairfax Court-House. He had as guide 
a deserter by the name of Ames, lately a sergeant in the 5 N. Y. Cav- 
alry, stationed at Fairfax Court-House. Having followed the turn- 
pike about 8 miles, he halted to await the approach of night. When he 
resumed his march, darkness, combined with rain, furnished him an 
impenetrable screen, and a melting snow deadened the sound of his 
horses' hoofs. About 3 miles from Chantilly he turned off the turn- 
pike to the right, slipped through the opening in the outer picket line 
of the cavalry, and gained the Warrenton Turnpike about half-way 
between Centreville and Fairfax Court-House. Here he cut the tele- 
graph wires by which the force at Centreville might communicate 
with its support at Fairfax Court-House. He had no difiSculty in 
pursuing his way. Nowhere did he meet with resistance. In the inky 
darkness it was impossible to tell from their appearance to which side 
his, men belonged. The names of the cavalry regiments stationed along 
the line were known to him. Whenever he was challenged the answer 
was, "Fifth New York Cavalry," and it was all right. There was no 
countersign out.^ Proceeding a short distance toward the court-house, 
he turned off to the right, passed around to the left of a corps directly 
in his front, continued past the town, and came into the latter by the 
eastern or near entrance about 2 o'clock in the morning. He had in- 
tended to reach the court-house at 12 o 'clock, but in the darkness of the 
night a portion of his command had become separated from him and 
caused him a loss of two hours before he could reunite with it. 

On reaching the court-house square the men were detailed in squads 
which were sent, some to the stables to collect the horses which were 
known to be there, others to the different quarters of the officers. 
Mosby was particularly anxious to capture Colonel Wyndham. He 
says: 

1 Report of Lieutenant D. L. O'Connor, Provost-Marshal, published in Mosby's 
Rangers, by J. J. Williamson, pp. 46, 47. 



80 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The commander of the Union cavalry at that time was Colonel Percy Wynd- 
ham, an English adventurer, who, it was said, had served with Garibaldi. He 
had been greatly exasperated by my midnight forays on his outposts and mor- 
tified at his own unsuccessful attempts at reprisal. In consequence he had sent 
me many insulting messages. I thought I would put a stop to his talk by gob- 
bling him up in bed and sending him off to Richmond. "^ 

It was found that Colonel Wyndham had gone to Washington that 
evening by the railroad, and so was not to be caught. The irony of 
fate made Ames the captor of his former commander (Captain Barker 
of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry). Brigadier-General Stoughton was found 
asleep in his bed, and required to get up and dress himself and go 
along. After spending about an hour making captures, Mosby started 
with his prisoners and booty toward Fairfax Station to deceive his 
pursuers. Having gone about half a mile, he turned off at right angles, 
and made for the pike leading from the court-house to Centreville (the 
Warrenton Pike), cutting telegraph wires as he went. He reached 
the pike about 4 miles from Centreville, and followed it at a fast trot 
about 31/^ miles, when he came upon the smouldering camp-fire of 
a Federal picket abandoned a short time before. Dawn was just begin- 
ning to break. He jiassed the deserted picket, turned off the pike to 
his right, and proceeded past Centreville, leaving that place on his left. 
The camps were all quiet; there was no sign of alarm; his men could 
see the cannon bristling through the embrasures of the redoubts not 
more than two or three hundred yards away, and heard a sentinel on the 
parapet call them to halt, but paid no attention to him. As Mosby 's 
prisoners outnumbered his own men, and he was coming from the direc- 
tion of the cavalry camp, the sentinels doubtless mistook his column for 
a body of Federal cavalry going out on a scout." 

Soon after he had passed out of the Federal lines he came upon 
Cub Run, which was so swollen by the melting snow and rain that he 
was compelled to swim it. Proceeding through Sudley Springs, he 
came back into the Warrenton Turnpike at Groveton, and followed it 
to Warrenton. 

Early this morning an expedition was fitted out by the Federals to 
capture Mosby by stratagem. Four men from each of the ten companies 
of the 42 Pa. Volunteers (Bucktails) were detailed for this service. 
They were formed in four squads and placed in four army wagons, in 
which they were concealed by the canvas sheets. The train of wagons 
was escorted by a plainly insufficient detachment of cavalry (1 R. I.). 

1 Mosby's account published in the Bel- I surmise that their offensiveness lay in a 

ford Magazine (no longer extant), 1892, just characterization of Mosby's methods as 

and quoted at length in Mosby's Rangers, those of a guerilla and bushwhacker. J. B. 

by J. J. Williamson. None of the "insult- Jr. 

ing messages" have come under niv eve, but ° Mosbv's account. 



CAPTURE OF STOUGHTON 81 

Proceeding down the pike under the guidance of a civilian Unionist 
called "Yankee" Davidson, everything went peacefully; the party put 
up for the night in a barn. Hardly, however, was the expedition under 
way the next morning (March 10) when the cavalry in the advance 
ran into some of Mosby's men, and immediately retreated upon the 
wagons. The Bucktails, lying in their places of concealment, heard 
the cavalry come racing back, and naturally judged that the guerillas 
were in full pursuit. Leaping to their feet, they threw back the 
curtains of the wagons and blazed away. Instantly the Confederates 
realized the trap set for them, and not being too near, wheeled about 
and escaped. The hook having been seen, it was not to be expected 
that the prey would bite a second time, so this attempt to catch it was 
given up. The wagons, with their disappointed passengers and escort, 
returned to Fairfax Court-House.' 

The same day Mosby reported with his conmaand, and prisoners, 
and booty, to Fitzhugh Lee at Culpeper Court-House, where Stuart 
arrived in the course of the day from Fredericksburg. Some of his 
prisoners had escaped. He turned over to Fitzhugh Lee, besides 
Stoughton, 1 captain and 30 privates.^ It is probable that at the time of 
his capture Stoughton had not received notification of his non-con- 
firmation, and so was still practically a brigadier-general. The vacant 
colonelcy in the 4 Vt. had been filled.^ Referring to the capture of 
Stoughton, Mosby says: 

I was never able to duplicate this adventure ; it was one of those things a man 
can do only once in a lifetime. The Northern cavalry got too smart to allow the 
repetition. My calculation of success was based upon the theory that, to all 
appearances, it was impossible. It was charged at the time that citizens of the 
place Mere in collusion with me, and had given the information on which I had 
acted. It was not true ; I had had no communication with any one there.'' 

At Fairfax Court-House there resided a Mr. Ford, with whom 
several of Stoughton 's staff officers boarded. Mr. Ford had a young, 
good-looking daughter. Whether this had anything to do with the 
patronage of Mr. Ford's board by the officers must be left to conjec- 
ture. At any rate, Miss Ford made herself very agreeable to her 
guests, impressing them as a loyal L^nion woman. She was permitted 
to visit a lady cousin outside of the Federal lines ; and this cousin was 
permitted to visit her at Fairfax Court-House. On one of these visits, 
the cousin made a diagram of the house in which Stoughton was quar- 
tered and the surroundings, showing the positions of the troops, and 
this diagram, it seems, she gave to Mosby. 

^ History of the Bucktails, by 0. K. ^ Editorial foot-note, History of the Civil 

Thomson and W. R. Ranch, pp. 247, 248. War in America, by Comte de Paris, III, 12. 

2 W. R., 39, p. 44. * Belford Magazine, 1892 ; and Mosby's 

Bangers, by .T. .J. WilHamson, p. 46. 



82 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Miss Ford was arrested on suspicion by the Federal Detective Police, 
and sent North. On her person or at her residence were found a num- 
ber of private letters from officers and other persons in the Confederate 
service, eighty-seven dollars in Confederate bank-bills, and a commis- 
sion as honorary aide-de-camp to General Stuart.' 

Stoughton was taken South and confined in Libby Prison. He was 
released several weeks afterward, but the ridicule excited by his cap- 
ture had destroyed his military prospects. He resigned from the 
army, and entered upon the practice of law in New York City, where he 
died in 1868. 

The showing made by the Federals in this affair mortified both the 
army and the public. The New York Times, in its issue of March 16, 
commented on it as follows: 

The capture of General Stoughton in his bed by a party of rebel cavalry at 
Fairfax Court-House is another of those utterly disgraceful incidents with which 
this war has abounded. . . . Colonel Johnson,^ the cavalry ofScer in command of 
the post, was himself in bed, and undressed, and escaped in his shirt ^ by taking 
refuge in the roof of a barn. . . . 

We believe that in the regular army of any other coiintry such a thing as a 
cavalry officer in command of an outpost undressing and going to bed at night 
is unknown ; we believe, moreover, that there are but few military men in any 
well-ordered service who ever think under such circumstances of doing more than 
taking their coats off. 

One can at least understand Lincoln's remarking when informed 
that Mosby carried otf a number of horses: 

Well, I am sorry for that, for I can make brigadier-generals, but I can't make 
horses.* 

This exploit of Mosby 's elicited from General J. E. B. Stuart the 
following complimentary notice: 

Headquarters Cavalry Division, March 12, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 7 : 

Captain John S. Mosby "^ has for a long time attracted the attention of his 
generals by his boldness, skill, and success, so signally displayed in his numerous 

^ History of the U. S. Secret Service, by clothes under a stack of hay" {Histonj of 

General L. C. Baker, pp. 170 et seq.; His- the Civil War in America, III, 13). 

tory of the Army of the Potomac, by J. H. * History of the U. S. Secret Service, by 

Stine, p. 316. General L. C. Baker, p. 170. 

" Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, com- ^ The title is purely honorary. Mosby 

manding cavalry brigade. held no commission at this time. He had 

^ The report of Provost-Marshal O'Con- been offered by Governor Letcher a cap- 

nor says, "hi a nude state" (TF. B., 39, p. taincy in the Provisional Army of Virginia, 

43). The Comte de Paris says, "without an organization which had practically 



COMMENDATION 83 

forays upon the invaders of liis native state. None know his daring enterprise 
and dashing heroism better than those foul invaders, though strangers themselves 
to such noble traits. 

His late brilliant exploit, the capture of Brigadier-General Stoughton, U. S. 
Army, 2 captains,^ 30 other prisoners, together with arms, equipments, and 58 
horses, justifies this recognition in general orders. The feat, unparalleled in the 
war, was performed, in the midst of the enemy's troops at Fairfax Court-House, 
without loss or injury. 

The gallant band of Captain Mosby share the glory, as they did the danger, of 
this enterprise, and are worthy of such a leader.^ 

In order to strengthen Ms command for another foray Mosby pro- 
posed to take the dismounted men of Fitzhngh Lee's brigade, promis- 
ing to mount and equip them in return for a short term of service. 
His proposition was declined, and the dismounted men were sent under 
charge of one of their own officers to get horses and equipments from 
the enemy. The result was that they were all captured.^ 

On the 20th of March Major-General Stahel, promoted from 
Brigadier-General on the 17th, was relieved from duty with the Army 
of the Potomac, and ordered to report to Major-General Heintzelman, 
commanding the Department of Washington. He was temporarily 
succeeded in the command of the XI Corps by Major-General Carl 
Schurz, lately commanding its Third Division. On the 25th the three 
brigades of cavalry in the Department of Washington were organized 
as a division, which, together with the outposts lately commanded by 
Stoughton, was placed under the command of General Stahel. 
Colonel Wyndham was transferred to the Cavalry Corps of the Army 
of the Potomac. 

Mosby was not content to rest on his laurels. On the 16th he wrote 
to Stuart from near Middleburg, Va. : 

I start with my command to-day, to go down in the neighboi-hood of Dranes- 
ville. I expect to flush some game before returning. I have received several 
more recruits. 

Public sentiment seems now entirely changed, and I think it is the universal 
desire here for me to remain. 

Accordingly on the 16th, with about 50 men, he attacked a Federal 
outpost between Middleburg and Dranesville. The pickets gave the 
alarm, which brought up about 200 of their supporting cavalry. Mosby 
was driven off and pursued about 2 miles. Being then suitably 

ceased to exist, and this empty honor he by J. J. WilUamson, p. 47. For Confeder- 

had declined {Partisan Life with Colonel ate reports, see B^. B., 39, pp. 44, 1121 ; and 

John S. Mosby, bv Major .John Scott, p. 51) . 40, p. 667. 

1 Fitzhugh Lee said owe. ^Partisan Life with Colonel John S. 

" W. R., 40, p. 856. For Federal reports, Moshij, by Major John Scott, p. 53. 
see ih., 39, p. 43. and Moshy's Rangers. 



84 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

situated, he halted and prepared an ambush. His pursuers ran into it, 
were fired upon from front and flank, charged, and routed, with a loss 
according to Mosby of 5 killed, a considerable number wounded, and 
1 lieutenant and 35 men captured.' 

On the 17th he made a dash at Herndon Station on the Loudon and 
Hampton Railroad, surprised a picket of 1 officer and 25 men, and 
captured the whole of it, with 3 officers who happened to be visiting 
the post.^ Before this exploit came to the knowledge of President 
Davis, the latter had appointed him a Captain of Partisan Rangers 
in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States. 

Lee, hearing unofficially of this appointment, wrote to Davis on the 
21st, inclosing Mosby 's report of the affair at Herndon Station: 

You will, I know, be gratified to learn by the inclosed dispatch that the ap- 
pointment you conferred a few days since on Capt. J. S. Mosby was not un- 
worthily bestowed. ... I wish I could receive his appointment, or some official 
notification of it, that I might announce it to him. 

A few days later Mosby received the following communications : 

From the Adjutant-General, Army of Northern Virginia, March 23 

. . . the President has appointed you captain of Partisan Rangers. ... it is 
desired that you proceed at once to organize your company, with the understand- 
ing that it is to be placed on a footing with all troops of the line, and to be mus- 
tered unconditionally into the Confederate service for and during the war. 

Though yovi are to be its captain, the men will have the privilege of selecting 
the lieutenants so soon as its numbers reach the legal standard. Tou will report 
your progress from time to time, and when the requisite number of men are en- 
rolled, an officer will be designated to muster the company into the service.'' 

From Stuart, March 25, 1863 

. . . you will be continued in your present sphere of conduct and enterprise, and 
already a captain, you will proceed to organize a band of permanent followers 
for the war, but by all means ignore the term "Partisan Rangers." It is in bad 
repute. Call your command " Mosby 's Regulars," and it will give it a tone of 
meaning and solid worth which all the world will soon recognize, and you will 
inscribe that name of a fearless band of heroes on the pages of our country's 
history, and enshrine it in the hearts of a grateful people. Let " Mosby 's Regu- 
lars" be a name of pride with friends and respectful trepidation with enemies. 

You will have to be very much on your guard against incorporating in your 
command deserters from other branches of the service. Insist upon the most un- 
equivocal evidence of honorable discharge in all cases. Non-conscripts under and 
over age will be very advantageous. Their entry into service must be unconditional, 
excepting that you are their captain, and their lieutenants to be chosen by the 
men, provided no unworthy man be so chosen. As there is no time vnthin which 

I W. B., 39, p. 72. = 76.. 39, pp. 65, 66. " lb.. 40, pp. 856, 857. 



COMMENDATION 85 

you are required to raise this command, you ought to be very fastidious in choos- 
ing youi- men, and make them always stand the test of battle and temptation to 
neglect duty before acceptance. 

I was greatly obliged to you for the saddle of Stoughton. I wish you would 
send me whatever evidence you may be able to furnish of Miss Ford's innocence 
of the charge of having guided you in your exploit at Fairfax, so that I can insist 
upon her unconditional release. 

We must have that unprincipled scoundrel Wyndham. Can you catch him? 
Do not get caught. 

Be vigilant about your own safety, and do not have any established head- 
quarters anywhere but "in the saddle." 

Your praise is on every lip, and the compliment the President has paid you is 
as marked as it is deserved. 

Mosby was quite willing to have the title and commission of Cap- 
tain of Partisan Rangers, provided it would not prevent his being a 
guerilla, but nothing was further from his thoughts than being a Par- 
tisan—say nothing of being a regular. He knew that if he discarded 
the character of a guerilla he would greatly diminish, perhaps wholly 
stop, recruiting for his command; and that the numerous cavalry of 
the enemy would soon capture it. He wrote to Stuart : 

I have received from the War Office a notice of my appointment as Captain of 
Partisan Rangers. The letter of Captain Taylor [Adjutant-General] says that 
they are to be organized with the understanding that they are to be on the same 
footing with other cavalry. The men who have joined me have done so under the 
impression that they are to be entitled to the privileges allowed in the Partisan 
Ranger Act. If they are to be denied them, I can not accept the appointment. 
Please let me know.^ 

This letter was forwarded to Lee. 

On the 16th Pleasonton reported to Hooker the capture, between Dum- 
fries and Occoquan, of a Federal cavalry patrol consisting of a cor- 
poral and 6 privates. "It is recommended," he wrote, "that the rebel 
partisans and bushwhackers be cleared out from the vicinity of Occo- 
quan and Brentsville by a command from this division. One brigade 
and a couple of guns would be sufficient." Referring to this occurrence, 
General Stoneman wrote Hooker on the 17th: 

These annoyances will continue until some stringent measures are taken to 
clear that section of country of every male inhabitant, either by shooting, hang- 
ing, banishment, or incarceration. I had a party organized some time ago to do 
this, but the commanding general did not at that time think it advisable to send 
it out. A great portion of the country is of such a nature that it is impossible for 
' Partisan Life with Colonel John S. Mosby, by Major John Scott, p. 76. 



86 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

cavalry to operate in it, and to perform the duty properly will require the coop- 
eration of an infantry force. The country is infested by a set of bushwhacking 
thieves and smugglers who should be ei'adicated root and branch. 

Regarding these recommendations Hooker, on the 26th, wrote to 
Pleasonton: 

If there are any of the male portion of the community operating as bush- 
whackers or guerillas against our troops, and the facts can be proven, let them 
be arrested and brought in. The commanding general can not understand why 
our cavalry can not operate where the enemy's cavalry prove so active.^ 

In the meantime a blow had been struck by the Federal cavalry which 
brought some relief to Hooker's vexed and troubled outposts. This 
was the battle of Kelley 's Ford, to be described in the next chapter. 

On the 23d of March Mosby was again on the war-path. He had 
learned on his raid to Fairfax Court-House that the Federals had a 
force of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, about 3000 strong, posted at 
Ox Hill (Map 1, sheet A), with outposts at Frying Pan and Chantilly, 
each composed of about 100 men of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry. The force 
at Ox Hill was the General Reserve ; the forces at Frying Pan and Chan- 
tilly were the main reserves, or what we now call the supports. The 
latter were covered by pickets. Mosby 's object was to surprise the posts 
at Frying Pan and Chantilly. Starting from Rector's Cross-Roads, 
he followed the turnpike in the direction of Chantilly to within 6 miles 
of that point, and there turned off the road to the right. Proceeding 
across country to within about a mile of Chantilly, he surprised a picket 
of 10 men, killing 1 and capturing 7. Perceiving that the enemy was 
turning out to attack him, he withdrew precipitately, as if really re- 
treating, to a point between the Toll Gate and Cub Run, where the 
Federals had closed the turnpike with a barricade. Here he halted 
and formed a portion of his force dismounted behind the obstruction, 
and the remainder mounted in the woods lining the road. He was hotly 
pursued by the 5 N. Y. Cavalry. As the column, strung out along the 
road, approached the barricade, it was arrested by a fire of carbines 
and pistols in front and flank. It wavered and the next moment was 
charged and broken. Its fragments were chased about 3 miles, when 
they were reenforced by a reserve from Frying Pan, and Mosby was 
in turn put to flight. He was pursued about 8 miles, but not over- 
taken.2 

^ TF. B., 39, pp. 45, 46. posed to be about 80 strong. Every one 

^ A historian of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry says felt mortified at the result of this day's 

with reference to that organization in this work, and resolved to retrieve our fortunes 

affair: "For some reason the regiment never on some more fortunate occasion." 

acted with so little concert, and was never For Federal and Confederate reports, see 

so badly beaten by so small a force, sup- W. R., 39, pp. 70-73. The affair is desig- 



AFFAIR NEAR CHANTILLY 87 

For this affair Mosby was rewarded with the following commenda- 
tion sent him by Stuart on the 27th : 

Captain : 

Your telegram announcing your brilliant achievement near Chantilly was duly 
received and forwarded to General Lee. He exclaimed upon reading it, — "Hur- 
rah for Mosby ! I wish I had a hundred like him. ' '^ 

At the instance of General Lee he was appointed a major. He had 
not yet accepted his captain's commission, as he had not received any 
answer to the letter he had addressed to Stuart and which the latter had 
forwarded to Lee. The answer came in the form of the following in- 
dorsement by Lee: 

No authority has been given Major Mosby to raise partisan troops, nor has it 
been so intended. He was commissioned as such [major] to give him rank, pay, 
and command, until he could organize companies that could be mustered regu- 
larly into the service. He was so informed when his commission was sent him, to 
prevent mistake. His commission was limited to himself, and did not extend to 
his troops.- 

Not satisfioii with Lee's view of the matter, Mosby appealed to the 
Secretary of War, who decided that Mosby 's commission entitled him 
to recruit a command for the Partisan sei-vice.* Mosby thereupon ac- 
cepted his commission as captain. He did not receive his commission 
as major.^ 

On the 31st of March, returning from a scouting expedition, he 
arrived with 65 men at Miskell's Farm, near Dranesville. It was 10 
o'clock at night. Having ridden over 40 miles through snow and mud, 
his men and horses were exhausted. They went into a barn-yard sur- 
rounded by a high board fence, outside of which was another board 
fence encircling the farm. The men tumbled in upon the hay and under 
the eaves outside of the barn and fell asleep. None of the horses were 
saddled or bridled. No precautious were taken against surprise. 
There must have been some friend of the Federals, perhaps a negro, 
about the place, for that night Mosby 's location and numbers were 

nated as Skirmish on the Little River Turn- "294. The Secretary of War shall_ be 

pike near Chantilly, Va. authorized, if he deems proper, for a time 

1 Partisan Life with Colonel John S. or permanently, to exempt from the opera- 
Moshy, by Major John Scott, p. 62. tion of this act such companies as are serv- 

2 jf,_ p_ 76. ing within the lines of the enemy, and 
^ 7b., pp. 76. 77. under such conditions as he may prescribe." 
* The evils of Partisan ser\'ice led to the Mosby continued a guerilla under the 

repeal of the Partisan Ranger Act on the name of Partisan to the end of the war. 

17th of Febmai-y, 1864. But the repealing For the purpose of surrender, his command 

act assured the mamtenance of Mosby's was recognized by the Federals as a part of 

command and one or more similar bodies the Army of Northern Virg-iiiia, although it 

by the following provision : was never so regarded by the Confederates. 



88 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

reported to :\Iajor Taggart, commanding the Federal outpost at Union 
Church, who immediately dispatched Captain Flint, with 150 men of the 
1 Vt. Cavalry, to rout or capture Mosby and his force. 

Early the following morning one of Mosby 's men, who had been out 
looking around on his own account, came dashing into the barn-yard 
at Miskell's Farm, yelling: "Mount your horses! the Yankees are 
coming!" Before most of the sleepers had raised their weary heads 
Captain Flint with his men tore through the farm gate, and opened 
fire upon them with carbines. The fire, it seems, was delivered mounted ; 
at any rate it was ineffective, and Flint, perceiving the fact, ordered 
a charge. When this was checked by the fence inclosing the barn-yard, 
Mosby opened upon the disordered Federals with pistols, and pouring 
out of the gate of the barn-yard charged them with the Mosby yell. 
The Federals were panic-struck, and ran for the farm fence through 
which they had entered. The Confederates followed, shooting and 
yelling. They poured a murderous fire into the struggling, howling 
mob jammed in the narrow farm gate, and followed its fleeing fragments 
7 or 8 miles down the pike. Captain Flint was killed and a lieutenant 
mortally wounded. Mosby says that he left 25 killed and wounded on 
the field and brought off 82 prisoners. General Stahel, reporting the 
affair, says: "In comparison to the nmnber engaged, our loss was very 
heavy." He also says: "I regret to be obliged to inform the command- 
ing general that the forces sent out by Major Taggart missed so good 
an opportunity of capturing this rebel guerilla. It is only to be as- 
cribed to the bad management on the part of the officers and the 
cowardice of the men." In reporting the affair to President Davis, 
General Lee said: "I had the pleasure to send by return courier to 
Major Mosby his commission of major of Partisan Eangers. ..." 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE BATTLE OF KELLEY 's FORD 

A BOUT the 14th of March, Hooker gave Averell an order to take 
r\ 3000 cavalry and six pieces of artillery, and with that force to 
attack and rout or destroy "the cavalry forces of the enemy reported 
to be in the vicinity of Culpeper Court-House.'" 

The 17th of March, 1863, was a red-letter day for the cavalry of the 
Army of the Potomac; for on this day was fought at Kelley's Ford the 
first purely cavalry fight east of the Mississippi River in which more 
than one battalion was engaged on each side. In preparation for the 
event, Averell, the Federal commander, had instructed his men to have 
their sabers sharpened, and to use them. He promised them a victory.- 
Pursuant to Hooker's order, he left the main body of the army about 
8 a.m. on the 16th of March with portions of the 1st and 2d brigades 
of his division and of the reserve brigade, aggregating about 3000 men, 
and provided with four days' rations and one day's forage. About 
dark he arrived at Morrisville, 16 miles from camp. Here he bivouacked 
for the night, and, about 11 p.m., was joined by Martin's 6-gun battery 
of horse artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Browne, from the artillery 
camp near Aquia Creek. 

His orders were accompanied by reports of operations of the Con- 
federate cavalry in the vicinity of Brentsville, in which the number of 
the enemy was represented as from 250 to 1000 men. As a precaution 
he requested that a regiment of cavalry be sent to Catlett's Station 
(Map 1, sheet A), which he regarded as the key-point to the "middle" 
fords of the Rappahannock, to throw out pickets in the direction of 
Warrenton, Greenwich, and Brentsville; but as this request was not 
granted, he detailed the 1 Mass. and the greater part of the 4 Pa., to- 
gether about 900 men, to guard the fords and observe the enemy on 
the north side of the Rappahannock. It is hard to justify this weakening of 
his active force. He had no train or depot between himself and the Army 

1 The text of the order can not be found. - Captain D. M. Gilmore, 3 Pa. Cavalry, 

The gist of it is given as above in Averell's in Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle, 2d 
report of March 20 (TF. R., 39, p. 47) and Series, pp. 38^14. 
in Hooker's letter of May 13, transmitting 
it toKelton (ib., p. 1073). 



90 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

of the Potomac. There was nothing to be guarded in his rear except 
his line of retreat, and that he should have been able to open, if any 
force which the enemy could spare from his front had presumed to close 
it. He may have apprehended a movement in some force against his 
rear from the direction of the Shenandoah Valley. In that case he 
should, it seems, have contented himself with communicating his appre- 
hensions to Hooker, leaving it to him to provide such protection as 
might be necessary. 

Captain Hart of the 4 N. Y., with 100 picked men taken partly from 
that regiment and partly from the 5 U. S. Regulars, was ordered to 
proceed to Kelley's Ford as an advance-guard, and at the first glimpse 
of dawn on the 17th to dash across the river and capture the pickets 
on the south bank. His command was to be supported by the remainder 
of the 4 N. Y. In the course of the evening this regiment and the de- 
tachment of the 5 U. S. took position near the river. The advance was 
thus formed almost wholly of the 4 N. Y. (first New York German regi- 
ment). The reader may ask why Averell selected for so dangerous, diffi- 
cult, and important a service, a command which bore, to say the least, an 
imenviable reputation as to fighting, and which disgraced itself in the 
action at Hartwood Church only about three weeks before. 

About 11 a.m. on the 16th, Fitzhugh Lee, at Culpeper Court-House, 
received a telegram from R. E. Lee informing him that "a large body 
of cavalry had left the Federal army, and was marching up the Rappa- 
hannock. "^ By 6 p.m. his scouts had located this force at Morrisville, 
and reported the fact to him, but they left him in doubt as to whether 
the Federals would cross at Kelley's Ford or at Rappahannock Ford, 
or pursue their march toward Warrenton. He reenforced his picket 
of 20 sharpshooters at Kelley's Ford with 40 more, and ordered the 
remainder of his sharpshooters to be stationed at daylight where the 
road to the ford leaves the railroad and held ready to move to either 
crossing. About 4 a.m. on the 17th Averell started from Morrisville 
with the following command : 

MEN 

1st brigade, Second Division (4 N.Y., 6 0., 1 R. I.), Colonel Duffie ... 775 
2d brigade, Second Division (3 Pa., two squadrons of the 4 Pa., 16 Pa.), 

Colonel Mcintosh 565 

Reserve brigade (1 IT. S. and three squadrons of 5 U. S.-) , Captain Reno' . 760 

6 N. Y. Battery, First Division, Lieutenant Browne (6 pieces) 100 

Total 2.200 

The force left behind— 1 Mass. and four squadrons of the 4 Pa.— 
took post along the railroad between Bealeton and Catlett's Stations, 

1 Fitzhugh Lee's report, W. R., 39, p. 61. ' Who commanded a detachment of the 7 

- Companies C, E, O, H, I, K. U. S. Cavalry at the Custer massacre, 1876. 



MARCH TO KELLEY'S FORD 91 

with a reserve at Morrisville, and pickets at the fords and beyond the 
railroad. 

The Confederate force available to oppose Averell's consisted of 
Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry and Breathed 's battery of horse 
artillery (4 pieces). The brigade comprised at this time the 1st, 2d, 3d, 
4th, and 5th regiments of Virginia Cavalry. There were thus 5 regi- 
ments to oppose to Averell's 6% regiments; and 4 pieces to oppose to 
his 6. The Confederate regiments, however, were not as strong as the 
Federal. The author hesitates to state the numerical strength of the 
Confederates, there being a wide disagreement among authorities who 
have expressed themselves regarding it. Fitzhugh Lee does not give 
it in his official report, but in his Chancellorsville Address he says that 
he had less than 800 men in the saddle, and "less than 800" is the 
expression used by Stuart in his report to R. E. Lee for the number of 
men in action.' The Comte de Paris says that Fitzhugh Lee could not 
put more than 1000 sabers in line." Major D. A. Grimsley, 6 Va. Cav- 
alry, says, "Lee's brigade numbered perhaps 1200 in all," but he refers 
to it as occupying Culpeper Court-House and encamped in the vicinity 
of Brandy Station and Stevensburg, and does not state how much of it 
was assembled for this engagement.^ Major Frank W. Hess, 3 Artil- 
lery, who was a captain in the 3 Pa. Cavalry, calculates Fitzhugh Lee's 
force as about 1500 sabers." Rev. Frederic Denison, the historian of 
the 1 R. I. Cavalry, says that Lee's five regiments and horse artillery 
must have given him about 3000 effective men.^ D. M. Gilmore, late 
captain of the 3 Pa. Cavalry and a participant in the action, says : "The 
forces were nearly equal, about 3500 men and a battery on each side."® 
The correct number will probably be found between that of the Comte 
de Paris and that of Major Grimsley. Let us assimie that, including the 
artillery (which did not arrive until the action was about half over) 
and the men at the ford, Fitzhugh Lee's force aggregated 1100, or half 
as many as Averell's. 

Averell selected Kelley's Ford as the place of crossing because the 
country beyond it was better known to him than that beyond any other 
crossing, and it afforded the shortest route to the enemy's camp. When 
his column arrived near the ford, the cracking of carbines told that the 
passage of the river by the advance under Hart had not been effected. 
The head of the main column reached the ford about 6 a.m.'^ The river 
at this point was about 100 yards wide, four feet deep, and running 

1 -pfT-, jfj. 39^ p. 59. ^ Sabres and Spurs, by F. Denison, p. 

^History of the Civil War in America, 213. 

Y 25 26. * Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle, 2d 

3 Battles in Culpeper County, Virginia, Series, p. 42. 

by D. A. Grimsley, p. 7. ' Averell gives the hour as 8 a.m. (W. R., 

*The First Battle of Kelley's Ford, 39, p. 48) ; Lieutenant Browne as 6: 30 a.m.; 

First Maine Buqle, 1893. Colonel Mcintosh as 6 a.m.: General Fitz- 



92 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLB 

swiftly. The approach on both banks was obstructed by abatis. The 
southern bank was manned by the detachment of Fitzhugh Lee's sharp- 
shooters under Captain Breckinridge of the 2 Va. Cavalry and Com- 
pany K of the 4 Va. Cavalry, commanded by Captain Moss, the latter 
having come up this morning.^ These troops were in rifle-pits or in a 
dry mill-race, which in the present instance may be regarded and 
referred to as a rifle-pit. Deduction being made for horse-holders, 
Captain Breckinridge's command numbered about 45 and Captain 
Moss' about 85 men, or the two together about 130 men. 

Averell was indignant at finding that the surprise of the enemy's 
picket had not been attempted. The left bank of the river was traversed 
here for a short distance by a road which had been worn down to the 
depth of about three feet by long usage. Under cover afforded by this 
road, Hart 's command was firing at Moss ' men in the rifle-pits. 

On catching sight of the Federal column. Captain Breckinridge, com- 
manding the reroainder of the Confederate force, had mounted his men, 
and marched them to the rear to place his horses in a safe place. The 
first thing that suggested itself to Averell was to detach a small force 
to steal a passage above or below the ford, and take the enemy in rear. 
This he accordingly did, directing the movement below the ford. Major 
Chamberlain of the 1 Mass. Cavalry, his chief of staff, dashed down in 
the meantime to Captain Hart's command, and ordered it, including the 
main body of the 4 N. Y., to mount, form in column of fours, and follow 
him across the river. On reaching the river's bank he was arrested 
by the abatis and his command overwhelmed with fire. His horse was 
shot in three places and he himself in the face. His men recoiled and 
retreated rapidly up the bank. Sending to Averell for pioneers, he 
obtained 20 men of the 16 Pa. with axes, whom he put to work cutting 
away the abatis. Two dismounted squadrons were placed by Averell in 
the sunken road to cover the axemen with their fire. By this time a 
couple of field-pieces were unlimbered, and it would have been easy 
with their fire to demolish the enemy's defences and drive him beyond 
the range of his carbines. But to do this would have been to announce 
the point of crossing and the magnitude of the expedition to Fitzhugh 
Lee. So Averell contented himself with keeping up the fire of his two 
squadrons, numbering 100 men, with a view to preventing the enemy 
from rising to take aim. Under cover of this fire Major Chamberlain 

hugh Lee as about 5 a.m. (TF. E., 39, pp. time for the attack of the enemy (owing to 
48-61), and Frederic Denison as about day- an unnecessary delay in earrsring their 
light {Sabres and Spurs, p. 208). horses to the rear), which commenced 
1 General Fitzhugh Lee in his official re- about 5 a.m." But see the letter of Cap- 
port (W. R., 39, p. 61) makes no mention tain Moss in The Battle of Kelley's Ford, 
of Captain Moss' company, and says re- by J. B. Cooke, published by the Soldiers' 
garding Breckinridge's men: "Only about and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode 
11 or 12 of them got into the rifle-pits in Island. 



THE CROSSING 93 

again ordered the 4 N. Y. to follow hira, and dashed at the river. The 
trees had been only partially removed, for the fire from the sunken 
road had not sufficed to protect the Federal axemen ; and the fire from 
the enemy's rifle-pits had driven them from their work. It proved too 
hot for the men of the 4 N. Y., and they returned at breakneck speed. 

General Averell had placed himself on a little knoll to the left of the 
approach to the ford, and from this point overlooked and directed 
operations. His division stood in column of fours stretched out along 
the road, eagerly and anxiously looking for a chance to "mix in." The 
force detached to try a crossing below the ford had returned baffled 
by the depth and swiftness of the water and the precipitous character 
of the banks. There was nothing left to do but to force a crossing in the 
face of the enemy at the ford. 

It was impossible to get into or out of the river until the abatis was 
removed, and the work of cutting it away had to be done under the fire 
of the enemy's carbines or rifles at the very short range of from 50 to 
100 yards. 

Major Chamberlain again showed himself the man for the occasion. 
Giving his valuables to a staff officer, he rode up to the main column and 
called for volunteers to carry the crossing, offering the first opportunity 
to the regiment at the head of the column, the 1 E. I. The whole regi- 
ment replied by moving to the front. The nearest platoon, which was 
commanded by Lieutenant S. A. Browne, was selected and made ready 
for the dash. The fire from the sunken road was now keeping down 
that from the pits, and under its protection the axemen resumed their 
work, and made some progress toward opening the approach to the 
ford. They now ceased working and formed mounted in rear of 
Browne's platoon. The main body of the 1 R. I. and the 6 0. were 
moved up in support. The first dash was to be made by Browne 
with his 18 troopers. Major Chamberlain placed himself at the post 
of danger and honor in front of Browne. The signal was given, and 
away they went. As soon as they entered the road they were sub- 
jected to a withering fire. Browne's men broke, and came back in 
confusion. Major Chamberlain's horse was mortally wounded just 
as it reached the water, and at the same moment the major himself 
received a second wound. A ball struck him in the left cheek and ranged 
down through the neck, the shock throwing him from his horse. He was 
dragged up the bank by the pioneers. There, sitting on the ground 
partially blinded with blood, he emptied the chambers of his revolver, 
firing first, it is said, at the fleeing Rhode Islanders, and then at the 
enemy on the opposite side of the river. The men, however, were soon 
rallied and brought back. With a cheer they went forward again, and 
dashed into the ice-cold water. Close behind them went the mounted 
axemen. The latter had left their carbines behind, and had their sabers 



94 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

fastened to their saddles to facilitate mountiiig and dismounting. As 
they pushed forward, intermingling with Browne's men, their axes 
shining and glittering above their heads, the ford and its passengers 
presented a singularly picturesque scene suggestive of medifeval men- 
at-arms with their battle-axes. This party was followed by the re- 
mainder of the 1 R. I. and the 6 0. 

Fortunately for Browne, the enemy was not altogether ready for him. 
Breckinridge had gone with his 60 men so far to the rear that he could 
not get more than about a dozen of them back into the rifle-pits by the 
time the assailants took to the water. His handful of men, being short 
of ammunition, did not fire. Moss' 85 carbines divided their fire be- 
tween Browne's little band and the two dismounted squadrons in the 
sunken road. As soon as Browne's men and the pioneers began to 
approach the south shore the Federal fire from the sunken road had to 
be suspended, which gave the enemy an opportunity to increase his. 
Captain Moss directed all the fire he could upon the gray horse ridden 
by the gallant young Federal commander whom he saw plowing the 
surging waters at the head of his column. The horse was a larger mark 
than its rider, and he knew that the horse being disabled, the rider 
would be also. Besides, the rider had won his admiration by his cour- 
ageous bearing. The axemen, on arriving about in the middle of the 
stream, inclined to the right, going up-stream, some of their horses 
swimmii^g. They landed above the road, and coming down to it, went 
to work with a will at the obstruction. Of the 18 men of Browne's 
platoon who entered the ford with him, but 3 came out with him on the 
enemy's side, all the rest being either killed or wounded or having their 
horses disabled. The actual loss amounted to 2 men killed, 3 officers 
and 5 men woimded, and 15 horses killed or rendered permanently un- 
serviceable.' The axemen suffered little. The loss fell principally upon 
Browne's horses. Browne rode up the bank and fired a shot among the 
enemy in the rifle-pits now below him. Then turning toward the ford, 
he waved his sword to the main body of his regiment, and called on it to 
come on. A few of the leading men arrived, and broke through or over 
the obstructions. In the meantime the enemy in the rifle-pit, perceiving 
their inability to hold their position, commenced retiring toward their 
horses. Being afoot and pursued by mounted men, it was well for them 
that they started early. As it was, 25 of them were made prison- 
ers. They were found to be armed with new English revolvers— 
Kerr's patent— and provided with ammunition recently made in Con- 
necticut.^ 

The Federal advance formed close column of squadrons, throwing 
out pickets on the roads radiating from the ford. About two hours were 

1 First Maine Bugle, October, 1893, p. 13. 

^ History of the 1 Mass. Cavalry, by D. H. L. Gleason. p. 117. 



ADVANCE FROM KELLEY'S FORD 95 

spent in removing the obstructions on the south bank and getting the 
remainder of the force across. The ammunition for the artillery was 
taken out of the limbers and carried over by a squadron of cavalry in 
nose-bags, which was necessary in order to prevent its being wet. This 
precaution would be imnecessary with the fixed ammunition of the 
present day. The guns were dragged through the water, which came up 
to the tops of the limber-boxes. The division was formed up so as to 
meet the enemy in any direction. The horses were watered. On account 
of the narrowness of the ford this had to be done by squadrons, which 
caused considerable delay. In the meantime General Averell galloped 
to the front with a detachment, and made a hasty reconnaissance, which 
satisfied him that the proper place for the expected battle was an open 
field which he could see about % of a mile from the river. From what 
he had learned about Lee's position, and what he knew of him person- 
ally, he was confident that he would not await an attack ui his camp, 
but would come out and attack Averell wherever he might be. So, about 
10:10 a.m., everything being ready, Averell put his whole command in 
motion toward the forementioned field. The column marched through 
the hamlet of Kelleysville, consisting of six houses and a grist-mill, 
which the Confederates kept constantly employed; and took the road 
leading northwestward past R. Dean's to the railroad (Map 3). The 
advance was formed of Duffle's brigade, the 6 0. being deployed as skir- 
mishers, the 4 N. Y. and 1 R. I. following as supports. The movement 
was conducted with caution and as slowly as if made with infantry, 
the ground scouts dismoimting to search the woods. A squadron was 
left at the ford as picket, or rear-guard. 

While Averell was crossing the river, Fitzhugh Lee was at Culpeper 
Court-House, awaiting news from the front. A report of the attack 
at the ford was sent to him, but failed to reach him.^ The first intima- 
tion he received of an attempt to cross was at 7:30 a.m., to the effect 
that the enemy had succeeded in crossing, capturing 25 of his men who 
were unable to reach their horses.^ Fitzhugh Lee at once moved his 
brigade at a rapid trot to the road junction about a mile and a half 

' This statement is made on the authority demonstrated the fact that the horse-holders 
of Fitzhngh Lee. who makes it in his report in a cavalry fight should be the coolest and 
(TT. B., 39, p. 61). It implies that the dis- bravest men in the company. 'Number 
patch was delivered to the bearer or courier Four" has no right to be exempt from the 
before the rifle-pits were abandoned. If perils of the battle. He holds the horses of 
this was the case and the courier started his comrades only in order that they may 
promptly on his mission, he could hardly more efficiently fight on foot ; and he should 
have been captured. It can not be supposed always be near at hand to give whatever aid 
that he lost his way, for the route which he the occasion demands. In the present in- 
had to travel must have been generally stance several brave men were captured 
known and easy to find or ascertain. He simply because their horses were so far dis- 
must have been exceedingly derelict. tant" {The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, 

= "This occasion as well as many others by H. B. McClellan. pp. 207, 205?). 



96 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

northeast of Brandy Station, ordering his wagons and disabled horses 
back to Eapidan Station. 

Some time having elapsed, and the enemy not appearing, he pushed 
on rapidly toward the ford. About 12 m., as the Federal skirmishers 
emerged from a belt of timber about a mile from the ford, they received 
a volley from a dismounted squadron which Lee, thinking he had to do 
only with an advance-guard, had posted behind a stone fence a short 
distance from the wood. Averell at once deployed the 4 N. Y. dis- 
mounted on the right of the road, the 4 Pa. on the left, placed a section 
of artillery between them, and ordered the line to advance "to the 
edge of the woods and use carbines." The two dismounted regiments 
exhibited some unsteadiness ; it required the exertions of General Averell 
and his staff to bring them under the carbine fire which was now sweep- 
ing the woods. But they soon regained their firmness, and opened an 
effective fire in return.^ 

Averell ordered Mcintosh to deploy his two regiments ( ^^a.^^c^"' ) ^^ 
the right, and Eeno to send three squadrons to act as reserve for the 
right wing (Mcintosh's command), and one squadron up the road to 
support the left (4 N. Y., 4 Pa., and 1 R. I.) ; he also ordered a section 
of artillery to operate with the right wing. The remainder of Reno's 
command, consisting of the greater part of the 1 and 5 U. S., he retained 
as a general reserve (Map 3). 

As the 4 N. Y. and 4 Pa. advanced with a cheer against the stone fence, 
about 100 dismounted men of the 16 Pa., who were smelling powder 
for the first time, double-timed through the woods on the right, and 
came in the rear of the stone fence, causing the force that occupied it 
to beat a hasty retreat. The 4 Pa. and the 4 N. Y. established them- 
selves behind the stone fence. The Confederates were seen advancing 
covered by mounted skirmishers, whose fire soon made itself felt. But 
Lee was not going to content himself with mounted skirmishing. At 
the head of his main column was the 3 Va. This regiment threw down 
a rail fence about 100 yards below Brannin's House, and moved to near 
J. Brown's House to form. Here Lee ordered it to charge. It did so 
in column of fours, directing the movement against the stone fence. 
Underestimating Averell 's force and the extent of his front, Lee meant 
that this regiment should gain the right flank or rear of the Federal 
line. The Confederate troopers, finding that they were heading into 
a line of men firing dismounted with carbines, veered to their left, across 
the front of the Federal line, looking in vain for an opening, discharg- 
ing their pistols with little or no effect, and receiving a withering fire 
from the Federal carbines. As they came opposite the Federal right 
they were joined by the 5 Va. The two regiments tried to gain the 

1 TF. R., 39, p. 49; Hist, of the 3 Pa. Cavalrp, by the Eegimental Association, p. 20S. 



DUFFIE'S CHARGE 97 

cover of the Wlieatley House (AVheatleyville) to strike from there 
against the Federal right and rear, and cut the force off from the ford. 
But Mcintosh, commanding Averell's brigade, was too quick for them. 
He had the building occupied by dismounted men of the 16 Pa., who 
with their carbine fire compelled tliem to fall back. Among the losses 
sustained by the enemy was John Pelham, the "Boy Major," Stuart's 
young and capable chief of artillery, killed by a piece of shell.^ 

The 3 and 5 Va. were badly shaken up, and should have been charged 
as they retired, but General Averell had no troops in position from 
which an effective charge could be made; besides, Lee's strength had 
not yet been developed, and the charging force might, he thought, be 
exposed to a destructive counter-attack. About this time Colonel Duffie, 
on the Federal left, started on his own responsibility to lead his bri- 
gade out in front of Averell's line as an invitation to the enemy to 
advance. The colonel was a Frenchman, formerly an officer of the 4 
Chasseurs d'Afrique. He was a good swordsman, believing in the 
efficacy of the saber and the mounted charge, and had imbued his com- 
mand with his own dashing spirit. Duffie was hurrying his regiment 
(1 E. I.) "front into line" on the head of his column, when a line of 
sabers was seen flashing along the edge of the woods immediately in 
his front. It was the 1, 2, and 4 Va. regiments, which, requiring no 
invitation, were advancing in three lines under Lee at a trot. The 
Federals awaited at a halt their approach to within 50 or 100 yards, 
when the 1 R. I. dashed forward to the charge, followed on its right 
by the 6 0. and the two squadrons of the 4 Pa., and on its left by two 
squadrons of the 5 U. S. At the same time the 3 Pa., clearing the 
ground lately covered by the 3 and 5 Va., threatened to take Lee's lines 
in flank and rear. There were thus nearly 4 Federal regiments in 
action against the 3 Confederate. The former were not only numeri- 
cally stronger and in better condition than the latter, but, with their 
broader front, had a better formation for attack. The Confederates, 
perceiving the hopeless disadvantage at which they were placed, fired 
a few shots with their pistols, wheeled rather irregularly by fours 
and i^latoons to the right, and immediately repeating the manoeuver, 
made otf in haste, pursued principally by the 1 R. I. Among the pris- 
oners taken by the latter was Major Breckinridge, a cousin of the Vice- 
President of the Confederacy. A portion of the 1 R. I. carried the 
pursuit too far. A fresh squadron of the enemy being thrown into the 
running fight, 2 officers and 18 men of the Federals were captured. 

1 His body was borne to the rear on the by a Federal officer, once his companion 

bow of the saddle of a fleeing Confederate and friend: "After long absence I write,— 

trooper {The Life and Campaigns of Major 'God bless you, dear Pelham; I am proud 

J. E. B. Stuart, by Major H. B. McClellan, of your success' " (New York Times, May 

p. 217). In his purse was found, folded 3. 1863^. 
away, a slip of paper on which was written 



98 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

This squadron of the enemy was met by a charge of two squadi'ons of 
the 5 Regulars. Lieutenant Nathaniel Bowditch, of the 1 Mass. Cav- 
alry, an assistant adjutant- general on DufiSe's staff, was mortally 
wounded after having cut down three men. A squadron of the 3 Pa. 
on the right spontaneously rushed forward to join in the pursuit, but 
was promptly recalled. Averell then and there issued a very emphatic 
order, that troops once assigned a position in line should under no cir- 
cumstances leave it without orders from himself or some one desig- 
nated by him as competent to act for him. Such an order is prohibitive 
of effective cavalry action. 

The 3 Pa. crossed the field in echelon of squadrons at a walk, annoy- 
ing the retreating enemy with volleys from the saddle, and as it neared 
the next wood, formed * ' front into line ' ' at the trot. The 16 Pa. accom- 
panied this movement on the extreme right. The 1 IT. S. was, for the 
greater part, still in reserve under Eeno. 

Prisoners taken in the last charge stated that Stuart himself, with 
his chief of artillery, was on the field, from which Averell apprehended 
that more than Fitzhugh Lee's brigade would soon be before him. 
Stuart's chief of artillery, as already stated, had fallen. Stuart was 
indeed on the field, but he had brought no troops with him. He and 
Pelham, happening to be at Culpeper Court-House on court-martial 
duty, had simply come out with Fitzhugh Lee to see the fight. 

Being driven at every point, Lee withdrew about a mile, rallied his 
command, and formed line across the road on the north side of Carter's 
Run, with mounted skirmishers in front (Map 4). Behind his right 
wing stood a battery of four guns, which had not been able to come up 
in time to take part in the first encounter. Averell spent a half-hour 
or more preparing to advance. He marched in line of columns. His 
left, formed of the 1 R. I. and 6 O., rested its left on the road, the 
ground on the left of the road being impracticable. The scattered 
sections of artillery were assembled, and the battery advanced with the 
cavalry to the further edge of the next strip of wood, where it formed 
in battery to receive the enemy, who was expected to make a charge. 
Here two of the pieces were sent to the rear, their ammunition being 
nearly exhausted. After an appreciable delay the battery advanced in 
column of pieces, following and overtaking the cavalry. The latter in 
the meantime had come under the fire of the enemy's battery. Emerg- 
ing from the strip of wood, and discovering the enemy, the Federal 
cavalry halted and formed line. The two lines were separated by an 
open field about 600 yards wide, sloping gently down from each side 
toward Carter's Run. The ground beyond the Federal left was now 
practicable, so it was necessary to extend the line in that direction. This 
was done by the 5 U. S. under a heavy' fire of artillery and small arms 
(Map 4). In his present position Averell again waited to be attacked. 



LEE'S GENERAL ATTACK 99 

Again the enemy accommodated him. Lee ordered his whole brigade 
to charge. From his left, the 1, 3, and 5 Va. regiments steered for the 
center of the Federal right. Crossing Carter's Run and reforming, 
they directed their course on three squadrons of the 3 Pa. Cavalry, 
which had been posted on the outer edge of a small wood. In the 
Federal squadrons the front rank had advanced carbines, and the rear 
rank drawn sabers.' The enemy was impeded by the soft ground, and 
a scattering fire from several squadrons of the 16 Pa., on the right of 
the 3. He was not within 100 yards of his objective, but his line was 
commencing to sift to pieces. More than half of the men had halted 
or were proceeding in a half-hearted way. A few only of the most 
daring spirits on the best horses arrived within from 25 to 50 yards 
of the Federal line. The Sharp's breech-loading carbines in the front 
rank of the 3 Pa. were now brought to an aim, and volley after volley 
was delivered with effect. The assailants pulled up, turned about, and 
retired in small squads to reform on the ground whence they started. 
As soon as General Averell jierceived that it was the purpose of the 
enemy to charge on this part of the line, he hurried up Reno's com- 
mand, the 1 U. S. Cavalry, and placed it in position about 100 yards 
to the left and slightly in advance of the 3 Pa., with the intention of 
making a counter-charge on the right flank of the advancing line as 
soon as the latter had made contact with the 3 Pa. But as the charge 
terminated in the air, Reno could not execute this counter-attack, and 
he was prohibited by Averell 's forementioned order from pursuing. 
The 3 Pa., too, was prevented by the same order from rushing at once on 
the disorganized enemy. But despite the order, individual officers and 
men rode out from both sides and engaged in hand-to-hand contests.- 
Not until after the shattered squadrons had in a measure recovered 
their spirits and formation did the order come for the 3 Pa. to charge. 
Carbines were dropped, and sabers drawn; the regiment dashed for- 
ward and drove the enemy from the field. 

Lee's right, consisting of the 2 and 4 Va., made an attack on the Fed- 
eral left, aiming apparently at the supports of the battery, the four 
pieces of which had just come into action. The Confederate formation 
was column of squadrons. Starting at a trot, and passing to a gallop, 
and then to a charge, the yelling and cheering lines, firing an occasional 
shot from a pistol or carbine, swept on toward the ranks of motionless 
figures with drawn sabers silently awaiting them. The battery opened 

1 The Federal cavali-y was fonned at that hoi-semen dashing- at each other with full 

time, as most European cavalry is to-day, speed, and cutting and slashing with their 

in double rank, which formation has been sabei-s until one or the other was disabled, 

totally discarded in the U. S. cavalry since The wounds received by both friends and 

the war. foes in these single combats were frightful 

-"Since the crossing of the river there —such as I tnist never to see again" (New 

had been many pei-sonal encounters— single York Times, March 20, 1863). 



100 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

on them with shell at 1500 yards, with shrapnel at about 1000 yards, 
and with double- shotted canister at about 400 yards. The leading 
squadron had begun to waver, files were breaking off from its right and 
left. Simultaneously with the first belch of canister rang out the com- 
mand— "Charge!" The expectant horsemen, giving sudden vent to 
their pent-up feelings and energy, shot forward. The enemy could not 
stand up to the impending shock. The Federal force comprised the 
1 R. I. and parts of the 5 U. S., 6 0., and 1 U. S.^ Lee's dashing horse- 
men had again to give way before Averell's superior numbers. They 
broke and ran in disorder, leaving a number of dead, wounded, and 
prisoners. The pursuit was conducted by Reno. He did not return to 
the line, but halted about a mile in advance of it, or about on the ground 
vacated by the enemy, where he was joined by the rest of the Federal 
cavalry. The Confederate cavalry halted about half a mile in rear of 
their late position, where it was concealed for the greater part by 
woods or swells in the ground. The artillery on both sides remained 
in its late position (Map 5). For a considerable time there was not a 
formed body of Confederate cavalry on the field. The Confederate 
battery was engaged with the Federal l)attery. All that Averell had to 
do to rid the country of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was to launch his own 
after it, reckless of everything but speed, to pulverize the fragments of 
Lee 's shattered regiments, and scatter the particles far and wide. But he 
did not attempt it. About this time he heard that infantry had been seen 
at a distance on his right moving toward his rear, and he himself heard 
cars running on the railroad in rear of the enemy, which he supposed 
were bringing reenforcements. As a matter of fact there was no in- 
fantry nearer his opponent than the Confederate army about Freder- 
icksburg ; and the cars which he heard were moving back and forth by 
Fitzhugh Lee's order to discourage the Federals, and perhaps to en- 
courage his own men. Averell got the idea that the enemy's line was 
covered with earthworks; it had no protection but what was afforded 
by the terrain. He says in his report: 

It was 5:30 p.m., and it was necessary to advance my cavalry upon their in- 
trenched positions, to make a direct and desperate attack, or to withdraw across 
the river. Either operation would be attended with immediate hazard. My 
horses were very much exhausted. We had been successful thus far. I deemed 
it proper to -withdraw. 

Detachments of cavalry were deployed in front of the artillery, and 
the division commenced its return march. Captain Reno, with the 1 
and 5 U. S., covered the rear. His task was anything but an easy one, 
the battery having almost exhausted its ammunition, and having there- 

1 Battle of Kelley's Ford, by J. B. Cooke, p. 28; History of the 3 Pa. Cavalry, by 
Committee, p. 213. 



COMMENTS 101 

fore to fire very slowly. The enemy, taking advantage of this fact, 
followed it up with the fire of his battery. Once or twice Reno halted 
to allow him to come up, but the latter contented himself with long- 
range firing. The enemy's object was to drive away the cavalry escort 
with artillery fire, and then charge the battery. The Federal cavalry 
had therefore to stand this fire, and stay with the battery. To have left 
it would have been to surrender it to the enemy. The battery lost 
heavily in horses, but, under the protection of its gallant escort, 
brought off all its guns. The sound of the artillery firing reached the 
ears of the Federal troops celebrating St. Patrick's day in their camps 
about Falmouth. 1 

Among Averell's wounded were two ofiBcers who could not be re- 
moved and were consequently left at a farm-house with a surgeon and 
some medical supplies. The surgeon was intrusted with a part of a 
sack of coffee and a note hastily written in about the following words : 

Dear Fitz : 

Here "s your coffee. Here 's your visit. How do you like it? How 's that 

^«^^^= AVERELL.= 

A few weeks afterward Aver ell received from Fitzhugh Lee the fol- 
lowing message: 

Your two officers ai-e well enough to go home, where they ought to be. Send an 
ambulance to Kelley's and you can have them. 

This was done. The officers were sent across the river without being 
paroled, and went to their homes. 

The Federal cavalry had crossed the river about 2200 strong, with 
supplies for four days and orders to rout or destroy an enemy about 
half as numerous as itself. About twelve hours later it returned; it 
had advanced but about 2i/o miles (to E. Dean's Shop), or less than 
one fourth of the distance to the enemy's camp (C'ulpeper Court- 
House, Map 2), and had done him no serious injury. 

Averell says in his report : 

The principal result achieved by this expedition has been that our cavalry has 
been brought to feel their superiority in battle ; they have learned the value of 
discipline and the use of their arms. At the first view I must confess that two 
regiments [4 N. Y., 4 Pa.] wavered, biat they did not lose their senses, and a few 
energetic remarks brought them to a sense of their duty. After that the feeling 

1 New York Times, March 22, 1863. lowing is the version of it given by Captain 

= This letter is taken from tlie foremen- Hess, 3 Artillery: "Dear Fit::: Here 's 

tioned newspaper account in the library of your coffee. How is yonr hoi-se? Averell." 

the Massachusetts Historical Society. Fol- 



102 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLP: 

became stronger throughout the day that it was our fight, and the mauceuvers 
were performed witli a precision which the enemy did not fail to observe. 

Averell's claim that the action elevated the morale of his commaud 
was undoubtedly well founded.^ But it was not for this that he had 
been given 3000 troopers and four days' rations and ordered across the 
Bappahauuock. He was to rout or destroy the enemy. As it was, 
the gain of his force in morale was probably offset by that of the enemy. 
For Fitzhugh Lee and his command felt that it was they and not the 
Federals who carried off the honors of the day. And it could hardly 
have been otherwise, unless they had been driven to their camp and 
captured or at least run out of it. The fight seems to have demon- 
strated that the Federal regiments were at least as well drilled and 
disciplined as the Confederate, but that Averell had not the aggressive- 
ness essential to the effective command of cavalry. His plan of action 
was based upon what he expected the enemy to do, rather than upon 
what he himself was ordered or determined to do. A¥hen he met the 
enemy, instead of proceeding to attack him, he took up a position and 
awaited his attack. This he did three times. In his third position 
neither side attacked, and he decided to withdraw. He did not make a 
single general attack. 

To attain his object, he would have been justified in sacrificing half 
of his command. How much of a loss did he incur? According to his 
own report, 56 in killed and wounded, and 22 in captured and missing. 
Lee claims to have captured 29. Accepting the latter number, we have 
a total of 85, which is less than four per cent, of the force with which 
he crossed the river. Although on the offensive, he suffered less abso- 
lutely and proportionately than the enemy. Fitzhugh Lee gives his 
killed and woimded as 99, and his loss by capture as 34. Averell claims 
to have captured 47. Accepting the latter number, we have for Lee's 
total loss 146, or more than eleven per cent, of his force. 

Averell's order depriving his subordinates of all initiative appears 
to have been caused by injudicious aggression on the part of Duffie and 
other officers, which would show that the Federal officers were deficient 
in instruction and discipline. While Averell erred from excess of cau- 
tion, Fitzhugh Lee may l)e criticized for excess of daring. His attacks 
were practically all directed against the enemy's front. This was just 
what Averell expected and wanted. Had Lee known Averell's tactical 

''- "The cavahy are in good spirits over alifair, and express astonishment at the 

their affair. . . . The enemy are not in- splendid fighting of our cavah-y. Fully one 

clined to talk about it, and no slurs or in- third of our wounded show marks of the 

sinuations come from their pickets" (New saber, so close was the contest. The effect 

York Herald, March 20). "Rebel officers of the fight upon the tone of our entire 

who have since met our own under the flag army has been admirable" (New York Trih- 

of trace seem to be very sore about the une, March 21). 



COMMENTS 103 

temperameut as well as Averell knew his, or knowing it, taken advan- 
tage of it to make proper reconnaissances and execute flanking and 
turning movements, he might have struck Averell a disastrous blow. 
As it was, he did not strike an effective one. His every attack was fol- 
lowed, or might have been, by an advance of his adversary. It is 
hardly unjust to Lee or to Averell to say that Averell gave Lee a vic- 
tory by retiring when he should not have done so. 

The result of the contest was communicated to R. E. Lee by the fol- 
lowmg dispatches : Headquarters, Two miles from Kelley's Ford, 

March 17, 1863, 7 p.m. 
General B. E. Lee, Richmond, Va. : 

Enemy is retiring. We are after him. His dead men and horses strew the 

™''^*^^^- J. E. B. Stuart, 

Major-General.i 

Headquarters, Culpeper, March 18, 1863. 
General B. E. Lee. Richmond, Va. : 

I telegraphed you last night enemy had retired [to] north bank of Rappa- 
hannock. From the best information it was Averell's division. 3000 in the saddle. 
Pork and hard bread packed in boxes. He was very badly hurt, and left a hos- 
pital on this side. It was undoubtedly intended as a great expedition, but, 
thanks to the superior conduct of General Fitzhugh Lee and his noble brigade, 
it has failed. ... j ^ g Stuart.^ 

The following congratulatory orders were issued from Stuart's and 
Fitzhugh Lee's headquarters: 

Stuart 

The series of fierce contests in which Brig. Gen. Fitz Lee's brigade was en- 
gaged on the 17th instant, with an enemy greatly superior in numbers, resulting 
in entire success to us. i-eflects the highest credit on its commander, its officers, 
and its men. On no occasion have I seen more in.stances of individual prowess— 
never such heroic firmness in the presence of danger the most appalling. The 
enemy, afraid to contest the palm as cavalry, preferred to rely upon his artillery, 
ensconcing his cavalry, dismounted, behind stone fences and other barriers, which 
alone saved him from capture or annihilation, thns converting the long-vaunted 
raid, which was "to break the backbone of the rebehion" with preparations com- 
plete for an extensive expedition, into a feeble advance and a defensive operation. 

Fitzhugh Lee 
The general commanding the brigade announces to his command his high 
gratification and proud appreciation of their heroic achievements upon the ever- 

1 TF. B. 108, p. 865. For similar dispatch see Richmond 

Enquirer, March 19, 1863. 
= TF. R., 108, p. 686. 



104 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

memorable 17th instant. Tlie enemj' crossed the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford 
with a force of certainly not less than 3000 cavalry and a battery of artillerj'. 
Confident in numbers and equipments, it was their purpose to penetrate the inte- 
rior, to destroy our railroads, to burn, rob, and devastate, and to commit their 
customary depredations upon the property of our peaceful citizens. Soldiers of 
the brigade ! you have been taught a lesson, and the enemy have also profited. . . . 
Rebel cavalry have been tauglit that a determined rush upon the foe is the part 
of sound policy as it is the part of true courage. Rebel cavalry have taught an 
insolent enemy tliat, notwithstanding they may possess advantages of chosen 
position, superiority in numbers and weapons, they cannot overwhelm soldiers 
fighting for the holiest cause that ever nerved the arm of a freeman or fired the 
breast of a patriot. . . . You have repeatedly charged an enemy sheltered by 
stone fences and impassable ditches, in the face of his artillery and volleys from 
thousands of his carbines. You checked his triumphant advance, and caused a 
precipitate retreat, with the legacy of his dead and wounded. . . . 

Averell's congratulatory order, if he issued one, is not to be found. 
Colonel DufBe, whose brigade may be said to have decided the first 
encounter, congratulated his command as follows : 

Again we have met the enemy, and beaten him at all points. . . . the enemy 
appeared in force, with their boasted 4 Virginia Cavalry in advance at a charge, 
supported in their flank and rear by three full regiments. Here was an oppor- 
tunity—so long sought for— of meeting the rebel cavalry in a fair and square 
fight in an open field. 

The Rhode Island squadron dashed at their column, broke the head of it in a 
moment, and sent the whole body back to their reserves, capturing nearly all 
the charging regiment with its commander. Again the enemy came thundering 
down, and these squadrons, nobly supported by the 6 Ohio, again showed the 
chivalrous sons of the ' ' sacred soil ' ' that on an open field they were no match for 
the hated Yankees. Although they were five to our one, a third time the lines 
were formed and this time by their famous Stuart, who had determined, if possi- 
ble, to retrieve his evil fortune. On they came. And then took place that terrible 
hand-to-hand fight — man to man — horse to horse — saber to saber — which ended 
in their utter defeat, and our most glorious victory. . . .' 

Butterfield wrote to the commanders of the I, XI, and XII Corps : 

I send, for your information, the following synopsis of Averell's atifair. 

He sent in a large number of prisoners (about 80), including 1 major. Captain 
Moore, of General Hooker's staff, who accompanied him, reports it as a brilliant 
and splendid fight — the best cavalry fight of the war — lasting five hours, charging 
and recharging on both sides, our men using their sabers handsomely and with 
effect, driving the enemy 3 miles into cover of earthworks and heavy guns. 
Forces about equal. 

Hooker's judgment of the affair was decidedly different. He re- 
marked : 

' Sabres and Spurs, by F. Denison, pp. 315, 316. 



COMMENTS 105 

. . . After the brigadier-general commanding had permitted one third of liis 
force to remain on the nortli bank of the Rappaliannock, his passage of the river 
witli the residue of his force appears to have been eminentlj' soldierlike, and his 
dispositions for engaging and following the enemy, tip to the time of his recross- 
ing the river, were made with skill and judgment ; and had he followed his in- 
structions and persevered in his success, he could easily have routed the enemy, 
fallen upon his camp, and inflicted a severe blow upon him. The enemy was 
inferior to the command he had in hand in all respects. The reason assigned— 
that he heard cars arriving at Culpeper, and not knowing but that they might 
be bringing reenforcements to the enemy— is very unsatisfactory, and should 
have had no influence in determining the line of that officer's conduct. He was 
sent to perform a certain duty, and failed to accomplish it from imaginary appre- 
hensions.^ 

That Averell's generalship on this occasion was satisfactory to the 
powers at Washington was forcibly, if not elegantly, attested by the 
following communication from Stanton : 

Major-General Hooker: 

I congratulate you upon the success of General Averell's expedition. It is 
good for the first lick. You have drawn the first blood, and I hope now soon to 
see "the boys up and at them." Give my compliments and thanks to Averell and 
his command. 

How the conduct of Fitzhugh Lee's conunand was regarded by R. E. 
Lee is shown in the following letter of March 27 from Lee to Stuart : 

... I am much gratified at the noble conduct of the officers and men in repuls- 
ing a greatly superior force of the enemy, and compelling him to give up the 
attempt to strike a blow at our line of communication. The reports have been 
forwarded for the information of the Department, and as an evidence of the 
merit and gallantry of Fitz Lee and his brigade. I regret with you the loss of our 
noble dead, and concur in your commendations of the living. 

So it would seem that everybody was satisfied except Hooker, and he 
was perhaps too severe in his criticism of Averell. ^ 

1 W. R., 39. p. 1073. 

^ For a defence of Averell's generalship, see History of the 3 Pa. Cav., by Committee, 
pp. 216-225. 



CHAPTER IX 

PEEPAKATIONS FOE A GENERAL MOVEMENT. PLANS OF OPERATION. BREAD 
RIOT IN RICHMOND. THE JONES AND IMBODEN EXPEDITION 

WHILE attending to the improvement of his army, Hooker be- 
thought himself of what he should do to satisfy the President's 
and the country's desire for a successful campaign. On this subject he 
obtained the views of others but did not give his own. He "kept his 
intentions an entire secret from every one, fearing that otherwise what 
he intended to do might come to the knowledge of the enemy. "^ In the 
letter from the President already cited, dated January 26, he had an 
intimation that the administration wanted a victory and did not care in 
what form. On the 31st of January he received a letter from General 
Halleck expressing his views as follows : 

In regard to the operations of your army, you can best judge when and where 
it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of 
covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as 
to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them. 

I inclose herewith a copy of my letter of tlie 7th instant to Major-Geueral 
Burnside. . . . That letter was submitted to the President and approved by 
him. . . . 

In the inclosure Halleck says to Burnside : 

. . . When the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to 
renew the attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the 
enemy's works, or to threaten their wings or communications; in other words, to 
keep the enemy occupied until a favorable opportunity offered to strike a decisive 
blow. I particularly advised you to use your cavalry and light artillery upon his 
communications, and attempt to cut off his supplies, and engage him at an advan- 
tage. In all our interviews I have urged that our first object was not Richmond, 
but the defeat or scattering of Lee's army, which threatened Washington and the 
line of the upper Potomac. 

I now recur to these things simply to remind you of the general views which I 
have expressed, and which I still hold. The circumstances of the case, however, 
have somewhat changed since the early part of November. The chances of an 
extended line of operations ^ are now, on account of the advanced season, much 

' Butterfield, Rep. of Com., IV, 74. 
- Of operating far from one's base. Halleck seems to refer especially to the execution 
of ^vicle turnina- movements. J. B. Jr. 



HOOKER'S INSTRUCTIONS 107 

less than tlu'o. But the chances are still iu our favor to meet and defeat the 
enemy on the Rappahannock if we can effect a crossing in a position where we 
can meet the enemy on favorable or even equal terms. T therefore still advise a 
movement against him. 

The character of that movement, however, must depend upon circumstances, 
which may change every day and almost every hour. ... It will not do to keep 
your large army inactive. As you yourself admit, it devolves upon you to decide 
upon the time, place, and character of the crossing which you attempt. I can 
only advise that an early attempt be made and as early as possible. 

This communication is made up of hints and suggestions, except for 
the two positive directions : 

(1) That the Army of the Potomac shall assume the offensive with- 
out any unnecessary delay. 

(2) That it shall not uncover Washington. 

With these sole limitations, Hooker was free to plan and direct the 
operations of his army according to his own ideas. 

On the 2d of February Lieutenant Comstock, Chief Engineer Officer, 
recommended to Hooker the fortification of his base at Aquia Creek 
Landing as a protection to his rear-guard in case of an embarkation, 
and to his depot against raiding parties in case of an advance. This 
recommendation was adopted; the construction of the necessary works 
commenced on the 8th of February and terminated on or before the 9th 
of March. On the 3d of February the same officer submitted to Butter- 
field a report on the topographical and tactical features of the follow- 
ing points of crossing (Map 2), commencing down-stream: Skinker's 
Neck, Hayfield's, Seddon's, Franklin's Crossing, Banks' Ford, and 
United States Ford, without recommending any of them.^ On the 6th 
be wrote to Butterfield suggesting for consideration "the propriety of 
thoroughly jireparing the approaches which would be needed if a cross- 
ing of the river were attempted either at United States Ford or at 
Seddon's." 

On the 8th he submitted to Hooker a memorandum for bringing the 
material for a bridge from Baltimore by water to and up the Rappa- 
hannock and throwing the bridge at Seddon's or Skinker's Neck. 
Hooker was thinking at this time of turning Lee's right flank, and 
forcing it from the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. He in- 
tended then to defeat his army in battle, and compel him to retreat 
toward Gordonsville, thus uncovering Richmond.- 

He spent the 11th of ]\Iarch iu Washington with the President, the 
Secretary of War, General Halleck, and the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War. What passed between him and the other members of this 
council is not known, but it may be assumed that he discussed with them 

1 W. B., 107, pp. 980, 981. 

2 Across the Continent with the 5 Cavalry, by Captain G. F. Price, pp. 113, 114. 



108 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

his plan for getting around Lee below Fredericksburg. On this visit, 
and on others of similar character, he exhibited great enthusiasm for 
his prospective campaign. 

At Falmouth on the 19th he reviewed the XII Corps. Meeting the 
officers afterward at Slocum's headquarters, he expressed to them his 
reliance upon their assistance and hearty cooperation in the impending 
campaign, and his determination that, so far as he was concerned, 
there should be no more mistakes or doubtful results. "If the enemy 
does not run," he said, "God help them.'" 

Again on the 29th, he remarked to a party of officers whom he was 
entertaining in his tent: "I have the finest army the sun ever shone on. 
I can march this army to New Orleans. My plans are perfect, and when 
I start to carry them out, may God have mercy on General Lee, for I 
will have none."" 

A few days later he received the following instigation to action : 

Washington, D. C, March 27, 1863, 2 :30 p.m. 
Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, Falmouth, Va. : 

Dispatches from Generals Dix, Foster,^ and Hunter," and from the west, indi- 
cate that the rebel troops formerly under Lee are now much scattered for sup- 
plies, and for operations elsewhere. It would seem, under these circumstances, 
advisable that a blow be struck by the Army of the Potomac as early as practica- 
ble. It is believed that during the next few days several conflicts will take place, 
both south and west, which may attract the enemy's attention particularly to 

those points. 

H. W. Halleck. 

General-in-Chief. 

Hooker was influenced, moreover, to initiate operations at an early 
date by the thought that he had in his army a number of regiments en- 
listed, some for two years and others for nine months, mostly from 
New York State, whose time would be up in the course of the spring. 
It was important that the services of these men should be utilized be- 
fore the time when they would have to be sent home to be mustered out, 
for they were entitled to be mustered out at the place where they were 
mustered in. 

Concerning a general iilan of operations, he realized that it was im- 
possible to assail the enemy in front. The mere passage of the river 
presented no serious difficulty, for Lee, adhering to his usual policy, 
invited rather than threatened that operation ; but his line of intrench- 
ments, stretching along the sides of the crest of the heights, was in 

1 New York Tribune, March 21, 1863. * Major-General D. Hnnter, commanding 

- War Talks in Kansas, p. 194. Department of the South, headquarters 

^ Major-General J. G. Foster, command- Port Royal. 
ing Department of North Carolina, head- 
quarters New Berne. 



THE TERKAIN 109 

plain view, aud the hopelessness of attacking it was a conviction in the 
mind of even the privates in the ranks. The enemy could then be as- 
sailed only by turning his position. The river increased so rapidly in 
width that to cross it below Port Royal, where Lee's right rested (Map 
1, sheet A), would require 1000 feet of 1)ridging, and the pontoon trains 
and artillery must march 20 miles over a broken and wooded country 
by roads of clayey mud. The march of an army under such conditions 
would be extremely slow. Lee's spy system was so efficient that the 
movement could not be kept from him, and his intrenchments might be 
extended down the river to keep pace with it. Furthermore, a move- 
ment of the army in this direction would uncover Washington. 

Above Fredericksburg the roads were comparatively firm and of easy 
grade, and the rivers narrower. A movement in this direction need not 
uncover Washington, unless, on account of the precautions taken by the 
enemy to prevent it, such a movement would have to be much more ex- 
tensive than one below. 

About 21/0 miles above Fredericksburg, as one ascends the river, the 
bluffs on each side of the Rappahannock close in upon it. They rise 
about 150 feet above the water, the right bank attaining a somewhat 
greater height than the left. Their slopes are generally well wooded, 
very steep, and deeply cut by ravines. Good ground for approach- 
ing the river from either side first presents itself at Banks' Ford. 
Here a foothold on the opposite hills gives command of the enemy's 
line. This important point was guarded by Wilcox's brigade and 
Penick's battery of Anderson's division, and presumably could not 
be surprised. Owing to the bend in the river, it is twice as far from the 
Federal position as it is from the Confederate, and, moreover, is just 
now impassable. 

The next point that offers a practicable approach is United States 
Ford. Here, also, the river was at this time unfordable ; the approach, 
moreover, was covered by long lines of works, to be manned whenever 
necessary by troops of Mahone's and Posey's brigades of Anderson's 
division, camped near by. Just above United States Ford is the junc- 
tion of the Rapidan with the Rappahannock. Any attempt to turn the 
enemy's left above this point involves the passage of both streams, each 
of which is from 200 to 300 feet in width. 

General Haupt was summoned from Washington to confer with 
Hooker. Describing the interview, Haupt says : 

[Hooker] handed me a paper to read, saying that it contained his plan of 
operations, but I must not on any consideration open my lips to any living soul : 
that even the members of his staff did not know what his plans were, and would 
not know until the time arrived for putting them in execution; he had left them 
under the impression that a very different movement was contemplated. He 
added that when he did move he expected to advance very rapidly, and as he 



110 THE CAMPAIGN OF C'HANCELLORSVILLE 

would depend upon me for his supplies, 1 had a very important duty to perform ; 
that upon its performance success or failure might depend, and he had concluded 
to advise me fully, so that I might make the necessary preparations.' 

Having read the paper, Haupt said that he would be ready. With this 
in view, he issued the following instructions, a copy of which was for- 
warded to Hooker: 

War Department, U. S. Military Railroads, 

Washington, D. C, March 26, 1863. 
A. Anderson, Esq., Chief Engineer Military Railroads of Virginia. 

Sir: 

You wiU take measures to have everything in readiness to meet the wishes 
and second the movements of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, spar- 
ing no labor or necessary expense to secure the most effective action when called 
upon, and to provide the materials and men necessary for the purpose. 

You will have a well-organized force of skilled men, complete in its appoint- 
ments, and fully provided with every means and appliance to facilitate the work 
it may have to do. You will apply to the commander of the army for such details 
of soldiers as you may want, and to the chief quartermaster for transportation of 
all kinds and forage for animals. 

While endeavoring to consult a judicious economy in expenditures, avoid that 
false economy which is purchased at the expense of efficiency. When active for- 
ward operations are re.sumed, the all-important object will be to secure the recon- 
struction of roads and bridges and the reopening of communications in the 
shortest possible time. 

Very respectfully, 

H. Haupt, 
Chief of Construction and Transportation, V. S. Mil. R. E. 

General Haupt had a profile of the line from Fredericksburg to 
Richmond, and knew the dimensions of all the bridges on it. He had a 
large number of bridge trusses prepared in spans of 60 feet to be 
transported on flat cars, hauled from the cars by oxen to the sites of the 
bridges, and hoisted bodily into position by suitable machinery.- 

The prospect of active oiierations occasioned, too, the following com- 
munication of the 31st instant from Comstock to Butterfield : 

In case a siege of Richmond is deemed among the possibilities of the coming 
campaign, I think the chief quartermaster shoiild be notified that he may be 
called on to furnish on our arrival in front of Richmond 10,000 shovels, 5000 
picks, 5000 axes, and 2000 .shingling hatchets; that the Engineer Department 
should hold in readiness 30,000 sand-bags; and the secret service should, if pos- 
sible, obtain authentic maps of the defences of Richmond, either through their 
agents or by the public offer of large rewards. Such maps would be of no less 

' Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, p. 193. - 76., p. 178. 



CONJECTURES 111 

value in case of an assault than in case of a siege. In the first case they would 
save valuable time that would otherwise be spent in selecting the proper point of 
attack, or might indicate at once that point. Such maps are undoubtedly in 
existence. Copies or originals may perhaps be obtained. It is believed to be 
impossible to compile such maps here from information given by persons who 
enter our lines, so as to obtain with sufficient accuracy either the strength of the 
works or the character of the ground around them.' 

The following day, April 2, Hooker wrote to Stanton : 

1 send you our last advices from Richmond. The papers contained but little 
news. Lieuten ant-General Longstreet [himself] was on the opposite side of the 
river night before last. It is reported that his conunand is returning. . . . Why 
is not the Second Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers on its way back ?- 

It looked as if the IX Corps was not a sufficient attraction to keep 
Longstreet away from Lee. But the following letter from Peck, dated 
April 4, put a new face on the matter : 

. . . My information from various sources has been that Longstreet liad 
within 20 or 30 miles of this place [Suffolk] 15,000 [men], and 1.5,000 along the 
railway this side of Petersburg, which he could concentrate [at an intermediate 
point] in 12 hours, and I was advised from headquarters [Fort Monroe] a few 
days since that one of our spies had a list of the regiments and the strength, and 
they amounted to 28,000. . . . 

Ever since my arrival the enemy has been impressed with the idea that an 
army [Federal] would attempt this route, and they have watched very closely.^ 

The expectations expressed in the following letter of Lieutenant 
Henry Eopes, 20 Mass. Volunteers,^ dated March 31, were perhaps 
shared by a large portion of the Army of the Potomac : 

... it appears likely that our corps [II] will remain to cover this front and 
conceal our movement from the enemy, in whatever direction the army goes. . . . 

' W. R. 107, p. 999 g^nia line, thus cutting our communication 

2 The 2 N. H. had been furloughed to go with a great part of the Confederacy." 
home and cany an election for the Repub- Goklsboro and New Berne are south of 
lican party. It did not return until after Weldon and nearer the coast. They are not 
the campaign (Hist, of the 2d Regiment of shown oti the map. 

N. H. Vol. Infantry, by M. A. Haynes, pp. * I shall take occasion again to quote 

152. 153). from this young officer's letters home, using 

3 The Richmond Enquirer of March 25, the manuscript copies deposited in the li- 
discussing the strategic deployment of the brary of the ]\Iilitary Historical Society of 
Federal annies. said: "Another gi-eat army Massachusetts, by John C. Ropes, Esq.. of 
is now threatening our communications, dis- Boston, the founder of the society and dis- 
tributed between Suffolk in Virginia, and tinguished military historian, and a brother 
New Berne in North Carolina; it may of Lieutenant Ropes. The II Corps sus- 
amount in the whole to 60.000 men ; and is tained a heavier loss than any other at the 
intended to take possession of the railroad battle of Fredericksburg, Derember 13, 
somewhere between Goldsboro and the Vir- 1.S62. .T. B. -Tr. 



112 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

It seems to be the general opinion that he [Hooker] wiU move secretly down the 
river, cross, say, 40 miles below, under cover of the gunboats, and move on the 
enemy's coiimiuuications with liichmond. . . . 

The following representatious were doubtless received at Hooker's 
headquarters in the course of the next few days : 

Keyes to Halleck, April 8 
H. A. Gibbon, a deserter from the 57 Regiment North Carolina [2. 3. II], . . . 
states that Lee has collected large pontoon trains, and is ready to cross the Rap- 
pahannock ;^ that he will attack Hooker soon, if Hooker does not- attack ; that 
Lee's army is 80,000 strong, all well armed, and mostly with Enfield rifles. The 
men are in good condition, and feel entire confidence that they will beat 
Hooker. . . . 

Brigadier-General Pleasonton, First Cavalry Division, to 
Assistant Secretary of War, April 10 

1. The rebel force on the Rappahannock has not been diminished. Two divi- 
sions of Longstreet's troops [Hood's and Pickett's] have returned to Fredericks- 
burg.^ 

2. The rebels ai-e fortifying the fords of the Rapidan [in the vicinity of Rapi- 
dan Station], and intend to fight on that stream [in that vicinity] and at Fred- 
ericksburg. 

3. There are no works or troops on the railroad from Culpeper to within 3 
miles of Richmond. All the heights around Richmond are fortified. . . . 

5. ... There is much suffering among the citizens in the south, but the 
soldiers are well supplied, and are in good health and spirits. Everybody has 
been conscripted. The troops have 22 ounces per day of flour, one-fourth pound 
of meat, with some sugar and rice occasionally.' 

The strength attributed to Lee's army in the first of these dispatches 
was about 30 per cent, in excess of the actual number. A truer estimate 
of it was given in a project for a passage of the Rappahannock below 
Fredericksburg prepared by Captain Comstock, and presented to 
Hooker on the 12th: "It is assumed," said Comstock, "that the force 
of the enemy within 15 miles [a day's march] of Fredericksburg is 
probably 40,000 men, and does not exceed 60,000."'' 

Comstock 's estimate of Lee's numbers, say 50,000, is from 15 to 20 
per cent, too small. It may be assumed that, balancing the various 
estimates afforded him. Hooker had a pretty correct idea of the strength 
of Lee's army. 

1 This statement appears to be au error. " These particulars may have been true as 

The author can find no evidence of Lee's to the other Confederate aiinies. In Lee's 

having the material for a pontoon bridge ai-my the ration of flour was 18 ounces (Lee 

that would span the Rappahannock. to Seddon, March 27, ante). 

- These divisions had not returned. J. B. * W. B.. 107, p. 1003. 

Jr. 



CONJECTURES 113 

On the south side of the Rappahannock the planning foi- a general 
movement looked less to the offensive than to the defensive. In answer 
to two letters from General Trimble proposing an attempt in force on 
the Federal camp at Falmouth, Lee wrote on the 8th of March : 

... I know the pleasure experienced in shaping campaigns and battles 
according to our wishes, and have enjoyed the ease with which obstacles to their 
accomplishment (in effigy) can be overcome. The movements you suggest in 
both letters have been at various times studied, canvassed with those who would 
be engaged in their execution, but no practicable solution of the difficulties to 
be overcome has yet been reasonably reached. The weather, roads, streams, pro- 
visions, transportation, etc., are all powerful elements in the calculation, as you 
know. . . . The idea of securing the provisions, wagons, guns, of the enemy, is 
truly tempting, and the desire has haunted me since December. Personally I 
would run any risk for their attainment, but I cannot jeopardize this army. 

I consider it impossible to throw a trestle bridge over the Rappahannock below 
the Rapidan, with a view to a surprise. Our first appearance at any point would 
be the signal for the concentration of their army, and their superior artillery 
would render its accomplishment impossible without great loss of life. A bridge 
might be thrown over the Rapidan above the Germanna Mills, and has been con- 
templated. Our movements might be concealed until we crossed the Rappahan- 
nock, but the distance from there to Ai(uia is great ; no forage in the country ; 
everything would have to be hauled. The route by Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
road is the most feasible. The bridge is passable at Rappahannock Station. We 
must talk about it some time. 

On the 12th he wrote to Stuart : 

... I have written to W. H. F. Lee [commanding cavalry below Port Royal] 
to be prepared to move at short notice, and to select one regiment to remain in 
that section. ... I will send Captain Johnson [of the Engineers] up to Rapidan 
Station [Map 1, sheet A] to see if rifle-pits can be constructed there to protect 
the bridge. I think it probable that a dash may be made at it to destroy it, in 
connection with other movements. Wliat can you put there to guard it ? 



The information from Falmouth is that the enemy will, as soon as roads per- 
mit, cross at United States Ford, Falmouth, and some point below, the attempt at 
Falmouth to be a feint. . . . 

I have told Johnson to throw up some works at Gordonsville, so that Major 
Boyle's men [posted there] might make a stand against cavalry.^ 

Under acts of the Virginia legislature, application was made by the 
chief of the Engineer Bureau at Richmond, to the Secretary of War, 
for 2832 slaves to labor on the fortifications and complete them "within 
the time desired by General Lee."- 

1 The italics are mine. J. B. .Tr. = Gilmer to Seddon, March 4. 



1/ 



114 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

On the 16th of March, Lee wrote to Longstreet : 

... I am led to believe that none of the army of General Hooker have left 
the vicinity of Aqiiia, except the corps of General Smith/ which went to Newport 
News. It is also reported that it is General Hooker's intention to cross the river 
and advance as soon as the state of the roads will permit, and that in fact he has 
issued repeated orders to that effect. I am not fully informed as to their appar- 
ent intentions, strength, etc., on the south side of the James River, but we should 
be prepared to concentrate to meet him wherever he should advance in force. 
From present indications it is fair to presume that we shall be called upon to 
engage him first on the Rappahannock, and I desire you to be prepared for this 
movement, and make endeavors to keep yourself advised of the disposition and 
preparations of the enemy on our front for moving the troops recently detached 
from the First Corps [Confederate], or such of them or others as may be neces- 
sary in that direction. - 

Lee took the incursion of the Federal cavalry under Averell to be a 
preparation for a general advance of the Army of the Potomac; by a 
letter to Longstreet, dated 10:30 p.m. the 17th, he ordered Hood's and 
Pickett's divisions to retitrn to Fredericksburg. Longstreet replied 
under date of the 18th : 

I do not think it would be well to draw off any portion of Pickett's division at 
present. All of it can not well be taken from here as long as the enemy holds this 
force of his so near Richmond.^ 

On the same day Lee learned that the Federal cavalry had recrossed. 
He concluded that he had mistaken the character of the enemy's opera- 
tion, and telegraphed the Adjutant-General at Kichmond: 

Please detain Hood's and Pickett's divisions until further notice. No infantry 
of enemy reported to be crossing. Cavalry retiring. Stuart pursuing. Divi- 
sions can either resume former or take more convenient positions. No more 
troops needed here. 

Alahone's and Posey's brigades of Auderson's division (77), both 
under command of Mahone, were posted to dispute the passage of the 
Rappahannock. At United States Ford a detail of 120 men was made 
from the two brigades to report to Captain Collins, Chief Engineer of 
General J. E. B. Stuart's staff, at Germanna Ford, on the Rapidan 
River, for the i^urpose of rebuilding a bridge across the river at that 
point. The double object of this work was to improve the communica- 
tion between Lee's army and Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery at 

^ IX Corps. It left the Army of the Potomac for Newport News on the 10th of 
February, commanded by Major-General W. F. Smith. 
= W. k., 26, pp. 921, 92'2. 
3 7b., 26, p. 924. 



CONFEDERATE PREPARATIONS 115 

Culpeper Court-House; and to facilitate a raid which Stuart was con- 
templating upon the Federal depots at Falmouth. ^ 

On the 17th, the daj^ of the battle of Kelley's Ford, Anderson wrote to 
Mahone : 
General: 

I wish you to place the forces under your command in the hest position for 
checking any attempt of the enemy to cross at United States Ford, to examine 
the river above and below you for some distance, and to ascertain whether any 
practicable ford exists. I have been informed tliat there is one, called the Blind 
Ford,- just below the junction of the rivers. 

If your position can be strengthened, have all needful work done. Have the 
road repaired. Learn all that you can about United States Ford. This may be 
effected by inducing one of the enemy's cavalry picket to come over to exchange 
papers or to trade. ^ 

Let me have timely notice of any movement of the enemy. Keep up communi- 
cation with our cavalry picket at Ely's Ford, on the Rapidau. 

On the 17th Longstreet wrote to Lee: 

... 1 shall be ready to join you with Hood's division at any moment, and 
trust to your being able to hold the force in your front in check until I can join 

you.-* 

One of the criticisms made since the war on the strategy of the 
Southern generals is that the Confederate armies did not generally 
withdraw from their frontiers so as to realize the advantage of prolong- 
ing the Federal, while shortening the Confederate lines of connnimica- 
tion. Whatever might be said for this manoeuver in an inland country, 
as illustrated, for instance, in the campaign of Atlanta, it offered no 
such advantage on the coast. As the Federals commanded the sea, their 
army would supply itself, as Grant's did during the Wilderness cam- 
paign, from its transports and its advanced bases established there- 
from. Hence in the plea which Longstreet now enters for a withdrawal 
from the Rappahannock, and Lee's answer thereto, there is no reference 
to the Federal communications. 

Longstreet wrote to Lee on the 19th of March : 

... It seems to me to be a matter of prime necessity with us to keep the 
enemy out of North Carolina in order that we may draw all the supplies there, 
and if we give him ground at all it «ould be better to do so from the Rappahan- 

^ Magazine of Am. Hist., XX. 378. This quarters, relative to communications under 

raid, it would seem, was to be made, as a flags of truce : 

sort of counter-offensive, when the Federal "Newspapers may be received ; but not 

ai-my should advance. exchanged except under special approval 

2 There seems to have been a ford by this from these Headquarters.'' 

name just above the junction of the rivers, * W. R., 26, pp. 558, 562. Messages of 

but none for some distance below. J. B. Jr. similar import were sent on the 2"lst and 

3 The following instruction was issued on 22d (ib.. 26, pp. 926, 927, 933). 
the 27th of FebruaiT. from Hooker's head- 



116 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

noek. It is right, as you say, to concentrate and crush him ; but will it be better 
to concentrate [first] upon his grand army rather than on his detachments, and 
then make a grand concentration on the grand army? If we draw o&. from the 
front of his grand army we ought to be able to crush rapidly his detachments, 
and at the same time hold the grand army in check as far back [from Richmond] 
as South Anna at least, particularly while the roads are so very bad, then con- 
centrate on the grand army and trj^ and dispose of that.^ 

On the 24th he wrote informing Lee that certain counties of Virginia 
and North Carolina, containing abundant supplies for the Confederate 
armies, were within the Federal lines, and representing that he could 
occupy these if he had another division of his corps.- 

Lee replied on the 27th : 

You have about 40,000 eiTeetive men; the enemy can bring out no more.^ I 
feel sure that with equal numbers you can go where you choose. 

The latter statement is striking evidence of Lee's belief in the supe- 
riority of the Confederate troops over the Federal, and is incompre- 
hensible without an appreciation of his readiness to trust to sheer valor 
for overcoming the advantages which inhere in the defensive. He went 
on to say : 

If this army is further weakened we must retire to the line of the Annas,* and 
trust to a battle near Richmond for the defence of the capital. It throws open a 
broad margin of our frontier and renders our railroad communications'"' more 
hazardous and more difficult to secure. Unless, therefore, a retrograde move- 
ment becomes necessary, I deem it advantageous to keep the enemy at a distance 
and trust to striking him on his line of advance. 

While not strong enough to attack Hooker in position, he might 
strike him an effective blow on the march. Recurring to Longstreet's 
situation, he added : 

A sudden, vigorous attack on Suffolk would doubtless give you that place. Of 
the propriety of this step, you can best judge. ... If operations in that quarter 
should draw reenforcements from General Hooker, more troops could be spared 
from this army.* 

Longstreet wrote back on the 17th : 

... I think it utterly impossible for the enemy to move against your posi- 
tion until the roads are sufficiently dry for him to move around you and turn 

1 W. R., 26, pp. 926, 927. at the end of Februai-y (ante) 43.239 pres- 

2 lb., 26, p. 944. ent for duty. 

2 The Federals present for duty num- * North and South Anna Rivers, 

bered : in southern Virginia, under Dix, ° Virginia Central Railroad, Richmond 

24,031, and in North Carolina, under Fos- and Dan^■ille Railroad, and South Side 

ter, 14,671; total 38,702 {W. R., 26, pp. Raih-oad. 

573, .576). Longstreet's command numbered " TF. R., 26, pp. 943, 944. 



LEE PLANNING 117 

your position. By reenforcing here we might destroy the enemy and get our 
forces together again in time to resist him at the Rappahannock. But if we suc- 
ceed in destroying him here and have to retire to the Annas before we can give 
him a general battle, we will accomplish a great deal and really have the enemy 
in a better position for our operations than the one he now occupies.^ 

By this time the information which Lee had acquired from the skir- 
mish at Hartwood Church seemed no longer reliable. He was doubting 
again whether Hooker's army or only a fraction of it was in his front. 
On the 2d of April he wrote to President Davis : 

. . . their lines are so closely guarded that it is difficult to penetrate them. 
Their pickets [mounted] are placed within sight of each other, with dismoimted 
men in the intervals.- ... I have apprehended, from the jealous manner of 
guarding their lines and the systematic propagation of reports of an intended 
advance of their armies on the Rappahannock and Blackwater [south of the 
James River], that their object is to deceive us, and that they may, while intend- 
ing to act on the defensive, have reenforced other points for offensive operations, 
but I have no means of ascertaining the truth of my suspicions until we are able 
to make some aggressive movements. It was with this view that General Fitz 
Lee was ordered some time since to penetrate General Hooker's lines, and from 
his report I judge that his whole army was then in position. 

Being on the defensive, Lee could afford to bide Hooker's time for 
commencing operations, but what if Hooker's objective were elsewhere? 
Lee must try to meet him or send aid to those who were to do so. Not 
knowing Hooker's designs, he replied to Longstreet on the 2d of April: 

. . . unless General Hooker soon takes the aggressive I must endeavor to oper- 
ate to draw him out.^ 

But he had another reason for thinking of taking the offensive, or 
wishing that he could do so. Foreshadowing the campaign of Gettys- 
burg, he wrote on the 9th to the Secretary of War : 

Should General Hooker's army assume the defensive, the readiest method of 
relieving the pressure upon General Johnston* and General Beauregard '^ would be 
for this army to cross into Maryland. This can not be done, however, in the pres- 
ent condition of the roads, nor unless I can obtain a certain amount of provisions 
and suitable transportation. But this is what I would recommend, if practicable. 

1 TT. R., 26, p. 950. states of Tennessee, Alabama, and Missis- 

- This is a mistake as to tbe pickets in sippi, and part of the state of Louisiana 

general. J. B. Jr. east of the Mississippi Kiver (W. R., 36, 

=* TF. R., 26, p. 954. pp. 202. 203, 213). 

* Commanding the Department of the ^ Commanding Department of South 

West, which included a portion of western Carolina. 
North Carolina and northern Georgia, the 



118 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Longstreet, returning to the subject of withdrawing from the Rappa- 
hannock, wrote on the 3d : 

... I have thought since about January 23 last (when I made the same sug- 
gestion to you) that one army corps could hold the line of the Rappahannock 
while the other was operating elsewhere. 

I cannot now appreciate the necessity of your retiring to the Annas in case 
you send off more troops from the Rappahannock. There you are fortified on 
the river and on the heights; on the Annas you would have neitlier. Besides, 
you would lose morale and encourage the enemy. ^ 

On the other hand, according to Longstreet 's message of the 30th 
ultimo, the Federals, on the Annas, would be in a better position for 
Lee's and Longstreet 's operations than they were in on the Rappa- 
hannock. He added on the 4th : 

I hope to be able to finish with the operations in this section in time to join 
you as soon as the roads are in condition for you to operate. - 

Lee replied on the 6th : 

... I cannot say whether General Hooker will advance or not, though, as 
before stated, all the information I receive from every source goes to show that 
it is his intention to do so, aqd that he is prepared. It may be a part of their 
general plan to deceive us while reenforcing their general armies ; but as soon as 
I can move I will find out. In the meantime I do not think it prudent to weaken 
the force here.^ 

On the 7th Longstreet wrote to Lee : 

I do not propose to do anything more than draw out the supplies from that 
country unless something very favorable should offer. ... If I find that I can 
do no more than haul off supplies, I shall hurry one of my divisions [Hood's] 
back, so as to be within reach of you, unless the force is much stronger than you 
suppose it to be.* 

The remark, "I do not propose to do anything more than draw out 
the supplies," etc., was thrown out to excuse a possible failure in of- 
fensive operations.'^ General Longstreet had set his heart upon the 
investment and capture of Suffolk, for which he had a qualified approval 
from Lee." 

The remark, "unless the force is much stronger than you suppose it 

' W. B., 26, 1). 959. ■■ The Siege of Suffolk, by Brevet Brig- 

-//)., 26, p. 960. adier-General Hazard Stevens (manuscript, 

■' lb., 26, p. 967. Mil. Hist. See. of Mass.). 

* lb., 26, p. 970. For Long'street to <■■ Lee to Lons'street, March 27 (anie). 
Seddon, April 6, see ib., 26, p. 910. 



CONCERTING WITH LOxNGSTREET 119 

to be," seems intended to make Lee responsible for the siege which 
Lougstreet was then carrying on. Lee had only sanctioned "a sudden 
vigorous attack on Suffolk," and that only at the discretion of General 
Long-street. 

On the 6th of April, Lee wrote to his chief of artillery at Chesterfield 
Station that as soon as the roads were sufiiciently improved, he might, 
with advantage, post the artillery "in part, if not the whole, about 3 
miles west of Guiney's Station, where it would be about equidistant 
from Port Royal, Fredericksburg, and United States Mine Ford, em- 
bracing the limits of the Rappahannock icithin which an attempt to 
cross hy the enemy may he expected." 

The italics are the author's. It is important to note this evidence of 
Lee's expectations as to Hooker's movements. On account of the bad 
condition of the roads, the artillery remained in its winter quarters 
until the campaign was fairly begun. 

The unsatisfactory manner in which outpost duty was still performed 
and the habitual deportment of the Army of the Potomac on the march, 
together with the prospect of an early resumption of operations, caused 
the following order to be issued on the 10th : 



II. . . . Officers of outposts are expected to inform themselves accurately of 
all events transpiring in tlieir vicinity, and those whose fears magnify trifling 
squads into large bodies of the enemy as richly deserve death a.s the base wretch 
who deserts his country's flag, or his comrades in battle. It has been too much a 
practice, upon outposts and battle-fields, to send back reports and calls for 
reenforeements, founded upon imagination or the tales of a frightened or cow- 
ardly shirk. The fate of battle may be elianged by such reports. 

III. Upon the march straggling must not be permitted. Corps commanders 
will take effectual measures to prevent it. Officers wlio fail to prevent it in their 
respective commands must be relieved and sent to the rear, and their names and 
the number of their regiments forwarded for publication in orders. Leaves of 
absence and furloughs must also be withheld from regiments in which straggling 
is tolerated. Drumhead court-martial, if necessary, can be held for the punish- 
ment of this class of offenders. 

IV. Corps and division commanders, and assistant inspectors-general, should 
watch the conduct and behavior of officers and men on the march as well as in 
battle. Regiments not moving promptly as ordered, permitting straggling, or 
where the officei-s show a lack of capacity and zeal in pushing forward and over- 
coming obstacles, must be specially reported for such neglect, in addition to 
other measures that maj' be taken by commanders in such cases for the enforce- 
ment of discipline. 

Three days later the following order was issued by General Stonewall 
Jackson for the government of his corps : 



120 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

II. Each division will move precisely at the time indicated in the order of 
march, and if a division or brigade is not ready to move at that time, the next 
will proceed and take its place, even if a division should be separated thereby. 

III. On the march, the troops are to have a rest of ten minutes each hour. 
The rate of march is not to exceed 1 mile in twenty-five minutes, unless otherwise 
specially ordered. The time of each division commander will be taken from that 
of the corps commander. When the troops are halted for the purpose of rest- 
ing, arms will be stacked and ranks broken, and in no case during the march will 
the troops be allowed to break ranks without previously stacking arms. 

IV. When any part of a battery or train is disabled on a march, the officer 
in charge must have it removed immediately from the road, so that no part of 
the command be impeded upon its march. 

Batteries or trains must not stop in the line of march to water ; when any part 
of a battery or train, from any cause, loses its place in the column, it must not 
pass any part of the column in regaining its place. 

Company commanders will march at the rear of their respective companies; 
officers must be liabitually occupied in seeing that orders are strictly enforced ; a 
day's march should be with them a day of labor; as much idgilance is required 
on the march as in camp. 

V. All ambulances . . . will . . . follow in rear of their respective bri- 
gades. . . . 

Any one leaving his appropriate duty, under pretext of taking care of the 
wounded, will be promptly arrested, and as soon as charges can be made out, 
they will be forwarded. 

On the same day Hooker addressed the following circular to his corps 
commanders : 

The major-general commanding directs that your command have packed in 
their knapsacks by to-morrow (Tuesday) night five days' rations of hard bread, 
coffee, sugar, and salt. 

That you have in readiness, so that it may be issued and cooked at short notice, 
three days' rations of pork or bacon, with hard bread, coff^ee and sugar, to be 
placed in the haversacks. 

That your command have drawn before Wednesday morning fl5th], and 
ready for the movement, five days' fresh beef on the lioof, making complete eight 
days' rations to be carried with the troops. 

That each officer, by the use of his servant and his haversack, provide himself 
with eight days' rations. 

That the small-arm ammunition to be carried will be 150^ rounds— 60 rounds 
on the person— the full complement of the pack-train, and the balance to be in 
the [wagon] train, ready to start first when the wagon-trains move. 

The supply-trains will be in readiness for such movements as may be ordered." 
Each teamster must have with him the forage for his own team. 

^ Changed by eireular of 14th to 140 rounds. 

- It will be obser\-ed that the supplies to be loaded in these trains are not stated. 



INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MARCH 121 

The batteries will carry eight days' subsisteuce for the troops and their full 
capacity of forage, at least six days' grain, as much as possible on the guns. 

The general hospital for those unable to move will be designated by the medi- 
cal director, who will give all the necessary directions in the premises. 

The surplus clothing of the troops, beyond the extra shirt, pair of socks and 
drawers [which each soldier is to take with him], should be stored under the 
supervision of the quartermaster's department. 

Corps commanders will require every serviceable man to march with the 
column.^ 



There was perhaps some encouragement for the Federal administra- 
tion in a report which had reached Washington of a riot in Richmond. 
About 10 o'clock in the morning of April 2, a crowd of about 4000 
women collected in a park in front of the Capitol, and clamorously de- 
manded bread for their starving families. President Davis appeared 
on the steps of the Capitol, and made a speech promising them money. 
They declared it worthless and drowned his voice with cries of 
' ' Bread ! " " The Union ! " " No more starvation ! ' ' etc. The crowd then 
proceeded to the general commissary depot, broke into it, and carried 
off a large quantity of stores. Davis remarked that such disgraceful 
affairs were worse than Union victories." At the Confederate War De- 
partment the affair was thought serious enough to call for the following 
communications : 

Richmond, April 2, 1863. 
To THE Richmond Press. 
Gentlemen: 
The unfortunate distui-bance which occurred to-day in this city is so liable 
to misconstruction and misrepresentation abroad that I am desired by the Secre- 
tary of War to make a special appeal to the editors and reporters of the press at 
Richmond and earnestly to request them to avoid all reference directly or indi- 
rectly to the affair. The reasons for this are so obvious that it is unnecessary to 
state them, and the Secretary indulges the hope that his own views in this con- 
nection will be approved by the press generally. Any other course must tend to 
embarrass our cause, and to encourage our enemies in their inhuman policy. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

Jno. Withers, 
Assistant Adjutant-General.-'' 

^ ". . . the articles of clothing which commanders knew just how mii(?h ought to 

each man was to carrv' were minutely spe- be expected of them" (Goss, Recollections 

ciiied. It was evident that in the move of a Private). The event is to prove that 

about to be made wagon-trains were to he the commanders miscalculated what their 

kept out of the way of capture. The men would carry. .J. B. .Jr. 

soldiers likewise gained the impression that ° W. R., 107, p. 1002. 

more attention was being paid to the de- ' Ih.. 2(i, p. 9.58. 
tails of their necessities, and that tlieir 



122 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Richmond, April 2, 1863. 
W. S. Morris, Esq., 
President Telegraph Company : 

I am desired by the Secretary of AVar to request that you will permit noth- 
ing relative to the unfortunate disturbance which occurred in the city to-day to 
be sent over the telegraph lines in any direction for any purpose. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

Jno. Withers, 
Assistant Adjutant-General.' 

The Richmond Enquirer of the 4th made light of the affair with a 
zeal and vigor which betokened disingenuousness. It said in part: 

A handful of prostitutes, professional thieves, Irish and Yankee hags, gallows- 
birds from all lands but our own, congregated in Richmond with a woman huck- 
ster at their head, who buys veal at the toll-gate for 100 and sells the same for 
250 in the morning market, undertook the other day to put into private practice 
the principles of the commissary department. Swearing that they would have 
"goods at government prices," they broke open half a dozen shoe-stores, hat- 
stores, and tobacco-houses, and robbed them of everything but bread, which was 
just the thing they wanted least. . . . 

On the 6th General Elzey said in a letter to Longstreet : 

Owing to the continually threatened riots in Richmond, it would not do to 
move any of Rhett's command [garrisoning the city] .- 

The Jones and Imhoden Expedition 

The Shenandoah Valley (Map 1, sheet A) was the great granary of 
Virginia, and it was the object of the Confederate forces to control as 
much of it as possible. The lower, or northern, portion of the Valley 
was connected with the open country east of it by the Manassas Gap 
Railroad, which joins the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Manassas 
Junction. These two roads would have been most useful in transfer- 
ring the produce of the Valley to Lee's army could the Confederate 
authorities have operated them. But this they were prevented from 
doing by the Federal troops defending Washington. The Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad was held by the Federals as far as Centreville. 
Between that point and the Rappahannock River the two roads were a 
sort of disimted territory which each army could keep the other from 
occupying, but could not occujw itself. The Confederate sup]ilies going 
from Manassas Gap to Rappahannock Bridge would cut off the bend of 

' TF. B., 26, p. 958. quoted) : "The bread riots in Richmond 

^ Refen-ing to these disturbances, Genei-al were gotten up by Union men, of whom 

Pleasonton wrote to the Assistant Secrctniy there are as many as ever." 

of War (dispatch of April 10 previously 



JONES AND IMBODEN EXPEDITION 123 

the railroad by leaving the Manassas Gap Railroad at Salem and going 
by ordinary road over the mountain to Warrenton. 

Referring to Milroy, Lee wrote to W. E. Jones in the Shenandoah 
Valley : 

February 3 

I am very anxious to expel him from the Valley, and nothing but the imme- 
diate presence of General Burnside's large army (now commanded by General 
Hooker) and its threatened movements have prevented me from detaching a por- 
tion of the cavalry of this army to aid in effecting this object. 

As I think it probable that General Hooker will not be able to move for some 
time, should the weather and roads not prevent, I wish now to carry this plan 
into effect. I wish you therefore to be prepared with all your available force to 
move at short notice against the enemy in front, while the forces from this side 
of the [Blue] Ridge will gain his rear and cut off his communications from 
Martinsburg and endeavor to destroy or capture the force in Winchester. I 
hope, therefore, you will be able to provide beforehand subsistence and forage 
for your troops, and, if possible, collect enough for 2000 men in addition, in case 
it should be required. 

Pebruarij 13 

... I have . . . directed General Stuart, with select detachments from 
Hampton's and Fitz Lee's brigades, to cross the Blue Ridge should no unfore- 
seen circumstances prevent, and I desire you with your whole available force to 
be in readiness to join him. As I cannot now detach any infantry from this 
army, it is hoped, by a combination of the cavalry with your command, that the 
enemy's [Milroy 's] communication with the railroad and his depot of supplies 
may be cut off. if not destroyed. . . . 

On the 9th of February Fitzhugh Lee's brigade broke camp below 
Fredericksburg and moved toward Culpeper Court-House, where on the 
12th it relieved Hampton's brigade, and assumed the duty of picketing 
the Upper Rappahannock. Hampton's brigade was detached to the 
south side of the James River to recruit. 

On the 2d of March, General Imboden, commanding the Department 
of Northwestern Virginia, wrote to General Lee, setting forth a plan 
which he had formed for operations to be conducted by himself, with the 
double object, first, of destroying the bridges and trestling on the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad from Oakland to Grafton, and, second, of de-, 
f eating and capturing the enemy's forces at Beverly, Philippi, and 
Buckhannon, enlisting in the Confederate army the young men of that 
section, and holding the country long enough, if possible, to overthrow 
the local goveimment, of which four fifths of the people, he said, were 
heartily tired. "The movement," he remarked, "must be a dash from 
its commencement to its conclusion, and . . . can not be safely under- 
taken before about the 1st of April on account of the swollen streams." 



124 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Lee replied on the 11th : 

I have received your letter of March 2, and approve the plan therein proposed. 
I think, if carried out \^'ith your energy and promptness, it will succeed. I will 
endeavor to give you the two regiments yoii ask, 25th and 31st [Va.], if I can 
replace them temporarily in this army, otherwise I shall not be able to spare 
them.' ... I am expecting General Hooker's army to move against me as soon 
as the roads will permit, and I do not feel that I ought to diminish this army by 
a single man. By the 1st of April, or before that time, I expect this army to be 
engaged in active operations. 

On the 26th of March he wrote to W. E. Jones, setting forth his plan 
for the raid. While Imboden dashed at the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road and destroyed it from Oakland to Grafton, W. E. Jones and Samuel 
Jones were to divert the attention of the Federal forces by demon- 
strating—the former to the right against Eomney, New Creek, and 
Cumberland, and the latter to the left against the Little Kanawha 
Valley. He continued : 

I think these operations will draw Milroy from Winchester and the Valley to 
the northwest ; open up that country [the Shenandoah Valle.y and northwestern 
Virginia] for a time, at least, to us ; enable us to drive out horses, cattle, etc. ; and 
afford an opportunity to our citizens who wish to join us, and give relief to others 
now suffering under oppression and robbery. 

He wrote also 

To Davis, April 2 

When the roads permit of our moving, unless in the meantime General 
Hooker takes the aggressive, I propose to make a blow at Milroy, which, I think, 
will draw General Hooker out. or at least prevent further reenforcements being 
sent to the west. . . . 

To Seddon, April 4 

. . . General W. H. F. Lee's cavalry brigade is now moving from our extreme 
right below Fredericksburg to the Upper Rappahannock ... to enable me to 
throw forward Fitz Lee's brigade into Loudon [County^] with a view of col- 
lecting all the supplies possible. 

On the 31st of March W. E. Jones wrote to Lee proposing that instead 
of his diverting Milroy 's attention while Imboden destroyed the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad from Oakland to Grafton, both Jones and 

' On the 9th of April, Lee ordered these Ridge, in the angle formed by the Blue 

regiments to report to Imboden; he was Ridge and the Potomac, about half of it 

enabled to do so by receiving the 50 Va., a lying between the Blue Ridge and the line 

strong regiment of infantry, sent him as of the Bull Run and Catoctin Mountains, 

a substitute for the forementioned regi- W. H. F. Lee's brigade J took position at 

raents by General Samuel Jones. Culpeper Court-House, relieving Fitzhugh 

^^ Loudon County is east of the Blue Lee's ^, which moved to Sperrj^ille. 



JONES AND IMBODEN EXPEDITION 125 

Imbodeu should strike the railroad and apply themselves to its destruc- 
tion at the same time, Jones at Oakland and Imboden at Grafton.' In 
reply, Lee wrote on the 7th of April : 

Two simultaneous attacks on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, at the points 
proposed [Oakland and Grafton], will certainly increase the probabilities of 
success, and facilitate a more complete destruction of the road. I therefore 
agree to the arrangement, and assent to the part to be undertaken by you. . . . 

About the time appointed for your departure, I will cause some demonstration 
to be made [by Stuart] east of the mountains, which may serve to fix his [Mil- 
roy's] attention upon his lines of communication, and thus give you time to 
make your blow. 

I feel it unnecessary to advise you that your movement must be expeditious 
and bold, but that you must take every precaution against discovery and failure. 
. . . The utmost secrecy in regard to your expedition must be observed, and I 
consider that the collection of cattle, horses, and provisions will be of as much 
importance to us, and, under certain contingencies, even more, than the destruc- 
tion of the railroad. I hope, therefore, that what so primarily concerns us may 
not be neglected. . . . 

At this time Jones was at Lacy Springs, and Imboden at Staunton, 
whence he moved to Shenandoah Mountain (Map 1, sheet B). We will 
leave these officers and their commands thus located, while we follow 
the preparations and operations of the opposing armies. - 

1 W. R., 39, p. 119. 

* The Jones-Imboden expedition will be described in Chapter XXIX. 



CHAPTER X 

MINOR PREPARATIONS. LINCOLN VISITS THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. NUM- 
BERS OF BOTH ARMIES. HOOKER 's SECOND PLAN OF OPERATION 



H 



OOKER wrote on the 23d of March to Keltou : 



I would respectfully suggest that hereafter the permits to visit this 
army be restricted to absolute positive necessity, and that the permission hereto- 
fore granted to females is denied. 

It is advisable that these restrictions be gradually introduced within the next 
few days, and not upon the ground that anything is likely to occur here requiring 
such a course. It cannot be foreseen at what moment this army will move, and 
the action in respect to the stoppage of travel heretofore has invariably been 
such as to indicate to the country pretty nearly the precise time of a movement. 

The Army of the Potomac was soon stripping for the march. How 
this was done is ijartially indicated in the following regimental order : 

Headquarters Thirteenth Mass. Vols., April 1, 1863. 

Company commanders, in accordance with previous orders, wiU turn in to the 
A. B. Q. M.,^ on or before 11 a.m., April 2, all wall tents, flies, and poles, and all 
otiier surplus camp and garrison equipage. 

One shelter tent will be furnished to eacli commissioned officer.- Transporta- 
tion for line officers will be furnished for five-mess'' kits only. 

Rations, cooking utensils, and all other appurtenances of each mess mu.st be 
properly packed in one ease not larger than a hard-bread box. 

Trunks will not be carried, neither blankets nor shelter tents, on wagons. 

Company books and blanks will be well packed in strong boxes, and distinctly 
marked — the boxes to be of the size of company clothing books, and not over five 
inches deep in the clear. 

The pack-mules will carry one shelter tent, two wool [blankets] and one rubber 
blanket for each officer, also (if possible) the officers' rations needed on the 
march. 

Transportation will be furnished for all .surplus private baggage, iinder 
charge of an officer detailed from the brigade.* 

Lee issued the following orders: 

March 21 
With a view to a resumption of active operations by the 1st of April, the 
army will at once prepare for the approaching campaign. 

^ Acting Brigade Quarteniiaster. ^ Messes of five members. 

- The officers had heretofore been allowed * Three Years in the Army, by C. E. 

wall tents. Davis, .Jr., p. 197. 

126 



STRIPPING FOR THE MARCH 127 

I. All surplus baggage, public and private, properly marked, will be sent to 
Richmond, under charge of a responsible officer from each brigade. . . . 

II. No further leaves of absence will be given, to extend beyond the 31st 
instant, except on surgeon's certificate of disability, as prescribed in Regulations, 
or in cases of extraordinary urgency. 

IV. It will be necessary to reduce the transportation of the army to the 
lowest limit. . . . The commanding general regrets the necessity for curtailing 
the comforts of an army which has evinced so much self-denial in the endurance 
of privations, but feels satisfied that ready acquiescence will be sho-mi in all 
measures tending to secure success and the more speedy conclusion of the war, 
and appeals to officers and men to aid him in the accomplishment of this greatly 
desired object by the strict observance of orders and careful preservation of the 
property in their hands, daily becoming more valuable by the difficulty of re- 
placing it. 

On the 2od of IMarch Lee issued an order for the oliservance of the 
27th of March as Thanksgiviuo- T)ay, in accordance with a proclamation 
by President Davis.' The dinners i^romised to be short. SuppHes of 
all kinds were growing scarcer and consequently dearer. Acts passed 
by the Confederate Congress March 26 and April 27, 1863, empowered 
the government to take whatever was necessary to the army, wherever 
it might find it, and pay for it whatever a joint board appointed by the 
President and the governor of the state should appraise it at. Tlie 
trials of the army and the people which led to the adoption of these 
drastic measures appear in the contemporary correspondence of 
General Lee {Appendix 10). 

About the beginning of the month of A]n-il President Lincoln ac- 
cepted an in\^tation from Hooker to visit the Army of the Potomac. 
His party comprised, besides himself and Mrs. Lincoln, his youngest 
son "Tad," Attorney-General Bates, Dr. A. G. Henry of Washington 
Territory, who was an old friend of Mr. Lincoln, and Noah Brooks. It 
began to snow furiously soon after the President's little steamer, the 

1 "In obedience to the proclamation of the given you fortitude under hardships, and 

President of the Confederate States, setting courage in the shock of battle; He has 

apart Friday, the 27th of March, as a day cheered you by the example and by the 

of fasting and prayer for the nation, all deeds of your martyred comrades: He has 

duties will be suspended on that day in the enabled you to defend your country suc- 

Ai-my of Northern Virginia, except such as cessfuUy against the assaults of a powerful 

are necessary for its safety and subsistence. oppressor. Devoutly thankful for His sig- 

Religious sen-ices appropriate to the oeea- nal mercies, let us bow before the Lord of 

sion v!i.\\ be performed by the chaplains in Hosts, and join our hearts with millions in 

their respective regiments. our land ui prayer that He will continue 

"Soldiers ! no portion of our people have His merciful protection over our cause; 

greater cause to be thankful to Almighty that He will scatter our enemies and set at 

God than yourselves. He has preserved naught their evil designs, and that He will 

your lives amidst countless dangers; He has araciously restore to our beloved coimtry 

been with you in all your trials ; He has the blessings of peace and security." 



128 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Carrie Martin, left the Washington Navy Yard. Noah Brooks, de- 
scribing the experience of the party, says : 

So thick was the weather, and so difficult the navigation, that we were forced 
to anchor for the night in a little cove in the Potomac opposite Indian Head, 
where we remained until the following morning [April 5]. I could not help 
thinking that if the rebels had made a raid on the Potomac at that time, the 
capture of the chief magistrate of the United States would have been a very simple 
matter. So far as I could see, there were no guards on board the boat, and no 
precautions were taken against a surprise. After the rest of the party had re- 
tired for the night, the President, Dr. Henry, and I sat up until long after 
midnight, telling stories and discussing matters, political or military, in the 
most free and easy way. During the conversation, after Dr. Henry had left us, 
Mr. Lincoln, dropping his voice almost to a confidential whisper, said: "How 
many of our ii-onclads, do you suppose, are at the bottom of the Charleston har- 
bor ? ' ' This was the first intimation I had had that the long-talked-of naval attack 
on Fort Sumter was to be made that day ; and the President, who had been jocular 
and cheerful during the evening, began despondently to discuss the probabilities 
of defeat. . . . 

Our landing-place, when en route for Falmouth, was at Aquia Creek, which 
we reached next morning [April 5], the untimely snow still falling. "The 
Creek," as it was called, was a village of hastily constructed warehouses, and its 
water-front was lined with transports and government steamers; enormous 
freight-trains were continually running from it to the army. . . . 

The President and his party were provided with an ordinary freight-car fitted 
up with rough plank benches, and profusely decorated with flags and bunting. 
A great crowd of army people saluted the President with cheers when he landed 
from the steamer, and with ' ' three times three ' ' when his unpretentious railway 
carriage rolled away.^ 

The ravages of war were visible all the way from Aquia to Falmouth. 
In the frequent clearings where farming had been carried on, there was 
nothing to be seen but half-destroyed fences, and the ruins of dwellings 
and outhouses without any inhabitants. At Falmouth Station the party 
was met by two ambulances and an escort of 200 mounted ofiBcers. The 
honors were done by General Butterfield. 

Lincoln was not a soldier. He could not critically inspect or test the 
great machine which he had come to see. Nor was it exhibited to him 
in a way to show its essential excellencies or deficiencies. One might 
suppose that the army would have shown itself off as in battle or on 
the march, that corps or divisions would have maneuvered against 
each other, displaying their proficiency in reconnoitering and deploy- 
ing, in guarding and attacking and defending positions. Instead of that, 
it gave itself up to a kind of a "circus." The military exercises con- 
sisted chiefly of reviews. The 6th was cavalry day. The corps marched 
past under Stoneman at a walk and at a trot. Then the 6 Pa. (Rush's 

^ Washington in Lincoln's Time, by Noah Brooks, pp. 45-57. 



LINCOLN VISITS THE ARMY 129 

Lancers) came alone on the ground in column of squadrons at a gallop, 
and elicited applause by its execution of the useless evolution of 
wheeling at a gallop into line and halting. This seems to have been the 
only organization that showed that it was capable of galloping. There 
was no charging, no dismounting to fight on foot, no firing. The 7th 
was devoted to a walk through the camps of several divisions and a 
collation at the headquarters of General Sickles, commanding the III 
Corps. The camps covered an undulating plain, with here and there a 
grove of trees in the green of an early Southern spring. Arches of 
evergreens decorated with flowers were thrown at intervals over the 
roadway. It did the army good to see the chief magistrate of the 
nation and commander-in-chief. Officers and men who came in contact 
with him were impressed by his earnest, care-worn, and kindly counte- 
nance, his rugged manliness and native dignity. As he passed^ through 
the camps the bands played, and the men gave cheer after cheer. Thou- 
sands of them crowded around his horse, hoping to touch his hand or 
hear his voice. These demonstrations affected the President deeply, 
awakening fresh life in his pale, anxious face. Wherever he went he 
had a hearty shake of the hand and a warm "God bless you" for the 
lowest in rank as well as the highest. In the camps of the Second Divi- 
sion of the V Corps, Sykes ' regulars, the orphans of the army, beyond 
the pale of Sanitary Commission and spiritual salvation— for they had 
no chaplains— the President's visit and attentions were especially ap- 
preeiated.i The President was escorted by the staff officers of the 
corps, and the division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders, 
all mounted and in full uniform. 

It was at the collation at General Sickles' that the Princess Salm- 
Salm, the beautiful wife of the colonel of a New York regiment, won a 
wager and a uniciue reputation by stealing a kiss from President Lin- 
coln. Her example was quickly followed by a bevy of female com- 
panions. Mrs. Lincoln was not present, but of course she learned of it. 
The next day it was generally known in camp that the President had 
been subjected to an unhappy quarter of an hour for allowing the 
princess and other ladies to kiss him, and that General Sickles was 
quite out of favor with Mrs. Lincoln. 

On this day, the 8th, came a joint review of four corps, the II, III, V, 
and VI, and the General Artillery Reserve. The President sat his 
small but handsome black horse with ease, his long legs hanging straight 
down, the feet nearly reaching to the ground. He was dressed in a suit 
of plain black clothes, with a much-worn black silk hat. His pale, sad 
face contrasted strongly with the florid coimtenance of General Hooker, 
who rode by his side.^ The general's military seat and carriage, his 

' Mag. of Am. Hist., XV. 195. 

- Abraham Lincoln, by W. H. Ward, D.D., p. 188; History of the Tenth Begiment of 

Cavalry, lY. T. State Volunteers, by X. D. Preston, p. 64. 



130 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

glittering uniform and equipments, and shining white horse, combined 
to accentuate the plain, somber appearance of the President. The 
long and tiresome ceremony was followed by an exhibition given by the 
5 N. Y. (Duryee Zouaves) in battalion drill, quick and double time, 
and the manual of arms, and bayonet exercise. In the course of the 
visit Hooker remarked to the President: "I have under my command 
the finest army on the planet." He gave a dinner-party to the Presi- 
dent and Mrs. Lincoln, which was attended by all the corps commanders. 

"I recall with sadness," says Noah Brooks, "the easy confidence and 
nonchalance which Hooker showed in all his conversations with the 
President and his little party while we were at headquarters. . . . One 
of his most frequent expressions when talking with the President was 
'When I get to Richmond,' or 'After we have taken Richmond,' etc. 
The President, noting this, said to me confidentially, and with a sigh: 
•That is the most depressing thing about Hooker. It seems to me that 
lie is overconfident.' "^ 

l)n the day after the President's arrival, Hooker received the follow- 
ing communication from G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 
It was dated April 6, 8 p.m. 

There is reasonable ground to expect important news hourly from Charleston 
ina Richmond. Will you be on the qui rive for anything from the enemy oppo- 
site?-' 

On the 9th it was hallooed across the river to Couch's pickets: "You 
have taken Charleston." The news was sent to Hooker's headquarters. 
President Lincoln, hearing of it, invited Couch to come up and talk the 
matter over. Arriving at headquarters, Couch was ushered into a side 
tent in which there was no one but Hooker and the President. His 
entrance apparently interrupted a weighty conversation, for both were 
looking grave. The President's manner was kindly, while Hooker, 
usually courteous, forgot to be conventionally polite. The Charleston 
rumor having been briefly discussed, Lincoln remarked that it was time 
for him to leave. As he stepped toward Hooker, who had risen from 
his seat as well as Couch, he said: "I want to impress upon you two 
gentlemen— in your next fight"— and turning to Couch, he completed 
the sentence— "put in all your men."^ 

The report of the capture of Charleston was a canard. The defences 
were attacked on the 7th by Dupont's fleet of ironclads, but an hour's 
engagement sufiiced to prove that vessels were no match for forts, that 
it was useless to try to carry the place without the cooperation of a 
land force. As no such cooperation was possible, the attack was aban- 
doned. On the 9th the presidential party reviewed the I Corps, made a 
visit to the XI and XII Corps, and embarked for Washington. 

' Washington in Lincoln's Time, by Noah Brooks, pp. 51, 52. 

= Tr. JR., 107. p. 1001. 

= General Coueh in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, III, 155. 



LINCOLN'S IMPRESSIONS 131 

The President had on the whole been favorably impressed. The 
bands and banners, the tramping columns, the precise wheels and 
alignments, the streets of tents, the general method and smartness 
pleased him. He was particularly impressed with the soldierly appear- 
ance of Schurz's division of the XI Corps.* He was delighted with the 
great and wonderful improvement in the morale of the army,^ but he 
saw nothing that demonstrated the inurement of the troops to march- 
ing, their proficiency in the duties of advance and rear guards, noth- 
ing that showed how the army commander and liis corps and division 
commanders would act in the presence of an enemy, how orders would 
be framed and transmitted, amnumition supplied, and sick and 
wounded cared for. His judgment of the tactical proficiency of the 
army, if he formed any, must have been based on its appearance at re- 
view, and the showing made by companies and regiments at drill. He 
had yet by bitter disappointment to learn that a collection of well- 
drilled regiments is not necessarily a well-trained army. 

In the course of his stay with the army he had sent for General 
Averell and expressed great interest in the fight which had taken place 
at Kelley's Ford, inquiring particularly about the Confederate Com- 
manders. Averell told him how the fight came to pass, and showed him 
the note which he received from General Fitzhugh Lee with reference 
to the Federal wounded. Lincoln put on his spectacles, and read it 
carefully, then he asked : 

"Were you and General Lee friends?" 

"Certainly," said Averell, "and always have been." 

"What would happen should you meet on the battle-field?" 

"One or both of us would be badly hurt, or killed." 

After a pause Lincoln said, with emotion : 

' ' Oh, my God, what a dreadful thing is a war like this, in which per- 
sonal friends must slay each other, and die like fiends ! General Averell, 
I wish you would give me this letter of Lee's." 

It is said that for a long time afterward President Lincoln carried 
that note about with him, and would frequently take it out of his pocket 
and show it. 

Hooker had intended to have Butterfield escort the presidential party 
back to Washington, but he changed his mind and charged Sickles with 
this act of courtesy in order that he might make his peace with Mrs. 
Lincoln. Sickles got along very well with the President, but do what 
he would, he coiald not soften the freezing look with which Mrs. Lincoln 
met his advances. At supper the President tried his capital story- 
telling to bring about a reconciliation, but without success. Turning 
finally to General Sickles, he said: "I never knew until last night that 
you were a very pious man." Sickles, taken aback, replied that he 

' Washington in Lincoln's Time, by Noah Brooks, p. 51. 
^ Mag. of Am. History, XV, 195. 



132 THE CAIIPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

feared that the President had been misinformed. ' ' Not at all, ' ' said the 
President, gravely; "Mother [Mrs. Lincoln] says you are the greatest 
Psalmist in the army. She says you are more than a Psalmist, you are 
a Salm-Sahnist." Mrs. Lincoln joined in the hearty laughter about the 
table, and forgave the general.^ 

After the departure of the President the preparations for a general 
movement proceeded with increased vigor. 

On the 13th of April the Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac 
ordered the establishment of division hospitals (formed of tents) for 
the II, in, V, and VI Corps near Potomac Creek Bridge ;2 for the XI 
and XII Corps near Brooke's Station; and for the I Corps, and the 
Cavalry Corps, on the Potomac Eiver near the mouth of Aquia Creek. 
An officer of the line was detailed to act as quartermaster and commis- 
sary for all these hospitals.^ 

The commander of the Engineer Brigade was directed to have his 
command ready for a move in any direction at short notice. 

The cavalry pickets, while retaining in general the liues that they had 
held, were reduced in strength about one half. 

Before taking up Hooker's plan of operation, let us consider some- 
what in detail the composition and strength of the opposing armies: 



THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 
Effective Strength 



COMMANDS 

I Corps, Longstreet: 

'1 Brigade, Mahoue 

2 ' ' Posey 

3 ' ' Perry 

4 ' ' Wilcox 

5 " Wright 
-Artillery, Hardaway^ 

'1 Brigade, Kershaw 

2 ' ' Semmes 

< 3 " Wofford 

4 ' ' Barksdale 

Artillery, Cabell ■' 

Artillery Reserve (no chief) . . 



1 Division, 
Anderson 



2 Division, 
McLaws 



Total 



OFFICERS 
AND MEN 



8,345 



16,395 



ARTILLERY 

OFFICERS 

AND MEN ^^^"^ 



8,050 320 16 



CAVALRY TOTAL 

OFFICERS OFFICERS 
AND MEN AND MEN 



8,370 



320 



720 
1,360 



16 



36 

68 



8,665 



720 
17,755 



'^ A Biographical Memorial of General 
Daniel Butterfield, edited by Julia L. But- 
terfleld, pp. 161, 162. 

- The raih-oad bridge across Potomac 
Creek. 



' Medical Itecollections of the Army of 
the Potomac, by Jonathan Letterman, pp. 
113, 114. 

* Commanded also by Gamett. 

^ Commanded also bv Hamilton. 



CONFEDERATE FORCES 



133 



THE AEMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA— Co;iiJ«iiea! 



INFANTRY 



ARTILLERY 



OFFICERS OFFICERS 
AND MEN AND MEN 



II Corps, Jackson: 

'1 Brigade, Heth' 



1 Division, 
A.P.Hill 



Pender 

McGowan 

Lane 

Archer 

Thomas 



Artillery, Walker - 



2 Division, 
Rodes* 



3 Division, 
Early 



4 Division, 
Colston'' 



1 Brigade 


O'NeaP 


2 " 


Doles 


3 


Iverson 


4 


Colquitt 


5 


Ramseur 


-Artillery, 


Carter 


1 Brigade 


Gordon 


2 


Hoke 


3 


Smith 


4 


Hays 


Artillery, 


Andrews 



Artillery Reserve, Crutchfield" 
Total 



11,351 



400 



20 



CAVALRY TOTAL 

OFFICERS OFFICERS 
AND MEN AND MEN 



11,751 



9,663 



400 



20 



10,063 



1 Brigade, Paxton 

2 " Jones ^' 

3 " Warren*' ^ 

4 ' ' NicholLs 
Artillery, Jones 



8,276 



6,669 



35,959 



General Artillery Reserve, Pendleton 

Cavalry CI Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee 
Division, J 2 " W. H. F. Lee 

Stuart [Artillery, Beckham 



' Commancled also by Brockenbrough. 

' Commanded also by Pegram. 

^ In the absence of Rodes, peiinaneut 
commander; commanded also by Hall. 

* In the absence of D. H. Hill, perma- 
nent commander. 

^ Commanded also by Gamett and by 
Vandeventer. 



320 



320 

800 

2,240 

480 

320 



16 



16 



40 

112 

24 



8,596 



6,989 



800 
38,199 



480 



16 4,138 4,458 



* In the absence of Colston, permanent 
commander; commanded also by T. V. Wil- 
liams and by Brown. 

' In the absence of Trimble, pennanent 
commander. 

^ Commanded also by J. M. Williams. 

* Commanded also bv Alexander. 



134 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

THE ARMY OP NORTHERN YIRGINIA-Continued 

SUJIMARY INFANTRY ARTILLERY CAVALRY TOTAL 

COMMANDS OFFICERS OFFICERS pjpcEs OFFICERS OFFICERS 

AND MEN AND MEN ' '' AND MEN AND MEN 

I Corps 16,395 1,360 68 17,755 

II Corps 35,959 2,240 112 38,199 

General Artillery Reserve .... 4S0 24 480 

Cavalry Division 320 16 4,138 4,458 

Total 52,354 4,400 220 4,138 60,892 

This table is based mainly upon the return of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia for the month of March, 1863.^ There is no cor- 
responding return for April, 1863. The figures stand for effective 
officers and men, and include about 1500 recruits supposed to have 
joined during the month of April.^ The strength of the Confederate 
artillery can not be determined solely from the official records. The 
author has supplemented what information he could gather therefrom 
with the results of inquiry among ex-officers of the Confederate artillery 
regarding the number of pieces. Where the personnel was not other- 
wise to be determined, he computed it on the basis of 20 officers 
and men to a piece.^ The author is assured by Mr. Kirkley, of 
the War Records office, that the numbers .given in the abstract^ 
for Stuart's cavalry division do not include Jones' brigade, in the 
Valley; that they stand for three brigades: Hampton's, which was 
absent recruiting, and W. H. F. Lee's, and Fitzhugh Lee's. Hampton's 
brigade numbered five regiments and those of the two Lees ten. The 
abstract gives Stuart but twelve pieces of artillery. During the cam- 
paign he had sixteen, as appears from the reports of various com- 
manders.^ Deducting 240 officers and men, for twelve pieces of artillery, 
from the 6967 officers and men present for duty in the division, as given 
in the abstract, and taking % of the result, we have 4138 officers and 
men for Stuart's two brigades of cavalry. It should be borne in mind 
that this is only the personnel. It does not represent the number of 
serviceable horses, or number of mounted men, or effectives. Three 
fourths of the number of men, or about 3000, would be a liberal estimate 
of the number of effective cavalrj-men in Stuart's command on the Rap- 
pahannock. The Confederate brigades and divisions were generally 
designated solely by the names of their commanders. They are num- 
bered in the foregoing table for convenience of reference and notation. 

' W. R., 40, p. 696. 3 Tor official authority, see W. R., 39, p. 

-This gain is given as about 3500 by 789 (Org-anization of the Amiy of Northern 

General Alexander (Memoirs, p. 322), and Virginia), also reports of chief of artillery 

as 4000 by Colonel Henderson (Stonewall and of artillery commanders, same volume. 

Jackson, II, 508). General Longstreet * IF. K., 40. p. 696. 

gives it as possibly 1000 (From Manassas ^ lb.. 39, p. 794. 
to Appomattox, p. 328). 



THE TERM EFFECTIVE 135 

The two divisions of Lougstreet's corps (Anderson's and McLaws') 
were commanded directly by General Lee. Both Federal and Con- 
federate returns coninionly give in separate cohmms the officers and 
men Present for Duty, from whom men on Extra Dntij (teamsters, etc.), 
the sick, and the officers and men in arrest or in confinement, are ex- 
cluded. The Federal returns give, in addition to the Present for Duty, 
the officers and men Present for Duty Equipped. The Confederate re- 
turns give nothing that exactly corresponds to the latter, but give a 
column of Total Effective Present. 

The statement of Present for Duty, being compiled in the same way 
in both of the opposing armies, is the best standard for their numerical 
comparison according to the records. But to get nearer to the fighting 
strength, I have obtained the figures resulting from the deduction of 
certain non-combatants. The term Present for Duty Equipped is de- 
fined to be "those officers and men who are actually available for the 
line of battle at the date of the regimental report,'" and the term Total 
Effective Present, or Total Effective, to be the "total enlisted men pres- 
ent, less sum of enlisted men sick and on extra duty."^ The first of 
these definitions was not strictly observed, if indeed it was adopted, at 
the time of the campaign of Chancellorsville. In Hooker's tri-monthly 
return for April 30 we find the Provost Guard included in this category, 
while the Engineer Brigade and Signal Corps, to whom the definition 
would better apply, are not. 

The Aggregate (officers and men) Effective Present can be obtained 
with practical accuracy by adding the officers Present for Duty to the 
Total Effective. According to the definition above given for Total 
Effective, the Confederates included in their effective strength the 
officers and men in arrest or confinement. They did not, nor did the 
Federals, include them in the Present for Duty. The return of the 
Army of Northern Virginia for March^ gives the Effective Total 
as exactly equal to the il/ew Present for Duty, though the table 
given in Chapter TV of this volume shows 1222 officers and men In 
Arrest or Confinement. During the period covered by this narrative 
the number of Present for Duty Equipped was generally about ten per 
cent, less than the number of Present for Duty, and the Effective or 
Effective Present (officers and men) about equal to the Present for 
Duty. Henceforth in this work, numbers expressing the strength of 
bodies of troops in personnel stand for officers and men of infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery. Effective or Present for Duty Equipped, accord- 
ing as the forces are Confederate or Federal. In a statement like 
"5000 men with 16 pieces of artillery" the word men includes officers 
and men of artillery as well as of infantry and cavalry. To determine 
the latter without the artillery, deduct about 20 men for each piece. 
' W. R.. 40. p. 320. = 76., 45, p. 947. ^ lb.. 40. p. 696. 



136 



THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 



THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC 

Effective Strength (Present for Duty Equipped) 



II Corps, 
Couch 

III Corps, 
Sickles 

V Corps, 
Meade 



VI Corps, 
Sedgwick 1 3 



I Corps, Longstreet: 

fl Division, Wadsworth 
I Corps, ! 2 " Robinson 

Reynolds [3 " Doubleday 

1 Division, Hancock 

2 ' ' Gibbon 

3 ' ' French 
ArtiUery Reserve, Kirby 

1 Division, Birney 

2 ' ' Berry 

3 " Whipple 

1 Division, Griffin 

2 " Sykes 

3 ' ' Humphreys 
rl Division, Brooks 

J 2 " Howe 
Newton 
Burnham 
rl Division, Devens ■> 

XI Corps, J 2 " von Steinwehr I 
Howard 1 3 " Schurz f 

'- ArtiUery Reserve, Schirmer ^ 

XII Corps, I 1 Division, "Williams ( 
Slocmn (2 " Geary 3 

General Artillery Reserve, Graham 
fl Division, Pleasonton 
I 2 " AvereU 
3 " Gregg 
Reserve Brigade, Buford 
Reserve Regiment (6 Pa.) 

Morris 
Artilleiy Reserve, 

Robertson 



Cavalry 
Corps, 
Stoneman 



Provost Guard, Patrick 



INPANTEY 


ARTILLERY 


CAVALRY 


TOTAL 


OFFICERS 
ANO MEN 


OFFICERS 
AND MEN 


PIECES 


OFFICERS 
AND MEN 

60' 


OFFICERS 
AND MEN 

60 


15,782 


1,061 


51 


65 


16,908 


15,907 


977 


48 


9 


16,893 


17,568 


1,153 


60 




18,721 


14,867 


857 


42 


100 == 


15,824 


22,427 


1,136 


54 


104 


23,667 


12,170 


757 


36 


50 


12,977 


12,929 


521 


28 




13,450 


320 


1,290 


56 




1,610 



1,868 



Total 113,838 



462 



254 

8,468 



28 11,079 = 11,541 



10 
413 



95 2,217 



11,562 133,868 



1 In Hooker's return (TT. R., 40, p. 320) 
the cavahy attached to his headquarters as 
guards and orderlies, or escort, is not re- 
ported as Present for Duty Equipped, or 
"available for the line of battle," while that 
attached in the same capacity to the head- 
quarters of his corps commandere is. I can 
see no good reason for tliis distinction, and 
have accordingly included Hooker's escort 



(Companies E and I, 6 Pa. Cav.) in my 
figures for the Present for Duty Equipped 
(see History of Pennst/hmnia Volunteers, 
by S. P. Bates, IV, 1002). 

^ History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
by S. P. Bates, IV, 1002. 

^ According to return of April 10, the 
latest available (W. B., 40, p. 320). 



FEDERAL FORCES 137 

This table is based upon the return of the Army of the Potomac for 
April, 1863.' The figures stand for officers and men Present for Duty 
Equipped." 

As in the table of the Army of Northern Virginia, the cavalry is given 
in number of men. The Federal cavalry could mount about 11,000 men. 

The foregoing tables give with satisfactory accuracy the strength of 
the larger units of both armies at the beginning of operations. But as 
the operations proceed, deductions have to be made on accoimt of losses. 
Unfortunately, the tables in the official records do not give the losses 
from day to day; they give them only for the whole campaign, which 
may be considered as lasting from the 28th of April to the 6th of May, 
both dates inclusive. The daily loss in killed, wounded, and missing 
may be gathered in a small number of cases from the reports of com- 
manders. The data afforded by these cases the author has compiled 
into a table and used as a basis for the calculation or estimation of 
losses of the three classes mentioned from day to day {Appendix 12). 
But the killed, wounded, and missing are not all the losses that may de- 
serve consideration. The effective strength of an army marching and 
fighting for seven days is diminished more or less by the loss or dete- 
rioration of arms and equipment, by sickness, and by straggling and 
skulking, detected as such and consequently not included in the missing, 
to say nothing of possible arrests and confinement for punishment, or 
of formal transfers from eomliatant to non-combatant branches of the 
service. The most reliable figures as to the numbers taken into action 
are reports based upon roll-calls, held immediately before the action, 
but such figures are very rare. Here and there in the official recoids 
commanding officers report the numbers that they took into action, but 
without indicating how the numbers were arrived at. These statements 
the author has tabulated as a basis for calculating or estimating the 
effective strength from day to day {Appendix 13). There are then two 
ways of determining the effective strength for a particular engage- 
ment. One is to take the figures from the returns,' and deduct the 
losses incurred between the dates of the returns and the engagement 

' TF. E.. 40, p. 320. his report (ib.. 39. p. 252). The eon- 
^ For official authority see Orgauizatiou siderable disparity between my total and 
of the Army of the Potomac {W. R., 39, p. that of the abstract of return may be attrib- 
156). I have taken the batteries as griven uted to tlie fact that the army return was 
in the forementioned statement, and deter- compiled from regimental and battery re- 
mined— generally from official reports, but turns made up some time before the com- 
always from good authority — the number pilation, while my total is determined from 
of pieces composing them. It will be seen reports con-esponding in date to the com- 
that my total is somewhat greater than that pilation. The composition of the units of 
given in the abstract of return on p. 320 artillery and their assignments in both 
of Vol. 40 of the War Records. Mine dif- armies are given in Appendix 11. 
fers only by one piece from that given by ^ W. R., 40, pp. 320, 696. 
General Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, in 



138 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

{Appendix 12). This may be called the method by Return. Its inaccu- 
racy is due chiefly to the following circumstances : 

1. The returns are compiled weeks jjefore the engagement. 

2. The figures in the returns are for corps and divisions; those for 
smaller units have to be computed. 

3. The losses are given in the records only for the whole campaign. 
Daily losses have to be estimated or computed. ^ 

The other, which may be called the method by Report, is based upon 
the reports of regimental and higher commanders as to the number of 
men which they took into action {Appendix 13). Such reports being 
exceptional, the total or aggregate is obtained by generalization from 
particular and meager data. The inaccuracy of this method is due, not 
only to the process of generalization, but also to the disposition of com- 
manding officers in their reports to minimize the numbers that they 
took into action. The most accurate figures obtainable are perhaps a 
niean between those furnished by these two methods. For the purpose 
of this study, however, the method by return is generally preferable, 
and is the one employed unless otherwise indicated.' 

Regarding the general condition and efficiency of the Army of the 
Potomac, Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War: 

During the time allowed us for the preparation, the army made rapid strides 
in discipline, instruction, and morale, and early in April was in a condition to 
inspire the highest expectations. Its ranks had been filled by the return of 
absentees. All were actuated by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, 
and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the republic. 

President Lincoln's views of the strategic situation were substan- 
tially those expressed by Halleck to Burnside and to Hooker. They 
were recorded by the President himself on the 11th of April in the form 
of the following memorandum : 

My opinion is that, just now with the enemj' directl.y ahead of its, there is yio 
eligible route for us into Eiehmond ; and consequently a question of preference 

' W. B., 39. pp. 172-192, 806-809. 

- According' to my calculations the regiments of infanti-y averaged in the larger units 
of the opposing armies the strength indicated in the following table (J. B. Jr.) : 

Army of the Potomac Army of Northern Virginia 

I Corps 405 men I Corps : 

II " .350 " 1 Division 383 men 

HI " 420 " 2 " 452 " 

V « 390 " II Corps: 

VI " 520 " 1 Division 405 men 

XI " 450 " 2 " 439 " 

Xn " 440 " 3 " 414 " 

Army 433 " 4 " 233 " 

Armv 409 " 



THE STRATEGIC SITUATION 139 

between the Rappahannock route ^ and the James river route is a contest about 
nothing. Hence our primary object is the enemy's army in front of ns, and is 
not with or about Richmond at all, unless it be incidental to the main object. 

What then? The two armies are face to face, with a narrow river between 
them. Our communications are shorter and safer than are those of the enemy. 
For this reason we can with equal powers fret him more than he can us. I do 
not think tliat by raids toward Washington he can derange the Army of the 
Potomac at all. He has no distant operations which can call any of the Army 
of the Potomac away; we have such operations which may call him away, at 
least in part. While he remains intact, I do not think we should take the dis- 
advantage of attacking him in his intrenchments, but we should continually 
harass and menace him, so that he shall have no leisure nor safety in sending 
away detachments. If he weakens himself then pitch into him.^ 

Assuming that the enemy did weaken himself, and that Hooker 
did "pitch into him," what was to be accomplished? What was Lin- 
coln's "general idea"? It was simply to score a victory and thereby 
encourage the war party at home and discourage the intervention, or 
recognition, party abroad. Beyond that he did not pretend to look. 

Though the roads were hardly practicable for artillery and wagons, 
Hooker believed that the time had come for operations to commence; 
that the army was in condition to march on the enemy."' His plan was 
communicated to the President in the following letter: 

Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 11, 1863. 
His Excellencij the President of the United States: 

After giving the subject my best reflection, I have concluded that I will have 
more chance of inflicting a heavier blow upon the enemy by turning his position 
to my right, and if practicable, to sever his communications with Richmond, with 
my dragoon force and such light batteries as it may be advisable to send with 
him. I am apprehensive that he will retire from before me the moment I should 
succeed in crossing the river, and over the shortest line to Richmond, and thus 
escape being seriously crippled. I hope that when the cavalry have established 
themselves on the line between him and Richmond, they will be able to hold him 
and check his retreat until I can fall on his rear, or, if not, that I will compel 
him to fall back by the way of Culpeper and Gordons^dlle, over a longer line than 
my own, w'ith his supplies cut ofl'. The cavalry will probably cross the river 
above the Rappahannock Bridge, thence to Culpeper and Gordonsville and across 
the Acjuia [Richmond and Fredericksburg] Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity 
of Hanover Court-House. Tliey will probably have a fight in the vicinity of 
Culpeper, but not one that should cause them much delay or embarrassment. I 
have given directions for the cavalry to be in readiness to commence the move- 
ment on Monday morning next [April 131 • While the cavalry are moving I shall 
threaten the passage of the river at various points, and after they have passed 

^ By water to Urbaiia, on the Lower - Abraham Lincoln, by J. G. Nicolay and 

Rappahannopk. and thence overland to Jolm Hay, VTI, 90. 
Richuiond. ^ Hooker, Rep. of Com., TV, 113. 



140 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

well to the enemy's rear, shall endeavor to effect the crossing. I hope, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that this plan will receive your approval. It will obviate the necessity of 
detaching a force from Washington in the direction of Warrenton, while I think 
it will enhance my chances for inflicting a heavy blow upon the enemy 's forces. 

"We have no news from over the river to-day, tlie enemy refusing to let us have 
the newspapers. . . . 

It seems that the former or original plan was to cross with the 
greater part of the army below Fredericksburg and move against Lee's 
right flank and communications, while minor fractions of the army 
crossed or pretended to cross above Fi-edericksburg as far as United 
States Ford. Probably before any of these movements commenced, and 
to divert attention therefrom, a force was to advance from Washington 
toward "Warrenton and thus threaten the Upper Shenandoah Valley. 
In the new plan the cavalry going up the river was to serve, instead of 
a force from "Washington, as a diversion in the direction of the Valley. 

While the cavalry, with a few light batteries, crossed the Rappahan- 
nock and proceeded as indicated in the foregoing letter, the remainder 
of the army was to cross below Fredericksburg, seize or threaten the 
Richmond and Potomac Railroad in the enemy's rear, and attack the 
enemy or pursue him, "as occasion might require." As he kept but a 
limited amount of stores at Fredericksburg, it was believed that he 
would have to abandon his defences immediately, and retire in the 
direction of Richmond or Gordonsville.^ 

The roads were not considered firm enough for the movement of 
infantry with traias up the river and ai'ound the enemy's flank. It was 
for this reason that the turning of the enemy in that direction was in- 
trusted entirely to the cavalry, and the passage of the broad Lower 
Rappahannock, without a ford, projected for the infantry, artillery, and 
trains. Hooker knew that the passage of the river would be resisted, 
and perhaps defeated, if brought to the knowledge of the enemy. He 
accordingly took every precaution to keep it a secret, even to the ofiBcers 
of his staff, and would not intrust it to the mail.- 

"As to whatever General Hooker's plans were," says his chief of 
topographical engineers, "they were kept perfectly secret from every- 
body until the movements themselves developed them. I did not know 
any of his plans until I saw them being carried into operation."^ That 
they were not known to his chief engineer appears in the project pre- 
viously mentioned, which that officer presented to Hooker on the 12th. 
According to that, the highest crossing was to be "at U. S. Ford or 
at Banks' Ford, if possible," by a force to consist of "cavalry with two 
or three brigades of infantry to clear the way.""* 

^ Hooker, Rep. of Com., IV, 115. ^ "Wan-en. Rep. of Com.. IV. 43. 

= Ih., I. 4.3. * Comstock, W. R., 107, p. 1003. 



HOOKER'S SECRECY 141 

To deliver the foregoing letter to Lincoln, Butterfield was sent on a 
special mission to Washington. Incidents of the interview between 
the President and Hooker's chief of staff on this occasion are related 
in A Biographical Memorial of General Daniel Butterfield, edited by 
Julia Lorillard Butterfield, pp. 153 et seq. ; and in the History of the 
Army of the Potomac, by J. H. Stine, pp. 329, 325. If they are correctly 
presented, Butterfield was at this time thoroughly informed as to 
Hooker's plan, and discussed it freely with Lincoln, but not in the 
presence of any one else. The President signified his approval of 
Hooker's plan by the following telegram of 12 : 10 a.m., April 12 : 

Your letter, by the haud of General Butterfield, is received, and will be con- 
formed to. The thing you dispense with [detaching a force from Washington in 
tlie direction of Warrenton] would have been ready by midday to-morrow. 

Hooker expected that if Lee was cut off from Richmond, or abandoned 
it, he would take that place himself. But why should not Lee, while 
Hooker was doing this, throw himself upon the latter 's communications 
with the North? To provide for this contingency. Hooker was to have a 
million and a half rations, over ten days ' supply for his army, on board 
lighters ; these were to be towed by gunboats down the Potomac and up 
the Pamunkey, so that his advance should not be impeded by the loss of 
his land communications, nor by slowness in the movement of his trains.^ 

1 Hooker to Colonel Ross, Feb. 28, 1864, in B. and L., Ill, 223 ; 

ib.. Rep. of Com.. IV. 145. 



CHAPTER XI 

GENEEAi MOVEMENT ATTEMPTED AND SUSPENDED. NAV.AL DEMONSTRATION. 
EUMOKS AND CONJECTURES 



H 



OOKER'S cavalry prepared for active service iu accordance with 
tlie following instructions of the 11th of April : 

I. The effective force of this corps will be in readiness to move at daylight on 
Monday, April 13. 

II. Each trooper will carry on his horse not less than three days' rations for 
himself and horse, and as much more as shall be judged practicable for him to 
take on short marches; and he will carry as much ammunition for the arms he 
bears as he can conveniently on his person, the amount not to be less in any case 
than 40 rounds of carbine and 20 rounds of pistol cartridge. 

III. The pack-trains will be loaded with five days' rations for the men. The 
supply-trains will be loaded with rations of grain and subsistence in such propor- 
tion that men and animals will be supplied to the same date. 

IV. The headquarters of the corps will be designated at night during the cam- 
paign, either in bivouac or on the march, by a red lantern.^ 

On the same day Heintzelnian, commanding the Department of Wash- 
ington, issued an order for forty-six of his regiments, which probably 
aggregated about 18,000 men, to be immediately prepared to take the 
field, and be ready the morning of the 13th.- 

Instructions for the employment of the cavalry corps were issued to 
General Stoneman on the 12th in the form of the following discursive 
letter from Williams, Adjutant-General : 

. . . you will march at 7 a.m. on the 13th instant, with all your available 
force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position on his 
left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond, and isolating 
him from his supplies, cheeking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible 
injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat. To accomplish this, the 
general suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock by the different routes, 
keeping well out of the view of the enemy, and throwing out well to the front 
and flank small parties to mask your movement and to cut off all communica- 
tions with the enemy by the people in their interests, living on this side of the 

' From Everglade to Canon with the 2 Dragoons, by T. F. Rodenbough, ( 'olonel and 

Brevet Brigadier-General, pp. 530, 531: and W. R., 40, p. 198. 

-TT'. R., 107, pp. 1002. 1003. 

142 



ORDERS FOR STONEMAN 143 

river. To divert suspicion it may not be amiss to have word given out that you 
are in pursuit of [W. E.] Jones' guerillas, as they are operating extensively in 
tlie Shenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester. 

He further suggests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahan- 
nock some point to the west of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which can 
only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of 
your advance. In the vicinity of Culpeper you will be likely to come against 
Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about 2000 men, which it is 
expected that you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your 
advance or detriment to any considerable number of your command. 

At Gordonsville the enemy had [has] a small provost guard of infantry, which 
it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your forward 
movement. From there it is expected that you will be able to push forward to 
the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's 
[Hanover] Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad bridges, 
trains, cars, depots of provisions, lines of telegraph communication, etc. The 
general directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish 
this work effectually. As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond pre- 
sents the shortest one for the enemy to retire on, it is more than probable that 
the enemy may avail himself of it and the usually traveled highways on each 
side of it for this purpose, in which event you will select the strongest positions, 
such as banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in order to check or prevent 
it, and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flank, attack his artillery and 
trains, and harass and delay him until he is exhausted and out of supplies. Mo- 
ments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit. If the enemy 
should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your 
force in his front, and harass him night and day on the march and in camp 
unceasingly. If you can not cut off from his columns large slices, the general 
desires that you will not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be, fight, 
fight, fight, bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as the rebel 
carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you with more than 
5000 .sabers, and those badly mounted, and — after they leave Culpeper— without 
forage or rations ; keep them from Richmond, and, sooner or later, they must fall 
in our hands. 

The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary object 
of j-our movement the cutting of the enemy's connections with Richmond by the 
Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines, and he wishes to 
make everything subservient to that object. He desires that you keep yourself 
informed of the enemy's whereabouts and attack him wherever you find him. 
If, in your operations, an.y opportunity should present itself for you to detach 
a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy the depot of 
supplies said to be there, or along the Aquia Railroad in the direction of Rich- 
mond, to destroy the bridges, etc., or the crossing of the Pamunkey in the direc- 
tion of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the 
crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our complete success. You may rely 
upon the general being in connection with you before your supplies are ex- 
hausted. Let him hear from yon as often as necessary and practicable. 



144 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

A brigade of infantr}^ will march to-morrow morning at 8 o'clock for Kelley's 
Ford, with one battery and a regiment to the United States and Banl\s' Fords, to 
threaten and hold those places. 

It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward movement 
of this grand army, and on you and your noble command must depend in a 
great measure the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that 
celerity, audacity, and resolution are everything in war, and especially is it the 
case with the command you have and the enterprise upon which you are about 
to embark. 

The gist of all this is that the cavalry corps is to cross the EapiDa- 
hannock above the railroad bridge, and operate against the communica- 
tions and resources of the enemy, and against his marching columns. 
The instructions relative to the latter are based upon the expectation 
that the enemy will retreat as Stoneman proceeds with the destruction 
of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, and will 
direct his march either toward Richmond or toward Gordonsville. If 
toward Richmond, Stoneman will be in position to oppose him in front; 
if toward Gordonsville, he is, if possible, to i)lace himself across the 
enemy's front, and if not, to hang on his flank and rear. While in re- 
spect to time the work of demolition is expected to precede the oiDeration 
of interception, in respect to importance demolition is subordinated to 
interception. "Keep them from Richmond," said Hooker, "and sooner 
or later they must fall in our hands." How was a cavalry corps that 
should not have been expected to muster more than 10,000 effectives to 
keep an army estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000 men from going where 
it chose to; and how was keeping the enemy from Richmond to make 
him fall into the hands of the Army of the Potomac ? Hooker may have 
had answers to these questions, but it is hard to believe that, if he had, 
he would not have given expression to them. 

Should Lee not retreat, Stoneman 's operations would l)e a blow in the 
air or, at best, an effective raid. 

The only provision made for communication between Stoneman and 
Hooker was the injunction: "Let him [Hooker] hear from you as often 
as necessary and practicable. ' ' What if it should not be practicable for 
Stoneman to get a message to Hooker? In that case he could not expect 
to be in communication with the latter until the army and the cavalry 
were reunited. ' ' You may rely, ' ' says the letter, ' ' upon the general being 
in connection with you before your supplies are exhausted." How soon 
was this to be? The order did not prescribe the amount of supplies to 
be carried. Stoneman 's circular required the pack-trains to be loaded 
with five days' rations and each trooper to carry on his horse not less 
than three days' rations and "as much more as shall be judged practica- 
ble for him to take on short marches. ' ' It also provided that the animals 
should be rationed to the same date as the men. The expedition may 



STONEMAN MARCHES TO MORRISVILLE 145 

therefore be considered as supplied for a period of from eight to teu 
days— a long time to be possibly without news or instructions from army 
headquarters. 

Neither Hooker's order nor Stoneman's circular makes any reference 
to subsisting off the country. Stoneman was to decide for himself 
whether he should fraction his command or keep it united. 

The following force of cavalry was to remain with the army : 

Of the First Division— the commanding general (Pleasonton), the 2d brigade 

(Devin), and the battery (Martin). 
Of the Third Division— the 1 Pa. of the 2d brigade. 

As diminished by the deduction of this force and the dismounted men, 
the cavalry corps marched on the 13th to Morrisville (21 miles). It 
ni;mbered 9895 cavalrjonen and 22 guns manned by 427 artillerymen:* 

Cavalry Corps— Stoneman 

First Division, 1st brigade (8 111., 3 Ind., 8 and 9 N. Y.) —Davis. 
Seco7id Division— Axerell. 

1st brigade (1 Ma.ss., 4 N. Y., 6 0., 1 R. I.) -Sargent. 

2d brigade (3, 4, and 16 Pa.) —Mcintosh. 

Battery A, 2 U. S. (horse artillery) — Tidball. 
Third Divisio n— Gregg. 

1st brigade (1 Me., 2 and 10 N. Y.) — Kilpatrick. 

2d brigade (12 III., 1 Md., 1 N. J.)-Wyndham. 
Reserve Brigade (1, 2, 5, and 6 U. S.)— Buford. 
Reserve Regiment (6 Pa. Lancers)- Rush. 
Corps Artillery (horse) —Robertson. 

Battery B and L,= 2 U. S.— Vincent. 

Battery M, 2 U. S.-Clark. 

Battery E, 4 U. S.— Elder. 

The command had with it six days' rations and five days' short 
forage, carried on the horses or on pack-mules or in a wagon-train 
which was to accompany the column during the first two days. An 
extra supply-train of 275 wagons, carrying three days' rations and 
three days' short forage, was sent by the chief quartermaster of the 
army (Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls) to Bealeton. The command was 
thus provided with nine days' subsistence and eight days' short forage. 

The only force available to oppose it was four regiments of W. H. F. 
Lee's cavalry brigade^ and a portion of Stuart's horse artillery. The 

^ W. R., 39, p. 1067. fomier was near Beaver Dam, on the Vir- 

2 FoiTued by the consolidation of two de- ginia Central Railroad, and the latter on 
pleted batteries. the Lower Rappahannock below Freder- 

3 2 N. Ca., 5, 9, and 13 Va. The 10 and icksburg. 
15 Va. of this brigade were detached ; the 



146 THE CAMPAION OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE 

former numbered about 1200 men. The latter consisted probably of two 
batteries, or eight pieces, manned by about 150 men. This force was 
assembled about Culpeper Court-House, with outposts along the Rappa- 
hannock. Fitzhugh Lee's brigade (1, 2, 3, and 4 Va.), with perhaps a 
battery of horse artillery, was at Sperryville (Map 1, sheet A). It num- 
bered about 1000 sabers. Of Stuart's remaining battery one or two 
pieces were probably with the 15 Va. Cavalry below Fredericksburg, and 
the others detached between the Rapidau and the Virginia Central Rail- 
road. 

For the concealment and protection of the Federal movement, in- 
fantry was ordered to take post as intimated to Stoneman— the 91 Pa. 
(1. 3. V) at Banks' Ford, and Buschbeck's brigade (—) at Kelley's 
Ford, each with instructions to prevent a crossing by the enemy or any 
communication across the river, and to keep as far as practicable from 
being seen.' 

Stoneman issued the following order (Map 6) : 

Three'' squadrons of Davis' brigade will cross the North Fork of the Rappa- 
hannock at Sulphur Springs about 12 o'clock to-night [13th], and follow down 
the south bank of this fork, and clear out any enemy's force met with between 
the point of crossing and Freeman's Ford, at which point Colonel Davis will be 
with the head of his brigade. As soon as Colonel Davis opens up communica- 
tion with these three squadrons, he will cross with the whole of his brigade, and 
turn Beverly Ford, where General Averell will be with the head of his division. 

General Averell will cross with his division at Beverly Ford, followed by 
General Gregg with his division. General Buford, with his Reserve Brigade, will 
cross at the ford in the vicinity of the Rappahannock railroad bridge simulta- 
neously with General Averell. As soon as General Averell and General Buford 
are across the river and both have formed their commands a short distance be- 
yond the river, Averell will push on to Culpeper Court-House, keeping to the 
right of the railroad, if possible to transport his artillery, or if there is no road 
leading along the right and near the railroad, then by the nearest road. Gregg 
will cross the river as soon after Averell as possible, and follow him well closed 
up on his rear. 

If there should be a route practicable for artillery, and running parallel to 
the route pursued by Averell, Buford will follow it, provided it does not lead too 
far to the left. If there is no such route, the artillery of Buford will be sent to 
the rear of Gregg, and the Reserve Brigade will march through the country, irre- 
spective of roads, keeping at such distance from Averell as to give room for 
Averell to form his division front into line of battle. Averell will move on in the 
direction of the enemy, who is supposed to be a mile or so this side of Culpeper 
Court-House. In case Averell comes upon the enemy, Gregg will form his divi- 
sion at once, and hold it in readiness to move to the right of Averell 's division, 
and Buford will act looking to the left, and Davis will endeavor to turn the 

1 W. B., 40, p. 202. 

= In the official publication this word reads the; it should evidently read three. J. B. .Tr. 



STONEMAN AT RAPPAHANNOCK BRIDGE 147 

enemy's left flank. If the enemy is encountered he will be attacked at once and 
with the utmost vigor, pouring in ui)on him every available man, excepting a 
limited reserve in each command. 

Colonel Rush, commanding Lancers [6 Pa.], will report in person at daylight, 
April 15, to these headquarters, for special service. 

The major-general commanding expects to be kept informed of all that may be 
deemed by commanding officers as important, and commanding officers will keep 
themselves posted as to what is transpiring on their right and left. 

Corps headquarters will be, after to-night, with headquarters Gregg's division, 
until fuftlier orders. 

Tlie night of the 13th wa.s quite cold. In spite of the heavy frost, 
Stoneman's cavalry bivonaoked without fires, and consequently without 
sleep. 

The following- communication was addressed to-day (13th) to the 
commander of the XII Corps, and one of tlie same tenor to the com- 
mander of the III Corps : 

A large portion of General Stoneman's cavalry force have gone in the direc- 
tion of the Shenandoah Valley, and will be absent some days. Tour infantry 
pickets must be vigilant and strong, as they will have no cavalry force of any 
account to rely upon. 

It does not appear whether this dispatch was intended to be inter- 
cepted, but seems well adapted to deceive in case it should be. However 
this may have I teen, W. II. F. Lee, near Culpeper Court-House, received 
information in the course of the niglit from Lieutenant Payne— com- 
manding the famous company of the 4 Va. Cavalry known as the Black 
Horse Cavalry— that the Federal cavalry and artillery, in heavy force, 
were moving up from Fredericksburg in the direction of Kelley 's Ford.^ 
Lee reenforced th.e picket at the ford with a company of sharpshooters 
and awaited developments. 

The Federal movements for elfeeting a passage were then in progress. 
Davis took up the march for Suljiliur Springs at 11 p.m., and marched 
on through tho night. Buschbeek not having come uj), Buford was sent 
with his brigade and a battery of horse artillery to Kelley 's Ford, where 
he was to make a demonstration in the morning as a diversion in favor 
of Davis. It was contemplated that the 14th would be consumed by the 
movement of Davis' brigade down the river, and that the crossing of 
the remainder of the corps and the pack-train would take place on the 
morning of the 15th. 

On the 14th, a clear, fine day, the cavalry proceeded to Bealeton, on 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, about 6 miles from Morrisville 
(Map 6). Here its wagons were unloaded and sent back to Morrisville. 

1 TT'. R., 39. p. 85. 



148 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

At daylight General Buford made a demonstration, as ordered, at 
Kelley's Ford, which had the desired effect of drawing the greater part 
of W. H. F. Lee's brigade from Culpeper to Kelley's Ford. Davis 
crossed the river at Sulphur Springs and Freeman's Ford, and marched 
for Beverly Ford. His brigade numbered about 1500 men. To avoid 
unnecessary delay in crossing the river, an attempt was made to-day to 
force it without the cooperation of Davis' brigade. Gregg's division 
went to the Rappahannock Bridge, leaving Averell's division and the 
artillery at Bealeton. The position at the river was examined, and it 
was found that a small body of the enemy was strongly posted on the 
opposite side to dispute the crossing, a part at the far end of the bridge, 
the remainder in a blockhouse and a line of rifle-pits beyond the bridge. 
Wiile two companies forded the river below the bridge under a sharp 
fire, three companies charged across the bridge, and after a slight skir- 
mish with the men in the blockhouse and line of rifle-pits, went back 
across the river. Gregg then examined Beverly Ford, and finding the 
south bank occupied by dismounted men, posted two squadrons opposite 
them on the north bank, and went into camp between Bealeton and Rap- 
pahannock Station. 

A determined effort on the part of General Gregg's command could not have 
failed to secure the passage of his division at the railroad and at Beverly Ford ; 
and success at these points would have caused the withdrawal of the Confed- 
erates at Kelley's Ford.' 

Busehbeck's brigade, ordered to take post at Kelley's Ford, arrived 
there about 3 p.m. to-day. One of its regiments (29 N. Y.) was detached 
to Rappahannock Station to guard the bridge and the train which was 
thought to be at that point. The following letter from Stoneman's chief 
of staff was on its way to Buschbeck : 

The major-general commanding desires that as soon as the cavalry shall have 
crossed the river to-morrow morning, you direct the regiment of your brigade 
now at the Rappahannock railroad bridge to rejoin you at Kelley's Ford. After 
it has joined you, you will send one regiment back to Morrisville, to guard your 
right and rear and protect the wagon-train which vnW be left at that point. At 
early dawn to-morrow morning [15th] the major-general commanding desires 
you to make a vigorous demonstration at Kelley's Ford, so as to induce the 
enemy to believe that you intend crossing at that point. Extend your pickets 
well down the river, so as to prevent the enemy crossing below and cutting 
you off. 

At 4 p.m. Buford 's brigade and battery withdrew from Kelley's Ford 
and went into camp probably near Gregg's division, between Bealeton 
Station and Rappahannock Bridge. 

■^ Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, by McClellan, p. 222. See also History of the 10th 
Regiment of Cavalry, N. 1'. State Volunteers, by N. D. Preston, pp. 68, 69. 



HOOKER AND HALLECK 149 

The following dispatch was received in Washington at 10 : 20 a.m. : 

Iloadquarters Army of the Potomac, April 14, 1863. 
Postmaster, Washington, D. C. : 

Major-General Hooker, commanding this army, would like to have the entire 
mails of to-day from his army detained twenty-four hours in your ofiSce, if you 
can do so with propriety. He has very urgent reasons for making this request, 
as you may readily imagine. Inform me whether or not you wiU comply. 

Rupus Ingalls, 
Colonel and Quartermaster. ^ 

At 9 : 20 p.m. on the 13th Hooker telegraphed to Halleck : 

If it is deemed of importance to keep open the telegraph communication to 
this point, it will require that a regiment of cavalry be sent from Washington to 
patrol and guard tlie line via Occoquan to Dumfries. My cavalry have other 
duties that will prevent their attending to this. The force should be sent without 
delay. 

This dispatch was received at 9 : 35 and answered at 10 : 45 as follows :2 

I do not think that the safety of Washington depends upon the maintenance 
of communication with your army, but I think it is your duty to maintain your 
communications with Washington, and to keep the War Department advised of 
all your movements and intended movements. You therefore have my orders to 
keep up such communications. 

At 7 : 30 a.m. on the 14th the Secretary of War received the following 
dispatch of the same day from Hooker:-* 

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my telegram to Major-General 
Halleck [9:20 p.m., April 13, and his reply thereto, 10:45 p.m., April 13]. I re- 
spectfully request that these be laid before the President of the United States 
without delay. 

The President took the part of Hooker and caused Halleck to reply at 
11 a.m.:* 

1 The author wrote to the I ostmaster- the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
General for infomiation a» to the action {IV, 214). The dispatch, it seems, was re- 
taken on this dispatch, and received the peated on the 14th (ib., p. 215). 
following answer : ^ The War Records give the hour as 7 : 50 

". . . the Postmaster at Washington in- p.m., which is in all probability erroneous, 

forms me that there are no records in his The hour is a.m. in the Report of the Com- 

office to show that any reply was made to mittee on the Conduct of the War (TV, 

the dispatch mentioned, but he learns from 214). 

employees who were in the ofBce at the * The War Records give the hour as 11 

time, that such requests to hold mail were p.m., which is in all probability erroneous, 

not infrequent. It is probable that the tele- The hour is a.m. in the Report of the Com- 

fn'am was complied with without any record mittee on the Conduct of the War fIV, 

being made of the fact." 215), from which the text is taken. 

^ The hours are taken from the Report of 



150 THE CA^rPAION OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

General Heintzelman has ordered a regiment of cavalry to scout soutli of 
Oecoquan and Dumfries. 

Hooker now expected that General Dix at Fort Monroe, with Peck 
at Suffolk, would detain Longstreet about Richmond while Stoueman 
carried out his instructions. He had reason to believe that the Federal 
movements on the Peninsula had caused a depletion of the garrison of 
Richmond, but he did not wish his cavalry to be led off by this circum- 
stance from its prescribed task. Referring to a re])ort from Peck, he 
wrote to Stoneman on the 14th : 

. . . the enemj- . . . must have withdrawn all his forces from Richmond, and 
you can have nothing to apprehend from there. This information must not 
delay or divert you from the main object of your expedition, as set fiorth in your 
instructions. The general is exceedingly anxious that you should be at your 
work [of destruction] on the Aquia and Richmond [Railroad] lines at the 
earliest practicable moment. 

Peck, not being informed of Hooker's plans, was not unnaturally con- 
cerned for the safety of his post and garrison. He communicated his 
uneasiness to the President, and the latter at 5 : oO p.m. telegraphed to 
Hooker : 

Would like to have a letter from you a.s soon as convenient. 

Hooker replied at 11 p.m. : 

... As soon as Stoneman "s designs are discovered to the enemy, Peck will be 
relieved. The enemy have not to exceed 30,000 men between Richmond and 
Suffolk, including both of those towns. 

The enemy had actually about tlie following effective forces: 

Garrison of Richmond (Elzey) 5,100 

Department of Southern Virginia (French) 7,471 

Hood's and Pickett's divisions (Longstreet) 11,050 

23.621 ' 
< hi the morning of the l.")th. Hooker added : 

A letter from Major-General Stoneman, dated 1 ]i.in. yestri-day, informs me 
tliat his command will be across the river before daylight this morning [15th]. 
It was his intention to cross at three points all above the Rappahannock Station. 
I sent him six days' rations I'ov men and animals, by wagons, to be distributed 
just before liis passage of the rix-cr." The \viii;'ons are now on their return [to 
Falmouth ].= 

1 W. R., 20, pp. 952, 978, 929, 916. Aecording: to his official report Stoneman 

- It would appear lierefrom. together was assured that Hooker would 'Vertainly 

with the promise conveyed in Williams' let- communicate" with him within that time 

ter of the 12th, that six days was the long- (TT^ /,'., .39. p. 1062). 

est time after passing the Rappahannock ^ They pi-obably arn\ed by nishtfall. 

that Stoneman might have to w.Tit to come J. B. Jr. 

ai;ain into coninuinication with Hooker. 



STONEMAN BAFFLED 151 

From the Eappaliannoek. if he should meet with uo iimisual delay, he will 
strike the Aqiiia and Richmond Railroad on the night of the second day [17th] . 

Meanwhile I shall do what I can to keep the enemy up to their works in mj' 
front, and if they should fall hack, shall pursue with all the vigor practicable. 

Up to date last night the enemy appeared to have no suspicions of our designs. 

This morning I can see nothing from the storm. 

I am rejoiced that Stoneman had two good days to go up the river, and was 
enabled to cross it before it had become too much swollen. If he can reach his 
position [on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad], the storm and mud 
will not damage our prospects. . . . 

Alas for these fond hopes and fair promises. The heavy rain, which 
set in abont 2 o'clock in the morning, and the consequent rapid rise of 
the river, put a sudden end to the crossing. Rush's Lancers reported 
to the corps commander at daylight, and received their orders "for 
special service." This regiment was to cross the Rappahannock with 
the main command, and while the latter did the heavy work on Lee's 
communications, was to make a dash at Richmond, and by forced 
marches rejoin the main command at Suffolk or Fort Monroe. It 
marched down to the river, and finding it so swollen as to be impassable, 
returned to camp.' Buford was at Rappahannock Bridge with his 
brigade at 6:30 a.m., ready to cross. He received orders to await 
further instructions. But no "further instructions" came, except to 
return to cam]3. 

Buschbeck did not receive the order for him to make a demonstration 
until about 7:30 o'clock. Having heard no firing above, he judged that 
the cavalry had not attempted to cross, and that it would be useless to 
make a demonstration. So he made none. He dispatched his adjutant 
to the headquarters of General Stoneman at Bealeton "to examine into 
the state of affairs and to receive further orders," and i-eceived from 
Stoneman an order to remain at Kelley's Ford, and let the I'egiment at 
Rappahannock Station remain at that point to guard the bridge. 

Davis' brigade, which was working its way down toward the bridge 
by the south bank, was recalled, and before it finished crossing, had to 
swim its horses. Its rear-guard was charged by about 50 cavalrymen. 
One lieutenant and 24 men were captured and several men and horses 
drowned in the rapid waters. The Confederates sustained a loss of 
1 killed, 2 wounded, and 6 captured or missing. They also lost 20 horses, 
killed, wounded, and captured.^ W. H. F. Lee explains this loss by the 
statement that the men "were separated some distance from their 
horses, and being ]»artially surprised, they had to make their escape 
without their hoi-ses, a-^ they were in great danger of themselves being 
captureil."'' 

' Aniinh of the 6 Pa. Cavalri/, by S. L. Gracey. 

- W. R.. 39, pp. 8.5, 86, 88. ' - lb.. .39, p. 8ii. 



152 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The following communications went to Stoneman on the 15th : 

From Hooker's Chief of Staff 
. . . The tenor of your dispatches might indicate that you were manceuvering 
your whole force against the command of Fitz Lee, numbering not over 2000 
men. The commanding general does not expect, nor do your instructions indi- 
cate, that you are to act from any base or depot. . . . 

From Hooker's Adjutant-General 
... As you state in your communication of yesterday that you would be over 
the river with your command at daylight this morning, it was so communicated 
to Washington, and it was hoped that the crossing had been made in advance of 
the rise in the river. If your artillery is your only hindrance to your advance, 
the major-general commanding directs that you order it to return, and proceed 
to the execiition of your orders without it. It is but reasonable to suppose that if 
you can not make use of that arm of the service, the enemy can not. If it is 
practicable to cany into execution the general instructions communicated to you 
on the 12th instant, the major-general commanding expects you to make use of 
such means as will, in your opinion, enable you to accomplish them, and that as 
speedily as possible. This army is now awaiting your movement. I am directed 
to add that, in view of the swollen condition of the streams, it is not probable, 
in the event of your being able to advance, that you will be troubled by the 
infantry of the enemy. 

Regarding Stoneman 's movements Hooker telegraphed to President 
Lincoln at 8 p.m. : 

Just heard from General Stoneman. His artillery has been brought to a halt 
by the mud, one division only having crossed the river.^ If practicable, he will 
proceed without it. All the streams are swimming. 

He received the following reply, same date : 

It is now 10 :15 p.m. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and 
a few moments later your dispatch of this evening. The latter gives me con- 
siderable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be calculated upon. 
General S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to any- 
thing. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair 
weather, and all three without hindrance from the enemy, and yet he is not 25 
miles from where he started. To reach his point fon the Richmond and Fred- 
ericksburg Railroad] he still has 60 miles to go, another river (the Rapidan) to 
cross, and will be hindered by the enemy. By arithmetic, how many days will 
it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly 
fear it is another failure already. Write me often ; I am very anxious. 

Even had Gregg's division remained across, and cleared the south 
bank of the river, Stoneman could not have begun a general movement 
until about midnight, as it took until then to get the wagons unloaded 

^ The troops that crossed were Gregg's division and Da\Tis' brigade. J. B. .Jr. 



JONES AND IMBODEN 153 

and their contents issued. By this time Davis with his brigade was 
within striking distance of Beverly E^ord. But his cooperation could 
perhaps not be counted upon before the morning of the 15th. A cross- 
ing might have been made, however, without assistance from Davis. It 
should again have been attempted. Stoneman must have known from 
indications in the sky that a storm was brewing, and before it could 
break and cause the river to rise, he might have forced the position of 
Beverly Ford or Rapi^ahannock Bridge, and got his whole command 
across the river. No delay was caused by, or involved in, Davis' wide 
turning movement, as it was accomplished by the time the main force 
was ready to advance, which, under the circumstances, could hardly 
have been earlier than it was— the morning of the 15th. The cause of 
Stoneman 's tardiness is to be found, not in the elements, nor in any 
one's failing him under fire or on the march, but in his having handi- 
capped himself with a column of wagons the contents of which had to be 
transferred to pack-mules before he could cross the river. He should 
have packed his mules before leaving Morrisville, and have crossed the 
river with his whole force on the 15th, ascending it, if necessary, still 
further for a practicable crossing. He might have dispensed with the 
supplies that he put on his pack-mules, and carried such supplies as he 
could in saddle-pockets, trusting to the enemy's country for the re- 
mainder. 

At the same time that Stoneman was to cross the Rappahannock, 
Jones and Imboden were to start on their raid to the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad.^ Imboden, who had moved to Shenandoah Mountain, 
was to jjroceed from there on the 15th ; W. E. Jones was to take up the 
march from Lacy Spring about the same time. Thus, as Hooker was 
coming out of his winter quarters of his own accord, these commanders 
were starting to "draw him out." 

With a view to the demonstration which was to fix Milroy's attention 
upon his communications while W. E. Jones and Imboden struck at the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Pitzhugh Lee put his brigade in motion 
(14th) from Sperrj'ville toward Salem, on the Manassas Gap Railroad; 
but hearing that a large force of " Yankee" cavalry was at Morrisville, 
preparing to cross at Kelley's Ford and attack W. H. F. Lee, he aban- 
doned this movement and marched back to Amissville, where he en- 
camped for the night.' 

W. E. Jones received the following dispatches of this day from R. E. 
Lee: 

1 

I learn enemy's cavalry are moving against you in Shenandoah Valley; -will 
attack Fitz Lee in passing. They have crossed at Rappahannock Station. Gen- 

^ Lee to W. E. Jones, March 25 and April 7. 

2 Campaigns of Stuart's Cavaln/, by H. B. McClellan, p. 220. 



154 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

eral Stuart, vvitli two brigades, will attend [to] them. Collect your forces and 
be on your guard. 

2 

The dispatch I sent you is confirmed; main body of enemy's cavalry is mov- 
ing via Liberty [north of Bealeton Station, Map 6] toward Warrenton, with 
the intention to march into Shenandoah Valley against you. General Stuart, at 
Rappahannock Bridge, is apprised ; directed to join you. Be prepared. 

The Jones-Imboden expedition was consequently suspended. S. 
Jones wrote to W. E. Jones : 

I countermand the movement of troops. Meet an advance of Hooker's cavalry 
into the Valley; will detain me here for the present. 

The late attempt of the Army of the Potomac to advance was to have 
been sup]iorted by its naval auxiliary. On the 13th of April Hoolcer re- 
quested Magaw, commanding the first division of the Potomac Flotilla, 
to send two of his gunboats up the Rappahannock as far as Port Eoyal 
and further if possible, having reason to believe that the Confederate 
batteries below Port Eoyal had been withdrawn. "It is desired," he 
said, ' ' that your demonstrations shall hold the enemy in that vicinity, 
and keep them from retiring. If the batteries are there, the purposes 
for which you go would be favored by exchanging a few shots with them. 
It is hoped that this movement will be made as soon as possible.'" 

On the 14th Magaw wrote to Harwood, commanding the Pgtomac 
Flotilla: 

I shall make an effort to reach Port Royal by to-morrow night (15th). ... If 
we had some transports with [even] raw troops on board, the enemy's attention 
might be attracted, but without a cooperating force, I fear "General W. P. 
[W. H. F.] Lee" will laugh at us.= 

On the 15th the IT. S. ships Anacostia and Dragon went up the Rappa- 
hannock as far as Briscoe Mines, a distance of 110 miles, without re- 
ceiving any shots. Arriving too late in the day to proceed with safety, 
they anchored for the night. From reports received, the commander 
believed "that the enemy were in strong force and with heavy batteries 
from Port Tobacco to Fredericksburg." He consequently renounced 
the idea of reaching Port Royal, and to prevent being cut off, dropped 
down during the night below I^eedsburg. He did not advance again. 
"I am convinced," he said in his report, "that s(|uads of the enemy's 
cavalry cross the river above and below Briscoe Mines almost daily. "^ 

1 Naval W. R., Series I, Vol. V, pp. 255. •25(5. 

= lb., p. 256. 

•'' 7b., pp. 2.58. 259. 



SURMISALS 155 

The line of cavalry outposts from Falmouth westward and northward 
was now dispensed with. Devin's brigade (fV) remained in camp rest 
ing up. The brigade of the XII Corps at Dumfries (~xri) was relieved 
by dismounted cavalry. The 1 Pa. Cavalry, with headquarters at King 
George Court-House, picketed the Rappahannock from Falmouth down 
to Port Conway, and thence across country at right angles with the 
river a distance of about 3 miles, making occasional reconnaissances 
beyond the picket line.' 

The withdrawal of the old line of cavalry on the 13th was noticed by 
the residents on the north side, and probably by those on the south 
side, of the Rappahannock when they rose the following morning, as 
they had the pickets and some of the reserves in full view. On the 14th 
a Confederate picket called over : ' ' You need not be so still ; we know 
all about it; you have got orders to move." Lieutenant Ropes, 20 Mass.. 
wrote home : 

We have every reason to expect an immediate move, but in what direction, no 
one can tell. 

The correspondents of the Richmond Whig and Richmond Exoniiiicr 
wi'ote from Fredericksburg: 

1 

Report says that the enemy have been massing troops in the vicinity of U. S. 
Ford for several days past. Yesterday and to-day considerable bodies of cavalry 
and immense wagon-trains were moving up the river. . . . 



... It is hoped that Hooker will advance. His coming is anxiously awaited 
by the Army of Northern Virginia, who now i-egard the destruction of the Army 
of the Potomac as a military necessity; and believing that the war is near its 
termination, they desire to give it a brilliant coup de grace. . . . 

It was now understood in both armies that Hooker was about to move, 
but whether he would try to cross the Rappahannock, and if so whei-e, 
were still matters of conjecture. In Lee's army it was generally suji- 
posed that, if he attempted a crossing, it would be at or near United 
States Ford. There was not a suspicion of Hooker's purpose of placing 
the cavalry corps on Lee's line of retreat. As has been shown, the 
Federal cavalry was believed to be aiming at the Shenandoah Valley. 

Cn the night of the 15th the following conversation was carried on 
across the river: 

Confederate: "Any signs of a move?" 

Federal: "Yes, we have got eight days' rations, and expect to move in a few 
days. We liave three days' rations in our haversaeks and five in our knapsacks.'' 

1 History of the First Reij't Pa. lipscrr,- Car., by W. P. Tiloyd. ji. 4.'i. 



156 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Confederate: "Where is the move to be?" 
Federal: "Up to the right."' 

General Longstreet says : 

Long aud close study of tlie field from the Potomac to the James River, and 
the experiences of former campaigns, made it clear that the Army of the 
Potomac had been dra-nTi into a false position, and it became manifest that there 
were but two moves left open for its spring campaign: first, by crossing the 
upper fords of the Rappahannock; secondly, by detaching forces to the south 
side of the James, and by that route moving against Richmond. 

To guard against the former, I laid out lines for field works and rifle-pits cov- 
ering all approaches by the upper fords as far as the road leading from United 
States Ford. From that point the line broke to the rear, crossing the Plank 
Road and extending back half a mile to command the road from Chancellors- 
ville to Spottsylvania Court-House." 

By "upper fords" Longstreet meant the fords between Fredericks- 
burg and the United States Ford. The lines that he mentions can not 
be located with any accuracy, but, on careful consideration, seem to 
have extended from the vicinity of Banks' Ford westward to the old 
Mine Road in the vicinity of Childs, thence southwestward to some 
point between Chandler's and Chancellor sville, on the road to Ely's 
Ford, and thence southward toward the Plank Eoad. These lines, be 
it observed, were not intrenched ; they were only ' ' laid out. ' ' 

' w. R., 40, p. 219. 

= From Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 323, 324. The italics are mine. J. B. Jr. 



CHAPTER XII 

hooker's thibd plan of operation 

THE rain continued with short intervals, making the river impassa- 
ble, for about two weeks. The Federal cavalry remained near 
Warrenton Junction, confronted on the south side of the river by W. H. 
F. Lee's cavalry brigade and Beckham's horse artillery, and on the 
north side by Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, Mosby's guerillas, the Black 
Horse Cavalry, and a portion of the 2 N. Ca. Cavalry. 
W. E. Jones wrote to Imboden : 

There is no sign of the enemy in the Valley. News has reached me from 
Sperryville just now, but no tidings of the move anticipated [into the Valley]. 
. . . My opinion is, the attack on the Valley has been abandoned, if ever enter- 
tained, bj" the enemy. . . . 

E. E. Lee wrote 

To President Davis, April 16 

The last dispatches from General Stuart, dated yesterday, report the enemy's 
cavalry north of the Rappahannock, massed opposite Kelley's and Beverly 
Fords and Rappahannock Bridge. Prisoners report they were rationed for 
eight days. The cavalry were accompanied by artillery and wagons. General 
Stuart thinks the movement a feint to cover other operations. He can learn of 
no force moving toward the Blue Ridge, but thinks from the reports of his 
scouts that General Hooker intends to transfer his army to White House, on the 
Pamunkey, or to the south side of James River. My own impression has been 
that the movement was intended to draw us to the Upper Rappahannock, that 
Fredericksburg might be seized, and the bridges across the river rebuilt. I do 
not think General Hooker will venture to uncover "Washington City by trans- 
ferring his army to James River, unless the force in front of Alexandria is 
greater than I suppose, or unless he believes this army incapable of advancing to 
the Potomac. My only anxiety arises from the present immobility of the army 
[of Northern Virginia], owing to the condition of our horses and tlie scarcity 
of forage and provisions. I think it all-important that we should assume the 
aggressive by the 1st of May, when we may expect General Hooker's army to be 
weakened by the expiration of the term of service of many of his regiments, ^nd 
before new recruits can be received. If we could be placed in a condition to make 
a vigorous advance at that time, I think the Valley [of the Shenandoah] could be 
swept of Milroy. and the army opposite me be throwTi north of the Potomac. . . . 

157 



158 THE CAMPAICiN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

P.S. A dispatch from General Stuart, dated 9 p.m. yesterdaj', just received, 
states that the heavy rains and swollen streams have entirely arrested military 
operations on tlie Upper Rappahannock. 

To Cooper, April 16 

... I doubt whether General Hooker will be quiescent. There is some move- 
ment in agitation now not yet developed. By the last report he was drawing 
rations for 90,000 men. . . . Making a liberal deduction, I should think this 
would give from 65,000 to 70,000 effectives.^ 

To Seddon, April 17 

I am informed by the chief commissary of the army [of Northern Virginia] 
that he has been unable to issue the sugar ration to the troops for the last ten 
days. Their ration consequently consists of Y^ pound of bacon, 18 ovmces of 
flour, 10 pounds of rice to each 100 men about every third day, with some few 
peas and a small amount of dried fruit occasionall}', as they can be obtained. 
This may give existence to the troops while idle, but will certainly cause them 
to break down when called upon for exertion. . . . The time has come when 
it is necessary the men should have full rations. Their health is failing, 
scurvy and typhus fever are making their appearance, and it is necessary for 
them to have a more generous diet. 

Lieutenant Ropes wrote home on the 16th : 

. . . The river has risen tremendously, say 12 feet. Roads muddy, of course. 
We do not in the least know wliat to expect. . . . Hooker seems to be about a 
great thing now, if the impossible order to carry eight days' rations means any- 
thing. If this is often repeated, we shall lose half the army by sickness; but it 
may be only for a great march and a great strike and then a rest. 

Hooker wrote to President Lincoln on the 17th: 

His [Stoneman's] failure to accomplish speedily the objects of his expedition 
is a source of deep regret to me, but I can find nothing in his conduct of it requir- 
ing my animadversion or censure. We can not control the elements. . . . 

While a commander can not control theelements, he can, within limits, 
regulate his movements by them. It is rather surprisinj? after reading 
Hooker's defence of Stoneman in this letter to find his adjutant-general 
writing to him on the same day : 

... it was not expected that you would embarrass yourself with wagons in 
your present expedition. It was supposed that your pack-mules would furnish a 
sufficient amount of transportation for your purpose. 

' This is about the strength at which Lee underestimated the strength of Hooker's 

Hooker estimated Lee's army (Halleck to ai-m.v, and Hooker overestimated that of 

Stanton, TF. B., 40, p. 505). " It seems that Lee's, 
throughout the operations to be described 



HOOKER ON STONKMAN'S CHECK 159 

The general fears that your artillery is so strong that it will detract from the 
rapidity of your movements. He desires that you will use your discretion in 
returning to camp such portions of it as will embarrass you. 

These comments should have been made when Stoneman was starting 
from Falmouth with his wagons and artillery. 
Hooker's adjutant-general wrote to Stoneman at 9 a.m. on the 18th: 

No evidence exists here that the enemy has made any change in the disposition 
of his forces from the United States Ford down the river in consequence of your 
movement. Your delay in consequence of the storm may enable him to bring up 
a small force to dispute the passage of the river. It can only be a small one, and 
must be knocked out of the way. 

The major-general commanding directs that you bear in mind that a part of 
your route lies along the line over which the enemy receives his supplies, and it 
may be with reason expected that some portion of them will fall into your hands. 
From the character of your movement, it should not be expected that you will be 
provided with full rations every hour in the day. Such never has been and 
never will be the case. 

If. from your delay, Culpeper or Gordonsville should be found to have been 
reenforced with infantry of considerable number, he suggests that you go around 
them. 

The same day Lee wrote to W. E. Jones : 

I wish you to keep General J. E. B. Stuart informed of all movements of im- 
portance of the enemy in the Valley, while he [Stuart] is operating on your right 
flank. He is now near Culpeper Court-House. 

The Special Correspondent of the Richmond 117//// wrote from Fred- 
ericksburg : 

The improving condition of the roads and thoroughfares, rendering military 
operations practicable, and particularly the demonstrations of the cavalry re- 
cently, warranted the expectation that Hooker would ere this have attempted a 
passage of the Rappahannock at one or more points simultaneously. ... If we 
may form an opinion from appearances, the enemy have been moving up the 
river for several days. . . . 

Lieutenant Ropes wrote home : 

I incline to think the movement is for the present given up, or at any rate is 
to be altered. The Rebels know all about it now, and are shouting to our pickets 
in a derisive manner about the eight days' rations they are to carry. 

On tlie 19th Lee wrote to Stuart : 

... It appears to me that he [Hooker] is rather fearful of an attack from us 
than preparing to attack. His operations in front of you look rather to prevent 
your moving against his riglit or getting in his rear. 



160 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHAKCELLORSVILLE 

... I am aware that from the superior strength of the enemy he will be able 
to overpower you at any one point, but believe by your good management, bold- 
ness, and discretion, you will be able to baffle his designs. I do not think the 
enemy's infantry extend as high as Kelley's Ford. They have a picket at the 
United States iline Ford and a strong resei'\'e about Hartwood Church. They 
may extend to a higher point. ^ 

. . . Save your horses all you can. Put yourself in communication with the 
commanding officer in the Valley, and desire him to keep you informed of all 
matters of importance. 

Hooker's adjutant-general wrote to Stoneman: 

. . . you have two small brigades of cavalry opposed to you, numbering be- 
tween 4000 and 5000 sabers. The prisoners from there state that they are 
wretchedly mounted, as we know they must be. Your force of cavalry and artil- 
lerj' is more than double that of the enemy. 

The two brigades referred to were Fitzhugh Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's, 
which numbered, including detached regiments, abotit 3000 men. 

The 29 N. Y. returned on the 18th to its brigade at Kelley's Ford and 
was replaced on the 20th by 230 men of the 73 Pa. of the same brigade. 

Correspondence between the Army of the Potomac and the Potomac 
Flotilla was resumed with the following telegram of the 20th from But- 
terfield to Magaw, commanding first division Potomac Flotilla : 

The major-general commanding desires to be informed of the number of boats 
in the Potomac Flotilla, what orders you have, and where the boats are. He has 
been advised by the President that they will act under his orders. He desires 
that none should go away without his knowledge. He desires the same informa- 
tion with regard to the fleet of Commander McCrea [second division Potomac 
Flotilla]. Please answer. 

The substance of this dispatch was referred by telegraph to Commo- 
dore Harwood, who replied the same day that all the available steam 
force of the Potomac Flotilla, not under repair, had been already de- 
tached to cooperate with the army, either off Aquia Creek or in the 
iSTansemond River; and that two vessels were detailed to convoy General 
Hooker's transports.- 

The situation on and near the Peninsula occasioned the following 
corresiDondence : 

Halleck to Dix, April 17 

... I think that Lee's main army will be massed between Richmond and the 
Rappahannock. This would of course give you an opportunity to operate in the 

^ They extended to Rappahannock Bridge, 4 miles above Kelley's Ford. 
^ The composition and disposition of the Potomac Flotilla at this time are given in 

Ajjpendix 1. 



HOOKER TO LINCOLN 161 

direction of Hicksford or Weldon, to destroy tlie railroads connecting with the 
south. But would that be a safe operation? . . . Would it not be more in ac- 
cordance with principles for you and Hooker to act as nearly together as possible, 
and at the same time to secure your smaller force from the enemy's heavy 
blows? Suppose, while General Hooker operates against the enemy's front, you 
threaten his flank and rear by the Pamunkey and Mattapony in such a way as 
to secure your own retreat, would there not be greater chance of success? It 
seems to me that West Point furnishes you a most excellent base for such an 
operation. . . . 

Dix to Halleck, April IS, about 1:30 p.m. 
... I have long been in favor of occupying the point referred to [West 
Point].! 

Peck to Hooker, April 21 
... I hold everything yet. How do you get along? 

IJooker to Peck, 10 p.m. 
I am glad to hear good tidings from you. You must be patient with me. I 
must play with these devils before I can spring. Remember that my army is at 
the bottom of a well, and the enemy holds the top. 

On the 21st Hooker wrote to President Lincoln : 

... As I can only cross the river by stratagem, without great loss, which I 
wish to avoid, it may be a few days before I make it. I must threaten several 
points, and be in readiness to spring when a suitable opportunity presents itself. 

Deserters inform me that the talk in the rebel camp is that when we cross the 
river it is their intention to fall in our rear and attack our depot at Aquia. The 
recent arrival of a pontoon train at Hamilton's Crossing lends plausibility to 
these reports. - 

The sanguine temperament of the commander of the Army of the 
Potomac stood him in good stead through the trying period of boggy 
roads and swollen streams and consequent inaction. At perhaps its 
darkest moment he expressed himself as follows : 

Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 21, 1863, 9 a.m. 
His Excellency the President of the United States: 

My latest advices from Major-General Stoneman were i;p to 9 o'clock yester- 
day morning. At that time his command was moving to ascertain whether or 
not the fords were practicable. If he had crossed, I can not but feel that I 
should have been informed of it ere this. . . . 

The weather appears to continue averse to the execution of my plans as first 
formed, as, in fact, for all others; but if these do not admit of speedy solution, 
I feel that I miist modify them to conform to the condition of things as they are. 

! TF. R., 26, p. 1002. there is no evidence of the presence of a 

^ This is probably a reference to a pon- pontoon train at Hamilton's Crossing at 

toon train reported by Couch, which had this time. J. B. Jr. 

no existence (Appendix 8). At any rate, 



162 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

I was attached to the movement as first projected, as it promised unusual success ; 
but if it fails, I will project a movement which I trust will secure us success, but 
not to so great an extent, and one in the execution of which I shall be able to 
exercise personal supervision. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

Joseph Hooker, 

Major-General Commandiug. 

The last sentence shows Hooker's characteristic distrust of his sub- 
ordinates. His concern for the secrecy of his plan had received a rude 
shock. A letter of April 4 from his medical director {Appendix 5) 
was published in full in the Washington Morning Chronicle of the 
17th. It contained the statements: "The paper marked A shows the 
whole number of sick in this army to be on the 28th of March ultimo 
10,777," and "The ratio of sick for the ivhole army is 67.64 per 1000." 
From these it was easy, by simple proportion, to determine the strength 
of the whole army in officers and men present as 159,329. Such calcu- 
lation is alluded to by Lee in a letter to Davis dated April 27 and in 
one to Seddon dated May 10.' According to the consolidated morning 
report the aggregate present on the 31st of March was 163,005. Lee 
was getting near the truth, but not quite as near as these figures would 
indicate. He discounted them too much on account of non-effectives. 
On the 7th of May he wrote to President Davis : 

The strength of the enemy seems to be greater than I had estimated, as from 
various sources it is stated that they crossed the Rappahannock witli 120,000 men. 

If from Hooker's effective strength we deduct for the cavalry and 
horse artillery left behind 2400 men, for the 20 Me. Infantry 400 men, 
for the General Artillery Reserve, less Brooker's battery, 1500 men, 
and for the Provost Guard 2200 men, we get as about the force which, 
first and last, crossed the Rappahannock 127,460. On the 21st Hooker 
wrote to his friend in Washington, the Secretary of War, inviting his 
attention to the newspaper article and remarking : 

Already all the arithmeticians in the army have figured up the strength of the 
sick and well, as shown in this published extract, as belonging to the army. Its 
complete organization is given, and in the ease of two corps [I, VI] the number 
of regiments. The chief of my secret service department would have willingly 
paid $1000 for such information in regard to the enemy at the commencement 
of his operations, and even now would give that sum for it to verify the state- 
ments which he has been at great trouble to collect and systematize. 

On the 21st the pickets of Devin's brigade of cavalry were ordered 
in, and at 3 p.m. the three regiments proceeded to Potomac Bridge.^ 

1 W. R., 40, pp. 752, 790. 
- The Cavalry at Chancellorsrille, by J. E. Carpenter, in Philadelphia Weekly Times. 



NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO STONEMAN 163 

On the 22d Stoneman received another set of long, rambling instruc- 
tions in which the following points are to be observed {Appendix 14) : 

1. lie is to be ready to move on short notice. 

2. He may subdivide his force, but if he does, he must have the several parts 
come together at some point in the enemy's country which he is to designate. 

3. He is, if necessary, to subsist off the country. 

They contain nothing about intercepting the enemy's retreat upon 
Richmond, which in the instructions issued on the 12th was made the 
"primary object" of Stoneman's movement. True, those instructions 
had not been revoked, but those of the 22d, not referring to this object, 
and dwelling upon certain other objects, might give the impression that 
the latter had been substituted for the former.* 

To confuse the enemy as much as possible Hooker made demonstra- 
tions as if to attack at both ends of his line. On the 19th Doubleday's 
division of the I Corps marched to Port Conway (Map 2), 21 miles be- 
low Fredericksburg, where it made a pretence of crossing, and at night 
built fires in every direction to make the impression of a large force. 
It returned on the 22d." On the 20th the cavalry corps moved toward 
the Rappahannock to ascertain whether it was fordable ; and about this 
time the small infantry force ordered to Rappahannock Ford and Bev- 
erly Ford showed itself at both points. 

On the 23d Lee wrote to General Jackson : 

... I think that, if a real attempt is made to cross the river, it will be above 
Fredericksburg.^ 

On the same day he wrote to the Adjutant and Inspector General : 
As regards the reported movement of General Hooker toward Riclunond, I 
know of no direct route which he can take, shorter than the line which we now 

1 Writing- from Warrenton Junction, Bristoe, where I will connect with it by 

Stoneman reported his situation as follows. patrol from Cedar Run. I am sorry to say 

It should be premised that the enemy had that the horses have suffered considerably 

evacuated Warrenton, and that Stoneman for want of forage and from exposure to 

was drawing his suppUes from Alexandria ; rain and wind. A few days, I hope, will 

"April 22 bring them up again. The railroad is in 

"Averell's division and Davis' brigade are good order up to the Rappahannock rail- 
on the raih-oad, half-way between Warren- road biidge and to Warrenton. The con- 
ton and the Junction. Gregg's division and stiiiction train is now at the bridge. Three 
Buford's brigade are at the Junction. All trains have arrived with stores, 
are on the railroad. As we have not, nor, "April 23 
by being there, do we require, wagons to "The command is now separated [di- 
transport our supplies, I shall make ar- vided?] by impassable streams, and I am 
rangements to keep on hand two days' ra- unable to communicate with the different 
tions of long, and six of short forage, and portions of it, owing to the small streams 
eight of subsistence stores. I patrol the being swimming. The pickets are cut off 
road to Bristoe Station, and have tele- by high water." 

graphed the commanding officer of Alexan- - Itinerai-y of the I Army Coi-ps, W. R., 

dria of the fact, and requested that the 39, p. 256. 

force at Washington be sent out as far as " W. 7?., 40, p. 859. 



164 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

occupy, and should he attempt such a movement when the army is able to oper- 
ate, I think he will find it very difficult to reach his destination. 

On the 22(1 another demonstration was made below Fredericksburg. 
Two regiments of infantry (^-^. ^) left their camp near Belle 
Plain at 1 :30 p.m., and about 10 p.m. bivouacked about half a mile in 
rear of the village of Port Conway. About 3 a.m. on the 23d, the 24 
Mich, was under arms and marched into the village. Twenty men were 
picked from each company to set up canvas boats and cross the river to 
Port Royal. Owing to a heavy rain, and the entire ignorance of the 
men as to the manner of constructing the boats, the work was not com- 
pleted and the crossing effected until nearly 6 a.m. At that hour, thir- 
teen boats crossed the Rappahannock without opposition. Parties were 
sent in different directions through the village of Port Royal. A 
wagon-train was captured and destroyed, several prisoners taken, and 
a mail seized. The boats returned to Port Conway about 9 a.m.^ The 
expedition commenced its march toward camp about 11 a.m. and arrived 
there about 7:30 p.m. It rained all day, and the roads were almost 
impassable.^ 

"It seems," said Captain Candler, an aide on Hooker's staff, writing 
home on the 24th, "as though it were never to stop raining; the longer 
it rains the harder it seems to come down. I can see no prospects of any 
clearing up. . . . Our entire plan may have to be changed, and unless 
fortune favors us our chances for complete victory will not be very high. 
Could you come into Headquarters at any time during the day you 
would see that something was wrong; every one is moving around in an 
aimless, nervous way, looking at the clouds and then at the ground, and 
in knots trying to convince themselves that it is going to clear off and 
they will be able to move day after to-morrow. ' ' 

The 25th dawned bright and springlike, with a good stiff breeze, which 
dried the mud rapidly. The day promised a spell of good weather and 
held out a prospect of an early move. The country was gay with fresh 
shrubs and flowers. Peach-trees were in full bloom. Bulbs and hya- 
cinths abounded in the gardens of the deserted houses, and the Plymouth 
Mayflowers in the woods. 

Howard was instructed to send knapsacks and other supplies to Buscli- 
beck's brigade at Kelley's Ford, and informed confidentially that his 
whole corps would ' ' probably move in that direction as early as ^^londay 
a.m., 27th." ' 

^ 14 N. y. Militia. ■* TIip brigade had marohed from its camp 

" The record, as pubHshed, gives this hour without knapsacks {Autobiography of O. 

as 9 p.m., manifestly an error. O. Howard. I, 350). 
» W. R., 39, pp. 137, 256. 



HOOKER'S FEINTS 165 

The 91 Pa. (1. 3. V) was relieved from duty at United States Ford 
and Banks' Ford by the 155 Pa. (2. 3. III). 

Hooker's feints, while they did not deceive the enemy, deceived his 
own army. Lieutenant Ropes wrote home on the 25th : 

I hear from undoubted authority something which I tell you, and do not wish 
to have go further at present, viz.. that it was, and probably still is, Hooker's 
plan to attack Fredericksburg again in front to accomplish what Burnside failed 
to do. The recent storm .stopped it, but a few days ago the bridges were actually 
moved down and ready to be thrown across in the same places again. . . . An- 
other thing, Macy [commanding 20 ]Mass.] has been asked if he will volunteer his 
regiment to lead in a desperate assault, and has of course accepted. So you may 
hear of another Fredericksburg any day, and the 20th will probably be ahead. 
Do not, of course, speak of this, for it must not get round. Nothing would so 
demoralize the army, and destroy the little confidence they feel in Hooker, as to 
know that lie intended to repeat Burnside "s move. 

But he added on the 26th : 

I heard from a staff officer last niglit that the projected move across the river 
here is given up. Couch told me so. . . . The rebels appear to be fitting up their 
works and increasing them. The river has now gone down to about its normal 
size. Weather fine. 

Under date of April 25, 1 a.m., Lee wrote to Stuart: 

I think it probable that among the considerations that prevent Stoneman from 
crossing the Blue Ridge is the apprehension that you will plunge into the rear of 
their army and cut up their line of communications. Should he cross into the 
Valley, nothing would call him back sooner than such a move on your part, and 
it is worthy of your consideration how you could, in that event, most damage 
him. Should you determine to follow him, Mosby and the Black Horse [Cavalry] 
might be let loose on his rear, which would, perhaps, produce similar consterna- 
tion, though not so much harm. 

Stoneman never thouijht of crossinof the Blue Ridge. Lee's decep- 
tion on this point was to prove, as we shall see, a potent and unexpected 
factor of success in the execution of Hooker 's grand manoeuver. 

Stuart's adjutant-general wi'ote on the 25th to Mo.sby that the general 
was extremely anxious to know what was going on beliind Centreville, 
and whether Hooker was moving any troops up iu that vicinity.^ 

^ Tt". R., 40, p. 860. Stuart wi-ote to nuining regularly to that point (it may be 

Mosby on the 26th : "There is now a splen- by the time that you get this, the oppor- 

did opportunity to strike the enemy in rear tnnity may have gone). Capture a train 

of Warrenton Junction. The trains are and inteniipt the operation of the railroad. 



166 THE CAMPAIC4N OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

April 26 

On the 26tli a detachment of the 1 Pa. Cavalry went from King George 
Court-Honse down the Neck, the peninsula between the Rappahannock 
and the Potomac, for the purpose of capturing mails or small parties of 
Confederate troops, of breaking up contraband trade, seizing or de- 
stroying supplies intended for the enemy, stopping the Confederate 
conscription, and arresting any citizens that might appear to be actively 
hostile to the United States. It reached Leedsburg (Map 1, sheet A) 
and returned the same day with a dozen prisoners, having destroyed 
several boats and a considerable amount of contraband property.* 

By this time a material change was made in the Federal plan of opera- 
tion. The new plan was stated and discussed by Hooker and his chief 
of staff about a year later as follows : 

Hooker 

... as the season was now more advanced, and the roads firmer, with a pros- 
pect that the rainy season had ended, I concluded to change my plan and strike 
for the whole rebel army, instead of forcing it back on its line of retreat, which 
was as much as I could hope to accomplish in executing my first design. 

As modified, the problem was to throw a sufiicient infantry force to cross at 
Kelley's Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away the enemy's forces 
holding the U. S. and Banks' Fords by attacking them in rear, and as soon as 
these fords were open to reenforce the marching column sufficiently for them to 
continue the march upon the flank of the rebel army until the whole force was 
routed ; and if successful his retreat intercepted. Simultaneously with this 
movement on the right, the left were [sic] to cross the Rappahannock below Fred- 
ericksburg, and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of sup- 
plies, to prevent his dispatching an overwhelming force to his left.'' 

What I wanted was Lee's army; with that Richmond would have been ours, 
and indeed all of Virginia; and it was with this view that instructions were 
given General Stoneman.^. . . I not only expected a victory, but I expected to 
get the whole army. I had reason to expect it, and I struck for that object.'' 

BuUerf,eld 

General Hooker finally determined upon a plan of campaign the intent and 
purpose of which was to destroy the army of General Lee where it then was, 

Stoneman's main body of cavalry is located sure to give dates and numbers and names 

near Warrenton Junction, Bealeton, and as far as possible." 

Warrenton Springs. Keep far enough from ^ W. R., 40, p. 249 ; History of the First 

a brigade camp to give you time to get off Reg't Pa. Reserve Cav., by W. P. Lloyd, 

your plunder and prisoners. Information pp. 45-47. 

of the movements of large bodies is of the - Rep. of Com.. IV, 116. 

greatest importance to us just now. The ■'' Ih., 1.39. 

marching or transportation of divisions will * 7b., 14-5. 

often indicate the plan of a campaign. Be 



HOOKER'S THIRD PLAN 167 

not merely to fight a battle and gain possession of the battle-ground, and have 
the enemy fall back on Richmond, but to destroy him there; for General Hooker 
believed that we could better afford to fight the enemy nearer Washington than 
Richmond.^ 

The new plan lent itself, by turning tlie enemy's left, to forcing him 
off his communications and up against the impassable obstacles of the 
Atlantic seaboard, but Hooker had no thought of such strenuous tactics. 
His general idea, as it appears in the foregoing statements, was to 
"march upon" the enemy's left flank, to "threaten" his right flank, and 
at the same time to intercept his retreat. It was apparently expected 
that the enemy would retreat, or attempt to, at the slightest pressure on 
a flank. He was then, if possible, to be intercepted and captured on the 
heights of Fredericksburg, or if that was not possible, to be followed 
and harassed till he brought up against the Federal cavalry, and then 
to be crushed between that force holding him in front and Hooker's 
army falling on his rear. 

The following instructions went to Stoneman at 9 : 10 a.m. : 

. . . you will use all possible means of obtaining information in regard to the 
different routes leading from the Rappahannock Station into the interior and 
leaving Culpeper and Gordonsville to the right, the best place of crossing the 
Rapidan, the best roads, etc. . . . Also what information, if any, of the forces 
at Culpeper and Gordonsville. . . . 

In the course of the day Hooker received a report from Stoneman 
that the people of the enemy's country were expecting an advance of 
Hooker's army on Gordonsville via Culpeper, that it was rumored that 
pontoon bridges had been thrown across the Upper Rappahannock for 
that purpose, and that there was probably a large force in front of 
Hooker at Fredericksburg. 

He stated in reply : 

. . . We know the strength of the enemy in front, and he is looking for us to 
advance in this vicinity. 

He received the following telegram from Peck : 

Longstreet is still here. Heavy artillery is coming to him from Petersburg. 
Tlie storm has ceased ; mud drying up. Advise me in cipher of as much as you 
deem proper of your operations. 

To which he replied : 

... I have communicated to no one what my intentions are. If you were 
here, I could properly and willingly impart them to you. So mucli is found 

1 Bep. of Com., TV, 74, 7.5. 



168 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

out by the enemy in my front with regard to movements, that I have concealed 
my designs from my own staff, and I dare not intrust them to the wires, knowing 
as 1 do that they are so often tapped. 

Reference has already been made to the two years' and the nine 
months' men in Hooker's army whose time was to expire in the spring. 
These men, like all the volunteers, enlisted originally as state troops, and 
were subsequently mustered into the service of the United States. They 
were given to believe, it seems, that their period of service would be 
reckoned from the time when they enlisted as state troops ; in other 
words, that they would be discharged the service of the United States 
two years after their enlistment in state regiments. On the 19th Hooker 
repaired to Washington to consult with the authorities on this question, 
and satisfied himself that they were not entitled to their discharge until 
two years from the time of their being mustered into the service of the 
United States. The men of the 5 N. Y. Volunteers, Duryee Zouaves, 
enlisted in the service of the state of New York April 23, 1861, and were 
mustered into the service of the United States May 9, 1861. They be- 
lieved themselves entitled to their discharge from the service of the 
United States on the 23d of April, 1863. But on that day their colonel 
assembled them in a square, and read to them an order of Hooker's 
informing them that they would be held to ser\'ice until May 9.^ They 
took it in very bad grace. There were three years' men, too, in these 
two-year regiments who had been deceived, or had deceived themselves, 
into believing that they would be discharged with their regiments. They 
felt greatly aggrieved when notified that they would be transferred to 
other regiments to serve out their time. Many of the men thus disap- 
pointed resolved that they would not go into another battle. 

About the 19th President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and General 
Halleck visited the army and spent a couple of days with it. Their 
presence in the camp was interpreted to mean an early move. It was 
intended to have, and doubtless did have, a favorable effect upon the 
dissatisfied men. Speeches were made which it was hoped would cause 
large numbers of the two years' and the nine months' men to decide to 
reenlist on the expiration of their terms of enlistment, but this hope was 
disappointed. On the 22d Hooker wrote to the Adjutant-General, U. S. 
Army, Washington, inclosing a list of the nine months' men and two 
years' men who were soon to be discharged by expiration of enlistment. 
Referring to them, he said : 

... I have reason to believe but few, if any, will reenlist at this time. They 
appear to be of opinion that they will be under less restraint to retire from 
service before incurring new obligations, and that if they should conclude to re- 

1 G. 0. No. 44, headquarters Army of the Potomac, April 20, 1863. See G. 0. No. 85 
for bounties offered in case of reenlistment (TF. R., 40, pp. 233, 234). 



LINCOLN REVISITS THE ARMY 



169 



turn, they will be able to realize a larger bounty as substitutes for conscripts than 
is provided by law. The large bounties heretofore paid by the State and Federal 
Governments seem to be uppermost in their minds, and they will be likely to 
hold back for their recurrence. At all events, tliey are unwilling to reenlist now. 



On the 24th of April, a general order from the Adjntant-General's 
office, Washington, directed that vohinteer regiments about to be dis- 
charged be returned at the expiration of their terms of service to the 
states in which they were raised, and that they "turn over their arms 
and equipments" before leaving the army in which they served. The 
latter requirement caused dissatisfaction, as it deprived these troops of 
the privilege of parading on their way home with the arms which they 
had carried in the field. ^ This grievance was removed bj' an order is- 
sued from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on the 1st of 
!May, when the army was engaged in active operations.- 



' For the case of the 7 and 8 N. Y., which, 
on their return from two years of senice 
in the Army of the Potomac, paraded in 
New York City without anns, see New 
York Times, April 29. 1863. 

^ "Pursuant to instructions which have 
been received from the War Department, 



hereafter regiments of volunteei-s leaving 
the field on account of expiration of teiin of 
service will be permitted to take their arms 
and accoutrements to the place of dis- 
charge, to be delivered to the governor of 
the state or to the officers appointed by 
him to receive them." 



PART II 

PERIOD OF KXKCUTION 



CHAPTER XIII 

APEH, 27 (map 7) . . . THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC IN MOTION 

Right Wing 
rpiHE following orders were issued for the grand turning movement: 

To Commanding Officers, XI and XII Corps, April 26 
. . . the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, in the order named, will begin their 
march at sunrise to-morrow morning, the former to encamp as near Kelley's 
Ford as practicable, without discovering itself to tlie enemy, and the latter as 
nearly in its rear as circumstances will permit. They will be established in 
their camps on or before 4 p.m. on Tuesday, the 28th instant. Corps com- 
manders will be held responsible that the men are kept in camp and do not go to 
the river. . . . 

To Commanding Officer, V Corps, April 27, 1 a.m. 

. . . your corps is to march to-morrow [to-day] so as to reach the vicinity of 
Kelley's Ford by Tuesday [28th] at 4 p.m. The corps of Generals Slocum [XII] 
and Howard [XI] take the same direction (and will be on the same route proba- 
bly) from Hartwood.^ 

To Commanding Officer, II Corps 

The major-general commanding directs that you move at sunrise to-morrow 
morning two divisions of your corps to encamp as near as practicable to Banks' 
Ford without exposing your camps to the view of the enemy ; that one brigade 
and one battery of one of these two divisions take position at United States Ford ; 
the movement to be made quietly ; the officers and men restrained from exhibit- 
ing themselves or making any sliow or appearance upon the river beyond the 
necessary picket duty. The division left m camp should be the one whose camps 
are most exposed to the view of the enemy. . . . [It] will be directed to keep 
up the picket line on the river and [to keep] in readiness to repel any attempt 
that may be made by the enemy to cross the river. Should the demonstration 
of the enemy prove of sufficient strength to indicate such a purpose, the Third 
Corps will be available for support. The division left in camp, as well as the 
divisions at Banks' and United States Fords, will be held in readiness to follow 
up any successful movements without delay. In moving from camp or breaking 

' It had been originally proposed that south bank. This idea was abandoned on 
General Meade with the V Corps should the representation by Meade of difficulties 
cross at United States Ford, as the XI and likely to ensue. 
Xn Corps moved down the river on the 

173 



174 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

camp, the practice of [making] large fires and burning camp rubbish will not be 
permitted. 

The Rappaliannock at Kelley's Ford was about 100 yards wide, and 
not fordable for infantry. For its passage bridges would be necessary. 
If these were brought up with the troops from the vicinity of Falmouth, 
the fact might become known to the enemy and betray the purpose of the 
march. This was probably why it was decided to have the bridge train 
brought by a better-concealed route. Captain Ludley of the 15 N. Y. 
Engineers was sent to-day to Washington with orders to get a canvas 
pontoon train and take it to Alexandria, and thence by rail to Bealeton, 
so as to arrive there by 10 : 30 a.m. to-morrow, the 28th. 

No effort was to be made to lay the bridges at Banks ' Ford until the 
night of the 29th, but they were to be held in readiness to be thrown 
across the river as soon as the enemy should leave the opi^osite bank. 

Two ambulances only and the pack-train of small-arm ammunition 
were to accompany each division, except that the II Corps, having no 
pack-train, was allowed wagons for the transportation of small-arm am- 
munition. With this exception the wagon transportation was limited to 
"a small number" or "a few" to each corps to carry forage for the ani- 
mals. The heavy trains of these divisions remained in rear of Falmouth. 

While stealing a march to cross at Kelley's Ford, Hooker tried to 
appear to be preparing to cross at Banks' Ford and United States Ford. 
He wanted the enemy to learn of the movement of troops to the latter 
points. His precautions against the unnecessary exposure of these 
troops to the enemy's view were merely a trick to give the movement an 
air of seriousness, or a blind. These troops, which may be considered 
for the present as the center of Hooker's army, were intended to with- 
draw attention from the Federal right wing, but not from the left. 
They were to appear to the enemy as constituting about half of the 
Federal army and seeking by a demonstration or turning movement to 
facilitate the advance of the remainder directly against the lines of 
Fredericksburg. 

The commanders of the V, XI, and XII Corps were enjoined to con- 
sider the information imparted to them regarding their respective des- 
tinations as "strictly confidential." No such injunction was placed 
upon the commander of the II Corps. 

The V, XI, and XII Corps were limited in artillery to one battery per 
division; the portion of the II Corps directed up the river was to take 
with it "all the artillery attached to the two divisions" (two batteries 
per division), and the corps artillery, consisting of two batteries. 

The artillery left behind, including the corps artillery of the XI 
Corps, was to be forwarded to the several corps after the successful 
execution of the turning movement. 



THE START PROM FALMOUTH 175 

The best road from Falmouth to United States Ford, and one that 
Hooker would naturally take, having regard to concealment, is the one 
through Hartwood Church. The V, XI, and XII Corps were assembled 
in the course of the day at this point (Map 7). 

Medical Director Letterman, learning that only two ambulances per 
division were to accompany the troops, ordered all the other ambu- 
lances, and all the medicine and hospital wagons, to be taken to United 
States Ford and parked on the north side of the river. 

The troops carried on their persons, as required by Hooker's circular 
of the 13th, eight days' field rations, except the beef for five days, which 
was driven along. The usual load of their haversacks had been three 
days' rations. They had carried five, but never more. Of the eight 
which they were now required to carry, they put five in their haversacks 
and three in their knapsacks. The men were stiff from their long en- 
campment, and had not the strength and hardiness that might have 
been acquired from practice marches. The weight of the packs, as de- 
termined by certain quartermasters after the campaign, was about 45 
pounds.' But these officers ignored all those personal belongings which 
a soldier thinks as important as many of the articles which he holds in 
trust for the government. No account was taken, for instance, of his 
towel or pocket-handkerchief, knife, pencil, pipe or tobacco, Bible or 
pack of cards, etc., or of the water or coffee in his canteen. The quarter- 
master of the VI Corps estimates the load of the soldier at from 56 to 60 
pounds.- Swinton gives it as 60 pounds.* 

The day was gloomy, rainy, and cold ; the roads were in places almost 
impassable. The men made the short march to Hartwood Church in 
excellent spirits, but lining the road with overcoats and other articles 
thrown away as too heavy or cumbersome to be borne.* General 
Hooker passed through the camp late in the afternoon and was greeted 
with deafening cheers. The soldiers sang "Hooker is our Leader": 

The Union boys are moving on the left and on the right, 
The bugle-call is sounding, our shelters we must strike ; 
Joe Hooker is our leader, he takes his whisky strong. 
So our knapsacks we will sling, and go marching along.^ 

The XT Corps was accompanied by 58 wagons, about twice as many 
as accompanied either of the other corps. A number of them were 
loaded with the knapsacks of Buschbeck's brigade at Kelley's Ford. 
Others carried extra rations. This corps had provided itself with ten 

' TT'. if.. 40, p. 545. - lb.. 40, p. 554. ' The whole song will be found iii the 

' Campaigns of the Army of the Poto- History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 

mac, p. 272. (118 Pa. Vols.), by the Siii-vivors' Assoc, 

* Papers ccrtrf before Illinnis Comman- p. 11)6. 

dery, Loyal Legion, IV, 177. 



176 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

days' supplies, or two days more than it was required or authorized to 
carry. ^ 

It was expected that at the end of eight days, if not before, the troops 
would be joined by the main trains. These were loaded on an average 
with field rations for five days and grain for two, making, with the 
supplies accompanying the troops, subsistence for thirteen days and 
grain for eight. They contained also medical supplies and reserve 
ammunition for artillery and infantry. Besides the ammunition car- 
ried in the limbers and caissons, the artillery had from 100 to 150 
roimds per piece in wagons of the main trains. The train of the V 
Corps remained at Stonemau's Switch. That of the XII Corps marched 
to the vicinity of Banks' Ford. That of the XI, which was required by 
order to do likewise, was parked at a road junction about a mile east of 
Berea Church by order of the corps commander. - 

The 140 rounds of infantry ammunition prescribed by Hooker's cir- 
culars to be provided per man were carried as follows : 60 on the person 
(40 in cartridge-boxes, 20 in pockets of clothing), 20 on pack-mules, 
60 in wagons of main trains. 

Pursuant to instructions from Hooker, General Hunt, his chief of 
artillery, made a reconnaissance of the enemy's jDosition at Banks' 
Ford, and determined upon the number and position of the guns to be 
placed there "to enfilade the enemy's rifle-pits; to crush the fire of his 
work on the hill overlooking the river; to cover the throwing of the 
bridges at that ford; and to protect the crossing of the troops."* The 
necessary instructions for placing the pieces, preparing cover for them, 
and taking command of the artillery at this point were given by Hunt to 
his inspector of artillery, Major A. Doul. Two batteries of position 
from the General Reserve (Brooker's four 4V2-iueh guns and von 
Bliicher's four 20-pounders), and the batteries left behind by the II, 
XI, and XII Corps, were posted accordingly by the major. 

One regiment of the V Corps ( 3 \°y ^ was left in camp at Falmouth on 
account of its having the smallpox.^ 

^Report of chief quartermaster, XI extra wagon till there were many; for 

Corps, W. B., 40, p. 555. Howard says in where were they to get their meals, if ra- 

his Autobiography (I, 353) : tion wagons were all left behind? This 

"Our orders were very strict to keep condition I quickly coiTected, but it was my 

down the trains to the smallest number for first mortification in this campaign. Some 

ammunition and forage only. I found that of the American oflicers were as careless as 

on that mai-ch several of my subordinate some of the foreign in the matter of orders 

commanders had been very careless in not —glorious in eye-service, but conscienceless 

carrying out these instructions to the letter. when out of sight." 

General Hooker and his staff passed my There is good reason, as we shall see, 

trains during the march and said to nie : for questioning the assertion that the trains 

'General Meade has done better than you.' were quickly reduced to proper size. 

Of course I had issued the orders, but field = W. R., 39, p. 632, and 40, pp. 557, 558. 

officers would here and there slip in an •'' lb., 39, p. 246. * lb., 39, p. 519. 



STONEMAN REPORTS 177 

In compliance with instructions from Halleck, General Staliel, with 
the 2d and 3d brigades of his cavalry division and a battery of four 
guns, marched from Fairfax Court-House to 2 miles beyond Middleburg. 
This movement, which the enemy might take for a reconnaissance to 
clear the way for Stoneman's cavalry into the Shenandoah Valley, was 
intended to hold in check the Confederate troops remaining in the Val- 
ley. Federal troops were being sent from the Valley westward to meet 
Jones and Imboden. 

Stoneman forwarded to headquarters the result of the "inquiries and 
investigations into the character and nature of the country lying south 
of the Rappahannock and east of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad." 
He reported in part : 

The roads leading out from Kelley's, Kemper's, and Barnett's Fords are 
country roads, and tolerably good in dry weather. There is a very good road 
leading from Culpeper Court-Hoiise to Germanna Mills [or Ford], on the 
Rapidan River, via Stevensburg, and another from the Court-House to Raccoon 
Ford, on the same river. The fords over the Rapidan River are numerous, and 
their practicability depends entirely upon the stage of water in the streams. 
The banks are generally rolling, open, and well cultivated, and the whole of it, 
as far north as Culpeper Court-House, is overlooked and in plain view from the 
top of Clark's mountain, on the top of which mountain the enemy has a tele- 
graph station (signal).^ . . . 

The inhabitants of Culpeper Court-House have been leaving for the Shenan- 
doah Valley. These fleeing inhabitants, as also the prisoners which have fallen 
into our hands, would lead us to suppose that the enemy expected an attack 
from this direction, but I am assured by yourself that such is not the case. 

If Hooker meant that the enemy was not looking for an advance upon 
Gordonsville, he was mistaken. A correspondent in the field wrote as 
follows : 

The rebels seem to regard Hooker's designs against Gordonsville as impolitic, 
and likely to result disastrously, saying that the "Confederates are making 
Gordonsville stronger than Fredericksburg was, and that we will discover [that] 
it is not the easiest way of getting to Richmond." . . . The blacks, as a general 
rule, come voluntarily forward, and disclose such facts as they deem to our 
advantage to be apprised of, oftentimes at much personal risk to themselves, for 
their ma.sters threaten them with siimmary vengeance for all such acts. The 
owners regard their slaves with marked distrust. 

Stoneman's reconnaissances have cleared up the country as far as the 
Rapidan. Beyond that line its most notable feature is a dense tangled 
forest of pine and oak interspersed with black-jack and other scrub 
growths, known as the Wilderness. A single good road, the Plank 
Road, leads from Fredericksburg westward, leaving comparatively open 
' A station for flag or torch signaling. , 



178 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

eounti'}^ behind it, and enters the Wilderness at a place called Salem 
Church. About a mile beyond this point, or a half-mile from Taber- 
nacle Church, it divides into two branches. The southern branch is the 
continuation of the Plank Road, and retains its name; the northern 
branch is known as the Turnpike. These two roads come together at 
Chancellor sville, about 4 miles from Tabernacle Church, or 10 miles 
from Fredericksburg. They continue one road to a point about 3 miles 
distant called Wilderness Church, where they separate as before, form- 
ing the two roads which connect this region with Orange Court-House, 
on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 

Chancellorsville consists of a single brick dwelling, and owes its im- 
portance to the meeting here of several roads. Around this house is an 
irregular cleared space of about 100 acres, or extending about 200 or 300 
yards in every direction. A road of inferior quality, known as the 
River Road, runs from Fredericksburg along the river to the vicinity 
of Mineral Spring Run, and thence to Chancellorsville. 

Left Wing 

Instructions sent to Sedgwick, commanding the I, III, and VI Corps 
(left wing), were received about 6 p.m. 

The three corps were to be in position to cross the river as follows: 

I and VI Corps, at or before 3:30 a.m. the 29th— the former at Fitz- 
hugh's Crossing, the latter at Franklin's Crossing. 

Ill Corps, as a support, at or before 4:30 a.m. the 29th— at either of 
the forementioned crossings. The ambulances and trains to be parked 
in the rear, and concealed behind the range of hills that was visible to 
the enemy, and to be ready to move when desired. The troops, as far 
as possible, to be concealed until they executed the demonstration which 
was to follow. The necessary batteries of the corps and of the General 
Artillery Reserve to be placed in position under direction of General 
Hunt to cover the crossing. . . . Two bridges to be laid at each cross- 
ing under the supervision of General Benham before 3 : 30 a.m. the 29th. 
Any troops needed to assist the Engineer Brigade in the performance of 
this duty to be furnished to General Benham, under the direction of 
General Sedgwick. A demonstration in full force to be made on the 
morning of the 29th with a view to securing the Telegraph Road and 
barring that route to Richmond. In the event of the enemy detaching 
any considerable part of his force against the troops operating toward 
Chancellorsville, Sedgwick was to attack and carry the works in his 
front at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph Road to 
prevent the enemy's turning his position on that road and gaining the 
route to Richmond. In case the enemy should succeed in doing this or 
should previously fall back on Richmond, Sedgwick was to pursue him 
with the utmost vigor. 



FEDERAL LEFT WING 179 

It was suggested that, in case the enemy retired, a force be thrown 
on the Bowling Green Road and pursuit be made both on that road and 
on the Telegraph Road. 

The 155 Pa. at Banks' and United States Fords was replaced by 
troops of the "Irish brigade," commanded by General Meagher. Two 
regiments (^^i) were posted at United States t'ord and two {^i^) 
at Banks' Ford. The remaining regiment (28 Mass.) camped at Hart- 
wood Church en route to United States Ford. Detachments of these 
regiments were distributed among the houses through the country, with 
instructions to keep the inhabitants from leaving their vicinity, and so 
prevent their giving information to the enemy. 

In preparation for supporting the II Corps, if necessary, the following 
dispatch was sent to the commander of the III Corps : 

The commanding general directs tliat you have your command in readiness 
to move early to-morrow f28th] with the subsistence (eight days) and ammuni- 
tion prescribed by existing orders for the march. Furtlier instructions will be 
sent to you later in the day. 

This corps was reviewed to-day by a number of distinguished visitors 
who were received at Hooker's headquarters yesterday. The reviewing 
party consisted of Secretary Seward; the Swedish minister; the sec- 
retary of the Swedish legation ; the Prussian minister; Mr. Peale, exam- 
iner of patents ; Mr. French, second auditor of the Treasury ; Mr. F. W. 
Seward, Assistant Secretary of State; the Governor of Maine; the 
Governor of New Jersey ; General Hooker and staff, and a large body 
of ci\nlians. The line was formed at 10 o'clock, the regiments having 
only company front. The artillery was formed in the rear, and the 
transportation in another part of the field. Notwithstandicg this con- 
tracted formation, the infantrj- alone presented a mile and a half of 
army blue, gaily relieved by the regimental colors and the designating 
flags of brigades and divisions. Secretary Seward and the Swedish sec- 
retary rode on horseback with General Hooker and staff. The rest of 
the party were in two carriages, drawn by four horses each. 

The troops appeared in heavy marching order, with Icnapsacks and 
haversacks packed. For nearly an hour, as the solid column filed by. 
General Hooker was enabled to entertain his foreign visitors with ac- 
counts of the exploits of its organizations. 

A noticeable feature of the review was the excellent appearance of 
the transportation of the corps, embracing over 400 wagons, with a long 
string of pack-animals. After the review and a lunch at General 
Hooker's headquarters the visitors returned to Washington. 

At 3 : 30 p.m. Lincoln telegraphed to Hooker : 

How does it look now ? 



180 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Hooker replied at 5 p.m. : 

I am uot sufficiently advanced to give an opinion. We are busy. Will tell 
you all as soon as I can, and will have it satisfactory. 

Lee wrote to President Davis : 

I feel by no means strong, and from the condition of our horses and the 
amount of our supplies, I am unable even to act on the defensive as vigorously 
as circumstances may require. A report sent me last night by Major Norris of 
the signal corps at Richmond, and which probably may have been submitted 
to you, states the strength of General Hooker's army to be from 150,000 to 
160,000,^ and that reenforcements had been sent him from Baltimore, Washing- 
ton, Alexandria, and Harper's Ferry. Though bodies of troops lieretofore re- 
tained in Maryland to keep that state in subjection, I believe, have been 
forwarded to General Hooker, still I think his numbers much exaggerated. But 
this report, said to be brought by a special scout from Washington, corroborates 
all previous intelligence showing that troops from the rear have been moved to 
the Rappahannock. This would indicate a forward movement of the Federal 
Army. 

A dispatch last night from General Stuart, dated 2 p.m., 26th instant, states 
that General Stoneman is encamped at Warrenton Springs. 

A brigade of infantry (Federal) is guarding Rappahannock Bridge and 
Beverly and Kel ley's Fords, and trains over the Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
road were arriving hourly without bringing troops, so far as known. He may 
intend to push his cavalry along by that route [toward Culpeper Court-House 
and Gordonsville], while his infantry attempt to seize this. 

And to Longstreet : 

Can you give me any idea when your operations will be completed and 
whether any of the troops you have in North Carolina can be spared from 
there ? ^ 

Major Norris, Chief Signal Officer, C. S. A., telegraphed to Longstreet 
and doubtless to Lee : 

Washington is almost stripped of its garrison. i\Iules with pack-saddles for 
ammunition have been sent to him [Hooker] . Hooker is going to cross the river 
at three points— two above and one below [Fredericksburg].^ 

The Chief Signal Officer of the Army of the Potomac, Captain S. T. 
Cushing, was directed by the Chief of Staff to extend the telegraph line 
from headquarters to Banks' Ford and to Franklin's Crossing. Be- 
yond this no intimation was given him as to any projected movement. 
He asked for information as to the general course of operations, but 

^ Doubtless the estimate referred to by * Banks' Ford and United States Ford 

Hooker in his letter to the Secretary of above, and probably Franklin's Crossing 

War, April 21 (page 162 ante). below. J. B. Jr. 

'' W. R., 26, pp. 1024, 1025. 



HOOKER COMMUNICATES HIS PLAN TO COUCH 181 

none was granted him. He was simply informed that the work ordered 
should be accomplished by night. The line that was to extend to Frank- 
lin's Crossing went via Phillips House to Tyler's Hill, where Sedgwick 
had his headquarters. The station at Tyler's Hill was ready for opera- 
tion at 4:30 p.m., but was not operated to-day. The line to Banks' 
Ford was arrested by the Federal pickets at a point near England, 
about 2 miles from Banks ' Ford. It was ready for operation by night. 
Imagining that a portion of the army would cross at or near Banks' 
Ford, Captain Cushing directed Captain B. H. Fisher of the Signal 
Corps to be at Banks ' Ford at dawn on the 28th, and take charge of all 
signal operations with the right wing of the army. Signal stations 
(flag and torch) were now established watching the movements of the 
enemy from the England House, the Phillips House, the Seddon House, 
and opposite Buckner's Neck. Only the latter two, it seems, commimi- 
cated with each other. The one at the Phillips House was equipped 
with a powerful telescope. 

The departure of the V, XI, and XII Corps from their winter quar- 
ters may have been known this evening throughout the Army of the 
Potomac. But where they were going, and when the remainder of the 
army would move, and in what direction, were generally a mystery. 
Hooker's orders to his corps and wing commanders did not divulge his 
general plan. His messages to commanders in the right wing contained, 
so far as known, no reference to the orders issued for the left wing, and 
vice versa. 

To-night Hooker sent for Couch, and explained to him, as next in 
rank, his plan of campaign. He informed Couch that, under certain 
contingencies, the right wing would be placed under his command.^ 

Lee's dispositions were the same as they had been during the winter 
(Map 2), except that Early's division of Jackson's corps (^) had 
moved up the Rappahannock to the lines of Fredericksburg, and W. H. 
F. Lee's brigade of cavalry had gone up to Brandy Station, leaving 
only the 15 Va. in the vicinity of Port Royal. 

What would Lee have done, had he at this time known the plan of 
operation which Hooker was starting to execute? During the last 
three months he must have spent many hours in thinking of manoeuvers 
that Hooker might attempt against him, but the one that was now 
under way had never, it would seem, suggested itself to him ; nor appar- 
ently did he ever express himself as to how, had it done so, he would 
have planned to meet it. On the latter point some speculation may 
not be unprofitable. Lee could hardly undertake to oppose Hooker in 
force at Kelley's Ford without exposing his depots and the Richmond 
and Fredericksburg Railroad to capture and destruction, or the frac- 
tions of his army, one at Fredericksburg and one at Kelley's Ford, to 

1 B. and L., Ill, 157. 



182 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

separate attack and defeat. It seems probable that he would have left a 
minor portion of his army in the lines of Fredericksburg to oppose 
Sedgwick, and established the major portion somewhere between Chan- 
cellorsville and the Rapidan to meet and repel the Federal right wing 
under Hooker. 

It may be assumed that Hooker's chief concern for the present is : 

1. That his columns may reach the Rapidan before Lee can take posi- 
tion to oppose its passage. 

2. That he may strike a decisive blow before T.ongstreet can be 
brought up to Lee's assistance. 



CHAPTER XIV 

APEIL '2S (MAP s) . . . THE EIGHT WING COMMENCES, AND THE LEET WING 
PEEP.AEES, TO CEOSS THE EAPPAHANNOCK 



B 



Bight Wing 
UTTERPIELD wrote to Stoneman at Warrenton Junctiou : 



One of Colonel Sharpe's' men just in from Kelley's Ford says, in his opinion, 
no large body of infantry there. Held mostly by cavalry and artillery. Rebel 
sympathizers on this side believe enemy have fallen back beyond Rapidan, mean- 
ing to make that their line of defence. . . . They think our cavalry move a 
feint, and that the crossing will be made at United States Ford, where they are 
still at work. 

The cavalry brigade left with Pleasonton (Devin's) marched this 
morning to Grove Church, whence at 5 a.m. its commander wrote to 
Pleasonton : 

We arrived here at 4 a.m.- . . . made a reconnaissance in person (after halt- 
ing and feeding horses and men) to Ellis' Ford. "Woke up their infantry, who 
came down into the rifle-pits and drew bead on us. . . . Picketed near Ellis', 
Kemper's, and Field's, and communicated on the right with a brigade of 
Howard's, between Kelley's and Rappahannock. Found no [Confederate] picket 
at the fords between Richards' and Kelley's. . . . The report among contrabands 
[negroes] here is that at the fords the water has been filled with iron wirework, 
calculated to entangle the feet of horses, while the sharpshooters pop them off. 
They say they have things fixed for our cavalry now. . . . 

A battalion of the 2 N. Y. Cavalry (1. 3. C) reeonnoitered fi-om War- 
renton Junctiou northeastward as far as Brentsville (Map 1, sheet A), 
capturing several guerillas;'^ and Stahel's division marched from IMid- 
dleburg to Rectortowu, Salem, White Plains, and back, taking a nimiber 
of prisoners, mostly from Mosby. 

The First and Third Divisions of the II Corps, with two ambulances 
per division, three batteries of divisional artillery.* and the two bat- 
teries of corps artillery, marched to the vicinity of Banks' Ford. 

' Colonel G. H. Sharpe, Deputy Provost- ^ Three Years in the Federal Cnrahy, by 

Marshal-General, Chief of Secret Service. Willard Glazier, p. 175. 

-Official publication reads p.m., evidently * Thomas' and Pettit's (1. II), Arnold's 

an eiTor. J. B. .Tr. (2. II). According to Hookei-'s orders, 

183 



184 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The 5 N. H. and 81 Pa. (1. 1. II) were sent out, under Colonel Cross of 
the former regiment, to picket houses and roads to United States Ford, 
in order to prevent information from going to the enemy. The two 
regiments occupied 41 dwelling-houses and a number of roads. They 
found the occupants of the houses full of suppressed hostility, but 
civil. ^ 

The troops carried, on their persons or on the hoof, rations as pre- 
scribed, for eight days. The small-arm ammimition was carried in a 
train of 70 wagons. A supply-train of 45 wagons carried forage for six 
days and hospital stores, though the orders limited the forage to a sup- 
ply for four or five days, and precluded the carrying of hospital stores 
in wagons. The remainder of the trains, containing five days' field 
rations and two days' grain, was parked in rear of Falmouth. The con- 
tents of all the trains, with what the troops had on their backs and on the 
hoof, would supply the command with subsistence for thirteen days 
and with forage for eight. Carroll's brigade (^), Ames' battery 
(3^3)) ^^d the train for two bridges near Falmouth went to United 
States Ford; Meagher's brigade Qt^h) assembled at Banks 'Ford. While 
a pretence of crossing was made at this point by throwing up works, 
etc.,^ large working parties were employed repairing the road to United 
States Ford. The Second Division (Gibbon's) remained in position 
opposite Fredericksburg with two batteries.^ 

The III Corps remained with the left wing imder Sedgwick. The 
"further instructions" which were to have been sent yesterday "later 
in the day," to the commander of this corps, were not sent— proba- 
bly to avoid drawing forces of the enemy toward Banks' or United 
States Ford. Hooker expected that the arrival of his right wing on the 
Rapidan would cause the onemj^ to withdraw his troops from United 
States Ford and that the further advance of that wing, reenforced by 
his center, would dispose in like manner of the enemy at Banks' Ford. 
He repaired to Morrisville to superintend in person the passage of the 
Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford. About 2 p.m. he there issued the fol- 
lowing instructions : 

To Slocuni, commanding XI and XII Corps 

... so long as the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps are operating on the same 
line, you will exercise the command of both. 

The general directs that the Eleventh Corps cross to the opposite side of the 
river to-night, and that the Twelfth Corps commence crossing at daylight to- 
morrow morning, and to be thrown over with all possible rapidity, and both 
corps marched by the most direct route without delay and seize the bridge, if 

each division was to be accompanied by its ^ History of the 5th Regiment N. H. Vol- 

own artillery. Arnold's battery for some unteers, by William Child, pp. 179, 181. 
reason took the place of Adams' battery of - W. R., 39, p. 306. 

the Third Division. -Brown's (2. II), Adams' (3. II). 



ORDERS FOR HOOKER'S RIGHT WING 185 

standing, and the ford, at Germanna Mills. He suggests that you make use of a 
cavalry regiment and three or four smart marching [infantrj] regiments to 
execute this duty and that you cross both of your corps over the Rapidan River 
to-morrow. You wiU find guides in General Pleasonton's cavalry. 

Major-General Meade will move on almost a parallel line at the same time, and 
will be in easy communication with you. He will cross [the Rapidan] at Ely's 
Ford. If his passage should be disputed, as you will probably be able to learn 
from the firing, or through your communication with that oflSeer, the general 
directs that you dispatch a corps along the south bank of the Rapidan, to knock 
away the enemy, to enable him to cross, and when the Fifth Corps is across, that 
you push on with both of your corps to Chancellorsville, at which point the three 
corps wiU come together and you will command by virtue of your seniority. 

The enemy have a brigade^ holding the United States Ford, which they will 
abandon as soon as they hear of your approach. This will open the United States 
Ford to us, when bridges will at once be thrown across the river, and will afford 
you a direct communication with headquarters. Telegraphic communication is 
established from that point [United States Ford to headquarters].^ If your 
cavalry is well advanced from Chancellorsville, you will be able to ascertain 
whether or not the enemy is detaching forces from behind Fredericksburg to 
resist your advance. If [he is] not [doing so] in any considerable force, the 
general desires that you will endeavor to advance at all hazards, securing a posi- 
tion on the Plank road, and uncovering Banks' Ford, which is also defended by 
a brigade of the rebel infantry (^) and a battery (^^j). If the enemy should 
be greatly reenforced you will then select a strong position, and compel him to 
attack you on your ground. You will have nearly 40,000 men, which is more 
than he can spare to send against you.' Every incident of your advance you 
will communicate to the general as soon as communication is established by the 
United States Ford. Two aides-de-camp are sent to report to you for this ser- 
vice. You are already advised of the operations going on below Fredericksburg. 

The general desires that not a moment be lost until our troops are established 
at or near Chancellorsville. From that moment all will be ours. A copy of this 
will be furnished Major-General Meade. 

It will be much easier to replenish batteries, ammunition, etc., by Banks' Ford 
than by the United States Ford, if you should succeed in uncovering it. 

Here we see the first reference in a coramunioation to an officer of the 
right wing to what is going on in the left wing, and Hooker's first refer- 
ence to the possibility of the enemy's assuming the offensive. If the 
enemy advanced in force, Slocum was to renounce the offensive, take up 
a strong position, and compel the enemy to attack him on his own 
ground. How was he to effect such compulsion? He could only do 
it, if at all, by cutting every line by which Lee might retreat. "The 
general desires," says the order, "that not a moment be lost until our 

^ Two brigades and a batterj-. J. B. Jr. Hooker gave the strength of the three corps 

- This was a mistake. as probably not exceeding 36.000 men. 

' Testifying abont a year later before the Adding 1000 for the cavalry would give for 

Committee on the Conduct of the War. the whole command about 37.000. 



186 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

troops are established at or uear Chaneellorsville. From that moment 
all ivill he ours." The possession of Chaneellorsville would give him 
Lee's shortest line of retreat to Gordonsville, but unless the neighbor- 
ing roads by which Chaneellorsville might be turned under cover of the 
surrounding forest were watched and guarded, this would not cut Lee 
off from Gordonsville. Moreover, assuming that it did, it would leave 
him his line of retreat to Eichmond. Hooker had no designs apparently 
against the latter. He supposed that his occui^ation of Chaneellorsville 
would compel Lee to attack him. 

In case the enemy did not advance in force, he would proceed beyond 
Chaneellorsville for the immediate purpose of opening communication 
by Banks ' Ford and taking up a position across the Plank Road. What 
he meant to do afterward he neither states nor intimates. The follow- 
ing dispatches were sent about this time : 

To Comstock. Chief Engineer 

... as soon as the Fifth Corps have crossed the bridge [at Kelley's Ford], 
you will call on Major-General Meade for the necessary details to enable you to 
take it up and prepare it for land transportation, and have it accompany the 
column of that officer for service at the Rapidan, if required. After that, and 
as soon as the United States Ford is uncovered, he desires it to be throwTi across 
the Rappahannock at that point, in order to open a short communication with 
headquarters, and also to enable Couch's [11] Corps to cross should circum- 
stances render it expedient.' 

To Meade, commanding Fifth Corps 

. . . you will exercise all your accustomed zeal and devotion in hastening the 
passage of the troops across the Rappahannock. He feels assured that you will. 

It is a great object to eifect tlie passage of the Rapidan to-morrow, as you well 
know ; and in so doing the United States Ford will be uncovered, and our line of 
communication established with the left wing of the army. 

I inclose herewith copies of instructions to Major-General Slocum, Brigadier- 
General Pleasonton, and Captain Comstock. and also reports of the strength of 
the enemy's forces holding fords on the Rappahannock above its junction with 
the Rapidan. I hope that you will be able to pick up some of them. U.se your 
cavalry freely, and send them well out. to bi-ing you timely information. Would 
it not be well to detach a division to seize the ford [Ely's] ? From the most 
reliable information in our possession, the ford must be a good one now. The 
cavalry can a.scertain. 

The general will join you as soon as he can— probably not until the United 
States Ford is opened. A portion of Couch's corps [II] now hold it on our side. 
The general will direct two aides-de-camp to report to you to furnish liim with 
information. Use them freely. . . . 

^ The support of the II Corps mifrht not In that ease this corps might be sent back 

be deemed necessary to carry the right wing to Banks' Ford to cross there, as that point 

from the Rapidan to the rear of Fredericks- is nearer United States Ford by the north 

bnrsr. where it would open up Banks' Ford. than by the south bank. 



MARCH TO KELLEY'S FORD 187 

The right wing, with the XI Corps in front, the XII next, and the V 
last, marched to the vicinity of Mount Holly Church, about 2 miles from 
Kelley's Ford. It rained almost all day, making the roads difficult and 
the packs heavy. Advantage was taken of every halt to throw away 
overcoats, knapsacks, or other articles of equipment that had become 
intolerable.' The XI Corps, which started at 4 a.m., was formed up in 
camp at 4 p.m. The V Corps did not all get in imtil after 10 o 'clock. 
The distance marched was about 17 miles. 

Every house along the route that might possibly harbor a disloyal 
man or woman was put under guard. So there was reason to believe 
that the movement had not been observed by the enemy. The men of 
Buschbeck's brigade, at Kelley's Ford, welcomed the arriving troops, 
and encouraged them with the prospect of an easy passage in the 
morning. 

Slocum, who commanded the XI and XII Corps, issued the following 
instructions to Howard, commanding the XI: 

. . . you will cross the river at Kelley's Ford at the earliest possible moment 
to-night. You will report to me as soon as your troops commence crossing, and 
also immediately after the crossing is effected. As soon as you have effected a 
crossing, you will take a defensive position, and await the crossing of the 
Twelfth Corps, which will precede you on the road to Germanna Bridge [Ford]. 
You will hold your command in readiness, and follow immediately in their rear. 
Keep your column well closed, with all your baggage-wagons in rear of youi- 
entire corps, except your rear-guards. Have two batteries accompany your 
leading brigades [in your several columns?]. 

Pleasonton received the following order: 

. . . report with your command of cavalry [Devin's brigade] to Major-Gen- 
eral Slocum, for service with his command. A portion of your force will accom- 
pany his command ; and a portion will be sent to report for duty with the Fifth 
Corps, and will report to Major-General Meade. 

Having reported to Slocum and received his orders, Pleasonton or- 
dered Devin at Grove Church to send the 17 Pa. to report to Howard, 
to draw in his pickets, and concentrate the rest of his brigade in the 
neighborhood of Mount Holly Church; also to furnish guides acquainted 
with the country to Generals Howard and Meade. 

The bridge train of canvas boats (advance-guard train) coming from 
Washington arrived at 5:30. At 7 p.m. the 15 N. Y. Engineers, as- 
sisted by men of the XI Corps, commenced laying it under the direction 
of Captain Comstock of the Engineer Corps. General Hooker was also 
present superintending this work. About 400 men of Buschbeck's bri- 
gade of the XI Corps manned a number of boats concealed in Marsh 

' Histori/ of the 53 Mass. Inftutlni. by .T. L. Parker, p. 2S4. 



188 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Run, crossed the river in them below the ford, and cleared the opposite 
bank. At 10 p.m. the troops commenced crossing, the XI Corps taking 
the lead.^ The 17 Pa. Cavalry, accompanying the advance, was ordered 
to send scouts and patrols up the different roads, and picket the front. 
At midnight Schurz's division and part of Devens' (3, 1) had crossed.^ 
Pleasonton's order to Devin had been carried out except that the 8 
Pa. Cavalry and brigade headquarters had not arrived at Holly Church. 

The Confederate pickets at Kelley's Ford were captured. The men 
in support, being stationed further back, made their escape; but their 
communication with the lower pickets was cut off, and so they could not 
give them the alarm. 

W. H. F. Lee's brigade (except the 10 and 15 Va.) was at Brandy 
Station; Fitzhugh Lee's brigade (except one regiment at Stevensburg) 
and the horse artillery were at Culpeper Court-House. W. H. F. Lee 
sent forward the 13 Va. to meet the advancing infantry. By 9 o'clock 
p.m. Stuart at Culpeper Court-House (Map 8) received a report that 
Federal troops were making preparations to cross at Kelley's Ford, 
but their number was concealed by darkness, and he would not leave his 
position to determine it, for fear of exposing the country in his rear, 
especially the railroads, to depredations by Federal cavalry. So far as 
he could observe, the crossing at Kelley's Ford might be but a diversion 
in favor of such operations. He accordingly ordered the enemy to be 
enveloped with pickets to observe the direction which he took, and 
ordered the concentration of his command at Brandy Station by day- 
light. 

The following order was sent to Stoneman : 

. . . the instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant 
are so far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such points as 
you may determine between Kelley's and Rappahannock Fords, and including 
them, and for a portion of your force to move in the direction of the Raccoon 
Ford and Louisa Court-House, while the remainder is engaged in carrying into 
execution that part of your original instructions which relates to the enemy's 
force and [in?] position on the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and 
the line itself, tlie operations of this column to be considered as masking the col- 
umn which is directed to move by forced marches to strike and destroy the line 
of the Aquia and Riclunond Railroad. 

You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns to imite, 
and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey and near that line, as you will 

' According to Howard the bridge was Sehurz says that the XI Corps "crossed be- 
not completed before 10 p.m. ( H^ ij., 39, p. fore midnight" (Reminiseenees, II, 408). 
627). According to Benham it was com- A historiail of the 26 Wise, 2d brigade, 
pleted at 7:45 p.m. {ib., p. 215). It is in- Schurz's division, says that his regiment 
advertently omitted from Maps 8 and 9. crossed "at midnight" (Wisconsin in the 

^ This statement is based upon vague and War of the Rebellion, by W. De Love, p. 

meager data. I have found no statement 397). According to two joint historians of 

of the order in which the divisions crossed. the 153 Pa., 1st brigade, Devens' division, 



ORDERS FOR STONEMAN 189 

there be in position with your full force to cut off the retreat of the enemy by 
his shortest line. In all other respects your instructions as before referred to will 
remain the same. 

You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that should not be prac- 
ticable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over before 8 o'clock 
to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep for your pack-animals and 
artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge at Kelley's Ford. You will please 
furnish the officers in command of the,se two columns with a copy of this and of 
your original instructions.^ 

Under this order Stoneman's latitude in the selection of a point of 
crossing was restricted to certain definite limits between Kelley's and 
Rappahannock Fords; he was required to be across by 8 o'clock in the 
morning, to divide his command into two columns, and to determine on 
some point for the columns, after the destruction of the Richmond, 
Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, to imite at and intercept the 
retreat of Lee's army.- 

The cavalry corps was accordingly formed in two columns. One con- 
sisted of Averell's division, Davis' brigade of Pleasonton's division, 
and Tidball's battery of horse artillery. This column numbered about 
3400 sabers and 6 guns, and was commanded by Averell. The other 
consisted of Gregg's division, Buford's reserve brigade, to which the 
6 Pa. had been attached, and a provisional battery of horse artillery 
under Captain Robertson. It numbered about 4200 sabers and 6 guns, 
and was commanded directly by Stoneman. The provisional battery 
was formed by taking a section from Elder's, Clarke's, and Vincent's 
batteries. The remaining sections of these batteries were sent back to 
Falmouth. 

The foregoing order was given to Stoneman at Hooker's headquarters 
at 5 : 45 p.m. 

From Morrisville to where the cavalry corps lay was 13 miles, from 
there to where some of the extreme pickets wer.e was 13 more, so that 
it was quite late at night before the command was all assembled and 
ready to start. 

The head of Stoneman's column started, however, at 5 p.m., and the 
head of Averell's at 10 p.m. ;3 the former directed upon Kelley's Ford, 

this regiment completed its crossing by were to cross the Rappahannock the same 
midnight, following Schurz's division ( The day with the infantry, the 29th, and one 
Volunteer's Manual, by W. Simmers and cohinm was to move directly to its destina^ 
P. Bachschmied, p. 20). Devens says that tion, while the other was threatening Cul- 
his division crossed "at 1 a.m. on the mom- peper and Gordonsville, and as soon as one 
ing of April 29." J. B. Jr. had passed, the other was to follow and join 
' TF. R., 39, p. 1065. it. . . . The object was to have no time lost 
^ "I concluded to divide the cavalry into in severing Lee's communications with Rich- 
two columns, each one outnumbering the en- mond" (Hooker, Rep. of Com., IV, 1.37). 
tire cavalry force of tlie enemy between the ^ IF. R., 39, pp. 1058, 1081, 1074. The 
Rappahannock and James Rivers. They following statement of the experience of one 



190 THE CAilPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

the latter upon Rappahannock Ford. Averell was to cross on his ar- 
rival at the ford, and await orders. At midnight most of the corps was 
resting at or near Bealeton. 

Meade, who was to take the road to Ely's Ford, issued the following 
order to his corps, the V : 

The order of march for to-morrow, 29th instant, will be, first. Griffin's divi- 
sion; second, Sykes' division; third, Humphreys' division. Brigadier-General 
Griffin will be prepared to move at 7 a.m. He will send a .staff officer at daylight 
to communicate with Major-General Slocum, in order to ascertain the earliest 
moment at which the road to Kelley's Ford will be open. Major-General Sykes 
will move at 7 a.m. and close up on Griffin's division. He will place his battery 
in front of his column, prepared to move forward, to report to General Griffin 
in case its services are required. Brigadier-General Humphreys will move im- 
mediately after General Sykes. He will furnish the necessary details to Captain 
Comstock to take up the pontoon bridge. When taken up he will place the 
pontoon train in his own train between his brigades, and so dispose his artillery 
as to cover to the best advantage the rear of the column, the protection of which 
he has the especial charge [of] . All officers are earnestly enjoined to keep their 
commands well closed, and prevent all straggling. Under instructions of the 
commanding general, this command will be called on to-morrow to make a long 
and rapid march. The major-general commanding the corps fully relies upon 
every man cheerfully submitting to the exertions he will be called upon to make 
for the purpose of securing the success which it is earnestly hoped and believed 
will attend the movement.' 

Left Wing 

The left wing (I, HI, VI Corps) was to break camp this morning, but 
on account of the rain no movement was made until noon, when the 
I Corps took up the march. The VI Corps followed about 3 p.m., and 
the III about 5 p.m. On this march as well as on that to Kelley's Ford, 
the roads were lined at every halt with equipments thrown away. The 
I Corps halted at Fitzhugh's Crossing about 5:30 p.m., and the VI 
Corps at Franklin's Crossing about 9 p.m., and the III Corps between 
these two corps and somewhat in rear of them, also about 9 p.m. The 
trains of the I and VT Corps were parked about a mile in rear of their 
respective corps. The train of the III Corps remained to-day parked 
near Falmouth. 

Sedgwick received the following communications : 

of Stoneman's regiments may be applicable passed, finding ns in the same position; 

to others: "About 5 o'clock in the evening midnight, and we were still impatiently 

of the 28th, 5 days' rations and 3 days' for- waiting, and wondering why we did not 

age were issued, and orders to hold the move. Near midnight rain began to fall, 

regiment in readiness to move at a mo- and continued with increased severity as 

ment's notice. Tents were immediately the day dawned" (Annals of the 6 Pa. Cav- 

struek, wagons loaded, horses saddled, and airy, by Rev. S. L. Graeey, Chaplain of the 

the whole command ordered to stand to Regiment, p. 136). 
horse, and await orders. Hour after hour * W. B., 107, p. 1014 



ORDERS FOR LEFT WING 191 

From Butterfield 

The major-general commanding has left for the scene of operation above. . . . 

Signal officers have been directed to be vigilant and watchful and to report 
everything. I shall keep you fully advised of everything that is reported here at 
Falmouth. Have you any ^\^shes or commands? . . . 

The night before last, April 26, Rodes' (D. H. Hill's) division had not moved. 
A. P. Hill's and Trimble's' also, and there are no signs of a move. This from 
deserters wlio have just come in.- 

From Williams, Adjutant-General 
. . . your operations for to-morrow are for a demonstration only, to hold the 
forces of the enemy while the operations are carried on above, unless the enemy 
should leave the position, or should weaken his force materially by detachments. 

As long as the enemy remained in position back of Fredericksburg, 
Sedgwick was to demonstrate to deter him, if possible, from moving, 
but not to attack. Should the enemy retreat, Sedgwick was to pursue. 
Should the enemy turn against the right wing, Sedgwick was to attack 
and establish himself on the Telegraph Eoad, and the right wing was 
to be reenforced with troops from the left. But the left wing might 
draw the main force of the enemy upon itself. It must try to anticipate 
this, and not expose itself to a serious attack. Under some apprehen- 
sion on this score. Hooker wrote to Butterfield from Morrisville at 
3 p.m. : 

Considering the [backward] state of affairs here, it will be advisable to sus- 
pend the crossing of the troops under Sedgwick and Reynolds until further 
orders, except the number necessary to protect the bridges after they are thrown, 
which will be [thrown] as already directed. Be pleased to have it [this] com- 
municated. 

The dispatch was transmitted to Sedgwick at 11:45 p.m. Brooks' 
division (^i) had already been selected by Sedgwick to protect the 
bridges of the VI Corps, and the following order to Brooks, command- 
ing First Division, was probably issued about as the corps went into 
bivouac : 

. . . you will have your division in the immediate vicinity of Franklin's Cross- 
ing at 11 p.m., ready to cross in boats and hold the ground on the opposite side 
until the bridges are completed. You will not move from the heights on this side 
of the river until you have the cover of the darkness. The crossing in the boats 
must be effected with the utmost celerity and in the strictest silence. General 
Benham will indicate to you the exact time and place of crossing.^ 

From the top of the ridge on which Sedgwick's lines were formed the 
ground sloped abruptly to the river, gullied here and there by ravines 

1 Commanded by Colston. ^ W. R., 107, p. 1015. s j^ 



192 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

running obliquely to the base of the ridge. Through sevei-al of these 
ravines roads had been built which enabled the Federal artillery and 
pontoon trains to reach the comparatively level ground adjacent to the 
river. About dusk the pontoon trains halted on the level ground at the 
edge of a piece of timber about two thirds of a mile from the water. 
At 10 o'clock Brooks' division was roused and prepared for crossing. 
The 3d brigade, Eussell 's, which was to take the lead, began to rehearse 
its part. It fixed and unfixed bayonets so deftly that the men could 
hardly hear themselves do it, deployed as skirmishers, and charged 
through the dark at an imaginary foe in invisible rifle-pits. Four men 
of the 15 N. Y. Engineers were assigned to each boat as oarsmen. The 
boats were to go and return until the whole of Russell's brigade had 
reached the opposite shore, when the bridge was to be laid. 

Similar preparations were made in Wadsworth's division (y), desig- 
nated by Reynolds to cover the bridges in his corps. General Benham, 
commanding the Engineer Brigade, who was charged by Hooker with 
the laying of the bridges, understood that General Brooks and General 
Wadsworth, commanding the details for covering the operation, were 
subject to his orders. General Brooks and General Wadsworth did not 
so understand. The consequence was friction and delay.' 

In each corps the boats were to be carried to the river on men's shoul- 
ders, lest the rumbling of pontoon trucks should give the enemy notice 
of the intended crossing. It was calculated that if they left their place 
of concealment by 11 : 30 they would be in the water by 12 : 30, and that 
if the crossing commenced at once, it would be accomplished by 1:30, 
leaving an hour and a half for the construction of the bridge. Orders 
were accordingly issued for the boats to be taken down to the river at 
11:30. It was nearly midnight before Brooks' men had taken a boat 
from its place of concealment. Reynolds' men went to work promptly, 
but had only gotten a number of boats part of the way to the river when 
Reynolds ordered them put on the trucks and all to be taken down by 
teams. 

Telegraphic communication was opened this morning between Sedg- 
wick's and Hooker's headquarters. ^ The line, which was in operation 
to England, was extended to within 2 miles of United States Ford, but, 
owing to an accident to one of the instruments, could not be operated 
to-day. The heavy rain and lack of signalmen prevented the establish- 
ment of communication by flag or torch. 

Lieutenant Ropes wrote home : 

. . . The great movement has commenced, and our division [Gibbon's fj] is, 
I believe, to be left to cover this front for the present. We are under marching 
orders. I also hear that the real attack is to be made in front, here, and that the 

1 W. R., 39, p. 211, and ib., 45. p. 63. ^ The former was on Tyler's Hill. 



PREPARATIONS BELOW FREDERICKSBURG 193 

movements up the river are feints. I can hardly believe this ; it seems like stark 
madness. You may hear exciting news very soon. I sometimes think the entire 
thing may be a great feint, but it is generally thought that we are on the eve of a 
great battle. . . . 

In the course of the day Lee was informed by Stuart that "a large 
body of infantry and artillery was passing up the river. "' This vague 
item seems to have been the only information that Lee possessed re- 
garding Hooker's movement. The Federal force, it would seem, might 
be anything from a division to an army. Its destination might be the 
Shenandoah Valley or Gordonsville. 

1 W. B., 39. p. 796. 



CHAPTER XV 

APBIL 29 . . . MANCEUVERING 

Right Wing, Forenoon 

DEVIN, with the 8 Pa. Cavalry, started from Grove Church about 
3 a.m., marched to Kelley's Ford, and on arriving, crossed the 
river. His brigade comprised the following units : 

AGGREGATE 



ORGANIZATIONS 



STRENGTH 



7 troops of the 6 X. Y 267^ 

17 Pa except 2 troops attached to the headquarters of the V Corps . . . 500=* 

8 Pa.' 350^ 

1 troop (Company L) of the 1 Mich 40* 

1,157 

The 6 N. Y. was assigned to the XII Corps. It started about 4 a.m., 
and marched on the road to Germanna Ford so as to cover the right and 
front of the column; General Pleasonton accompanied this regiment 
and directed its operations. The 17 Pa. was assigned to the XI Corps 
and took position to cover the right of that corps (Map 9). The 8 Pa. 
and Company L of the 1 Mich, were to cover the front and left of the 
V Corps, anci accordingly took the road to Ely's Ford. Colonel Devin 
marched with this force and took general charge of it. In rear of the 
cavalry came Euger's brigade (rhi) o^ ^^e regiments accompanied by 
two pieces of artillery from Battery M, 1 N. Y. This command moved 
out on the Germanna Ford Eoad about 4 : 30 a.m. as support and reserve 
for the cavalry at the head of the column. The main body of the 
XII Corps followed at a distance of about 21,2 miles. The XI Corps 
cleared the bridge a little before daylight, or the time fixed for the XII 
Corps to come upon it. 

Stuart captured an officer on the staff of General Carl Schurz, "who 

' History of the 6 N. Y. Cavalry, by ' The strength of the 8 Pa. is given by 

Committee, p. 101. The number is given as J. W. de Peyster as 200 (Onward, Febru- 

254, but does not inchide ofQcers. This &iy, 1870, p. 164), by Major Huey and 

t.tatement is made on the authority of Lieu- Captain Wells as 300 ( Charge of the 8 Pa. 

tenant F. A. Eastou, who compiled the Can. at Chancellorsville, pp. 42, 49, 65), 

work. To include the officers I increased and by General Pleasonton as between 400 

the number 5 per cent. and 500 (Rep. of Com., IV, 28). 

2 Onuard for Februai-y, 1870, p. 164. * Estimated. 

194 



CROSSING AT KELLEY'S FORD 195 

represented that the Eleventh Corps was certainly across; how much 
more was to follow, he could not tell ; but thought that the force alto- 
gether in this column was about 20,000. " ^ In the light of this and other 
evidence, Stuart telegraphed to Lee at an early hour that Howard had 
crossed at Kelley's Ford with a "division" of about 14,000 men, 6 
pieces of artillery, and some cavalry.^ Expecting an advance toward 
Gordonsville, W. H. F. Lee had taken position between Brandy Station 
and Kelley's Ford, with the 13 Va. pushed out toward the ford. Fitz- 
hugh Lee was held in reserve at Brandy Station, with a regiment at 
Stevensburg.2 Orders were telegraphed to the 10 Va. Cavalry near 
Beaver Dam Station (Map 1, sheet A) to move at once to hold and 
occupy the fords on the Rapidan, but it was doubted whether this 
would be done with sufficient promptness.^ 

The V Corps commenced to cross as soon as the XII had cleared the 
bridge. This was about 10 : 30 a.m., or three hours and a half after the 
time designated by Meade for his corps to be ready to start. At the 
same time the XI Corps took up the march in rear of the XII. 

The weather was damp and misty. A threatening sky lowered im- 
pressively over masses of troops crouching in close columns near the 
river. The long, thin column that wound serpentlike down to them from 
an amphitheater of hills deployed here and there to ward off a possible 
attack. General Hooker came over from his headquarters at Morris- 
ville to superintend the movement, and as he passed through the lines, 
was cheered to the echo. 

About noon the First and Second Divisions of the V Corps had com- 
pleted their crossing. The cavalry in advance of the XII Corps en- 
countered the 13 Va. Cavalry about 2yo miles from Kelley's Ford, and 
skirmished with it until within about 3 miles of Germanna Ford. 

It was about 10 a.m. when the Confederates at Germanna Ford first 
received reliable information of the crossing of the Federals at Kelley's 
Ford. The bridge-builders had three spans completed. All the men of 
the detail were quartered in an old mill on the south side of the river. 
About 50, who were engaged in the work of construction, were on the 
north side. On receipt of the forementioned information the Confed- 
erate commander put a picket of 10 men out on the road in his front, 
and had fifty who were working at the bridge go to their quarters, get 
their gims, and return. 

About 11 a.m., when the infantry advance-guard under Euger reached 
a point about 2 miles from Germanna Ford, its commander received the 
report that there was a detachment of about 150 men at the ford en- 
gaged in building a bridge. Soon afterward he learned that the Federal 

^ TF. R., 39, p. 1046; Reminiscences of Carl Schur:, II, 408. 
= "IF. R., 39, pp. 796. 1045, 1046; ib., 40, p. 758. 
3 lb., 39, p. 1046. ■■ Ib. 



196 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

cavalry was cheeked. It was reported that the enemy occupied the 
rifle-pits on the right (west) of the road and on the north side of the 
river. About noon, having reached a point about % of a mile from the 
ford, he received orders to deploy skirmishers on both sides of the road 
and advance rapidly. He had one regiment form on the right and one 
on the left of the road (Plan 1). Each of these regiments took up about 
a mile of front,^ which gave a density of about 1 man to every 3 or 4 
yards. One regiment, in column of fours, kept on the road, followed by 
a section of artillery. The remainder of the advance-guard, consisting 
of the 13 N. J. and 1 07 N. Y., followed the deployed regiments as sup- 
ports in line of columns of fours. 

The approaches to the Eapidan ran through dense thickets of scrub- 
oak, up to the immediate bluff overlooking the river, which spreads out 
for a few hundred yards into a comparatively easy plain. Upon the 
south bank (the Confederate side) were steep hills rising somewhat 
precipitously from the very edge of the river, which forms a decided 
bow at the ford, the bend being northward in such a shape that all the 
approaches to the ford on the south bank were completely covered by a 
cross-fire from those who should occupy the north bank. Ruger's long 
skirmish line stealthily, and rapidly, enveloped this bag. The first 
notice that the Confederate picket had of the Federal operation was the 
sound of firing in its rear. Under cover of the undergrowth it made its 
way unobserved some distance up the river, and was fortunate enough 
to find a boat in which to cross. The 50 men working on the bridge near 
the north bank were all captui-ed. The Federal line swept across the 
river, firing a few shots as a warning rather than to start a fight, and 
completed their capture. The number of prisoners made on both banks 
aggregated 103, of whom 7 were officers. On their way to the rear they 
gave frequent vent to their astonishment at the thousands of men that 
they passed, showing that the Federal movement had been executed 
without the knowledge of the enemy. 

Averell arrived at Rappahannock Bridge about 5 a.m. and found the 
ford impassable "without imminent hazard of drowning." At 6:25 
a.m. he received a copy of Hooker's instructions to Stoneman of April 
12 (Chapter XI) and of those of April 28, modifying these (Chapter 
XIV), but no instructions addressed directly to him except a message 
from Stoneman to the effect that, if the ford was impracticable, he 
should be guided by his own judgment as to the place of crossing.^ Pur- 
suant to the latter, he marched to Kelley's Ford, where Stoneman 's 
column had arrived at 8 a.m. Stoneman was not authorized to use the 
bridge except for pack-animals and artillery. But on account of his 
having but one ford, he assumed the responsibility of crossing half of 

1 The usual density of a line of skirmishers was one to evei-y 5 or 10 yards. 

2 TT^. B., 39, p. 1077. 



PLAN 1 



107 N Y 

II III! I II 



13 N J 

2 Pieces I I I 

ofArtillery 



FORMATION OF RITGERS BRIGADP: AS IT ADVANCED 
ON GERMANNA FORD, APRIL 29, 1863 



MARCH TO THE RAPIDAN 197 

his troopers by the bridge. On the north side of the Rappahannock at 
Kelley's Ford was a slough, or swamj), which could not be crossed ex- 
cept by a trestle bridge, constructed for that purpose. Neither the ford 
nor pontoon bridge, therefore, could be used by the cavalry until the 
infantry of the V Cor])s (First and Second Divisions) had cleared the 
trestle bridge. The cavalry commenced crossing by both the ford and 
the pontoon bridge about noon. The Third Division of the V Corps 
(Humphreys') was detailed about this time to remain behind to cover 
the passage of the trains and bring up the bridge. 

Right Wing, Afternoon 

The detachments of Confederate cavalry that observed and followed 
the Federal columns (contact detachments) were careless, it seems, 
about reporting what they saw. It was about 1 p.m. when Stuart 
learned from his pickets about Madden that a large force of Federal 
infantry was moving in that direction. Assembling his two brigades, 
he marched to that point and there pierced the Federal column, taking 
prisoners from the V, XI, and XII Corps. ^ The rear of the XI Corps 
was shelled by a couple of light pieces. The only way to stop this an- 
noyance was to attack and defeat Stuart's cavalry. But for this 
Pleasonton's cavalry was not sufiSciently strong, Stuart's outnumbering 
it two to one. So the shelling had to be endured until about 3 : 30 in the 
afternoon, when a portion of Stoneman's force came up and drove the 
enemy away. When Stuart learned that the right column was marching 
upon Germanna Ford, it was too late for him to warn the Confederate 
detachment at that point; the Federals were in possession of the ford.^ 
As already stated, this party had warning, hours before, of the Federal 
passage of Kelley's Ford, but they did not suspect, it seems, that it 
seriously concerned them. 

The handful of Confederates that escaped from Germanna Ford re- 
treated under cover of the woods to the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern, 
where they halted about 4 p.m. to await instructions from General Ma- 
hone or spend the night.^ The sound of firing at the ford brought 

^ These circumstances are deduced from points received no notice" (W. R., 39, 

conflicting- statements in the official reports. p. 1046 ) . 

Meade did not march in the same cohimn ^ Writing- in 188S for the Century Maga- 

■with Sloeum and Howard. The men of the zine, Pleasonton stated : 

corps who were captured by Stuart's first "In the afternoon (29th) at Germanna 

dash at Madden were perhaps flankers or Ford, I surprised and captured a picket of 

connecting- patrols ( W. B., 39, pp. 519, 796, some fifty of Stuart's cavahy soldiers. 

1046). With them was an engineer officer belong- 

- Stuart says in his report: "Couriers ing to Stuart's staff. On searching the 

had been, by direction, sent to Ely's and party, as is done with all prisoners, I found 

Germanna [Fords] to notify our parties on this engineer officer a very bulky vol- 

there of the enemy's advance, but were ume, which proved to be a diai-y which he 

captured ; consequently the parties at those had been keeping throughout the war. I 



198 THE CA3IPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

General Slocum to the front. When the atTair was over, he gave orders 
for the immediate crossing of the river. The cavalry and Kuger's and 
Knipe's brigades, with Battery M, 1 N. Y., crossed accordingly by the 
ford, the infantry wading almost to the armpits, with bayonets fixed, 
their cartridge-boxes and haversacks hanging on their bayonets. The 
music-boys were carried over on the shoulders of stalwart men. Num- 
bers of men were swept down the river, and only rescued from drowning 
by cavalrymen mounted on the largest, heaviest horses, and boatmen, 
stationed in the stream a short distance below the crossing. As the 
guns of the battery were hauled out on the farther shore, the water 
poured in streams from the muzzles. By the time the forementioned 
troops had crossed, the bridge built on the piers of the burnt bridge 
had been completed far enough to permit the rest of the infantry to 
use it. The artillery, cavalry, and trains continued to use the ford. 
Men relieved the pack-mules of their burdens by carrying the ammu- 
nition over the bridge while the little animals swam the stream to 
resume their loads on the other side. As night fell, huge bonfires were 
kindled on the banks. The light of the fires danced with the moonbeams 
on the bayonets and the water, and wrought fantastic shapes on the hill- 
side, while the long dark column streamed down from the woods into 
the gleaming current and the gorge beyond. The jubilant soldiers made 
the still night ring with their jokes and laughter. Communication 
across the river was maintained by signal stations established on both 
banks. The XII Corps completed its crossing about 11 p.m., when the 
XI Corps commenced to cross. At midnight it was still crossing 
(Map 10). 

At the intersection of the River Eoad with that to Culpeper, Colonel 
Devin. commanding the cavalry with the V Corps, sent a party to the 
right to communicate with General Slocum 's column, also a squadron 
to Barnett's Ford, to ascertain whether the enemy was still at that 
point. Having established communication with Slocum 's column, but 
not heard from the squadron sent to Barnett's Ford, he moved on to 
Richardsville. Here he dispatched Major Keenan with two squadrons 
to Richards' Ford, with instructions to drive the enemy, if possible, 
from that point, and establish communication with the Federal pickets 
opposite it, and then rejoin the connnand at Ely's Ford, which left him 
one squadron and one company.* This done, he awaited the arrival of 

spent the greater part of the night in read- were in conference over five hours, and 

ing it in hopes of finding something that came to the decision that the next battle 

would be of advantage to us, nor was I dis- would be at or near Chancellors^-ille, and 

appointed. This diaiy stated that in the that that position must be prepared" (5. 

first week of March a council of war had a7id L., Ill, 176). I have been unable to 

been held at General Stuart's headquarters, find this diaiy or a copy, or any trace of it. 

which had been attended by Generals Jack- J. B. Jr. 
son, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Stuart. They ^ Devin's report, W. R., 39, p. 779. Ac- 



CROSSING THE RAPIDAN 199 

General Meade. At the head of the infantry was the 1st brigade of the 
First Division, nnder General Barnes, marching- at top speed. Word 
was sent ahead to its commander that the men were falling out in 
scpiads, unable to keep up. Barnes sent back word that it was necessary 
to preserve a rapid gait, in order to seize the blulTs upon the opposite 
bank before the enemy, and thus prevent a battle. The roads were 
strewn with Imapsacks and superfluous clothing thrown away bj'' the 
men.i Straggling and desertion gave employment to the provost 
guards. But the men in general, stimulated by the sound of cannon in 
the direction of Fredericksburg, responded heartily and effectively to 
the appeal made to them by their corps commander in his order of the 
day before. 

When General Meade, who rode between his infantry and his cavalry, 
reached Richardsville, the dispositions made by his cavalry were ap- 
proved, and its commander, Colonel Devin, was ordered to go to Ely's 
Ford and ascertain and report the state of affairs there. Devin resumed 
his march accordingly. On reaching Ely's Ford he found a picket of 10 
mounted men on the opposite side, who made no motion to retire. He 
sent to General Meade for instructions, as he imderstood that the 
general did not wish to cross imtil he heard from Slocum's column at 
Germanna Ford. General Meade wanted to see the place of crossing 
himself, and to have troops at hand to support the cavalry before order- 
ing it to cross. So Devin had to wait for Meade's arrival. 

The river at Ely's Ford was three or four feet deep, and running 
with a swift current. Meade reached it with the head of his First Divi- 
sion about 4 : 30 p.m. He did not consider the depth of the water suffi- 
cient to warrant waiting for the pontoon train and the laying of a 
bridge.- So the cavalry was at once put across. The Confederate 
horsemen on the south bank stood their ground until the Federals had 
nearly reached the shore, when they scampered away, taking the road 
to Chancellorsville. The Federal cavalry was promptly followed by the 
First Division of infantry. As opposition was expected, orders were 

cording to Huey's report, ib., p. 783, Devin were struggling so manfully in the river, 

had no cavalry in reserve. an officer rode up and, presenting the eom- 

^ When the command started in the pliments of General Meade, announced that 

morning, the 5 N. Y. left in its camp at the V Corps had just an-ived at Ely's Ford, 

Kelley's Ford 20 rifles belonging to as the next ford below. He informed Slocum 

many three-year men who had taken advan- that the water there was very deep, up to 

tage of darkness to desei-t rather than be a man's hips; said something about pon- 

consoHdated with the 146 N. Y., to serve toons, and seemed to be asking for instruc- 

out the remainder of their tenn (Camp and tions. Slocum replied somewhat curtly that 

Field Life of the 5 N. Y. Vol. Infantry, his men were fording through swift water 

Dwrj/ee ZoMares, by A. Davenport, p. 379). breast-deep, and that the V Corps must 

^ Meade had perhaps heard by this time cross without further delay" (Slocum and 

from Slocum. "While Slocum was sitting his Men, by Committee, p. 159). 
on his horse intently watching his men who 



200 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

issued that no clothing should be removed. The men arranged their 
cartridge-boxes, haversacks, knapsacks, blankets, and valuables about 
their heads and necks, or secured them to the ends of their fixed bayo- 
nets, and plunged into the cold water. Some were swept away as at 
Germanna Ford, to be picked up by cavalry stationed below. The 
Second Division followed the First across after dark. The river was 
lighted by large fires on the farther bank, the sight of which cheered 
the troops forward. Out of the chilly water they climbed the slippery 
hillside— for it was then raining— and went to himting fire-wood in the 
darkness, building fires, cooking suppers, pitching shelter tents, drying 
clothes and shoes as best they could, and finally rolling up in blankets, 
feet to the fire, for a comfortless night.^ 

Devin sent a squadron to scour the country to the right toward Ger- 
manna and the road leading from that point into the Wilderness. He 
also picketed the roads about Ely's Ford. In the meantime the Federal 
squadron sent to Barnett's Ford, having found no enemy, joined the 
two squadrons under Keenan, and all three marched to Richards' Ford, 
where they surprised the enemy in his rifle-pits, captured 28 men and 1 
commissioned officer, and forwarded dispatches to Hooker. These were 
not received,' it would seem, before night. 

Butterfield wrote to Slocum from Falmouth : 

. . . the bridges are all across here.^ The demonstration here is a very strong 
one. Fifty or 60 prisoners taken in the enemy's rifle-pits report Jackson's whole 
force here. The enemy are in position, anticipating our main attack at Frank- 
lin's Crossing. The general directs that you move as high up as Chaneellorsville ; 
establish your right strongly on the Plank road ; look out for your left, too. The 
map indicates that from Chaneellorsville to the Rappaliannock is a very strong 
position. You must have that, and move to command the Plank road, which is 
the line of the enemy 's retreat. As soon as you uncover United States Ford, you 
will be reenforeed by C. [Couch] (two divisions), and then probably by S.'s 
[Sickles'] entire command. The general will be up to-morrow. The bearer, if 
he succeeds in reaching you, may be able to return with a dispatch from you. 

It will be observed that no reference is made in this communication to 
uncovering Banks' Ford. The idea is to secure a defensive position 
based upon United States Ford and cutting off Lee's retreat, thus com- 
pelling him to attack. That this will result in his defeat and loss of 
Fredericksburg, is a fixed idea in Hooker's mind. It is his intention 
that as soon as he has possession of Fredericksburg, the railroad bridge 
at that point, which has been destroyed, shall be reconstructed, and that 
as fast as the army advances along the railroad toward Richmond, the 
road shall be put in working order by his construction corps. From the 
following letter of Lieutenant Ropes, dated to-day, it would seem that 

^ Mag. of Am. Hist., XX, 378. = Five pontoon bridges below. J. B. Jr. 



STONEMAN CROSSES THE RAPPAHANNOCK 20] 

at least a part of the Army of the Potomac was still ignorant of the new 
plan of campaign : 

As far as I can make it out, the whole of tlie army, except the II Corps, has 
gone down [the river] to make a grand attack on the enemy's right. ... I 
understand the troops are in good spirits, and I am sure I hope for success, but 
I do not see how it can be decisive, for the enemy have a perfect line of retreat, 
unless Hooker crosses so far below as to be able to get between them and Rich- 
mond, while the bulk of their force is gathered to resist the feigned attack on 
their left. . . . 

Using the ford and the pontoon bridge at Kelley's Ford, Stoneman 
managed "by dint of great exertion" to get all his cavalry over by 3 and 
his trains by 5 p.m. He camped with his column for the night at Madden. 
No fire or noise was allowed. The horses remained saddled, the men in 
each set of fours taking turns in holding the four horses by the bridles 
while the other three men slept. The night was rendered still more 
uncomfortable by the cold, drizzly rain.' 

Here [says Stoneman in his report] I assembled the division and brigade com- 
manders, spread our maps, and had a thorough understanding of what we were 
to do, and where we were each to go. Averell . . . was to push on in the direction 
of Culpeper Court-House, and myself [with the main column] ... to push on 
toward Stevensburg. It was expected that Averell would be able to reach 
Brand.y Station that night, driving whatever enemy was there before him, and I 
was to communicate with him at that point. ^ 

What orders he issued are not given verbatim in the official records, 
and appear to have been communicated verbally. Averell reports : 

I was directed to proceed in the direction of Brandy Station, reach there, if 
possible, that night [29th], and communicate with Buford, who would be at 
Stevensburg. On the day following I was to proceed to Culpeper Court-House 
and Rapidau Station, attacking the cavalry of the enemy and keep liim occupied 
while Buford proceeded with the major-general commanding the corps to execute 
that portion of the original instructions which referred to operations in rear of 
the enemy's main body.^ 

It would seem from the two reports that Averell was ordered to be at 
Brandy Station on the night of the 29th, "if possible"; and was to 
govern his movements beyond that point by orders which he was to 
receive from time to time from Stoneman and to carry out conform- 
ably to such general instructions as he might have received; also that he 
understood that the active operations on Lee's commtmications were to 
be executed by the reserve brigade under Buford, accompanied and 
directed by Stoneman. What Gregg was to do, can only be conjectured. 

' History of the First Maine Cavalry, 1861-1865, by E. P. Tobie, p. 134. 
= W. R., 39, p. 105S. '' lb., 39. p. 1074. 



202 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

It was perhaps to follow the left column as a sort of general reserve. 
From these circumstances and others to develop later, it appears that 
the understanding which Stoneman had at this time with his division 
and brigade commanders as to what they were to do and where they 
were to go was not in any proper sense a "thorough" one. 

Only Buford's brigade went to Stevensburg. From there two squad- 
rons were sent on to Brand}- Station to communicate with Averell. 
Near midnight Stoneman learned from a staff officer of Averell's that 
Averell had gone into camp not far from Kelley's Ford. He at once 
sent an officer of his staff" with a platoon to recall the two squadrons. 
These had reached Brandy Station and found there the 13 Va. Cavalry 
and a battery of artillery, but no sign of Averell. A messenger sent 
back to Stevensburg with a report to this effect was either killed or cap- 
tured on the way. After waiting for some time at Brandy Station, the 
squadrons returned to Stevensburg and thence with the brigade to 
Madden, arriving there soon after midnight. 

Averell had been led to believe by deserters and intercepted dis- 
patches that Stuart with his entire force, reported as four brigades and 
fifteen pieces of artillery, was at Brandy Station awaiting his approach. 
He had consequently suspended his advance. 

The following dispatch was picked up on the march, delivered to him, 
and forwarded by him to Stoneman, who, however, was not to receive it 
to-day : 

Important 

Headquarters Cavalry Division, 
Near Brandy Station, Va., April 29, 1863. 
Colonel Chambliss, Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry. 

Colonel: 

The major-genei'al commanding directs me to say that he wishes you to get 
a man posted so as to have a view of the road leading down on the other side of 
Kelley's Ford, and find out what kind of troops marched down behind the 
wagons.^ The enemy have made a demonstration toward Stevensburg, but so far 
it amounts to nothing. The general is very anxious to know where to look for 
Stoneman. a.s we have heard nothing from him. 

]\Iost respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. Channing Price, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. ^ 

After the Federal cavalry and its trains had cleared the bridge at 
Kelley's Ford, a few remaining troops of the XI and XII Corps were 
allowed to cross. Then came the trains of these corps, which were fol- 

' Referring, it would seem, to wagons - TF. B., 39, p. 1059. The subsequent 

which accompanied the right wing to the operations of Stoneman's cavalry, being 

vicinity of Kelley's Ford and were proba- independent of those of the army, are de- 

bly escorted by troops that were to remain scribed separately in Chapter XXVIII. 
behind. 



BRIDGES TAKEN UP AT KELLEY'S f^ORD 203 

lowed by those of the V Cori^s.* Finally Humphreys crossed with his 
division, and about 7 p.m. the Engineers commenced taking up the 
bridge." About this time Humphreys received a communication from 
his corps commander advising him of the importance, as he supposed, 
of having the pontoon train at Ely's Ford at the earliest possible 
moment. It was about 11 : 30 when the bridge train was ready to move, 
and Humphreys ' division accompanied by it was put in motion through 
the darkness. At midnight this column was about 2 miles on its way 
from Kellej-'s to Ely's Ford. 

Stahel marched this afternoon with his division of cavalry from 
Fairfax Court-House westward to the vicinity of xVldie and returned 
after dai'k. 

Center and Left Wing 

The two divisions of the II Corps completed the road to United States 
Ford. Excepting the two regiments under Colonel Cross (f^), they 
took up the march at 2 p.m. in compliance with the following instructions 
addressed to the "Commanding Officer, II Corps, Banks' Ford": 



The eommandino: general directs that you encamp with your two divisions to- 
night at the United States Ford, leaving a company at Banks' Ford, and that you 
keep the road you have been repairing clear of wagons. The wagons must take 
the fields on the right and left of the road. Please acknowledge. 



The commanding general does not care about your movement to the United 
States Ford being kept secret from the enemy. He wishes you to march to-day, 
and by the best road. He also desires to know what road you have repaired. 

The two divisions, with the forementioned exception, bivouacked at 
United States Ford. The supply-train hauled two days' rations to 
them, and the wagons, after being reloaded at the depot at Falmouth, 
returned to the park. The trains for two bridges were also sent from 
Banlvs' Ford to United States Ford. 

It was late in the afternoon when two cavalry videttes galloped up to 
General Mahone's headquarters, and reported the Federals to be ad- 
vancing in force on the road from Ely's Ford. A little later informa- 
tion came to him of another column marching east by the Plank Road 
from Germanna Ford. In a few moments couriers were dashing off 
with orders, and within an hour the winter quarters were abandoned, 
wagons and impedimenta of all sorts were started to the rear, and the 

^ Humphreys, in his report, mentions a injj chiefly, almost entirely, as reported to 
train consisting of at least 125 wagons and him, to the XI Corps (W. B., 39, p. 550). 
55 spring wagons and ambulances belong- - lb., 39, p. 215. 



204 THE CAMPAIGN OF CIIANCELLORSVILLE 

two brigades were posted to meet the advancing Federals— Malione's to 
the north of Chancellorsville, covering the approaches from Ely's Ford 
and United States Ford; and Posey's to the west of it, covering the 
approach from Germanna Ford, with two guns of Grandy's battery (i^j) 
on each road. A regiment and a half, about 600 men, were left at 
United States Ford to hold the position as long as possible.^ 

It was nearly sunset when a courier from General Mahone reached 
the party at Wilderness Tavern with an order to make a reconnaissance 
toward Germanna Ford. This was done, and developed the fact that 
there was a large force of Federals at the ford. At midnight the recon- 
noitering party was on its way back to Wilderness Tavern.- 

Sometime after 6 : 30 p.m. the following order was sent to Couch at 
United States Ford : 

General Hooker directs that yoii establish eommmiieation with General Meade, 
at Ely's Ford, Rapidan, or vicinity, to-night. Use a pontoon boat or raft across 
the Rappaliaunoek. Swim a horse if necessary above its junction with Rapidan. 
Send following to Generals Meade and Sloeum [V and XII Corps] : 

"General Hooker learns that pontoon bridge has been made use of for cross- 
ing cavalry. He prefers that no dragoons should have crossed the Rappahan- 
nock. If Fords at Germanna and Ely's should be impracticable for artillery, 
cross infantry without waiting for artillery (infantry can raise cartridge-boxes) 
or trains, and drive enemy from before United States Ford." . . . 

Hooker no longer trusted to the movement upon Chancellorsville for 
opening the United States Ford. He now required, as he should have 
done in the first instance, that a force move upon the ford. Couch, it 
seems, did not receive this message. At any rate, he failed to commu- 
nicate with Meade; and neither Meade nor Sloeum took any action 
toward compelling the hostile detachment at United States Ford to retire. 

How is it now with the passage of the river by the left wing below 
Fredericksburg? Brooks' boats were not in the water until about 
1 : 30 a.m., and then it was found impossible to get a crossing" party. 
General Russell thought that the movement could not succeed in the 
dark, and would not let his brigade embark before daylight. Benham 
ordered him into arrest, but he paid no attention to the order. The 
situation was reported to Brooks and to Sedgwick, but the night wore 
away without bringing any material change in it. At 4 : 20 a.m. boats 
pushed from the shore, each containing 45 men and a quota of officers. 
These 1215 men were the 95 and 119 Pa., who had been chosen to sur- 
prise the enemy's pickets. The boats were soon lost in the fog. The 
river is not more than 80 or 100 yards wide at this point, but the 

' The 12 Va. of Mahone's brigade and five companies of the 19 IMiss. of Posey's brigade 
(Posey's report, TF. B., 39, p. 871). 
^ War Talks of Confederate Veterans, by G. S. Bernard, pp. 49 et seq. 



CROSSING BELOW FREDERICKSBURG 205 

progress of the boats, owing probably to the necessity of silence, was 
unusually slow. Suddenly there rang out on the misty air the unmis- 
takable sound "Fire," and about 200 yards of the opposite bank were 
lit up with musketry. The men crowded together in the boats could not 
reply. Their comrades on shore, peering after them through the im- 
penetrable fog, held their breath. But soon a loud cheer followed by 
another, and then another, told that the opposite bank was reached and 
held. The boats made another trip, bringing over the remainder of 
Russell's brigade. A bridge was immediately and rapidly laid, being 
commenced at 5 : 50 and completed at 7 a.m. A second bridge was laid 
between 6 and 7 : 30 ; and a third between 7 and 9 : 45. In the meantime 
the i-emainder of the division crossed in boats with perhaps a dozen 
casualties. 

Wadsworth did not have his boats in the water until about 4:30, and 
then no men were at hand to enter them. The crossing in boats at this 
point did not commence until about 9 o'clock. It was completed about 
10. The work of laying two bridges commenced about 10 : 15. It was 
completed, and the troops commenced crossing on the bridges about 
12 m. Russell's line of skirmishers drove the skirmishers opposing it 
out of two lines of rifle-pits, and established itself about 100 yards from 
the enemy and about 300 yards from the river. It was prolonged to the 
left until it connected with Wadsworth 's line. It was known that 
troops up the river were executing an offensive movement, and it was 
thought that at any moment a sound of firing might come from them 
that would be a signal for the left wing to advance. 

Benham received the following communication of this day from 
Hooker's adjutant-general: 

Your attention is called to the following extract from orders issued yesterday, 
of which you were furnished a copy : 

"The bridges, two at each crossing, to be laid complete before 3:30 a.m. on 
the 29th, under the supervision of General Benham, who is charged with the 
responsibility thereof. ' ' 

The major-general commanding is informed tliat, agreeably to your request. 
General Sedgwick placed at your disposal a brigade of infantry, and he desires 
to know why these orders were not complied witli, and those bridges laid at the 
hour specified.^ 

Benham replied in the course of the day with a lengthy report,- which 
seems to have cleared him of all responsibility for the delay. ■\A'liether 
or not the responsibility was ever officially fixed upon any one, the 
author is unable to state. Russell, in his report, accounted for the delay 
by the bare and simi^le statement :" The arrangements for crossing were 
not perfected till 4:20 o'clock on the morning of Wednesday, April 29." 

' TF. i?., 39, pp. 204, 205. - lb., 39. p. 205 : ib.. 45, p. 63. 



206 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The two divisions covering Sedgwick's five bridges were themselves 
covered by groups of guns on the north bank posted under the direction 
of the Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac. At Franklin's 
Crossing was a line of forty-six pieces (^, ~~, ~, ^, 4, vi, 5-^)^ 
commanded by Colonel Tompkins, Chief of Artillery- of the VI Corps, 
and at Pollock's Mill, a line of thirty- four pieces of the I Corps 
(H' "TT"' TT^)' commanded by Colonel Wainwright, Chief (if Artillery 
of that corps. Still further down the river, near Traveller's Rest, was 
a battery of sixteen pieces of the Creueral Reserve under Colonel War- 
ner, Inspector of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac.^ This battery 
was to command the bridge over the Massaponax and the valley of that 
stream, and so prevent the enemy from attacking Sedgwick's left flank 
after he had crossed. In addition to these groups of guns, five batteries 
of Napoleons (brass smooth-bore 12-pounders), numbering twenty-six 
pieces, were stationed near Falmouth, in readiness for service when and 
wherever they might be required.* The batteries of the I, III, and VI 
Corps, not mentioned, were likewise available for action. There still 
remain to be accounted for two batteries attached to the Provost Guard, 
numbering ten pieces. These were probably on the line of communica- 
tion between Falmouth and Aquia Creek. 

About daybreak the officers at Jackson's headquarters were aroused 
with the stirring news that Federal troops were crossing the Rappa- 
hannock in pontoons imder cover of a heavy fog. Jackson, who had 
spent the night at a house near by, was at once informed of the fact, 
and promptly issued orders for his divisions to prepare for action. As 
the long roll resounded through his camp, an officer of his staff rode 
over to army headquarters, and gave the news to General Lee, who ex- 
pressed no surprise, but remarked in plaj^ful tones: 

Well, I thouglit I heard firing, and was beginning to think it was time some of 
you young fellows were coming to tell me what it was all about. Tell your good 
general that I am sure he knows what to do. I will meet liim at the front very 
soon.° 

After going out and personally observing the enemy, he telegraphed 
to the Adjutant-General and to President Davis : 

The enemy is crossing below Deep Run, about the same place as before [in the 
Fredericksburg campaign]. The fog has been so thick during the night and 
morning tliat we can only see a few yards.'' Taken ^^-itli the reports received 

1 Four 4V2-mch guns. s 5 „„^ j^ ^ m^ 203 ; for a slightly dif- 

= Six 20-pounder guns. ferent version see Life and Letters of R. E. 

^Taft's 5 N. Y., four 20-pounders ; Lee, Soldier and Man, by J. W. Jones, 

Hart's 15 N. Y., six 3-inch guns; and Gas- p. 241. 

ton's 32 N.^Y., sis 3-ineh guns. e Tjje Rappahannock is usually covered 

iTTn> mi' rin> ~a~- with fog early in the morning. 



LEE LEARNS OP^ PASSAGE OP THE RAPPAHANNOCK 207 

from our left, it looks like a general advance ; but where his main effort will be 
made, can not say. Troops not wanted south of James River had better be 
moved in this direction, and all other necessary preparations made. 

About 5 a.m. a courier dashed into Fredericksburg with the intelli- 
gence that the Federals were crossing the Rappahannock a short dis- 
tance below. Immediately the Episcopal Church bell, the ringing of 
which had been agreed upon as a signal, sounded the alarm, and the 
streets presented a spectacle of military preparation, and women and 
children leaving the town. 

By 10 a.m. Lee received Stuart's report of Howard's passage of the 
Rappahannock yesterday at Kelley's Ford. The fog having then lifted, 
he observed that more Federal troops had crossed in his front. He tele- 
graphed to the Adjutant-General at Richmond : 

The enemy is in large force on north bank of Rappahannock, opposite rail- 
road at Hamilton's Crossing. He is crossing troops below the point at which 
he crossed in December, and extends lower down the river.^ I have discovered 
nothing lower than the mouth of ]\Iassaponax Creek. He is certainly crossing in 
large force here, and it looks as if he were in earnest. I hear of no other point 
at which he is crossing, except below Kelley's Ford, where General Howard has 
crossed with his division, said to be 14.000, six pieces of artillery, and some cav- 
alry. Stoueman will probably cross about the Warrenton Springs, and I fear 
will make for Gordonsville, and may destroy our roads. I have nothing to oppose 
to all that force up there except the two weak brigades of cavalry under General 
Stuart. All available troops had better be sent as rapidly as possible by rail and 
otherwise. 

Lee was inclining to believe that the main force of the Federals was 
crossing, after all, below Fredericksburg. But what, he asked himself, 
was Howard's objective? Apparently it was Gordonsville, but his 
"division" might be the advance of a force directed upon Richmond or 
Lee's communications or his army. Lee may have been misled by a 
subsequent report from Stuart. At any rate, he telegraphed also to the 
Adjutant-General somewhat later : 

If any troops can be sent by rail to Gordonsville. under a good officer, I recom- 
mend it. Long-street's division [s], if available, had better come to me; and the 
troops for Gordonsville and the protection of the railroads [be forwarded] from 
Richmond and North Carolina, if practicable. General Howard of the enemy's 
forces making toward Gordon.sville. . . . 

He contracted his main line by moving Jackson's corps into the space 
between the Massaponax Creek and Deep Run; placed Wright's brigade 
(o) within supporting distance of Early's left; formed Kershaw's 
brigade (oh) on Early's left; and placed the half of Semmes' brigade 

> The battle of Frederieksljurg- was fonglit on the 13tb of December, 1862. 



208 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

r-^) that was near the Plank Road in rear of Wofford (5^) as reserve. 
The trains of Hill's division, and probably of the other divisions of 
Jackson's corps, were assembled in the vicinity of Hamilton's Cross- 
ing.' 

Lee sent the following dispatch to the commander of the 15 Va. 
Cavalry : 

You had better draw up your pickets below Port Royal as high as the enemy's 
lowest picket, keeping well below their [infantry?] picket; and replace the 
infantry picket [on our side] above Port Royal, where they are withdrawn. Sta- 
tion your men to the best advantage at points where they can obser%'e their 
[own] line, so that the number [of our pickets] may be diminished as much as 
]iossible with safety. Caution your men to be very much on the alert, as a great 
deal depends upon their watchfulness and coolness.^ 

Jackson proposed to Lee to attack the troops under Sedgwick that 
had crossed the river. In reply Lee said: "It will be hard to get at the 
enemy, and harder still to get away, if we succeed in driving him to the 
river. But, General, if you think you can effect anything, I will give 
orders for the attack." 

Jackson asked for time for a careful reconnaissance, and having made 
it, reported that, upon closer examination, he concurred with Lee in 
the opinion that such an attack would accomplish nothing.'' 

Between 6 : 30 and 6 : 45 p.m.^ couriers and stray cavalrymen from the 
Rapidan reported to Lee that Federal cavalry crossed the river at Ger- 
manna Ford and Ely's Ford about 1 : 30 p.m.^ and that there was infan- 
try with the cavalry that crossed at Germanna Ford." This was Lee's 
first information of a Federal movement toward the Rapidan. It came 
too late to enable him to take up, say nothing of intrenching, the line 
that Longstreet had laid out. Together with the fact that he had not 
heard from Stuart since before noon, it satisfied him that the enemy was 
marching in force upon Germanna and Ely's Fords, and had cut Stuart 
off from him, but it left him presumably in doubt as to whether Howard 
was really marching toward Gordonsville or was with this force on the 

^ The author has been unable to get sat- 1 p.m. ; dispatch from Lee to Davis says 

isfactory information regarding the move- 2 p.m. 

ments of the Confederate trains. The only '^ In both of the opposing armies the cav- 

publisbed data that he has found refer to airy was trained to fight both on foot and 

the trains of Hill's division, and appeared on horseback. It was never necessary to 

in a paper of the Southern Hist. Soc. by attach infantry to cavalry for the protec- 

Captam R. E. Park (Vol. XXXIII). tion of the latter. The practice which ob- 

* W. B., 108, pp. 698, 699. tained in Europe as late as the Franco- 
^ Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., German War, of moving infantry in 

Vol. 3, p. 145. wagons beyond supporting distance of the 

* Lee to McLaws and to Anderson, W. army, was uncalled for and practically un- 
B., 40, p. 759. known in our war. Hence the presence of 

^Dispatch from Lee to McLaws says infanti-y, however few, indicated the prox- 

imitv of a large force. 



LEE'S PRELIMINARY MEASURES 209 

Rapidan. The circumstance that after crossing this river the routes 
followed by the Federal columns converged toward Chancellorsville, 
suggested this point as the immediate, and Lee's army as the final, 
objective of the Federal force, but it did not preclude a movement by at 
least one of the Federal columns upon his line of retreat to Richmond. 
If the Federals wanted to close with his army, he would give them the 
opportunity; this meant for him an essentially defensive fight with his 
communications with Richmond intact. But if they were trying to cut 
him off from Richmond, he meant to get ahead of them by retiring. He 
would not commit himself to the tactical offensive with his supplies cut 
off. He telegraphed to Pendleton, his chief of artillery at Chesterfield 
Station, to come up with all the artillery. Most of the artillery of the 
II Corps was at Bowling Green. Its chief. Colonel Crutchfield, was 
promptly communicated with, and probably had all his artillery up be- 
fore midnight. Of the artillery of the I Corps, Alexander's battalion, 
Manly's and McCarthy's batteries of Cabell's battalion (2. I), and 
Moore's battery of Hardaway's battalion (1. 1) took up the march from 
near Chesterfield for Fredericksburg that afternoon. Wright's brigade 
(pj) was ordered to report to Anderson, whose headquarters were near 
the point occupied by Perry's brigade (j-^), and the latter sent to re- 
lieve the half of Semmes' brigade in front of Falmouth. This half 
brigade reported to its brigade commander near Lee's Hill. Anderson 
was ordered to withdraw the brigades of Mahone and Posey from near 
United States Ford, where they were liable to be turned, and post these 
troops and Wright's brigade (j^) at Chancellorsville, so as to cover the 
roads to Fredericksburg, taking the strongest line he could, and holding 
it to the best advantage. He was directed to go forward himself to at- 
tend to this matter. "See," said Lee, "if you can find where Colonel 
Davis' cavalry [10 Va.] is, and collect all the mounted men you can in 
your front. ' ' 

Anderson received this order at 9 p.m. He proceeded to carry it out, 
sending an order to Wright to march with his brigade to Chancellors- 
ville. Wright received this order in bivouac near Tabernacle Church at 
midnight, at which hour Anderson arrived at Chancellorsville. General 
McLaws, commanding at Fredericksburg, was ordered to communicate 
to General Jackson and General Anderson all movements of the enemy 
affecting them, and if they asked for reenforcements, to furnish what he 
could. Lee was anxious about his cavalry, for he depended upon it for 
information enabling him to anticipate or counteract the enemy's opera- 
tions. In his dispatches to Anderson and McLaws he observed : 

We may be obliged to change our position in consequence of the enemy's hav- 
ing come between us and General Stuart. Make your preparatory arrangements 
to-night to secure all your property. 



210 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE 

In a dispatch to President Davis he said with reference to Meade and 
Slocum : 

Their intention, I presume, is to turn our left, and probably to get into our 
rear. 

Our scattered condition favors their operations.^ I hope if any reenforce- 
ments can be sent, they may be forwarded immediately. 

The bridges over tlie [North and South] Annas ought to be guarded, if possi- 
ble. 

And with reference to Sedgwick : 

The day has [by reason of the fog] been favorable for his operations, and to- 
night he will probably get over the remainder of his forces. 

It was late in the afternoon when Stuart learned that the Federal 
columns were marching, one upon Germanna Ford, and one upon Ely's 
Ford. The intelligence, with as much detail as practicable, was tele- 
graphed to General Lee from Culpeper Court-House.- Lee was now 
satisfied that Howard was not marching on Gordousville, but was with 
the Federal force on the Rapidan. On the other hand, he had learned, it 
seems, of Stoneman's laassage of the Raiipahannock. He directed 
Stuart to make arrangements for the protection of the public property 
along the railroads, and then to swing around so as to join the left wing 
of Lee's army, endeavoring at the same time to impede the progress of 
the Federal column marching by way of Germanna Ford.^ Stuart de- 
tached W. H. F. Lee, with the 9 and 13 Va. and half of the available 
artillery (about 1000 men and 6 gims), to go by Culpeper Court- 
House toward Gordousville; the other column was to be watched by 
the 10 Va. Cavalry, expected from Beaver Dam. With the remainder 
of his force, consisting of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade and the 5 Va. and 
6 guns (about 1600 men), he marched for Raccoon Ford, where he ar- 
rived about midnight, crossed, and halted for a few hours' rest. Colonel 
Owen with the 3 Va. went on without stopping, to get in front, if possi- 
ble, of the Federal column at Germanna Ford. Owing to the darkness 
of the night and the fatigue of his men, three squadrons became sepa- 
rated from him, leaving him only two squadrons. The former marched 
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Carter to rejoin the brigade 
under Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee. At midnight Owen with his two squad- 
rons reached Locust Grove.'' 

Two signal stations (flag and torch) were established at United States 
Ford to watch for the Federal column coming down the river, but the 

^ Referring especially to the absence of the Federal movements became fully enough 

Longstreet with two mixed divisions and developed to make it certain that they were 

of Hampton with a brigade of cavalry. directed upon Germanna and Ely's Fords." 

2 -So. Hist. Soc. Papers, VIII, 252. The ^ ^ ^fj _ 39^ pp_ 795^ io46. 

author says : "It was nearly night before * So. Hist. Soc. Papers, VIII, 252. 



STUART'S DISPOSITIONS 211 

observers did not catch sight of it to-daj\ The telegraph line was ex- 
tended from England to United States Ford, but this extension was not 
in successful operation until 9 p.m. In the meantime communication 
between England and United States Ford was maintained by courier. 

A flag and torch station was established at the Fitzhugh House, near 
Reynolds' headquarters, and Tyler's Hill near Sedgwick's, whence 
there was already telegraphic communication with Butterfield (old gen- 
eral headquarters). There was now a continuous line of flag and torch 
communication from opposite Buckner's Neck, through Seddon's, the 
Fitzhugh House, and Tyler's Hill, to the Phillips House. A flag and 
torch line of the Signal Corps connected Reynolds' with Sedgwick's 
headquarters. 

Hooker received the following dispatch of this day from Peck : 

I think I can hold Longstreet here [at Suffolk] for some time, which will 
favor your operations very materially. When he retires it will only be to his two 
railroads, where he can go to Lee or strike at me. according to circumstances. 
You and I will have plenty of work. 

He telegraphed to "Major-General Peck or Dix": 

I have fully commenced my operations here. The result may be to draw 
troops from your front, and afford you an opportunity to push or hold them. 

The following dispatch sent to-day was probably received in the 
course of the night : 

Davis to Lee 

One half of Colonel Rhett's command (600 men and one battery) leave to-night 
by rail for Gordonsville. The remainder to-morrow morning.^ Generals Long- 
street, French,- and D. H. Hill " have been telegraphed to on the subject of reen- 
forcements, but have not yet been heard from. Tlu'ee regiments of cavalry from 
"Western Virginia supposed to be en route to join you, but have not been heard 
from ; neither has anything been heard from the two cavalry regiments in North 
Carolina.* 

In consequence of Jackson's movement, numerous messages were 
forwarded to-day from the Federal signal stations below Fredericks- 
burg to the Federal headquarters, reporting infantry, artillery, and 
trains, of the enemy, in motion up the river. But these reports did not 
give a definite idea of the numbers of the troops that had moved or of 
the distance they had covered. The following dispatch from Butterfield 
to Sedgwick was sent from Falmouth probably after dark : 

If the enemy are massing troops in front of Brooks (^) it will suit the gen- 
eral's purposes. 

' Total force, 1400. Letter of May 1 from Cooper to Lee, W. B., 39, p. 763. 
' At Petersburg, Va. ^ At Goldsboro, N. Ca. * W. R., lOS, p. 698. 



212 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

. . . The moment news arrives with regard to the progress made to-day by 
the right wing, plans for to-morrow will issue. The mancBUvers now in progress, 
the general hopes, will compel the enemy to fight him on his, Hooker's, own 
ground. He has no desire to make the general engagement where you are, in 
front of Brooks or Wadstvorth. 

The italics are the author's. It appears therefroDi that Hooker was 
thinking more of the defensive than he was of the offensive, and that he 
contemplated renouncing the initiative and relying for successful 
achievement upon the enemy's doing what he wanted him to do ; that is, 
attacking him "on his own ground." By the phrase "on his own 
ground" he meant in a position of his own choice, and against such 
part only of his line as should be suited and prepared to receive an 
attack. 

With a view to the reenforcement of the right wing. Sickles, command- 
ing the III Corps, was ordered to hold his command "well in hand and 
all in readiness to march at a moment's notice." 

The battery of Pleasonton's division (1. C) marched to-day from its 
camp near Potomac Bridge to Hartwood Church under orders from 
General Pleasonton to report to him at United States Ford. 

The six batteries of the XI and XII Corps left on the north side of 
the river marched toward United States Ford, halting for the night 
probably at Hartwood Church. 

A correspondent wrote to the New York Herald: 

It is rumored that the enemy are falling back toward Richmond, but a fight to- 
morrow seems more than probable. "We expect it, and we also expect to be 
victorious. 



CHAPTER XVI 

APRIL 30 (map 11 ) ... AEEIVAL OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC AT CHAN- 
CELLOKSVILLE. DEMONSTRATION BY LEFT WING ORDERED AND SUSPENDED. 
LINE OF DEFENCE AT CHANCELLOES\^LLE. III CORPS IN MOTION. ADVANCE 
FROM CHANCELLORSVILLE COUNTERMANDED. HOOKER 'S CONGRATULATORY 
ORDER. AVERELL MARCHES TO RAPIDAN STATION. STUART INTERCEPTED AT 
TODD's TAVERN 

Right Wing, Forenoon 

ABOUT 1 a.m. the Confederate party returning from Germanua Ford 
JTjL reached Wilderness Tavern, and delivered its report to a courier 
of General Mahone 's. Between 4 and 5 a.m. its commander received an 
order from Mahone to fall back at once to Chancellorsville. 

Anderson decided to move back from Chancellorsville with Posey's 
and Mahone 's brigades, and take up a position across the Turnpike and 
Plank Road between Zion Church and Tabernacle Church. Before he 
began this movement the Federal cavalry had commenced clearing the 
ground in front of Meade. Three squadrons of the 8 Pa. (Arrow- 
smith's, McCallmn's, and Wickersham's) started from Ely's Ford 
under Major Huey, commanding the regiment, to reach United States 
Ford, and open communication with the Federal forces on the opposite 
bank of the Rappahannock. Their advance-guard, favored by the fog 
and the mat of wet leaves which covered the ground, surprised and 
captured a picket of Mahone 's consisting of Company H of the 12 Va. 
This party had taken possession of an old school-house which stood in 
a convenient position in the center of the road where it forked, and 
occupied it for shelter. The dash upon it was so sudden and unex- 
pected that those who were inside had no opportunity to see, or judge 
of, the strength of the attacking force, which numbered only 8 men. 
"\ATiile the Confederate sentries and videttes outside were being cared 
for, the door of the school-house was guarded, and each man was obliged 
to deliver his arms as he passed out. The 22 men and 3 commissioned 
ofiScers who were thus taken were much chagrined when they saw the 
handful of men to whom they had surrendered, but it was then too late 
to make resistance.^ 

1 J. E. Carpenter, late Captain 8 Pa. Cavalry, in Philadelphia Weekly Times. See also 
War Talks of Confederate Veterans, p. 50, and Huey's report, W. R., 39, p. 783. 

213 



214 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Arrowsmith's squadron proceeded toward United States Ford, and 
McCallum's toward Chaneellorsville. McCalham found a force of the 
enemy intrenched near the point where the road from Chaneellorsville 
branched toward Ely's Ford and United States Ford, and became 
sharply engaged. Wickersham's squadron was sent to his assistance, 
and finally the whole of the 8 Pa. became engaged. Colonel Devin sent 
word to General Meade that he had driven in the enemy's pickets on the 
United States Ford Road, and having pursued them for several miles, 
had encountered the enemy drawn up in line of battle to the number, he 
thought, of at least a brigade. Meade received this message just as his 
main column was about to move. Concluding that the enemy was pre- 
paring to dispute the opening of the United States Ford, he ordered his 
leading division (Sykes') to proceed at once to that ford, and with 
Griffin's division took up the march for Chaneellorsville. After cross- 
ing Hunting Run, he halted to await the development of Sykes' move- 
ment. By this time Devin had disposed of the enemy in Meade's 
immediate front and pursued him to the vicinity of Chaneellorsville. 
Halting there, he sent a request to Meade— "that the point, from its 
evident importance, be occupied in force." Wright arrived with his 
brigade (j— J at Chaneellorsville and reported to Anderson at daybreak. 
About 6 a.m. the whole command took up the march for the vicinity of 
Zion Church, Mahone's brigade (^^) by the Turnpike, Wright's and 
Posey's (j-^- jS-j) by the Plank Road. Anderson in person took the 
Plank Road. Aii advance detachment of the 8 Pa. Cavalry also took 
this road in pursuit. On reaching the open ground about Magee (A),^ 
it made a bold attack upon Mahone's rear-guard, consisting of the 12 
Va. Infantry. The latter deployed in two lines of skirmishers, one in 
rear of the other, which retired alternately, uniting for combined fire 
when pressed. The Federal cavalry was so effectually repulsed that it 
desisted from further attempt to interfere with the enem.y's retreat, 
contenting itself with following and observing him in small bodies. The 
main body remained in the vicinity of Chaneellorsville.- Anderson, 
with Mahone's brigade, reached his new position about 9 a.m. Wright 
arrived with his about 8 a.m. Here Anderson was met by the chief 
engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia and another engineer officer, 
who were sent to him by General Lee to assist him in selecting a defen- 
sive position. Mahone's brigade (f^) was established on the Turnpike; 
Posey's (i^) between the Turnpike and the Plank Road; and Wright's 
(ih) between the Plank Road and the unfinished railroad. Anderson 

1 The affixes (A) and (B) are the au- by G. S. Bernard, p. 50; W. R., 39, pp. 

thor's, to prevent confusion between the 850, 862, 783; The Charge of the 8 Pa. 

name Magee and that of McGee beyond Cav. at Chaneellorsville, by Pennock Hviey, 

Mott Run. p. 26. 

^ War Talks of Confederate Veterans, 



FROM THE RAPIDAN TO CHANCELLORSVILLE 215 

wrote to Lee requesting that Semmes' brigade (,— ) be sent to him as 
reenforceinent. His line being selected, the work of intrenching it com- 
menced. Alexander's battalion of ai'tillery (24 pieces) arrived at An- 
derson's position about 10 a.m., and Moore's battery (4 pieces 1. I) 
somewhat later in the forenoon. At noon the General Artillery Reserve 
and the Washington Artillery, advancing from Chesterfield depot by 
the Telegraph Road, were perhaps in the vicinity of Chilesburg 
(Map 10). 

About 1 o'clock this morning Captain Comstock, on the march with 
Humphreys from Kelley's Ford, received a message from the head- 
quarters of the Army of the Potomac urging him to hurry up the 
bridge train. It was evidently sent imder the impression that a bridge 
would be needed for the passage of the Rapidan. The train was in rear 
of the troops, and could not move faster than they, but kept well closed 
up on them. At 3 o 'clock the whole column was brought to a halt by the 
darkness. As soon as it was light enough to see, the bridge train was 
sent ahead under escort of two regiments, and the column resumed its 
march. At 7 a.m. Humphreys received the following dispatch from 
corps headquarters: 

The major-general commanding is of the opinion that, in consequence of the 
force we have across the river, there is no necessity for keeping the whole of your 
command with the train. He thinks one regiment ought to suffice. You are de- 
sired, therefore, to push forward with all speed possible with the rest of your 
command, in order to join the column. . . .* 

Early this morning General Warren at United States Ford recon- 
noitered the approach to the river, and finding it impracticable, pro- 
cured 500 men from General Couch, and put them to work improving it. 
The mist so obscured his view of the opposite bank that he could not 
tell whether the enemy had withdrawn from it until about 9 o'clock, 
when the appearance of a number of Meade's cavalrymen showed it to 
be in possession of the Federals. 

At 9 : 40 Humphreys received the following dispatch sent at 8 : 15 : 

The major-general commanding (V Corps) . . . has gone on to Hunting Run, 
at the head of General Griffin's column. You will follow on at once. The order 
of march this morning is. Sykes first, then Griffin, on the road to Chancellorsville." 

The Confederate scouting party falling back from Wilderness Tavern 
on Chancellorsville reached the latter point just as Devin's cavalry 
emerged from the woods into an open field immediately north of the' 
Chancellor House. The Confederates quickened their steps to escape 

1 W. R., 107. p. 1017. = 76.. 107, p. 1018. 



216 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

capture, and a moment or two afterward came upon Malione's rear- 
guard, retreating toward Zion Church, and joined it.' 

Meade, still on Hunting Run, received Devin's report, and concluding 
therefrom that there was no enemy at United States Ford, proceeded 
with Griffin 's division (v) to Chancellorsville. He arrived about 11 a.m.^ 
The Federals found the house occupied. On an upper veranda were 
four ladies in light, attractive spring costumes, who, neither abashed 
nor intimidated, scolded audibly and criticized severely. They seriously 
condemned the stoppage, and urged a more expeditious movement, rep- 
resenting General Lee as just ahead, and anxiously awaiting an oppor- 
tunity to dispense the "hospitality of the country." They little 
suspected the terrors that were in store for them as participants in that 
bountiful hospitality. General officers with their staffs, as the troops 
approached, gathered about the house and occupied the porches.=^ 

On Meade's arrival Griffin directed Colonel Devin to send out a strong 
picket on the Plank Road, and a reconnoitering patrol toward Banks' 
Ford. At noon these parties were still out. Sykes' and Humphreys' 
divisions were marching up from the Rapidan. The former (^) was 
about 2 miles, and the latter (|) about 4 miles from Chancellorsville. 

According to the instructions given Slocum on the 28th, the right 
wing was to advance from Chancellorsville to a point that should give 
it command of Banks' Ford. Once there, it could be reenforced by Gib- 
bon's division (fj) and soon afterward by the III Corps, assuming 
that the latter started from below Fredericksburg about the same time 
as the right wing from Chancellorsville. But it was decided this morn- 
ing at Hooker's headquarters that the right wing should wait to-day at 
Chancellorsville for the enemy to attack it. Butterfield wrote to Warren 
at 9 :30 a.m.: 

I have not received a word from United States Ford this morning. Do send me 
by the bearer all the news. He is directed to run his horse. 

I have sent up additional details from the Engineer brigade to assist at the 
bridges [at United States Ford]. When they are thrown across, I desire you 
to report to the commanding officer at Chancellorsville, to assist him, and give 
him the benefit of your advice in establishing a line of defence at that place or 
vicinity. The maps indicate that a formidable position can be taken there. 
Please show this to General Slocum, and to General Couch when he comes up. 

I am informed that the enemy continues in full force in front of General 
Sedgwick. At all events, we want to hold the strongest position that section 

1 "W. C. Smith in War Talks of Confed- join it by way of United States Ford. As 

erate Veterans, pp. 307-311. previously stated, one of its regiments (j-=^) 

^ Barnes, commanding the leading bri- was left at Falmouth. 

gade, says that his brigade "reached Chan- ' History of the Corn Exchange Begi- 

cellorsville at noon" (TF. R., 39, p. 514). ment, by the Survivors' Assoc, p. 171; 

Griffin's di\asion had but one of its four Marginalia, by "Personne," p. 53. 
batteries with it. The other three were to 



FITZHUGH LEE IN THE WAY 217 

[about Chancellorsville] affords to-night, and be in readiness to take the initia- 
tive in the morning. 

Until Banks' Ford is uncovered, the route by the United States Ford must 
be understood as our line of operations. The weather is favorable for securing 
our positions, and, after all is over [across], the Rapidan is no advantage to the 
enemy over ourselves. 

Colonel Owen upon halting with his two squadrons at Locust Grove, 
or soon after 12 p.m. the 29th, sent out scouting parties to Germanna 
and Ely's Fords with instructions to get as close to the enemy as possi- 
ble and ascertain his strength and position. At 3 a.m. he received a 
dispatch from Fitzhugh Lee directing him to move forward, get in 
front of the enemy, and delay him, giving all attainable information to 
General Lee. He marched to Wilderness Tavern, turned up the road to 
Germanna Ford, and sent forward another scouting party. Between 
6 and 7 a.m. his scouts from Germanna Ford reported a column of from 
15,000 to 20,000 infantry across the Eapidan, with a considerable ad- 
vance-guard of cavalry, mounted and forming to march. At 8 a.m. his 
scouts reported back from the direction of Ely's Ford.^ About the 
same time a detachment of the 6 N. Y. Cavalry at the head of Slocum's 
column came into view. This was soon followed by skirmishing and 
charging for the possession of the cross-road, in which the Confederates 
had some success, until the odds against them became too great. One 
of their best-mounted troopers was sent westward with a dispatch for 
Fitzhugh Lee reporting what had been learned as to the force at Ger- 
manna Ford, also that a heavy wagon-train and artillery- train were 
across at Ely's, and under escort of a large force of infantry moving 
toward Chancellorsville. This man was captured by Federal cavalry 
in the woods before he had gone a mile. Couriers returning from Chan- 
cellorsville to the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern reported that they had 
been unable to commimicate with the Confederate troops who were 
falling back; and that the Federals were already at Chancellorsville, 
and sending out scouting detachments. It was now nearly 9 a.m. Owen 
wheeled about and went toward Chancellorsville, but finding a strong 
force in his front, he turned to the right toward Todd's Tavern. As 
his column moved on, he started a courier with a dispatch to Major 
Taylor, R. E. Lee's adjutant-general, giving him all the information 
that he had of the two columns moving from Germanna and Ely's Fords. 
This man was cut off by the Federal cavalry at Chancellorsville, and 
thus compelled to go around that place, but he reached the general 
sometime between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m., bringing him the first intelligence 
that he received that day from the direction of the Rapidan.^ It 

^ So. Hist. Soc. Papers, VIII, 252. onton said : "At a place called the Wilder- 

'^ Testifying a year later before the Com- ness [Tavern] I captured a coniier from 

mittee on the Conduct of the War, Pleas- General Lee with a dispatch in Lee's own 



218 



THE CAJIPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 



amounted to little more than a confirmation of the information last 
received by telegraph from Stuart. At noon Owen was at Todd's 
Tavern resting and feeding his horses. 

Slocum resumed his march between 6 and 7 a.m./ the XII Corps 
leading, with Geary's (2d) division in front. About 10 a.m., or soon after 
Owen's departure with his two squadrons of the 3 Va., Stuart with the 
remainder of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, including the three squadrons of 
the 3 Va. under Carter, arrived in the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern, and, 
with thi-ee or four regiments and two pieces of artillery, attacked the 
28 Pa., covering the right of Geary's division. Two regiments of in- 
fantry went out, and about noon drove him away. In the meantime the 

handwriting. It was dated at 12 o'clock 
that day [30th], and I captured it at 1 
o'clock, only one hour from his, Lee's hands. 
It was addressed to General Anderson, and 
read: 'I have just received reliable infor- 
mation that the enemy have crossed the 
[Rappahannock] river in force. Why have 
you not kept me informed? I wish to see 
you at my headquarters as soon as possible.' 

"As soon as I got that dispatch I went to 
General Slocum and showed it to him, and 
told him that the rebel army had not moved 
from Fredericksburg and did not know the 
crossing of the three coi-ps at the Rapidan, 
and I ad\'ised him then to send one of his 
corps, the 11th, as that was the nearest 
one, immediately to Spottsylvania Court- 
House, and to take up a position there and 
intrench. General Slocum said that he 
was ordered to concentrate his three eoi'ps 
at Chancellorsville. I told him that Gen- 
eral Hooker never dreamed of getting three 
corps across that river in that position and 
Lee not know it, and without a fight, and 
that it gave us such an advantage that he 
ought to take the responsibility of putting 
that corps in that position. But he de- 
clined to do so and concentrated his three 
corps at Chancellorsville. 

"I think it was about 5 or 6 o'clock in 
the evening that General Hooker arrived 
there and I saw him. I mentioned this 
fact to him of the importance of the posi- 
tion at Spottsylvania Court-House, and 
told him what I had reconunended to Gen- 
eral Slocum, and urged him by all means 
to put a corps there that night. General 
Hooker, however, said that he did not think 
it was necessary; that he had the rebel 
army, and it could not get away" (Rep. of 
Com., IV, 27). 

Writing for the Century Magazine, 



Pleasonton stated that the dispatch was ad- 
dressed to Major-General McLaws, and 
continued : "At 2 o'clock p.m., one hour 
later, I reported to General Hooker at 
Chancellorsville, and submitted to him the 
diary [of an engineer officer captured the 
day before] and General Lee's dispatch, 
both of which he retained, and I suggested 
that we had evidently surprised General 
Lee by our rapid movements, and, as Lee 
had prepared for a battle at Chancellors- 
^■ille, he had better anticipate him by mov- 
ing on toward Fredericksburg. . . . Every 
instinct induced me to suggest to General 
Hooker — to relieve ourselves from our em- 
barrassment—to send the Eleventh Corps 
to Spottsylvania Court-House by the .lack 
Shop road, and make the line of battle 
from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania. 
This proposition was not approved" (B. 
and L., Ill, 173). 

Pleasonton thus contradicts himself, stat- 
ing that the dispatch was addressed to 
Anderson, and that it was addressed to 
McLaws; that Hooker, he thinks, arrived 
at Chancellorsville about 5 or 6 p.m., and 
that he arrived at or before 2 p.m. In 
neither of his official reports (one to 
Sickles, and one to Hooker) does he men- 
tion any such incident as the capture of a 
dispatch from Lee. The document referred 
to is not among the records of the War 
Department. 

1 Slocum says at daylight (W. JR., 39, p. 
669), which would have been by 5 a.m. 
Geaiy, wliose di\ision led the column, says 
early (ib., p. 728). His subordinates (ib., 
pp. 743, 748, 750, 755, 764) give the hour 
as 8 a.m. Howard, who followed Slocum, 
says 7 a.m. (Autobiography, I, 355). It is 
probable that the cavalry started an hour 
or two before the infantry. 



STUAKT HEADS FOR TODD'S TAVERN 219 

Federal main body continued its march.' Learning that the Federals 
were in possession of Chaueellorsville, Stuart took up the march with 
Fitzhug'h Lee's brigade toward Todd's Tavern. He meant to proceed 
thence by way of Spottsylvania Court-House to join the army under 
Lee. 

Right Wing, Afternoon to -1 O'clock 

With reference to the reeuforeement of the right wing the followiug 
instructions were issued to Couch : 

. . . You will have the bridges laid without delay as soon as the enemy leaves. 
Don't let a small force keep you back. Establish rapid communication [by signal 
or courier] with the telegraph at Banks' Ford and with Meade and Slocum, as 
the telegraph from Banks' to United States Ford works so slow. You will move 
to support Slocum. Be careful that no trains [not even fighting trains] cross 
at United States I'ord until further orders, as they will only be in the way. 
Meade's ammunition wagons may have to cross. [Until orders authorize the 
passage of trains at United States Ford.] tlie trains should cross at some point 
to be designated [by you]. 

The general directs me to add,— in moving in support of Slocum, move toward 
the heaviest firing, in the event of liis advance being disputed. The general 
wishes you to be up with him to-night. 

At 1 p.m. Sykes' division (^.) joined Griffin's (^.) at Chancellorsville. 

The II Corps, it will be remembered, was to have crossed the Eappa- 
hannock at 7 a.m. By 1 p.m. there was a practicable approach to the 
LTnited States Ford. At 2 the laying of the two bridges commenced; 
at 3 : 30 the work was completed, and the band of the Engineer Brigade 
crossed playing "In Dixie's land I '11 take my stand." It was fol- 
lowed by the 11 Corps. The advance was taken by Carroll's brigade 
(~3Ti)> which formed line of battle on the south side, and skirmished 
through the woods, finding no enemy, but catching reports of artillery 
that came rumbling through the forest from the left. A road had to 
be made up the river-bank; this was soon done, whereupon the whole 
force pushed on past the enemy's abandoned defences, elated with the 
prospect of meeting him in the open field. The two divisions of the II 
Corps were accompanied by six ambulances,^ or two more than they 
were allowed.* They left on the north side of the river the two regi- 
ments under Cross CrrVr) ^"*^^ ^^^^ ^'^ ^- Y. of Meagher's "Irish" bri- 

Humphreys reached Ely's Ford with his division between 12 m. and 
1 p.m., but his troops being greatly fatigued, he proceeded only as far 

^ TF. R., 39, p. 669. Stuart, who was deceived by appearances, thoug-ht that he delayed 
the main body («■&., 39, p. 1047). 
== lb., 39, p. 549. 3 /;, 39^ pp. 966, 267. 



220 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

as Hunting Run, and halted for the night. He received the following 
dispatch sent at 2 p.m. : 

Bring your command on as far as you can without destroying entirely their 
efficiency. We are going into camp near this place [Chancellorsville], and I 
[Meade] would like you to get up as far at least as the crossing of Hunting Creek 
by the road from Ely's Ford. Report where and when you go into camp.^ 

Colonel Owen, after feeding his horses at Todd's Tavern, marched 
toward Fredericksburg. Before 4 p.m. he joined General Wright at 
Tabernacle Church, where he bivouacked in rear of the infantry, throw- 
ing out pickets to the front and upon each flank of Anderson's position.^ 

At 4 p.m. Stuart, marching toward Todd's Tavern, was probably in 
the vicinity of Poplar Run. The 6 N. Y. Cavalry reached Chancellors- 
ville about 1 p.m. By order of General Pleasonton, its commander, 
Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar, reported his arrival to General Slocum, 
who was about 3 miles back. He received the following verbal order : 

You will proceed with your command to Spottsylvania Court-House, where 
you will be joined by others of our troops. Should you meet the enemy in force 
and offering resistance, you will gradually fall back and report to me by couriers. 
Meeting no resistance, you will continue the march. ^ 

After repeating the order to insure that he understood it, he saluted 
and retired. He had not gone far toward his regiment when it occurred 
to him that he had no instructions or intimation as to whom he should 
report to at Spottsylvania Court-House upon the arrival of other troops 
at that point. He remarked to his adjutant, who was with him, — "I 
wish for more definite information as to the troops we shall meet at 
Spottsylvania, and to whom I shall report." Riding back to Slocum, 
he began his inquiry and was interrupted with the statement,— "You 
have your orders, sir; go." As he went away he remarked that the 
order indicated a "dusty job with results uncertain and perilous." 
Upon rejoining his regiment he put it in motion toward Spottsylvania 
Court-House (Map 11). He followed the Plank Road to Aldrich, turn- 
ing off there on the road that led by Piney Branch Church, and at 4 p.m. 
was probably not far from the latter point. Meade heard from Devin that 
he had driven in the enemy's pickets on the Banks' Ford Road, and pur- 
sued them until he could see their line of battle, and that from the 
wagons visible he concluded they were about to evacuate the position. 
He sent him Barnes' brigade of infantry* (i-i). 

' W. R., 107, p. 1018. when this took place as 3 p.m. {W. R., 39, 

'So. Hist. Soc. Papers, VIII, 254; p. 506). Barnes gives it as 1 p.m. {ib., p. 

IF. B., 30, p. cS50. 514). J. L. Parker, in his History of the 

^History of the Sixth Neiv York Cav- 22 Mass., gives it as 1:30 p.m. It was 

alnj, by Committee, pp. 102, 103. probably about 1 :15 p.m. 

^ Meade in his report gives the time 



THE FEDERALS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE 221 

Slocum's column, after passing Wilderness Tavern, kept on the Ger- 
manna Plank Road to Wolfrey, and then followed the Orange Plank 
Road northeastward to the Turnpike (Map 11).* 

The head of the XII Corps reached Chancellorsville about 2 p.m. 
Before he arrived there, Slocum received the following order, copies of 
which were sent to Couch and Meade : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, April 30, 1863, 2:15 p.m. 
Captain Comstock: 

The genei-al directs that no advance be made from Chancellorsville until the 
columns [II, III, V, XI, and XII Coitjs] are concentrated. He expects to be at 
Chancellorsville to-uight. 

DaNL. BuTTERFrELD, 

Major-General, Chief of Staff. 

Meade could not have received his copy of the foregoing order, for he 
greeted Slocum with the words : ' ' This is splendid, Slocum ; hurrah for 
old Joe; we are on Lee's flank, and he does not know it. You take the 
Plank Road toward Fredericksburg, and I '11 take the Pike, or vice 
versa, as you prefer, and we will get out of this Wilderness." His 
anticipations were at once dampened by the reply: "My orders are to 
assume command on arriving at this point, and to take up a line of battle 
here, and not to move forward without further orders. ' ' - 

Howard reached the vicinity of Dowdall's Tavern with the head of 
his corps by 4 p.m. While his corps closed up and went into bivouac he 
rode over to Slocum's headquarters at Chancellorsville and reported 
for orders. Slocum told him that Hooker's orders were for Howard to 
cover the right of the general line, posting his command near Hunting 
Creek.5 Pointing to the place on the map marked Mill, he said,— "Es- 
tablish your right there. "•* He gave Howard to understand that he 
would himself take care of the entire front from Chancellorsville to 
Howard's left, the latter to be in the vicinity of Dowdall's Tavern, but 
afterward one of his division commanders sent Howard word that he 
would have to cover about three fourths of a mile of the Plank Road 
east of Dowdall's Tavern in order to connect with Slocum. Howard 
gave the right of his line to his First Division (Devens'). Of the two 
brigades of this division the 2d (McLean's) was posted near Taylor, 
facing southward; and the 1st (von Gilsa's), about half a mile to the 
right of the 2d, facing westward, with half a regiment deployed as 
skirmishers in the interval to keep up connection between them. In 
rear of the First Division, on the open ground about Hawkins' Farm, 

1 Map 6, Plate CXXXV, Atlas, W. B. ^ W. E., 39, p. 628. In Battles and Lead- 

2 Life of General G. G. Meade, by R. M. ers (III, 191) he says "near Dowdall's Tav- 
Bache, p. 260. em-" 

* Howard says there was no mill at this point, but the point 
was definitely located {W. R., 39, p. 268: B. and L., III. 191). 



222 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

he placed the Third Division (Schurz's), facing westward. The Second 
Division extended in a single thin line a mile long to the vicinity of the 
Old School-House. The XI Corps was apparently considered by 
Hooker, Slocum, and Howard as a sort of flank detachment to secure 
the army against an attack from the west.^ As such it was too much 
scattered and did not extend far enough to the rear. Howard says in 
his report that his right ' ' rested in the vicinity of the point marked Mill 
on the map." But his own map, as well as Schurz's, shows that he had 
not a battalion within half a mile of that point. On the other hand, 
pickets were placed out in front on the Brock Road a considerable dis- 
tance beyond the general line of outposts." 

The XII Corps formed a curve projecting southward and extending 
from the Old School-House eastward beyond the Plank Road. In the 
angle between this road and the Turnpike two batteries supported by 
two regiments were posted to command both roads. Further to the left 
and near Chancellorsville were the two divisions of the V Corps. 

Some intrenchmeuts and abatis were constructed along the fronts of 
the XI and XII Corps. It does not appear that any intrenching was 
done to-day in the V Corps. 

About 4 p.m. Meade heard from Barnes that his brigade was in the 
presence of a superior force of the enemy, and would require support 
if it was to maintain its position. Meade now learned to his surprise 
that the scene of action was not on the Banks' Ford Road, but on the 
Turnpike. Devin, who chased the Confederate cavalry up the Turnpike, 
had been brought to a halt in front of an outpost of Anderson 's on an 
eminence to the east of Mott Run (McGee, Map 11). McQuade's bri- 
gade of Griffin's division (^) now went to the support of Barnes, but 
Griffin had orders not to bring on an engagement. 

"After several hours of impatient waiting, in buoyant expectancy of 
a promised success, the whole force was withdrawn to the rifle-pits near 
the Chancellorsville House, over which they had charged the enemy in 
the morning. There they remained in bivouac for the night. The sol- 
diers were as discomfited as if they had been checked by a serious re- 
pulse. . . . 

"Both General Griffin and [General] Barnes were much chagrined 
at the peremptory orddr to stop. . . . Griffin, filled with soldierly en- 
thusiasm, and justly confident of his ability to take and hold the emi- 
nence, offered to surrender his commission if his attempt should prove a 
failure."^ 

1 The commanding officer of the 145 of 3 miles from the position taken by his 

N. Y. (1. XII) says in his report: "Our division (TF. R., 39, p. 633). They prob- 

position at this time was about the center ably did not remain out that far. 
of the XII Corps, which occupied the right ^ History of the Corn Exchange Begi- 

flank of the army" (TF. J?., 39, p. 706). nient (118 Pa. Volunteers), by the Sur- 

" Devens says in his rejjort at a distance vivors' Assoc., pp. 173, 174. 



RECONNAISSANCE TOWARD FREDERICKSBURG 223 

At 4 p.m. Lee's General Artillery Reserve, under Pendleton, had ar- 
rived or was arrivinic at Massapouax C'liurch (Map 10). The Washing- 
ton Artillery was still in rear.' 

Right Wing, 4 p.m. to 12 p.m. 
Hooker, with a portion of his staff, started from Falmouth for Chan- 
cellorsville about 4 p.m. His aide. Captain Candler, who was in the 
saddle from 6 p.m. yesterday till 5:30 a.m. to-day, wrote home: 

We are off. Have some 30 miles to ride. Fight to-morrow. We have out- 
witted the Rebels so far. God grant us good fortune. 

The distance to Chaneellorsville was little over 20 miles. Hooker ar- 
rived there between 5 and 6, and presumably received in due time the 
following message signaled to him by Butterfield at 6:45: 

Considerable cannonading in front of Sedgwick. Notliing from him yet. I 
have received no orders for Gibbon. He is held in readiness to move in accord- 
ance with your last instructions. . . . Comstock is here, pretty well used up; 
gone to bed ; reports his train in bad condition ; not fit for crossing trains, only 
for infantry, possibly for cavalry. Have directed him to United States Ford 
very early to-morrow a.m. in case nothing from you,— to take his train again. 

All quiet here [Falmouth] now. No apparent diminution in enemy's strength 
in front of Sedgwick, and no movement reported. 

By this time the following congratulatory order had been published 
to the troops under Sedgwick and to the II Corps. It was published in 
the right wing in the course of the evening and the following morning : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 30, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 47 : 

It is with heartfelt satisfaction the commanding general announces to the army 
that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must 
either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his intrenchments and give us 
battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. 

The operations of the 5tli, lltli, and 12th Corps have been a succession of 
splendid achievements. 

By order of Major-General Hooker : 

S. WmLIAMS, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. - 

Here, then, is Hooker's answer to the question: What was to be done 
in case the enemy would not attack him on his own ground? In this 
case the enemy would "ingloriously fly," and there would be nothing 
for the Army of the Potomac to do but to pursue him. 

^ According to Pendleton it was on the march, but had lost its way (TF. B., 39, p. SIO). 

= lb.. 39, p. 171. 



224 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The two divisions of the II Corps, with the batteries already men- 
tioned accompanying them, commenced arriving at the Chandler House 
about 10 p.m. and were closed up, and went into bivouac there about 
midnight. The two regiments under Cross (£^][^) marched from the 
vicinity of Banks' Ford to United States Ford, where they were joined 
by the 88 N. Y. of Meagher's brigade (^). These three regiments 
were here formed into a provisional brigade which was commanded by 
Colonel Cross throughout the campaign. It will be considered as the 
5th brigade of Hancock's division.^ In addition to this infantry on the 
north bank, the 116 Pa. of Meagher's brigade was left in the viciBity 
of United States Ford, on the south bank. Meagher's brigade, with the 
exception of the 88 N. Y. and 116 Pa., took post in the vicinity of Scott's 
Dam. The two divisions of the II Corps were accompanied by the 
corps ammunition-train (wagon) and six ambulances,- or two more 
ambulances than they were required or authorized to take.^ 

The 17 Pa. Cavalry, attached to the XI Corps, picketed the roads to 
the right and rear. 

The V, XI, and XII Corps had each marched with one battery per 
division. The XII was joined by one of its remaining batteries, F, Pa., 
Second Division. The other two CrYii) '^ei'e on the south bank of the 
Rappahannock near United States Ford. The five batteries of the 
V Corps that were left on the north bank marched to-day to Hartwood 
Church. Those of the XI Corps (corps artillery), crossed the river at 
United States Ford, but did not join the corps.'* Brooker's Battery B, 
1 Conn, (four 4it.-ineh guns), of the General Artillery Reserve, from 
Banks' Ford, crossed also at United States Ford, and remained near 
the river. 

The following order was sent to Humphreys (y) at 9 : 30 p.m. : 

. . . come forward to this place to-morrow morning. You will march by 
early daylight, as it is all-important that you report with your command at the 
earliest possible moment. Headquarters are at Mrs. Chancellor's house at this 
place. . . . The orderly who brings this will remain with you to-night to com- 
municate with the commanding general. 

The Federal cavalry in this part of the field, consisting of the 8 Pa., 
bivouacked without unsaddling on the west side of Mott Run, with one 
squadron picketing the Turnpike beyond it. Hooker had available for 
action between the Rapidan and Chancellor sville about 50,000 men and 

1 A History of the 5th Regiment N. H. C'oi-ps. April 27 and 30. IF. R.. 40, pp. 266, 

Volunteers, by William Child, pp. 179, 182; 267, 304. 

ir. R., 39, p. 159. * It is assumed that they bivouacked on 

- Batchelder's report, TF. R., 40, p. 549. the south bank in the ^^einity of United 

' Williams to commandina; officer II States Ford. 



STUART REACHES TODD'S TAVERN 225 

108 pieces of artillery.' With this force he barred Lee's line of retreat 
to Gordonsville, and, together with Sedgwick below Fredericksburg, 
threatened to cut him oft" from Eichmond. His confident expectation of 
victory was shared by the army. It was generally exi^ected that on the 
morrow it would advance to attack the enemy if he should stand; to 
pursue him if he should flee. Hooker's congratulatory order should 
have disabused all minds of the idea that he intended to attack. But 
understood, or misunderstood, as it was, the order was received with 
wild demonstrations of enthusiasm. In every direction as it was read, 
regiments could be seen cheering and tossing their hats in the air, while 
bands discoursed national music. But here and there an old soldier 
went on smoking his pipe in silence, and when reproached for his seem- 
ing apathy would reply to the efi'ect that Lee had never been known to 
ingloriously fly, that it would be better to wait until after the battle to 
do one's cheering." 

Colonel McViear, with the 6 X. Y. Cavalry, followed the road from 
Aldrieh (Map 10) past Piuey Branch Church to the first road on his 
left, and proceeded thereby to the road that led from Todd's Tavern to 
Spottsylvania Court-House, which he reached at the junction from half 
to three quarters of a mile northwest of H. Alsop. The road from 
Chancellorsville to this point was scarcely wide enough for a column of 
fours, and lined with woods nearly the entire distance. Night was fall- 
ing. The moon was between half and full. Detachments commanded by 
officers were sent out, one toward Spottsylvania Court-House, one to- 
ward Fredericksburg, and one to the right, perhaps on a wood road or 
path. The main body closed up in column, and dismounted to await 
developments. 

At nightfall Stuart halted at Todd's Tavern, intending that his 
troops should bivouac here, and he with his staft' ride on through Spott- 
sylvania Court-House to army headquarters and receive instructions. 
He had not gone far beyond the Tavern when he found himself con- 
fronted by a detachment of the 6 N. Y. numbering about 30 men. Fired 
ujaon and charged by these men, he beat a hasty retreat for some dis- 
tance, and then the pursuit ceasing, he halted and sent on to Todd's 
Tavern for aid. About as this firing was heard at the head of the 

1 ORGANIZATIOX.S INFA>'TEY CAVALRY ARTILLERY AGGREGATE PIECES 

V' 7,414 fi 733 8,156 36 

V 14,477 ion 286 14,863 14 

XI 12,170 50 757 12,977 36 

XII 12,929 335 13,264 18 

General Artilleiy Resene . . 92 92 4 

Pleasontoii .... 1.150 1,150 _ 

46.990 1,309 2,203 50,502 103 

- Slociim and his Men, by Committee, p. 161. 



226 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Federal column, the officer sent out to Spottsylvania Court-House re- 
turned with the report that hostile troops blocked the way to that 
point,^ and another came in with the report,— "The road is full of 
rebs. " ^ Men mounted without orders. ' ' We must have room to fight, ' ' 
they said. "Down with that gate! Forward!" and the regiment 
dashed through the opening made for itself into a field between the 
two roads that part at this point and meet about a mile further on, the 
Alsop Field. Here the command was formed in line facing the gate 
through which it had entered, or toward its late rear. Stuart's brigade 
had not yet dismounted. The 5 Va., being the nearest regiment, was 
laimched at once toward Spottsylvania Court-House. Driving the Fed- 
eral detachments before it, it dashed in column of fours at the opening 
into the Alsop Field, but was driven back with considerable loss by the 
concentrated carbine fire of the Federal horsemen delivered from the 
saddle. The rest of the command having come up, Stuart now ordered 
his next regiment, the 3 Va. (three squadrons under Carter), to renew 
the attack. It attempted, like the 5th, to charge through the entrance, 
but, like the former, was hurled back with the fire of carbines from the 
saddle. Colonel Mc Vicar, perceiving that he was heavily outnumbered, 
concluded that he was in danger of being surrounded and captured with 
his whole force. So forming column of fours with sabers drawn, and 
rising in his stirrups, he called out: "Sixth New York follow me. 
Charge!" The bugles sounded, the men cheered, and the column darted 
at the gate. About 70 feet from it Mc Vicar fell, shot through the heart. 
The charge nevertheless continued through the gate to the right on the 
road to Spottsylvania, and then again to the right back by the lower 
road, driving fragments of the enemy's regiments before it, aiming at 
the junction where the road branches off toward Piney Branch Church 
and Chancellorsville. The 2 Va. was now ordered to take the road, 
and open the way, if possible, to Spottsylvania Court-House. Stuart 
informed Colonel Munford, its commander, of the importance of his 
reporting in person to R. E. Lee, and stated that if he could not get 
through by Alsop 's he would have to take some other route to the 
Court-House.^ The 2 Va., with a yell which is said to have had more 
effect than sabers or pistols,* broke through the column of the 6 N. Y., 
cutting off the rear portion, and opened the way for Stuart. The latter 

• Hist, of the 6 N. Y. Cav., by Commit- unprotected at the time" ( W. R., 39, p. 

tee, p. 103. According to another author- 1046). 

ity, this report was that there was a heavy ^ Verbal statement of Lieutenant F. A. 

force at Spottsylvania Court-House {Jour- Easton, 6 N. Y. Cav. 

KaZ f/. S. Cau. .4SS0C., June, 1891, p. 110) . "Letters from Colonel T. T. Munford 

Stuart says in his report,— "ArtUlery as and Sergeant C. E. Adams, 2 Va. Cavalry, 

well as trains were passing Spottsylvania * Letters of Corporal M. T. Rucker and 

Sergeant C. E. Adams, 2 Va. Cavalry. 



CAVALRY FIGHT AT ALSOP'S 227 

pushed on with the brigade toward Spottsylvania Court-House, and the 
unintercepted portion of the 6 N. Y. went back by way of Piney Branch 
Church toward Chancellorsville. This was about midnight. The Fed- 
eral loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 51 officers and men.* The 
Confederate loss is not reported. The Federals took a number of prison- 
ers, but seem to have lost them afterward. Major McClellan, in his 
Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry (p. 231), mentions but one Confederate 
casualty. As result of the contest the 6 N. Y. was prevented from 
reaching Spottsylvania Court-House, and Stuart was delayed some 
twelve hours in communicating with R. E. Lee. 

The train of led horses, mules, etc., from Stoneman 's cavalry, went by 
way of Germauna Ford to Chancellorsville, and thence to United States 
Ford, j-ielding the main road to troops going to the front. The rear 
portion of the column was cut off by the enemy at or near Chancellors- 
ville. At United States Ford, after waiting for the troops that were 
crossing to clear the bridge, the train crossed the river to the north side 
and went into camp near the ford.- 

Early this morning (April 30) Averell received the following order 
from Stoneman 's adjutant-general i^ 

... we did not get off this morning as soon as was anticipated, but will en- 
deavor to carry out our original instructions in the next twenty-four hours. 
Keep your communications open with your infantry support. Our pack-train 
with Eleventh Corps.* 

By "infantry support" Averell not tmnaturally understood the divi- 
sion of the V Corps left at Kelley's Ford. It was intended, it seems, 
to mean the nearest portion of the right wing at the front (XI and XII 
Corps). W. H. F. Lee fell back through Culpeper Court-House to 
Rapidan Station, leaving a squadron at Culpeper Court-House. 
Averell 's movement to the latter jDoint was made in extended order. 
For miles to right and left lines of mounted skirmishers steadily ad- 
vanced in excellent order, driving back the enemy's skirmishers. Im- 
mediately in rear marched their support of squadrons in line about % 
of a mile apart. Then came the main body of the division, in columns 
of regiments with squadron front, about % of a mile apart, each regi- 
ment with a squadron as special advance-guard. The horse artillery 
was distributed between the regiments. The whole as it moved to the 
sound of cracking carbines over the beautiful open country formed a 
grand and imposing spectacle. About noon it contracted its front, and 

1 W. R., 39, p. 192. =• Averell gives the hour of receipt both 

^History of the 10th Regiment of Can- as 7 a.m. and as 8:05 a.m. (W. R., 39, pp. 

airy, New York State Volunteers, by N. D. 1075 and 1078). 

Preston, pp. 70, 77. * lb., 39, p. 1075. 



228 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

marched through Culpeper Court-House toward Rapidan Station, meet- 
ing with some resistance from Lee's squadron.' 

At 4 p.m. he halted for rest on the battle-field of Cedar Mountain 
(1862), recognizable at this time by a number of open trenches filled 
with human bones. At 6 : 30 p.m., being again on the march, he received 
the following dispatch: 

TJie uiajor-general commanding [General Stoneman] directs me to say that we 
have been del£i.ved by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push the enemy 
as vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and if possible, drive him 
in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy over to you.* 

He understood from these instructions that he was not expected to 
rejoin the cavalry corps for an indefinite time. The intention was that 
he should disperse W. H. F. Lee's brigade at once, and march without 
delay to join the force under Stoneman. Between 7 : 30 and 8 p.m. he 
arrived at Rapidan Station, and found himself confronted by W. H. F. 
Lee on the opposite side of the river. All the information that he had 
been able to gather from a mail captured at Culpeper Court-House, 
prisoners, and other sources, went to show that the enemy believed the 
Army of the Potomac to be advancing behind him. and that Stonewall 
Jackson was at Gordonsville with 25,000 men to resist it. This informa- 
tion, strange to say, was "deemed reliable and impoi'tant" and was sent 
to General Hooker at 11 p.m.'^ 

Left Wing, Forenoon 

The following message was probably received at Hooker's head- 
quarters early this morning : 

F Signal Station, April 30, 1863, 7 a.m. 
Captain Samuel T. Cushiny, 

Act'g Chief Signal Officer, Hqrs. Army of the Potomac : 

The enemy have occupied the cut of the River road from tlie city to near 
Hamilton's Crossing, the stone wall in front of Marye's, the ditches near Hazel 
Run, at the foot of the hill back of Hoblison's [Howison's] house [Map 12] ; 
also on the top of the hill. See but two batteries in position yet. No force above 
the city other than pickets. 

Jas. S. Hall, 

Captain and Signal Officer. 

The enemy seemed then to be remaining in position, but if he was, 
would he continite to do so"? To obtain an answer to this question, 

' History of a Cacalni Company (A, 4 Pa.), by Captain William Hynduian, p. 89; 
and Histori) of the 3 Pa. Cavalry, by Committee. 
= ir. R., ?.9. p. 1075. '=> lb., 39, p. 1078. 



LEFT WING INACTIVE 229 

Hooker had the followiug iustnictions sent at 8:30 a.m. to the com- 
mander of the left wing : 

. . . make a demonstration on the enemy's lines in the direction of Hamilton's 
Crossing at 1 o'clock, the object being simply to ascertain whether or not the 
enemy continues to hug his defences in full force ; and if he should have aban- 
doned them, to take possession of his works and the commanding ground in their 
vicinity. . . . 

If you are certain that tlie enemy is in full force in your front . . . the 
demonstration herein directed will not be made. The general must know the 
position of affairs and be advised fully ; also as to what you do, at once. 

The enemy have a pontoon train at Hamilton's.^ The general expects that 
you will not permit them to cross the river. 

Sedgwick wrote to Butterfield probably about 11 a.m. : 

General Reynolds is satisfied that the enemy have not weakened their forces 
either in infantry or artillery ; and that a demonstration will bring on a general 
engagement on the left. General Brooks thinks the infantry force in his front 
is undiminished and strong. He can see nothing of their batteries. 

This intimation of a possible movement of artillery from in front of 
Brooks seems to have been the only cause for apprehending any transfer 
of troops toward Chancellorsville. 

In answer to the foregoing note Butterfield wrote at 11 : 30 a.m. : 

Let tlie demonstration be suspended until further orders. 

Left Wing, Afternoon 

Having renounced the idea of a movement beyond Chancellorsville 
to-day, Hooker wanted to secure every possible advantage for the one 
to be undertaken to-morrow. Among these was early communication 
by way of Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, and the reenforcement of 
the right wing,— whence the followiug instructions: 

To Haupt (12 m.) : To be ready to commence work on the Richmond 
and Fredericksburg Railroad on the 2d. 

To BenJiam : To have two bridges, one at Franklin's and one at Fitz- 
hugh's Crossing, taken up during the night and placed in position to 
be laid at Banks' Ford before daylight. Nothing to be done before 
dark, the movement to be concealed from the enemy. 

To Sickles (12:30 p.m.) : To march with his corps to United States 
Ford and cross by 7 a.m. to-morrow.^ 

1 There was no poutooii train with Lee's lay, by the shortest road, concealed from 

amiy. .J. B. Jr. view of the enemy, to the United States 

-Butterfield to Sickles, 12:30 p.m.: Ford. The batteries taken from yonr com- 
"Upon the receipt of this order you will maud, placed in position to cover the cross- 
proceed with your corps [III] without de- iug [below Fredericksburg-], will be re- 



230 



THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 



To Sedgwick: In case of the enemy's exposing a weak point, to attack 
and destroy him; in case of his appearing to fall back, to advance in 
pursuit by the Bowling Green jRoad and Telegraph Road. 

To Gibbon (about 5 : 30 p.m.) : To be ready to move with his division 
at daylight to-morrow to join his corps. 

In Hooker 's instructions to Sedgwick there was much stress laid upon 
attacking, striking, destroying, capturing, etc., but all to be done by 
Sedgwick. There was no promise in them of any such action on the part 
of Hooker. The right wing was apparently intended to serve as a sort 
of anvil on which Sedgwick was to crush Lee's army. The instructions 
required him to throw his whole force on the Bowling Green Road and 
at the same time to have a column advance on the Telegraph Road.* 
Sedgwick telegraphed for an explanation of this contradiction (Appen- 
dix 15). 

Reports from Fredericksburg indicated to Hooker that Lee was being 
reenforced from Richmond, but they gave him apparently no serious 
concern. - 

Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick : • 

The general in speaking privately to me about the order No. 47, in which the 
movements of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps were commended, said he 
had been informed that there was some little feeling down on the left that they 



lieved, it is expected, in time to join you. 
It is desired that, in marching, your troops 
and your trains entire should be concealed 
from the sight of the enemy, that they may 
not be aware of your movement. Your 
pack-mules, small-arm ammunition-train, 
and two ambulances to a division, to ac- 
company you. Forage for animals for two 
days from to-day. The greatest promptness 
in executing this movement and arriving 
at your destination is expected of you. As 
much of your corps as can cross on the 
bridge at United States Ford to cross to- 
night, and all to cross by 7 a.m. to-morrow. 

"General Couch precedes you, and the 
batteries left by General Meade also. After 
crossing, you will take up your line of 
march toward Chancellorsville. ..." 

^Butterfield to Sedgwick: ". . . [Hook- 
er's] Headquarters will be at Chancellors- 
ville to-night. It is proposed that the army 
now at that point [V, XI, and XII Corps] 
will assume the initiative to-morrow morn- 
ing, and will advance along the line of the 
Plank road, uncovering what is called 
Banks' Ford, where bridges will be at once 
thrown across the river, which route will 
then become the shortest line of communi- 
cation between the two wings of the army. 



... It is not known, of course, what effect 
the advance [of the right vmig] will have 
upon the enemy, and the general command- 
ing directs that you obser^'e his movements 
with the utmost vigilance, and should he 
expose a weak point, attack him in full 
force and destroy him. If he should show 
any symptoms of falling back, the general 
directs that you throw your whole force 
on the Bowling Green road, and pursue him 
■with the utmost vigor, turning his fortified 
positions by the niunerous by-roads which 
you can make use of for that purpose. If 
any portion of his organized forces should 
pass off to the east of the railroad, you will 
by detachments pursue until you destroy or 
capture him. Simultaneously with the ad- 
vance of your column on the Bowling Green 
road, if at all, a column will also advance 
on the Telegraph road, and between you 
[your two columns] will sweeji the country' 
between the two highways and the railroad 
[between the Bowling Green road and rail- 
road on one hand and the railroad and Tele- 
graph road on the other]. . . . when you 
strike, let it be done to destroy. ..." 

The italics are mine. J. B. Jr. 

^Reynolds to Hooker, 2:20 p.m.: "1 
think that movements indicate that they 



MARCH OF III CORPS 231 

were not counted in. He said that would all come right. He expected wheu he 
left there, if he met with no serious opposition, to be on the heights west of 
Fredericksburg to-morrow noon or shortly after, and if opposed strongly, to- 
morrow night. . . . 

The departure of Brooker's battery had left at Banks' Ford only 
von Bliicher's light battery of the General Reserve and perhaps a 
detachment of engineers and provost guard. 

Hooker's order for the III Corps to come up to Chancellorsville by 
United States Ford was received at 1 p.m. By 1 : 30 the corps was under 
way. Orders had been issued to the chief commissary to replace the 
rations that had been consumed. This was generally done, but there 
were instances in which the troops refused to burden themselves with 
the new rations, and left them lying on the ground. The brigade com- 
missaries remained behind, gathered up these stores, and replaced them 
in the supply-wagons. The corps marched in three parallel columns, 
well concealed from the enemy, to Hamet, where it went into bivouac 
about 11:30 p.m. The train, left below Fredericksburg, broke camp 
about 5 p.m. It was formed of the supply section, carrying subsistence 
stores ; the baggage section, carrying camp and garrison equipage ; and 
the ammunition section, carrying ammunition. Each section carried 
eight days' rations of grain for itself. As the train proceeded in the 
wake of the troops it passed many places where knapsacks had been 
emptied of their contents, or slung into the bushes. Wlien it reached 
Falmouth, the officer in charge was ordered to park the baggage and 
supply sections and push forward the ammunition section at all hazards. 
The ammunition section accordingly went on. The baggage and supply 
sections did not leave Falmouth again during the campaign, though 
portions of the supply section were detached and sent to the front as 
occasion required. The ammunition section kept close behind the 
troops. 

Martin's horse battery (1. C), ordered to report to Pleasonton, 
marched to United States Ford, and camped on the north side. 

Lee's expectation that more Federal troops would cross in front of 
Fredericksburg was not realized. The troops under Sedgwick and 
under Early remained quiet to-day, except for some long-range artillery 
dueling,— a bit of the "Song of the Rappahannock," interesting to the 
spectators, and morfe or less impressive to every one within range of its 

are passing troops np to our right [toward Sedgwick to Butterfield (3:45 p.m.): 

Chancelloi-sville] .... The railroad seems "General Reynolds sends word in regard to 

to be busy to-day. . . ." movement of troops of the enemy on his 

Butterfield to Reynolds: "What did the front as follows: 'I think it must be troops 

locomotives draw? Could it be transporta- from Riehmond.' " 

tion trains [transportation of troops]?" Butter-jield to Sedgwick: "GeneraX'H.ookeT 

Reynolds to Butterfield : "The trains they hopes they are from Richmond, as the 

ran were passenger and platform care." greater will be our success." 



232 THE CA]MPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

far reverberations, but not of any tactical effect. The men, for the 
greater part, continued their usual games of ball and quoits, played 
cards, cut hair, and slept. Officers sat under their little shelter tents as 
deeply buried in a novel as in the days of drills, parades, and reviews. 
Lee was undecided during most of the day as to whether he should 
abandon his position near Fredericksburg or fight to retain it. He 
wrote at 2 : 30 p.m. to Anderson, at Tabernacle Church : 

Set all j'our spades to work as vigorously as possible. I hope to send you addi- 
tional troops. . . . Keep two days' rations cooked that the men can carry on 
their persons, and give orders that everything be prepared to pack your trains 
and move off at any moment when ordered. All your baggage, camp equipage, 
including your headquarters, etc., must be immediately reduced in order to 
accomplish this. 

General Stuart writes that the Third Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Owen, and 
Second North Carolina [Cavalry], Colonel Payne, have been ordered to report 
to me. They are probably on the Plank road ; direct them to keep in your front, 
and to keep you advised of all movements of the enemy, and to delay his progress 
as much as possible. 

The concentration of troops at Chancellor sville, together with the 
inactivity of those at Franklin's Crossing, satisfied him later in the day 
that the enemy's main effort was being made upon his left flank and 
rear. Expecting that Hooker would push on from Chancellorsville to 
attack him, he determined to leave a sufficient force in his lines to bold 
them, and to move out with the main body of his army to give battle to 
the advancing columns. He issued the following order : 

I. Major-General MeLaws will designate a brigade of his divisioli to hold the 
lines in rear of Fredericksburg, the commander of which will report to the major- 
general left in charge [division commander: see paragraph II]. With the rest 
of his division [three brigades and artillery] General McLaws will move as soon 
as possible to reeuforce General Anderson at the Tabernacle Church, on the 
Plank road to Orange Court-House. 

II. General Jackson will designate a division to hold the lines in front of the 
enemy on Pratt's and Bernard's farms. The commander of the division will 
establish such pickets as may be necessary. With the remainder of his corps 
General Jackson, at daylight to-morrow morning, will proceed to Tabernacle 
Church, and make arrangements to repulse the enemy. 

III. The troops will be provided with two days ' cooked provisions. The trains 
of all the divisions will be packed with their equipage, and [will] move to the 
rear under the direction of the chief quartermaster of the army. The reserve 
ammunition-trains will be under the charge of the chief of ordnance [at the 
rear]. The regimental ordnance wagons, ambulances, and medical wagons will 
accompany the troops. 

IV. The chief of artillerj' will superintend the service of the batteries in 
position on the lines, and take charge of those not required to operate with the 
troops. 



LEE FACES TOWARD CHANCELLORSVILLE 233 

McLaws designated Bavksdale's brigade (.,^1), and Jackson, Early's 
division (a), to remain in the lines of Fredericksburg. AVilcox with 
his brigade and two batteries was to hold Banks' Ford. 

At 6 p.m. Semmes' brigade (2^1), by General Lee's order, left its posi- 
tion in rear of Howison's, and marched toward Anderson's at Zion 
Church. At midnight it was probably within a mile of its destination ^ 
(Map 12). 

Lee wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Critcher, commanding the 15 Va. 
Cavalry: 

You will close your ca\alry pickets up to the infantry on the Rappahannock. 
I have sent you orders by a courier, but have heard nothing from you.= 

This officer, it seems, had crossed the river, and been captured by 
men of Eeynolds' cordis.' 

Lougstreet was ordered to move with his command to Richmond "to 
effect a junction with General Lee."^ 

Hooker's canvas bridge train brought down from Kelley's Ford re- 
crossed the Eappahannock at United States Ford, and was not laid 
again during the campaign. His telegraph line was extended across 
United States Ford and a station established at the Red House. The 
line between England and United States Ford was not working well, 
but flag and torch stations were established connecting these points; 
on the left the telegraph was extended from Sedgwick's to Reynolds' 
headquarters, but communication was not opened to-day. At 3 p.m. the 
flag and torch station opposite Buckner's Neck was broken up. 

In compliance with a request of the United States Senate, this day 
was designated by President Lincoln, in a proclamation, to be set apart 
for the expression of national humiliation, and the invocation of divine 
blessing. Little could be done in observance of it. Here and there, out 
of the immediate presence of the enemy, a chaplain succeeded, with the 
aid of more or less coercion, in getting an audience, and held forth on 
the crisis through which the nation was passing, the seriousness of life, 
and the solemnity of death. 

1 Semmes' report. W. S., 30, p. 833. Kappahannoek to organize bushwhacking 

McLaws erroneously reports that it took parties, and to funiish infoi-mation of our 

up the march toward Anderson's position movements to the enemy. One dispatch 

at 12:30 a.m. on the 1st of May (ib., p. from him to General Lee was intercepted, 

824). which led to his capture. There is not suf- 

- Ib., 108, p. 699. flcient evidence to hold him as a spy, but it 

^ On the 25th of May Captain Lytle, is requested that every impedunent possible 

Provost-Marshal, Army of the Potomac, be thrown in the way to prevent his ex- 

wi'ote to Colonel Hoffman, Commissary- change for some time to come" ( TF. B. 118 

General of Prisonei-s: p. 706). 

"Colonel Critcher has undoubtedly been * lb., 26, p. 1032. 

detailed to remain on the north side of the 



234 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Butterfield wrote to Heintzelman asking that the cavalry of his com- 
mand extend its patrols to the vicinity of Rappahannock Station. 

As a protection against the indiscreet publications of tlie press an 
order was issued from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac 
requiring all newspaper correspondents "to publish their communica- 
tions over their own signatures," under penalty of being excluded 
from, and having the circulation of their papers suppressed within, the 
lines of the army. The following dispatches remain to be noticed : 

Dix to Hooker 

... A successful movement on your part, for which we are all most anxious, 
will be of great service to us by preventing Longstreet from being further 
reenforced, and may compel him to withdraw. 

Hooker to Dix, 12:30 p.m. 
The enemy has need of every man here. He has his hands full. Rely on this. 
I can say no more. 

COMMENTS 

Hooker erred in consigning Sedgwick to inaction. To keep up the 
semblance of an offensive operation it is necessary to do something. 
Sedgwick should at least have thrown additional troops across the river. 

Hooker's passage of the Rappahannock, and march to the rear of 
Lee's army, is classed among the most brilliant manoeuvers in military 
history. What was the main secret of its success? It certainly was 
not punctuality of movement. On the 28th the right wing, which was 
to cross at Kelley's Ford "at the earliest possible moment," did not 
commence crossing until six hours after it was formed up in the vicinity 
of the ford; the left wing, which was to have left its bivouacs early in 
the morning, did not leave them until about the middle of the afternoon. 
On the 29th the bridges which should have been laid below Fredericks- 
burg by 3:30 a.m. were not all down until noon; the cavalry coi'ps, 
which was to have crossed the Rappahannock by 8 a.m., did not get 
over until 5 p.m. On the 30th the two divisions of the II Corps that 
should have crossed at United States Ford at 7 a.m. crossed at 3:30 
p.m. Nor was the success due to concealment. The plan had been kept 
a secret, but the movement, once started, was not long unobserved. It 
was executed, for the greater part, under the eye of the enemy. Its 
success must be attributed in the main to the circuitous and eccentric 
direction of the preliminary marches,— including perhaps the move- 
ments of Stahel 's division of cavalry from Fairfax Court-House, which 
led the enemy to believe that the movement was directed not against hun, 
but against the Shenandoah Valley or the remote railroad center of 
Gordonsville. It caused Stuart to post his cavalry so that the Federal 
columns cut it from its proper field of operation— the Federal front— 



COMMENTS 235 

and prevented him from warning his pickets along the Rappahannock. 
For this error of judgment Stuart is hardly to be criticized. "Show 
me the commander who has never made a mistake, and I will show you 
one who has never made war. ' ' 

Had Hooker been imbued with the true offensive spirit he would not 
have allowed his whole force to camp in the vicinity of Chancellorsville, 
but would have pushed at least a portion of it down the Rappahannock 
and gained possession of Banks' Ford. All necessary arrangements 
should have been made beforehand for proceeding by rapid marches 
from the time the general movement commenced until Banks ' Ford was 
secured. These arrangements in fact were made, and the movement 
went on with every promise of success until Hooker conceived the idea 
of receiving an attack at Chancellorsville. 

A year later he was asked by the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War : "T\Tiat was your reason for leaving so large a reserve force under 
Sedgwick at or near Falmouth?" He answered: "I left Sedgwick's 
corps and Gibbon's division there for this reason in part: they were 
encamped in sight of the enemy, and to have moved their camp would 
have betrayed our movement. I Imew I could not cross the river in the 
presence of Lee's army, if he was informed of my movement. The 
great difficulty I apprehended was in crossing the river. I apprehended 
no serious trouble after I had crossed. At the time I had to leave a 
force at Falmouth to keep the rebel force there. I did not want the 
enemy to throw a force to meet me on the Rapidan ; and, besides, I was 
informed that they had a pontoon bridge at Hamilton's Crossing, and 
did not want them to cross the river while I was away, as that would 
enable them to strike at my depots. Mine were large and full, and the 
enemy would have willingly exchanged theirs for them ; for theirs were 
comparatively empty. ' ' ' 

This is only half an answer. It does not account for Reynolds and 
Sickles as part of Sedgwick's command. If they were not necessary for 
Sedgwick, one at least should have been with Hooker from the start; 
at any rate, if one of them was necessary to Hooker, and could not have 
been furnished him without entailing a delay in his advance, the plan of 
campaign was radically defective, and should not have been adopted. 

Any advance that Hooker might make with the right wing was to 
have one of two objects : the pursuit of a fleeing enemy, or the taking up 
of a new defensive position. He had no intention apparently of looking 
up the enemy and attacking him. Now Lee was not retreating,— was he 
going to retreat? Suppose he should march on Chancellorsville. Would 
Hooker, after waiting for Sickles to join him, have time to anticipate 
Lee at a position commanding Banks' Ford or otherwise preferable to 
Chancellorsville? Misgivings in this regard prevented his issuing 

' Rep. of Com., IV, 145. 



236 



THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANGELLORSVILLE 



orders to-day for a movement to-morrow. His indecision, which was 
more or less apparent and disquieting to visitors at headquarters, did 
not in the least abate his confidence of victory. In his mind Lee was 
doomed to destruction. It was only a question as to how and where he 
should meet his ignominious fate. He said in the hearing of at least 
one newspaper correspondent : 

The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. 
They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond. I shall be 
after them.' 

Without the boastful speeches of which this is a sample, or the vain- 
o-lorious order No. 47, Hooker was under peculiar and heavy bonds to 
gain a victory. His severe and open criticisms of his predecessors in 
the command of the army warranted a general expectation of something 
brilliant and decisive from him.^ 



' Sainton's Campaigns of the Army of 
the Potomac, p. 27.5. 

- The state of the pubHc mind was re- 
flected in an editorial of the New York 
Herald of this day : 

"The ai-my of General Hooker is in mo- 
tion and has been for several days past. 
. . . He must win or his fall will be, like 
that of Lucifer, never to rise again. His 
pubhshed testimony before the Congres- 
sional Committee on the Conduct of the 
"War [given December 20, 1862. and March 
11, 1863] places him in a position of ex- 
traordmary responsibiUty. . . . General 
Hooker has now no alternative before him 
but victory or death— death in the field or 
death to his reputation as a militai-y leader. 
He has voluntarily set himself up as the 
superior of McCleUan and Bumside, and 
he must make his pretensions good or sink 



into irretrievable public disgrace. . . . We 
have no doubt that General Hooker is 
aware of all this, and that with his mag- 
nificent army he goes forward with his 
plans so carefully considered, and in such 
resolution to succeed, that he can not fail. 

Another paper said : 

"He enters upon the momentous task be- 
fore him with evei-ything supplied him, 
essential to success, by the government and 
the people, except those essential qualities 
of unfailing skill, promptitude in action, 
and vigilant discretion, which he is expected 
himself to supply, and which we trust he 
will supply as the leader to the magnificent 
army which he commands. We await the 
next intelligence of his advance, therefore, 
with confidence that it will give us the best 
assurance of a victorious campaign." 



CHAPTER XVII 

MAV 1 . . . ADVANCE TOWARD FREDEEICKSBUKG. SEDGWICK OEDEKED TO DEM- 
ONSTEATE. RETURN TO CHANCELLORSVILLE. DEMONSTEATION COUNTER- 
MANDED. ARTILLERY AT BANKS ' FOED 

Bight Wing until 11 a.m. 

IN the course of the uight the 6 N. Y. Cavalry arrived in the vicinity 
of Chancellorsville and took position with the Federal pickets on 
the Plank Road.^ Its scattered fragments were here reformed and 
brought together during the day.^ 

On the morning of the 1st of May, there existed much anxiety and appre- 
hension among nearly all, if not all, the corps, division, and other commanders 
[of the Federal army]. It was of cnrreut report that General Hooker, the night 
before, had said that God Almighty could not prevent his destroying the rebel 
army, which created great uneasiness— even to the most irreligious. Doubtless 
the absence of plan and preparation for combat contributed largely to disturb- 
ing the minds of many ; still the blasphemy (no one hesitating to call it that) 
produced a profound impression.^ 

It was a beautiful day. A fresh soft breeze stole through the forest, 
rustling the banners uncased to dry. Warren had gone out bright and 
early toward Fredericksburg on a reconnaissance. Hooker was waiting 
to hear from him and from the III Corps. A calm like that of an old- 
time Sabbath rested upon the camps. The corps commanders, impelled 
by impatience and curiosity, drifted over to Chancellorsville, and gath- 
ered encouragement from conferring with the army commander or 
members of his stat¥. Hooker showed in his countenance and speech 
the complete confidence which he felt that a decisive victory was about 
to crown his brilliant manoeuver. 

At 7:30 a.m. the III Corps commenced crossing the Rappahannock 
at United States Ford and massing on the south side. At 9 o'clock 
Sickles, in advance of his corps, reported to Hooker at Chancellorsville. 
At 10 Warren returned from his reconnaissance, having gone a little 
over 314 miles, and taken a look at the enemy's lines.* Generals were 

^ W. R., 39, p. 779. Commandery, Loyal Legion, I, 77; History 

^Journal U. S. Cavalry Assoc. Jime, of the 27 Indiana Vol. Inf., by a member 

1891; The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, of Company C, p. 313. 

by H. B. MeClellan. pp. 230. 231. * W. E., 39, p. 198. 
= E. S. Pittman in Papers of Michigan 



238 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

dispatching their aides in every direction for orders. It was evident 
that the morning's programme had been arranged. A newspaper cor- 
respondent asked of Lieutenant-Colonel Dickinson, of Hooker's staff, 
how matters were progressing. 

"Everything," he answered, "is going on splendidly, just as the 
general wants it." 

"Any news from General Stoneman?" an officer asked of another 
member of the staff. 

"Best news in the world," was the reply; "he has cut the enemy's 
railroad communication. ' ' 

Stoneman had done nothing of the kind. But the effect of the speech 
was just as good as if he had. With Stoneman tearing up his communi- 
cations, Lee would soon be in retreat, and there was therefore no serious 
opposition to be expected on the way to Fredericksburg. While 
Hooker had been wasting precious hours in waiting for reenforcements, 
Lee, through his trustj^ lieutenant, had proceeded to the execution of 
his plan. Jackson with his corps, except Early's division, took u^) the 
march for Tabernacle Church at about 3 a.m. At 5:30 a.m., after he 
had traveled with the head of his column about 5 miles, Butterfield 
wrote to Hooker : 

Prom deserter just in, learn that Jackson's whole corps is opposite Franklin's 
Crossing. Camp rumor that Longstreet had gone to Culpeper [from the south 
side of the James] ; that Lee had said it was the only time he should fight equal 
numbers; that we had about 80,000. Some of Trimble's division [commanded 
by Colston] told him [the deserter] they had to march to Culpeper to-morrow. 
They all knew that we had crossed 40,000 men above. 

This deserter came into the lines of Reynolds' corps last night, and 
was sent to Butterfield this morning.^ By "to-morrow" he may have 
meant this day, the 1st. Whatever he said or meant, Butterfield be- 
lieved, it seems, that Jackson 's whole corps was still in front of Sedg- 
wick. It is not improbable that this deserter was an emissary of Jack- 
son's. Longstreet 's corps had not moved from the south side of the 
James. 

Reynolds wrote to Sedgwick : 

The enemy appear to remain in their position, and as far as we can learn, 
have not changed. . . . The fog is so thick we can do little but be ready to meet 
an attack. ... 

Butterfield wrote to Hooker at 8 : 30 a.m. : 

. . . Your di.spatch - is dated May 1, and says Patrick and Gibbon are to cross 
to-morrow, which would be May 2. Is this right? . . . I have endeavored to send 

1 Reynolds to Sedgwick, W. R., 40, pp. 336, 337. 
^ Not found. 



JACKSON ON THE MARCH 239 

this dispatch by telegraph, but tlie line works very badly, and I send by orderly. 
I hope to have the new line constructed by night and in working order, with a 
party to work across [to you] from Banks' Ford the moment the bridge is laid. 
Please leave directions there [at Banks' Ford as to] where they will carry the 
telegraph to on the other side. 

The questions here raised were partly anticipated by the following 
dispatch from Hooker, which was not delivered until 11 : 30 a.m. : 

To Butterfield, 7 a.m. 

Hurry over the provost-marshal-general and his cavalry. Major-General 
Sedgwick was directed [in to-day's dispatcli] to throw his whole force on the 
Bowling Green road, and no other. 

Sedgwick's movement seems now intended as a manceuver against 
the enemy's communications. With Sedgwick threatening one line of 
supply and Hooker astride of the other, Lee would have to choose at 
once between taking to flight and closing with Hooker. 

Butterfield, still in doubt as to Hooker's intentions regarding Gibbon, 
sent the following dispatches: 

To Gibbon, 9:25 a.m. 

1 have received a dispatcli from the general directing you to cross at Banks' 
Ford to-morrow at 9 a.m.' This dispatch is dated May 1. I have strong reason 
to apprehend that it was intended that you should cross to-day at 9 a.m. I am 
momentarily expecting a telegram. I wish you would send a staff ofScer to Banks ' 
Ford to read all telegraphic dispatches there. Hold your command in readiness 
to spring, — in case this should prove an error, and it is intended you should 
cross to-day at 9 o'clock, — to move to that point as rapidly as possible, to 
cross. . . . 

To Hooker, 10:13 a.m. 

Is the order still effective for General Gibbon to move to Banks' Ford to-day 
with his whole division, or is he to wait until it is uncovered ? 

About 6 a.m. Martin's six-gun battery of horse artillery (6 Indepen- 
dent N. Y.) arrived at Chancellorsville, and reported to Pleasonton for 
duty with the cavalry. At the same time the two batteries of the First 
Division of the XII Corps (i^^) arrived from United States Ford and 
joined their division. The XII Corps now had all its artillery. At 7 
a.m. Humphreys' division (f) joined its corps on the left of Chancellors- 
ville. Probably about the same time the 17 Pa. Cavalry, which had been 
attached to the XI Corps, reported at brigade headquarters near Hunt- 
ing Run, leaving two squadrons to i^icket the right and front of the XI 
Corps and observe the country toward Orange Court-House and Spott- 

^ Butterfield seems to refer here to the dispatch refen-ed to in his of 8 : 30 a.m. to Hooker. 



240 THE CAJrPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

sylvania Court-House.^ The XI Corps was still short of its corps 
artillery, which was probably between United States Ford and Chan- 
cellorsville. Between 9 and 10 a.m. Cross's brigade crossed the Eappa- 
hannock and proceeded toward Chancellorsville. It was not to arrive 
until 4 p.m.^ 

Between 11 : 30 last night and 7 this morning two pontoon bridges 
were brought np to Banks' Ford from below Fredericksburg— one 
from Franklin's Crossing, and one from Fitzhugh's Crossing. This 
left three bridges below Fredericksburg. The two at Banks' Ford were 
held ready to be laid as soon as the ford was uncovered. 

Including the forementioued reenforcemeuts. Hooker's available force 
numbered about 70,000 men,- with 184 pieces of artillery (32 batteries). 

The general movement for to-day was prescribed in detail as follows : 

„. , ChanceliorsviUe, Va., May 1, 1863, 11 a.m. 

Circular: > i ./ i i 

The Fifth Corps, includiug three batteries,* will be thi-owu on the River road 
by [the] most direct route, the head of it advanced to near midway between 
Mott's and Colin Runs, the movement to be completed at 2 o'clock. 

The Twelfth Corps, including its [5] batteries, will be massed below the Plank 
road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle Church, and masked from the view 
of the enemy by small advanced parties, and the movement to be completed at 
12 o 'clock to enable the Eleventh Corps to take its position. 

The Eleventh Corps, witli its [6] batteries, will be masked on the Plank road, 
about 1 mile in rear of the Twelfth. This movement to be completed at 2 o'clock. 

One division of the Second Corps, with one battery, will take a position at 
Todd 's Tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the 
direction of the enemy. 

The other division and batteries ° of the corps will be massed out of the road 
near Chancellorsville. these dispositions to be made at once. 

The Third Corps will be massed as fast as it arrives about 1 mile from Chan- 
cellorsville, on the United States Ford road,'* excepting one brigade with a bat- 
terj% whieli will take position at Dowdall's Tavern. 

General Pleasonton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, 
at Chancellorsville. 

After the movement commences, headquai'ters will be at Tabernacle Churcli. 
By command of Major-General Hooker : 

Wm. L. Candler, 
Captain and Aide-de-Camp. 
> At 9:30 a.m. Hooker issued the follow- •• Infaiiti-y G.5,188; cavalry 1309; artilleiy 

ing circular: "Corps eommanders will hold 3041. 

their corps in hand, and wherever their com- * Of the eight batteries belonging to 

mands may find themselves night or day, this corps only three had crossed the river 
they ^vill keep pickets well thrown out on (j-^. ,-^. ^)- These aggregated 14 pieces, 
all the approaches to their positions. The '= Of the eight batteries of this coips only 
safety of this anny depends upon this being six had crossed the river, 
rigidly executed. ..." e ^^ ^jjg junction of this road with the 

= History of the 5th Regt. N. H. Volun- Ely's Ford Road. 
tcers. l)y William Child, p. 170. 



HOOKER'S INTENTION 241 

This order appears to be incorrectly timed. It was probably issued, 
in substance, verbally or in writing, formally or informally, at an 
earlier hour than it purports to have been. According to J. Watts de 
Peyster, orders for the V Corps to advance on the River Road were 
given verbally to Captain Paine of Hooker's staff about 10:30, and 
orders for the XII Corps were issued in printed form upon the return 
of Captain Paine from the V Corps.' Warren says that on returning 
from his reconnaissance, about 10 a.m., he found that an advance had 
been ordered.- Captain Waterman, commanding a battery (j^), says: 

Broke camp at 10 a.m. . . . and marched on the road to . . . Fredericksburg.' 

According to Humphreys he received instructions from Meade not 
long, it would seem, after 7 a.m.'' It can hardly be doubted that the hour 
of starting was nearer 10 than 11. 

Regarding the text of the forequoted 11 a.m. order, there was no 
reference in it to attacking. Hooker testified before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War : 

As soon as Conch's divisions and Sickles' corps came up, I directed an 
advance for the purpose, in the first instance, of driving the enemy away from 
Banks' Ford, which was six miles do^vn the river, in order that we might be in 
closer communication with the left wing of the army.^ 

The movements prescribed are only a transfer of the army from one 
defensive position to another. Besides uncovering Banks' Ford it 
would take the army out of the Wilderness to ground on which its artil- 
lery would be able to act and its general preponderance to tell. So 
much for Hooker's purpose "in the first instance." Wliat was it La 
the second instance? What, if anything, did Hooker mean to do after 
he had placed his army in its new position? When asked by the Com- 
mittee: "What action was taken on the 1st of May?" he answered: "I 
went out to attack the enemy."" There is reason to believe that he 
contemplated advancing at 2 p.m. from the position of Tabernacle 
Church against a force supposed to be on a line of hills between Salem 
Church and Banks' Ford.'^ But in the light of subsequent events it 
seems more probable that, when the time had come, he would have de- 
cided to await an attack. However that may have been, his immediate 

1 John Watts de Peyster. by Frank Alia- " Bep. of Com., IV, 140. lu a dispatch 

ben, p. 113. to Butterfield received at 8 : 45 p.m., he 

^ W. R., 39, p. 198. said : "The attack was ordered at 2 p.m.," 

' lb., 39, p. 524. but no such order can be found in the 

* lb., 39, p. 546. records. 

^ Rep. of Com., IV, 124. See also ^ Warren and Meade, W. R., 39, pp. 198, 

Hooker's Comments on Cbancellorsville, 506; Warren, Rep. of Com., IV, 44; John 

B. and L.. III. 218. Watts de Peyster, by Frank Allaben, p. 113. 



242 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

object was to take up a new defensive position. His main line was to be 
covered in rear by a division at Todd's Tavern, a brigade at Dowdall's 
Tavern, a corps (with the exception of a brigade) near Chandler's, and 
the cavalry at Chancellorsville. 

A signal station was established in a tree about a mile and a half east 
of Chancellorsville, in the vicinity of Newton, under Captain Fisher, 
and one about a mile and a half east of Howard's headquarters under 
Captain Castle. The former was to be used as an observation station 
and the latter to connect Howard's headquarters with Hooker's. 

Semmes ' brigade (o^) reported to Anderson, and, about 1 a.m., went 
into position with its left resting on the right of Mahone's brigade (j^), 
the left of the latter resting on the Turnpike. Between midnight and 
12:30 a.m., Kershaw's and Wofford's brigades of McLaws' division 
(t^) took up the march, by General Lee's order, for Anderson's position, 
where, on arrival, they formed up to the right and left about Smith's 
Hill, their left connecting with Semmes' right.' About 8 a.m. Jackson, 
in advance of his column, arrived at Tabernacle Church, and assumed 
command. By this time Anderson, with the help of Lee's engineers, 
had strongly intrenched the whole front. The flanks were more or less 
protected, on the right by Mott's Run and the Rappahannock, and on 
the left by Massaponax Creek. For the defence of this line, about 3 
miles in length, there were to be available about 40,000 infantry, which 
would furnish from 7 to 8 men to the yard, but the force at present on 
the ground did not number more than about 13,000 men with 44 i^ieees 
of artillery- (Map 12). Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee's brigade went on 
from Alsop's to Spottsylvania Court-House and about daylight pro- 
ceeded thence toward Anderson's position at Zion Church. Stuart 
started from Spottsylvania Court-House about daylight, followed by 
Fitzhugh Lee's brigade. By 11 o'clock he had probably communicated 
with Lee or Jackson and directed his march northward toward Chancel- 
lorsville. About this time he was joined by the 10 Va. and parts, at 
least, of the 15 Va. and 2 N. Ca. Allowing for casualties, he must now 
have had a force of about 2000 sabers,^ or about twice as many as 
Pleasonton had. The Confederate cavalry presented about the same 
anomaly as an organization that the Federal did. It consisted in the 
main of a brigade commanded by a major-general and a brigadier- 
general (Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee). Lee's instructions to Jackson 
were to "proceed to Tabernacle Church and make arrangements to re- 

' W. R., 39, pp. 824, 830, 833. => 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and part 

2 Mahone 1,915 Infanti-y 11,695 "^ ^'^'^ l^ Va. and 2 N. Ca., 

Semmes and Wofford 4,068 Artillery (44 pieces) . 880 and 8 guns (CTawfeZ/oretiiZZe, 

Kershaw .... 2,712 Cavalry (4 Va. and V Hotchkiss and Allan, p. 

Wright and Posev .3,000 pai-t"of 3) ... 500 l^l: ^''- -^v 39, pp. 794, 

" 1049, 1051; So. Hist. Soc. 

Infantry . . . 11,695 Total .... 13,075 Papers, VIII, 249). 



JACKSON AT TABERNACLE CHURCH 243 

pulse the enemy." They did not require him to go beyond Tabernacle 
Church. On the other hand, they did not prohibit it. That was enough 
for Jackson. With only about 10,000 Confederates between him and 
Sedgwick, he thought with dread of Federal guns thundering in his 
rear. For this reason as well as to secure, if possible, the advantage of 
the initiative, which he knew so well how to utilize, he ordered the work 
on the intrenchments to cease and the troops to prepare to advance. 
But he had first to wait for his own column and other reenforcements. 
About 10:30 a.m. his advanced troops moved out, Mahone's brigade on 
the Turnpike and Posey's on the Plank Road.* His reenforcements 
were still 2 or 3 miles off, but the sight of them approaching, as it 
seemed, from every direction, was restoring the spirit of the troops, 
somewhat dampened by the recent retrograde movement. 

The Federals were now pursuing their way eastward in columns well 
closed up, by the two roads that fork at Chancellorsville. xVrriving op- 
posite the house, they halt by brigade, load their pieces, and move on. 

Right Wing, 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. 

The V Coi'ps with three batteries, and the XII with two batteries,- 
altogether about 28,000 men and 28 guns, formed three columns (Map 
12). The V Corps had two roads, the River Road and Turnpike. Grif- 
fin's and Humphreys' divisions {^) under Meade took the River Road, 
and Sykes' division (f), the Turnpike. Humphreys' division was to 
hold itself ready to reenforce Griffin's or Sykes', as exigencies might 
require.^ The XII Corps marched on the Plank Road. After crossing 
Mott's Run Sykes' division was to turn to the left, deploy and open 
communication with Griffin 's on its left and Slocum 's corps on its right. 
The two corps were to take ixp a position extending from Tabernacle 
Church on the right to near Banks' Ford on the left, a distance of about 
21/2 miles— the position actually held by Anderson. Together with the 
XI Corps, which was to support the movement, the forces thus set in 
motion aggregated about 40,000 men and 62 guns. Two batteries 
(ih, 3^v) went with Sykes, one battery (fy) with Meade. The other five 
batteries of the V Corps were on the march from Hartwood Church. 

' Authorities differ considerably as to the - j-^; 5-Yn (W. R., 39, p. 674). The 

hour when the movement commenced. author can not state why this corps was 

Semmes, Kershaw, and Wright give it as not accompanied by its five batteries as re- 

about noon (W. R., 39, pp. 833, 829, 865). quired by Hooker's order of 11 a.m. 

Lee and McLaws give it as 11 (i6., pp. 794, 'Meade's report, TI'. R., 39, p. 506. 

849, 824), and Posey gives it as 9. Ma- Humphreys was originally directed to fol- 

hone's leading regiment was the 12 Va. low Sykes, but his instructions were subse- 

Lieutenant Keilev of this regiment wrote quently modified so as to require him to 

on the 7th of May. 1863, "About 10 we follow Griffin {ib., 39, p. 546). This 

moved to the front" {War Talks of Con- change, it will be seen, proved unfortunate. 
federate Veterans, p. 62). 



244 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

General Warren, Hooker's chief of topographical engineers, accom- 
panied Sykes ' colnmu. 

The woodiness of the country would considerably restrict the use of 
artillery, but would not altogether prevent it. There were straight 
stretches of road where a single gun might bring a hostile column to a 
halt or compel it to take to the woods. There were openings, too, af- 
fording positions for lines of guns. 

About 11 a.m. Sickles' corps commenced arriving from United States 
Ford at the junction of Ely's and United States Ford roads, and being 
massed there by Hooker's order. It left at United States Ford, on the 
south bank, as guard to the bridge, Mott's brigade of six regiments 
(jr^) and Jastram's and Seeley's batteries (rrii' Oil) "' ^^^ ^^ ^^^ 
north bank, the ambulances.^ Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster of 
the army, forbade the crossing of trains until further orders.- The 
engineer battalion, numbering 300 men, was also at the ford on the 
south side of the river.^ Meagher's brigade (-^i) at Scott's Dam was 
joined by the 116 Pa. from United States Ford. 

The following instructions were issued to the left wing : 

Chaneellorsville, May 1, 1863, 11 :30 a.m. 
General Butterfield: 

Direct Major-General Sedgwick to threaten an attack in full force at 1 o'clock, 
and to continue in that attitude until further orders. Let the demonstration be 
as severe as can be, but not an attack. 

Joseph Hooker, 

Major-General Commanding. 

That Sedgwick's attack was to be a pretended and not a real one 
shows that Hooker was not aware of the transference of most of Lee's 
army from the lines of Fredericksburg toward Chaneellorsville. 

As Hooker outwitted Lee by massing his right wing at Chaneellors- 
ville, so Lee outwitted Hooker by concentrating his army at Zion 
Church. The first point in the game was made yesterday by Hooker ; 
the second, which, as we shall see, neutralized the first, was made to-day 
by Lee. Sedgwick, by his demonstration at 1 o'clock, was to prevent 
the now consummated reenforcement of Anderson. 

Jackson's force marched in two columns. On the Turnpike went 
Mahone's brigade (jJ^) and McLaws' three brigades (^^), with six 
batteries of artillery {'-f-^> 5-4i |), numbering 24 pieces, all under 
the command of McLaws. This force was covered by Owen's two 
squadrons of the 3 Va. Cavalry and Jordan's battery of 4 guns (in- 
cluded in the 24 above mentioned), and followed by Wilcox's brigade 

'^ History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Artillery, by George Lewis, p. 157; 

W. R., 39, pp. 384, 421. 
2 W. R., 39, pp. 399, 401, 411, 493. ^ j^ _ 39^ pp. 334^ 2I6. 



JACKSON ADVANCES 245 

(j-^) from Banks' Ford, and Perry's brigade (j^) from the vicinity of 
Falmouth. 

On the Plank Road the column was headed by Posey's and Wright's 
brigades (y-f), together with Alexander's battalion of ai'tillery of the 
I Corps, numbering 14 pieces.* The main body of this column consisted 
of Rodes' and A. P. Hill's divisions (^). Its left flank was covered 
by the 4 Va. Cavalry (Colonel AVickham), detached by General Stuart 
this morning. The right column, including Wilcox's and Perry's bri- 
gades, numbered about 12,000 men with 24 pieces of artillery; the left 
column (including Jackson's leading and next division), commanded 
directly by Jackson, about 28,000 men with 54 pieces of artillery. These 
columns aggregated, it would seem, to a man the same strength as the 
forementioued Federal columns (40,000 men), but comprised 78 pieces 
of artillery, or 16 more than the Federal columns. They were followed 
by Colston's division (j^) and Jackson's corps artillery, numbering to- 
gether about 7800 men with 56 pieces, which were too far behind to 
come up before the afternoon was well spent, but miglit be counted on 
as a reserve to be used before night. On both sides the movements at 
this time were somewhat disjointed. The units were separated by ex- 
cessive distances— on the side of the Federals, to right and left, and on 
the side of the Confederates, to front and rear. 

Stuart's cavalry was divided into two parts, each with its particular 
function to perform. One, under Fitzhugh Lee, was to preserve con- 
tact with Hooker's army, and furnish information regarding it; the 
other, under Stuart, was to keep in touch with Lee's army, and protect 
it from annoyance and as far as possible from observation. Of Stuart's 
artillery, 6 pieces were detached with W. H. F. Lee. Two pieces, under 
Breathed, accompanied Fitzhugh Lee; 8 pieces, under Beckham, were 
with Stuart. 

Jackson's columns are hardly in motion when the Federals become 
aware of the fact. About 11 : 15 the pickets of the 8 Pa. Cavalry in front 
of Mott's Run are attacked by McLaws' skirmishers, consisting of the 
12 Va. The 8 Pa. comes to the support of its pickets, and succeeds in 
retarding the enemy's progress, but not in checking it. While it is 
giving way the head of Sykes' division, with Watson's battery of four 
pieces (j^), comes up. The only artillery opposing the Federal bat- 
tery is a piece of Jordan's battery (^) and a piece of Grandy's (^4).^ 
As a shell is seen bursting over the woods, a captain in the XII Corps, 
looking at his watch, remarks : ' ' Twenty minutes past eleven ; the first 
gun of the battle of Chancellorsville." 

1 The number left after deducting ior - W. R., 39, pp. 525, 8S3 ; War Talks of 

Jordan's batteiy on the Turnpike and Confederate Veterans, p. 69. The Confed- 

Rhett's battery and two pieces of Parkers erate artillery was subsequently reenforced 

at Fredericksburg. to 4 pieces (*.). 



246 ■ THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The rumbling of the guns traveling on to Fredericksburg informs 
Lee that Jackson has met and engaged the enemy, and assures Sedg- 
wick, so far as be may need to be assured, of the success, thus far, of 
Hooker's turning movement. Sykes, advancing still at double time, 
drives the Confederate skirmishers back, and about 12 o 'clocks occupies 
a ridge with open ground in its front, about 21/0 miles from Chancellors- 
vllle or about half-way from Chancellorsville to Anderson's late posi- 
tion at Zion Church ^ (Map 13). Sykes' position is not the open ground 
that Hooker has been aiming at outside of the Wilderness, but an open 
space within the Wilderness. His formation is in two lines. In his 
first line, Burbank with the 2d brigade and Watson's battery forms the 
right and center ; and Ayres with the 1st brigade, the left. His second 
line is formed of the 3d brigade. 

McLaws sends word to Jackson that the enemy is in force in his (Mc- 
Laws') immediate front and is advancing, and that a large force can 
be seen along the heights about a mile or more to the rear (n), and 
that the country is favorable for an attack from the Plank Road upon 
the Federal right flank. Jackson in reply tells McLaws to hold his 
position; that he is advancing his artillery; and that if this does not 
succeed, he will try to gain the enemy's rear. About this time Jackson 
receives the following dispatch : 

Headquarters Cavalry Division, 12 m., May 1, 1863. 
GcTteral: 

I am on a road running from Spottsylvania C. H. to Silvers, which is on Plank 
Road, three miles below Chancellorsville. General Fitz Lee is still further to 
the left and extends scouts to Plank Road (Orange), and has Turnpike watched 
beyond to see if any large movement takes place that way. I will close in on 
the flank and lielp all I can when the ball opens. I will communicate tlirough 
Wickhara and Owen to you. 

May God grant us victory. yours truly, , 



Upon the back of this dispatch Jackson wrote : 



J. E. B. Stuakt, 

Major-General. 
121/2 p.m., May 1, '63. 



Major-General J. E. B. Stuart. 
General : 

I trust that God will grant us a great victory. Keep closed on Chancellors- 

^'"''^- Yours very truly, 

T. J. Jackson, 

Lieut. General.' 

Precisely where Fitzhugh Lee was at this time, is not known. He was 
perhaps near the jimction of the Brook Road and Brock Eoad (Map 15). 
Stuart was probably not far from Welford's Furnace. 

^ W. R. 39, p. 198. ^ These two commuuications are taken 

2 7t. ' ' from the So. Hist. Soc. Papers, XI, 137, 138. 



SYKES ORDERED TO RETIRE 247 

About noon Colonel Owen of the 3 Va. reported to McLaws that a 
Federal column was advancing by the Mine Road. This was probably 
a flanking detachment of Meade's. McLaws kept the four brigades of 
Mahone, Wofford, Semmes, and Kershaw (about 8700 men) in his front 
to oppose Sykes, and sent the two brigades of Wilcox and Perry, as 
they arrived, out to his right to cover his flank and rear against a move- 
ment by the Duerson's Mill Road and Mine Road (Map 13). McLaws' 
main force now maintained a defensive attitude. His skirmishers, 
however, especially on his flanks, kept up a vigorous demonstration. 

Sykes heard no sound of cannon from the direction of Meade or 
Slocum. He was totally isolated. He had a good field of fire in his 
front, and his flanks rested upon woods, but these were not impassable 
to the Confederate skirmishers, who were threatening to envelop both of 
his flanks and gain his rear. Colonel O'Rorke, commanding his second 
line, sent out six companies of the 146 N. Y. as skirmishers to protect 
the right flank, and the whole of the 5 N. Y. (Duryee Zouaves) also as 
skirmishers to protect the left flank (Map 14). A detachment of the 
8 Pa. Cavalry sent to the left to connect with the column on the River 
Road failed to do so. An aide of General Warren's who attempted to 
communicate with General Slocum ran into the enemy's skirmishers 
and narrowly escaped capture. A similar effort by one of General 
Sykes' aides was foiled in the same way.' About 1 p.m. Sykes reported 
his situation to Hooker. Soon afterward he received an order to retire 
in the direction of Chancellorsville. Arnold's battery (2~n) was sent 
to report to him, and later Conch was ordered to support him with a 
division. Couch went himself with the available infantry of Hancock's 
division (}^), about 3800 men.- Before this infantry arrived, proba- 
bly soon after 1 : 30 p.m., Sykes commenced retiring, covered by 
Arnold's and Watson's batteries (3^11. ^). The 8 Pa. Cavalry retired 
to the vicinity of Chancellorsville, where it stood to horse the rest of 
the day.'' By 2 p.m. Hooker had probably received the following dis- 
patch of 12 : 30 from Butterfield : 

Biiiferfifhl to Hooker, 12:30 p.m. 

Patrick [provost-niarshal-general] ordered from Banks' to United States 
Ford, and cavalry * ordered there from Hartwood. Balloon and signal reports 

' W. R., 39, pp. 198, 199. 311). It is probable that Arnold moved 

- Couch says he g'ave his order to Arnold out a little before 1 : 15 and Hancock a 

at 1 p.m. ; Arnold says it was given at little later. 

2 p.m. {W. R., 39, pp. 306, 360). Couch ^ The Charge of the S Pa. Cavalry at 

says in a report of May 9 that he went Chancellorsville, by Pennoek Huey, p. 77. 

with Hancock's division at 1 p.m. (ih., * About 140 of Patrick's cavalry. About 

39, p. 305) ; and in a report of May 20, 40 of these went on to Chancelloi-sville to 

that instructions for him to do this were keep the communications open, 
given him soon after 1 p.m. (ih., 39, p. 



248 THE CAJVIPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

to this moment all sent you. The enemy wiU meet you between ChancellorsviUe 
and Hamilton's Crossing. He can not, I judge from aU reports, have detached 
over 10,000 or 15,000 men from Sedgwick's front since sun cleared fog. ... I 
will have telegraph to Banks' Ford shortly. Shall I keep party waiting there to 
cross, or build line from United States Ford to Chancellorsville ? 

It was long after the time for Sedgwick's demonstration ordered this 
morning, and there were no signs of its being made. Hooker could not 
count on Sedgwick's cooperation, and feared that without it, and per- 
haps with it, he would be unable to deploy outside of the Wilderness; 
that the heads of his columns would be crushed, and his forces beaten 
in detail. We will leave hiui now to his disquieting reflections, and take 
a look at the Federal column on the right. 

The XII Corps took up the march as ordered on the Plank Road about 
10 : 30 a.m. Having advanced about a mile, it came upon the skirmishers 
of the enemy with one howitzer ^ in the vicinity of Decker (A). The ad- 
vance-guard deployed in line of skirmishers, and pushed on, driving 
the enemy before it. The main body deployed on either side of the 
road; Geary's division (^j) on the right, Williams' (si) on the left, 
each division with two brigades in the first line and one in the second. 
The brigades in the first line were formed each in two lines ; and those 
in reserve in double column. This triple line of battle was a long time 
in forming. It did not advance until about 1 p.m., or about the time 
when Sykes, barely holding his owti on the Turnpike, sent a report of 
his situation to Hooker.^ 

Jackson reenforced his advance under Anderson with Eamseur's bri- 
gade (arn)- The three brigades, Posey's on the right, Ramseur's in 
the center, and Wright's on the left, pushed back Slocum's advance 
upon his main line (Map 14). The artillery of the head of Jackson's 
column (14 pieces) went into action and was opposed by Atwell's bat- 
tery (2TX11) of 6 pieces; Winegar's battery (i;iii) was put into position 
to add its fire to that of Atwell's; and Crosby's battery (r.iii) was 
brought up from Chancellorsville and posted near Atwell's. Neither 
Winegar nor Crosby had opened fire, and Atwell had fired but about 
sixty rounds,^' when, about 1 : 30 p.m., Slocum received an order from 
Hooker directing him to return to the position which he occupied the 
night before.* Consequently before the artillery duel was decided or 
his reserve brigades were brought into line, he broke off the engage- 
ment, and put his force in retreat. He was followed by the three 
brigades under Anderson, a part of Stuart's cavalry, Alexander's bat- 
talion of artillery, and McGraw's battery of A. P. Hill's division 

^ W. B,., 39, p. 821. ■* Sloeum errs, it seems, in stating that 

=*/&., 39, p. 728, first line. this order was received at 1 p.m. {W. B., 

3 lb., 39, pp. 723, 771. 39, p. 670). 



FEDERAL FORCES RECALLED 249 

(j-yj).^ Rodes' artillery, it seems, was not engaged at all. Eodes de- 
ployed his four remaining brigades Qf^) between the Plank Eoad and 
the Turnpike. A. P. Hill's division (fj) formed line of columns on 
both sides of the Plank Road. 

Howard received an order at 12 o'clock to place his corps a mile in 
rear of the XH, but he had hardly started from camp when it was 
countermanded." The corps resumed its former positions, except that 
the Third Division, which had been at Hawkins' Farm, facing west- 
ward, was ijlaced in the line between the First and Second Divisions, 
facing southward, leaving the 82 O. (not brigaded) at Hawkins' Farm 
(Map 15). AVhen the corps started forward Captain Castle's signal 
station was broken up. It was not reestablished. 

The V Corps marched, as ordered, by the River Road. An order was 
issued for its recall probably about 1 p.m., but at 2 p.m. it had not been 
received. About 1 p.m. Graham's brigade (j-^)^ and Turnbull's bat- 
tery (jtIii) took up the march from the junction of the Ely's Ford and 
United States Ford Roads by way of Chancellorsville for Dowdall's 
Tavern, pursuant to a provision of Hooker's order of 11 a.m. Whether 
it was before or after the issue of this order can not be stated, but by 
midday Hooker had an apprehension that a force of Confederate cav- 
alry was demonstrating against his right and rear, which was probably 
caused by patrols of Fitzhugh Lee's looking for Federal troops on the 
Germanna Plank Road. As a consequence Graham was directed to 
picket well out to the right and rear, connecting on his right with 
"\¥hipple (j^), who was to connect his right with Berry (jfj).^ On ar- 
riving at Dowdall 's Tavern Graham halted by order of General Howard 
to await further orders.-^ Whipple on the left and Berry on the right 

1 TF. B., 39, pp. 821, 937. sent to support j'oii.' 'That can not be,' 

^ Howard's report, ib., 39, p. 628. How- replied Howard. 'I would send my eompli- 

ard says in his Autobiography (I, 361) ments to the whole rebel army, and invite 

that his corps had "gone out two miles." them to attack me, in my present position ; 

Captain Castle, Howard's signal officei', and if it was not out of compliment to 

says in his report that the corps was turned General Sickles, I would order you back.' 

back at ChancellorsvUle (TT. ^., 39, p. 231). To this Graham, having obseixed that he 

^ Except the 105 Pa., which had not come would not be justified in obeying such an 

up from United States Ford. order, turned to Briscoe (attached to Bir- 

* TT. R., 39, p. 384. ney's staff as engineer) and said to him : 

° ''Howard met Graham half-way from 'There seems to be some misunderstanding 

Chaneellors\alle[ f] to Dowdall's Tavern. here; you had better go back with Bullard 

'Where are you going?' Howard asked Gra- [his aide] to General Bimey, and find out.' 

ham. 'To Dowdall's Tavern.' "Perhaps Graham then proceeded on to DowdaU's Tav- 

you mean Todd's Tavern f 'No. Dowdall's.' em. where he found General Carl Schurz 

'That can not be; there must be some mis- and a nimiber of officers of the XI Corps; 

take about this. My headquarters are while Howard kept on to Chancellorsville 

there.' 'I do not know anything about that,' to see General Hooker'' (ChanceUorsvillP., 

replied Graham ; 'such are my orders. Per- by J. Watts de Peyster; Onward, Decem- 

haps they are afraid of an attack, and I am ber, 1869. See Report of Committee on Con- 



250 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

established a line of outposts extending from the Plank Road to the 
United States Ford.' 

In the meantime General French with his division (1^1) and Pettit's 
battery (lAi) got under way for Todd's Tavern. After he had made 
about ly^ miles the XII Corps, coming up the Plank Road, intersected 
his column, and compelled him to halt until it had passed, when he 
received orders to return to his original position. He turned back 
about the same time as Howard. - 

Right Wing, 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. 
A little after 2 p.m. Couch with Hancock's division met Sykes with 
his in the vicinity of Newton. At this moment Couch received the fol- 
lowing order : 

Headquartei's Army of the Potomac, May 1, 1863. 
General Sykes will retire to his position of last night, and take up a line con- 
necting his right with General Slocum [XII Corps], making his line as strong 
as he can by felling trees, etc. General Coixeh will then retire to his position of 
last night. Major-General Hooker.' 

Hancock deployed to cover Sykes' withdrawal. "General Couch, 
while preparing to obey the order, so far as concerned Hancock's divi- 
sion, determined at least to delay its execution until he could communi- 
cate to the commanding general his own earnest belief that the position 
which had been reached should be held, and he accordingly dispatched 
Major Burt, his senior aide, to headquarters, with urgent representa- 
tions as to the admirable nature of the ground he held, and his ability 
to 'stand off' any enemy on his front, if Meade and Slocum could keep 
their place on his flanks. Major Burt returned with a peremptory 
order to retire."^ 

At 2 o 'clock Hooker telegraphed to Butterfield : 

From character of information have suspended attack. The enemy may 
attack me— I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout, and attack if 
[he] can succeed. 

Probably about the same time he wrote : 

. . . Hope the enemy will be emboldened to attack me. I did feel certain of 
success. If his communications are cut [by Stoneman] he must attack me. I 

duct of the War, 1865, I, xlv, 4, 6, 34, etc. ; Colonel Powers, commandiiiis: his leading 

Chancellorsville, by Hotehkiss and Allan, brigade. General Sloeun,, and General How- 

48, 50; W. R., 39. pp. 412, 413). ard, seems to show that be could not have 

1 W. R., 39, pp. 385, 448. started much before noon (IF. R., 39, pp. 

= French in his report says that he re- 362, 375, 628, 669). 

ceived the order to move to Todd's Tavern ^ Histon/ of the II Army Corps, by Fran- 

at 8 a.m. and implies that he started about cis A. Walker, p. 221. 

that time. But his report, read in connec- * lb. 
tion with the reports of Captain Pettit, 



HOOKER'S STATE OF MIND 251 

have a strong position. ... All the enemy's cavalry are on my flanks, which 
leads me to suppose that our dragoons will meet with no obstacles in cutting 
their communications. 

The "information" to which Hooker referred in his telegram does 
not admit, unfortunatelj-, of specification. But it probably consisted 
in substance of the items that 15,000 men or more had moved from 
about Fredericksburg toward Chancellorsville; and that the total in tlie 
former position did not appear to have been diminished, from which 
Hooker naturally inferred that Confederate reenforcements had ar- 
rived from Richmond. This view of the situation was probably con- 
firmed by the receipt of the following dispatch from Butterfield : 

2:0') p.m. 

I have two deserters just from Hays' brigade, Early's division. They report 
A. P. Hill left here this morning to move up to our right [Chancellorsville]. 
Hood's division arrived yesterday from Richmond. The deserter was from New 
York State originally; an intelligent man. He said he knew it was Hood's divi- 
sion, for he asked the troops as they passed along. He reports D. H. Hill, Early, 
and Trimble in front of Sedgwick. Anderson, McLaws, A. P. Hill, and Hood 
would therefore be in your front.' 

Hooker's reckoning with the cavalry involved three erroneous ideas: 

1. That all of Stuart's cavalry was with Lee, 

2. That all of Stoneman's cavalry was with Stoneman, 

3. That Stoneman was carrying out Hooker's orders. 

Reynolds wrote to Sedgwick : 

If they have not detached more than A. P. Hill's division from our front, 
they have been keeping up appearances [of detaching more], showing weakness 
[here], with a view of delaying Hooker. 

Reynolds, it seems, was now satisfied that the enemy's forces had for 
the greater part been withdrawn from their old lines, but was in doubt 
as to whether they had gone on to Chancellorsville or lay concealed in 
rear of Fredericksburg. 

About this time Slocum, falling back before Jackson, made a stand 
on the Welford's Furnace and Newton Road, but there was no commu- 
nication between Slocum and Couch. 

' D. H. Hill was in North Carolina ; bis Thi.s dispatch represented tlie force oppos- 

division, commanded by R. E. Rodes, was inp: Sedsrwiek as nearly three times as 

wth .Jackson ; Trimble's division, com- strong as it was, and that opposing Hooker 

manded by Colston, was also with Jackson ; as about four fifths as strong as it was. 
Hood was still south of the James River. 



252 THE CAJVIPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

At 2:30 p.m. the following dispatch was sent from Jackson's head- 
quarters to McLaws : 

The lieutenant-general commanding directs me to say that he is pressing on 
up the Plank road ; also that you will press on up the turnpike toward Chancel- 
lorsville, as the enemy is falling back. 

Keep your skirmishers and flanking parties well out, to guard against ambus- 
cade. 

About 3 p.m. General Heth of A. P. Hill's division was detached with 
three brigades (y^) to go over to the Turnpike, and having reached it, 
to feel his way, and advance in the direction of Chancellorsville ; and 
General Wright of Anderson's division was ordered to move his bri- 
gade (j-ij) "across and to the left of the Plank Eoad, and bearing well 
off from the road, endeavor to get upon the enemy's right flank and 
rear."i Slocum, having resimaed his retreat, was pressed in rear and 
on his right rear by Posey's brigade (j^), supported by Alexander's 
artillery and Jackson's leading division (Rodes'). His command was 
thrown into some disorder, but got back without much loss to its original 
position about 4 p.m. His artillery, numbering twenty-eight pieces, 
was disposed in two batteries of equal strength, "for defence against 
the probable following enemy"— one at the junction of the Plank Eoad 
and Turnpike east of Chancellorsville, commanding both approaches; 
and the other on the height of Fairview, west of Chancellorsville, facing 
south. Wright took the line of the unfinished railroad, followed it 
rapidly to the Welford's Furnace Road, and proceeded by the latter 
toward the Furnace. He apparently intended to go on from the Fur- 
nace to the elevation of Hazel Grove and there place himself in an 
advantageous position on the flank and rear, as he thought, of the 
Federal line. He arrived at the Furnace about 4 : 30 p.m.^ Here he 
found Stuart with his staff, and Beckham, commanding the horse artil- 
lery, with six guns.^ From Stuart he learned that the Federals occu- 
pied the woods north of the Furnace. His brigade comprised three 
regiments of about 380 men each and one battalion numbering, say, 
150 men. He deployed two of his regiments, keeping one regiment and 
the battalion in reserve. The former were ordered, he says, ' ' to move 
cautiously forward through the almost impenetrable forest, and finding 
the enemy, to press him vigorously." They advanced rapidly, and 
were soon engaged with two regiments on the outposts of Williams' 
division, the 3 Wise, and 123 N. Y. ( 3 ^'^„ , ^ "xii )- Colonel Hawley of 
the 3 Wise, says that he saw three Confederate regiments, so Wright's 
third regiment was probably put into action. At any rate, Wright 

' W. R., 39, p. 866. p. 866), but is based upon a careful study 

^ This is about an hour and a half earlier of all the reports. Federal and Confederate, 
than the hour given by Wright (TF. R., 39, ^ -jy. j{,^ 39, pp. 1048, 1049. 



WRIGHT'S MANCEUVER 253 

forced the Federals back to the Farm-House, whereupon he ordered a 
halt and called upon Stuart for a portion of his artillery. Beckham 
was sent forward with four guns, under the supposition that the Fed- 
erals had little or no artillery at this point. Owing to the character of 
the ground and the bad condition of the roads, it was about 5 : 30 when 
the Confederate guns came into position and opened fire. The imme- 
diate effect of the fire was to compel the Federal regiments to fall back 
to the intrenchments on the northern edge of Hazel Grove. A third 
regiment, the 27 Ind. (3. 1. XII), which had come to their support, was 
ordered back with the others before it had time to deploy. This was 
no sooner accomplished, however, than Beckham's four pieces were 
fired upon by eight pieces of artillery at Fairview.^ Soon afterward 
they became the target also of two pieces at Hazel Grove, the latter 
supported by a regiment of infantry (Sketch 1). Wbile this action was 
in progress, General Jackson with his staff came galloping up from the 
Plank Road. Going forward with the artillery, he came under the 
heavy fire to which it was subjected. The danger of the situation 
elicited from Stuart the remark : ' ' General Jackson, we must move from 
here." Before they could turn, Stuart's adjutant-general was mortally 
wounded. 

Fitzhugh Lee, with his brigade of cavalry and two pieces of 
Breathed 's battery of horse artillery, had been feeling the Federal out- 
posts about a mile and a half further west. Soon after 4 p.m. his two 
pieces of artillery opened fire on Carpenter's Farm. A regiment was 
sent out from Howard's line (1. 3. XI) and drove them back, silencing 
their fire. 

Probably about i p.m. Wilcox, coming over with his brigade (^) 
from the Turnpike, took position on the right of Perry's brigade, occu- 
pying part of a line of rifle-pits running from Banks' Ford to within a 
few hundred yards of the Mine Road (Maps 13, 14). 

McLaws received Jackson 's order of 2 : 30 at 4 p.m. and proceeded 
accordingly with his whole force "to press on up the Turnpike toward 
Chancellorsville. " He left Wilcox, however, in the position just de- 
scribed, and Perry in his position on the Mine Road (Map 14). The 
latter moved forward about 5 p.m., following the Mine Road. 

Heth passed between Rodes and McLaws, and came out on the Turn- 
pike about half a mile in advance of McLaws, Couch having fallen back 
from Newton. Heth's skirmishers became engaged with Hancock's. 

It may have been in answer to an inquiry from Hooker that Butter- 
field wired the latter at 2 : 45 p.m. : 

All passage of troops from enemy's right to his left cea-sed about 11 :30 o'clock. 
Nothing apparently going now except small detachments. . . . 

1 Winegai-'s batteiy (p^)and one section of Crosby's (j-^j). 



254 THE CAj\IPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

At any rate, the receipt of this message or some other circumstance 
seems to have revived Hooker's spirits. After Sykes, in compHance 
with Hooker's order to retire, had passed through Hancock's line, Han- 
cock commenced withdrawing his division. When all but two of his 
regiments had retired (about 4:30 p.m.) the following order was deliv- 
ered to Couch : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 1, 1863. 
General Couch: 

Hold on to your position till 5 p.m., and extend your skirmishers on each flank, 
so as to secure yourself against being surrounded. General Slocum will hold a 
position on the Plank road equally advanced. 

By command of Major-General Hooker : 

Wa,LiAM L. Candler, Captain, 

Aide-de-Camp.i 

But what might have been done a couple of hours before was now no 
longer possible. Couch replied with warmth to the bearer: "Tell 
General Hooker he is too late ; the enemy are on my right and rear. I 
am in full retreat," and proceeded accordingly. Fisher's signal party 
fell back from their observation station. The position thus abandoned 
(Newton) was high ground, more or less open in front, over which an 
army might move, and artillery be used advantageously. General 
Meade is said to have remarked: " ... if we can't hold the top of a 
hill, we certainly can't hold the bottom of it." Hancock, with his divi- 
sion, stood across the main road to Fredericksburg, with two pieces of 
artillery on the Turnpike, and one on a wood road nearly parallel to it 
about 200 yards to the left. 

The following answer to Hooker's telegram of 2 p.m. went to him 
from Butterfield at 4 p.m. : 

. . . copy announcing suspension of your attack sent Sedgwick. He and 
Reynolds remain quiet. They consider that to attack before you have accom- 
plished some success, in view of the strong position and numbers in their front, 
might fail to dislodge the enemy and render them [Sedgwick and Reynolds] 
unserviceable at the proper time. They are anxious to hear from you. . . . 

Hooker was waiting for Sedgwick to do something, and Sedgwick 
was waiting for Hooker to do something. 

When Hooker ordered a return to Chancellorsville, Meade was still 
advancing ; and Couch and Slocum felt able to hold their positions. The 
latter expected to be adequately supported, and resume the advance. 
Hooker saw that to advance in the face of the attack which had devel- 
oped or seemed impending meant his making a general attack with his 
somewhat scattered forces. He was more or less unnerved by the unex- 

1 Jlistonj of the II Army Corps, by Francis A. Walker, p. 222. 



HOOKER'S DILEMMA 255 

pected aggression of the enemy. He wanted the enemy to attack him, 
but not then or there. He had started out to fight a battle, but he wanted 
to fight it in a position of his own choice. But here he was between his 
position of the night before, which he had but partially abandoned, and 
his contemplated new position, which he could not reach without fight- 
ing an offensive battle. He had remained at Chancellorsville in order, 
no doubt, to be as near as possible to the terminus of his telegrajth line, 
which was broken or out of order most of the day. Not being at the 
front, he did not know the ground on which his troops were fighting. 
He had not uncovered Banks' Ford, and therefore could not expect any 
reenforcement from the north side of the river. He felt that he must 
choose between attacking in full force and retreating. At this critical 
moment he perhaps recalled the President's earnest warning: "Beware 
of rashness." 

General Francis A. Walker in his interesting biography of General 
Hancock says: "Various explanations have been given of Hooker's 
actions on the afternoon of the 1st of May. The writer has always be- 
lieved that they were due partly to lack of that firm moral stamina 
which is so often found to accompany a spirit of arrogance and boast- 
fulness, but chiefly to a nervous collapse occasioned by the excitement 
and fatigue of the four preceding days. Drunkenness, once alleged, 
certainly was not any part of the cause. "> It has indeed been asserted 
that Hooker was suffering at this time from the need of a stimulant.- 

About 3 p.m. the V Corps, on the River Road, had reached Decker (B), 
about two miles from Banks' Ford and in sight of that point, when it 
received orders to turn back. Humphreys' division proceeded to exe- 
cute the order at double time. Griffin did not receive the order, it 
would seem, until sometime between 5 and 6 o'clock, when his division 
took the back track at a killing puce. 

' The report that Hooker was drunk at paign, or, at all events, on the day that he 

Chancellorsville is denied or discredited by reached Chancellorsville, from motives 

Sickles, Biniey, Wadsworth, and Pleason- which do him honor, he stopped drinking 

ton, before the Committee on the Conduct entirely" (Rhodes' History of the United 

of the War (IV, 15, 37, 73, 31), by the States, IV, 264, foot-note). 

Committee itself (IV, p. xlix), and finally - Letter from Brooks to Hooker in Army 

by Hooker himself, testifying before the and Navy Journal, III, 27; Couch's article 

same (IV, 149). "The truth seems to be in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 

that Hooker was accustomed to drink a III, 170; Military Miscellanies, by James 

large amount of wlusky daily without be- B. Fi-y, p. 432; and The Campaign of 

ing prevented from attending to his round Chancellorsville, by T. A. Dodge, pp. 268, 

of duties; but when he started on this cam- 269. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

MAY 1 (continued) . . . DISPOSITIONS FOE THE NIGHT. PLANS. CAKE OF 
THE WOUNDED. GAINS AND LOSSES. THE FEDERAL LEFT WING. AVEEELL 
RECALLED. COMMENTS 

Right Wing, 6 p.m. to 12 p.m. 

HETH kept up his pressure on Hancock until the latter, in obedience 
to an order from Hooker, took position on Sykes' left (Map 15). 
O'Rorke's (3d) brigade of Sykes' division was then between these com- 
mands and the enemy. About 6 p.m. Heth was forced by the Federal 
fire and approaching darkness to withdraw. To make room for Mc- 
Laws, who was approaching from the rear, he moved to the left and 
went into bivouac near the right of the Plank Road.^ McLaws halted 
at dark and bivouacked along the heights between Newton and R. 
McGee, Jr. 

Lee wanted to attack from his right, and cut Hooker off from United 
States Ford. He went forward himself to examine the ground and re- 
ceive reports from officers charged with reconnoitering and feeling the 
enemy. About 6 : 30 p.m. Wilcox moved with his brigade (o) to Duer- 
son's Mill. From there he sent out a patrol of two companies "with 
the view of ascertaining whether or not the enemy occupied the River 
Road near Decker's house," and, if not, to cormnunicate with the Con- 
federate pickets left near Banks' Ford. The patrol did not catch sight 
of Meade's column, but captured three Federal soldiers, making their 
way, they said, to the United States Ford. Perry's and Wofford's 
brigades (j2j. o) moved up the Mine Road— Wofford on the left and 
losing connection with the line on his left. The 4 Va. Cavalry was trans- 
ferred to the right, and cooperated with the two squadrons of the 3 Va. 
under Owen. But no suitable point of attack was found. Posey (o), 
between the Turnpike and the Plank Road, brought up about this time 
in Big Meadow Swamp, where he was arrested by the difficulty of the 
ground and a rapid shelling. On Posey's left, Ramseur (jnn) charged 
up the Plank Road. Receiving the fire of eight pieces of artillery, he 
withdrew, and, night approaching, went into bivouac. Off to their left 
and front Beckham's four pieces of artillery pluckily held out against 
the ten pieces of Best's for about three quarters of an hour, and then, 

1 W. B., pp. 890, 894. 
256 



LEE'S CONJECTURES 257 

together with the infautry, went back, by order of General Wright, to 
the Furnace. 

Wright's operation failed not only as a flank manceuver, but also as a 
reconnaissance. Neither Wright nor Fitzhugh Lee, so far as can be 
learned, penetrated the Federal outposts far enough to see the main 
line. 

General Howard says in his Aufobiographij: 

During tlie confusion of the changes of troops at Dowdall's Tavern some 
female members of a family there, taking a basket of provisions with them, 
escaped from our lines and informed some Confederate officer of the situation, 
carrying accurate information of how we occupied that position.^ 

On what authority this statement is made is not known. The author 
is convinced, however, that the information thus carried into the Con- 
federate lines did not serve to locate the Federal right flank. 

Lee, who had followed Jackson's advance from Zion Church, was puz- 
zled by the feebleness of the resistance which it met with. To clear this 
matter up, he dispatched the following message to Stuart: 

Plank Road. 2 miles from Chancellorsville, 

May 1, 186.3, 4 o'clock. 
General: 

The captured prisouere agree in stating that this is Meade's [V] corps with 
which we are now engaged, and that Howard's [XI] corps preceded them across 
the Rapidan, and has taken some other road. This is the only column that we 
can find in this direction. What has become of the other two [Howard's and 
Slocum's XI and XII Corps] ? 
Meade appears to be falling back. 

I am. very respectfully yours, etc.. 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 

Lee apparently was not aware that the III Corps and two divisions 
of the n Corps had joined the Federal right wing, and was uncertain as 
to whether the XI and XII Corps were still with it. At the close of the 
day he had a fairly correct idea of the position of Hooker's left, 
his line from the Plank Road around northward to the Rap]iahannoek; 
but as to his right wing, he was quite in the dark. He not improbably 
supposed it to extend from near Slocum's right over the Vista of Hazel 
Grove south of west through the woods between Carpenter's Farm and 
the Orange Plank Road. Apprehending, it would seem, that a consid- 
erable fraction of Hooker's army was marching npon Gordonsville, he 
ordered W. H. F. Lee at Rapidan Station to destroy the bridge over the 
Rapidan at that point. 

* See also B. and L., Ill, 194. 



258 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

In the Army of the Potomac two general plans of operation were now 
considered. One was to select a line of defence and intrench it; the 
other, to select a point of attack and advance upon it.' The former plan 
was adopted. The line chosen was the one actually held, except that 
the right was to be thrown back to a better position. At 4 p.m. Sickles 
was directed to bring up his whole corps except Mott's brigade (.y^) 
and Seeley's battery (j-ni)> still guarding the United States Ford, and 
get it rapidly into position parallel to the Plank Road at Chancellors- 
ville. This he proceeded to do, recalling Graham's brigade of Birney's 
division from Dowdall's Tavern. Instructions for the adjustment and 
strengthening of the lines were issued in the following form : 

4:20 p.m. Commanders of the Second, Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps 
will at once have their commands established on the lines assigned them last 
night, and have them put in condition of defence without a moment's delay. 
The major-general commanding trusts that a suspension in the attack to-day 
will embolden the enemy to attack him. . . . 

Chancellorsville, Va., May 1, 1863, 4:45 p.m. 
Major-General Slocum: 

Let the right of your line [XI and XII Corps] fall back and rest at the saw- 
mill ruin on Hunting Run, or in that direction, and have evei-ything passed to 
the rear of it. g^ command of Major-General Hooker : 

Wm. L. Candler, 

Captain and Aide-de-Camp. 

6 p.m. Corps commanders will set their pioneers at work in their fronts to 
make abatis, and clearing for artillery. The pioneers will be kept at work 
during the night. 

A copy of the second dispatch was sent directly to Howard. Both 
Slocum and Howard protested against the refusal of the right wing. 
They believed that the forest about them was impenetrable to troops 
except on the roads, and represented that they were abundantly able to 
hold their position against any force which the nature of the ground in 
their front would enable the enemy to bring against them, and that to 
fall back would have some of the demoralizing effect of a retreat. It 
was consequently decided not to change the position of the right wing, 
but to strengthen it with breastwork and abatis, for which the timber 
and brushwood afforded an abundance of useful material. The line 
was strengthened as rapidly as possible "by each division, brigade, or 
regiment, according to its own idea of military engineering. "^ The 
art of field fortification was not so well understood nor the advantage 
of it so highly appreciated, in either army, as it was to be later in the 

> W. R., 39, p. 199. 
" lb., 39, p. 199 ; Journal of the Mil. Serv. Inst, of the U. S., XII, 285. 



DISPOSITIONS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE 259 

war. The intrenchments constructed in the XI Corps were weak even 
for this time, and decidedly inferior to those constructed in the XII, V, 
and II Corps. Where the line had not been intrenched, it was gener- 
ally covered with abatis. It was commanded in several places, but 
Hooker preferred retaining it to changing it in the presence of the 
enemy. The work of fortifying it went on here and there through the 
night. It does not appear that there was any fortifying in Lee's army 
until after midnight. 

Did Hooker consider that the passive defence, if good for himself, 
might be good for his opponent ; and think of what he should do, should 
Lee now renounce the offensive, leaving the initiative again to Hooker? 
What was there in this case for Hooker to do, but to attack ; and would 
it not be harder for him to advance from his present position than it 
was to continue advancing from the one that he had abandoned! No, 
he did not worry himself with any such questions; his all-absorbing 
thought was hurling back the enemy's decimated ranks, trusting that 
Lee's easy success thus far had made him bold enough to attack the 
Federal intrenchments in front. 

When Couch after the fight went to Hooker and made his report on 
it. Hooker remarked: "It is all right. Couch; I have got Lee just where 
I want him; he must fight me on my own ground." "The retrograde 
movement," says Couch, "had prepared me for something of the kind, 
but to hear fi'om his own lips that the advantages gained by the suc- 
cessful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a de- 
fensive battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and I retired from 
his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped 
man. ' ' 

In the course of the afternoon, probably between 2 and 4 p.m., Devin's 
cavalry brigade with its battery of artillery was assembled in camp on 
Little Hunting Run to feed and rest, having left the 8 Pa. near Chan- 
cellorsville and two squadrons of the 17 Pa. with General Howard, 
' ' charged with the duty of picketing to his right and front, and observ- 
ing the country toward Orange and Spottsylvania Court-House. " ' 
Companies D and H of the 33 Mass. (2. 2. XI) were placed in observation 
on a road leading to Ely's Ford (Map 15). The infantry picket line 
extending from the Plank Road on Howard's right to United States 
Ford was withdrawn. 

Hancock's division (n) bivouacked about on the ground taken up 
early this morning in three lines of battle supported on its right and 
rear by Sykes' division (|), which formed parallel to the Turnpike, 
facing south. About dusk Humphreys' division (|) arrived on its re- 
turn from Decker's. Meade now received orders to occupy a line from 
Chancellorsville to the river. He at once sent Humphreys with his divi- 
1 W. R., 39, p. 778. 



260 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

sion (I) to take the extreme left of this line on the river-bank near 
Childs and hold the approach to the United States Ford by the River 
Road. The woods through which the column wound its way to the new 
position were on fire. Their light was taken by the enemy for that of 
camp-fires, and this, together with the rattling of canteens, drew upon 
it a brisk fire of musketry. Griffin's division (^), on its return from 
Decker's, was halted some distance from Chancellorsville and put in 
position on Hancock's left (Map 15). The V Corps was reenforced this 
evening by its five batteries from the north bank of the river (28 
pieces) ; and the II Corps by the three regiments which it left at United 
States Ford (j^„ iroi. ^nd ^^). 

Of the batteries which had been in action on the Turnpike, Arnold's 
(-ij) returned to the artillery camp at Chandler's, Watson's (tv) 
bivouacked near Chancellorsville, Randol's (5^) rejoined its division 
under Humphreys on the left. Of Waterman's battery (rv), which had 
accompanied Humphreys on the River Road, two pieces took posi- 
tion about midway between Chandler's and Childs; the other four 
bivouacked near Chancellorsville. 

The artillery of the XII Corps was formed, as stated, in two bat- 
teries: one near Chancellorsville, commanding the Plank Road from 
Fredericksburg; the other on the height of Fairview, facing south. 
Each numbered fourteen pieces. These were the only masses, or con- 
siderable groups, formed by the artillery of the right wing, which (in- 
cluding Seeley's and Jastram's batteries at United States Ford) num- 
bered 183 pieces. 

Hooker had dispensed with the services of his chief of artillery, and 
there was no one to make proper disposition of the batteries.' 

French's division (n) was held massed near Chandler's until about 
sunset, when the 1st and 2d brigades were deployed on the skirts of a 
wood between Chandler's and the position held by the XII Corps. The 
3d brigade remained near Chandler's. The III Corps, moving in ac- 
cordance with Hooker's order of 4 o'clock, arrived in the vicinity of 
Chancellorsville while the Confederates were pressing Slocum in front 
and on his right. Graham's brigade, after receiving several orders and 
counter-orders, took position in close column of regiments in rear of 
Best's batteries at Fairview, ready to support them or to advance to 
the aid of Williams' division, then engaged in repelling Wright's attack. 
The brigade was immediately ordered to lie down to escape the fire of 
Beckham's artillery, to which it was subjected, and from which it lost 
1 man killed and 5 wounded. 

About sunset Birney's division (j^j), except Graham's brigade (r.in) 
and Jastram's battery (i.lii), was moved up the Plank Road to the right 

' Joiinial of the Mil. Serv. Inst, of the U. S.. XII, 28.5. 



HOOKER'S RIGHT 261 

of the XII Corps, and bivouacked near the interval between the XI and 
XII Corps. Two regiments and three pieces of this division took a 
forward position near two regiments of the XII Corps (Map 15).^ 
AVhile this was being done the sound of skirmishing indicated that an 
enemy was near. Shells and bullets reached the troops as they came 
into position. 

"To discover the enemy's movements five or six daring men had 
climbed to the tops of the highest trees, from which they had a view over 
the surrounding woods. The position was very dangerous, for they 
might become targets for the rebel sharpshooters. In order to guard 
against it as much as possible, they kept up a continual shaking of the 
trees in which they were; they could be seen thus swinging in the air 
more than 100 feet above the ground, braving the double danger of the 
enemy's bullets and a fall— death in either case."^ 

Jastram's battery (r.m) moved up from United States Ford, and 
about midnight bivouacked near Chandler's.* 

Whipple's division (j|j) bivouacked in reserve at Chancellorsville, 
also the infantry of Berry's division {m)y except Mott's brigade (j-^)' 
left at United States Ford. Berry's artillery, except Seeley's battery 
(rfn)> ^6^^ ^t United States Ford, bivouacked near the junction of the 
United States Ford and Ely's Ford Eoads, about a mile in rear of 
Chancellorsville. 

With Hooker's approval. Sickles gave orders during the night to 
Birney to occupy at daybreak a portion of the front line between the 
XI and XII Corps, so as, to some extent, to relieve those corps, and 
enable them to strengthen their lines. 

In the course of the day a line of shallow rifle-pits was constructed 
from the vicinity of Buschbeck's position northward past Dowdall's 
Tavern. This will be referred to hereafter as the Buschbeck line 
(MaplS).-* 

About nightfall, von Gilsa's brigade (j-^)was drawn in, and the half 
a regiment by which it maintained connection with McLean's brigade 
on its left replaced by two regiments. The brigade now connected 
directly with McLean's. Two pieces of Dieckman's batterj' (~j) were 
placed in the angle on the Turnpike facing down the latter. The 8 Pa. 
joined the cavalry brigade on Hunting Eun.^ 

During to-day's fighting in the Wilderness the wounded, who were 
not numerous, were taken to some houses near the scene of action, 

^ W. R.. 39. pp. 40,S. 429, 442, 70S. ^ Pleasoiiton's report, W. B., 39, p. 774; 

-Four Tears with the Army of the Poto- Devin's report, ib., pp. 778, 781; Martin's 

mac, by R. G. de Trobriaiid, p. 438. report, ib., p. 786; Carpenter's letter in The 

^ History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Ar- Charge of the Eighth Penn. Cavalry at 

tiUery, by George Lewis, p. 159. Chancellorsville, p. 77. 

* Sehurz's map, TF. R., 39, p. 649. 



262 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

where they were promptly attended to. Authority was obtained to take 
a few ambulances to the front from United States Ford, by which, when 
the lines fell back, the wounded were removed to the field hospitals. 
After urgent representation permission was obtained to order a few 
medicine- wagons to the field ; not enough, however, to supply the wants 
of all the wounded. The defect was remedied by transporting the sup- 
plies in the ambulances and on horses and mules. In this way medical 
and surgical supplies in ample quantities were conveyed to the field 
hospitals.^ The wounded of the V Corps were carried to the Chan- 
cellor House, part of which was turned into a hospital and the re- 
mainder used by General Hooker as his headquarters. The yard was 
occupied by wounded who could not be accommodated in the house. 
The ladies of the house, suppressing their feelings as hostiles to obey 
their kindly and tender instincts as women, came with their gentle min- 
istrations to the assistance of the surgeons. A hospital for Hancock's 
division, which became the hospital of the II Corps, was established in 
the woods near Chandler 's. Here the wounded were placed in rows upon 
blankets. Dry leaves gathered by attendants served as straw, which 
ordinarily took the place of mattresses. This evening, by order of the 
medical director, all the wounded were sent to the division hospitals 
prepared for them beyond Falmouth. 

Anderson's division (\) bivouacked on or near the Turnpike, and 
Jackson's corps (II) on or near the Plank Road (Map 15). Jackson 
sent word to Lee that his advance was checked and that the enemy was 
in force at Chancellorsville. This brought Lee toward Jackson, who 
met him on his return from the Furnace, or about 7:30 p.m., at 
Decker (A). Lee had now more reason than Jackson had this morning 
to apprehend an advance on the part of Sedgwick against his rear. He 
knew Hooker's reputation as an aggressive fighter, even to the nick- 
name that it had fastened upon him ; and must have credited him with 
knowing that Longstreet had been detached from Lee's army. He had 
every reason to expect, and, as it seems, did expect, of his opponent a 
speedy resumption and a vigorous prosecution of the offensive. He felt 
that he could not himself remain inactive where he was. Before decid- 
ing to retire he wanted to try an attack. He believed that to succeed he 
must strike quickly. The question was, Where should he deliver his 
blow? Satisfied that it should not be in the direction of his right, he 
asked Jackson if he had found any suitable point for an attack by the 
left. Jackson replied with a description of Wright's unsuccessful at- 
tempt to advance from the Furnace. Major Talcott, an aide of General 
Lee's, and Captain Boswell, Jackson's chief engineer, were now sent 
out together to reconnoiter the enemy's front. During their absence 

^ Medical Eecollections of the Army of the Potomac, by Jonathan Letterman, late 
Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac, pp. 124, 125. 



LEE AND JACKSON IN CONSULTATION 263 

Jackson spoke to Lee about what he had seen and heard during the ad- 
vance, and commented upon the promptness with which the enemy had 
appeared to abandon his movements toward Fredericksburg when op- 
posed, and the ease with which he had been driven back to Chancellors- 
ville, and concluded by expressing the opinion very decidedly, and 
repeating it more than once, that the enemy would recross the Rappa- 
hannock before morning. He said in substance: "By to-morrow morn- 
ing there will not be any of them this side of the river." General Lee 
expressed the hope that General Jackson's expectations might be real- 
ized, but said that he did not look for such a result; that he did not 
believe the enemy would abandon his attempt so easily; and expressed 
his conviction that the real move was to be made from Chaneellorsville 
and not from Fredericksburg. On this point there was a great differ- 
ence of opinion among the higher officers of his army, and Lee was the 
only one who seemed to have the absolute conviction that the real move- 
ment of the Federal army was the one he was then meeting. In this 
belief he never wavered from the first. 

Talcott and Boswell returned about 10 p.m. and made a report that 
was unfavorable to an attack in front. According to Hooker's thinking, 
there was now no recourse for Lee but inglorious flight. But Lee did 
not think so. About this time he received a report from Fitzhugh Lee 
"describing," says Dabney,^ "the position of the Federal army and 
the roads which he held with his cavalry leading to its rear." This de- 
scription could not have been very accurate. The positions of the Fed- 
eral troops were determined mainly, it would seem, by feeling the pick- 
ets. The positions of the latter can not now be determined. It would 
seem that they changed frequently, also that the pickets, patrols, and 
larger detachments kept the Confederate scouting parties at a good dis- 
tance from the Federal lines. 

Howard says: "The first distant symptoms occurred on the evening 
of May 1. Then was heard the sudden crack of rifle-shooting. It began 
with Steinwehr's skirmishers and then passed on to Schurz. Schimmel- 
fennig pushed out a brigade- straight forward toward the southwest 
and received a sudden fire of artillery from the intruders. They left 
him and pushed on. 

"It was a 'rolling' reconnaissance, evidently to determine for Lee's 
and Jackson's information the position of our flank."' 

It may be safely asserted that not an officer or soldier of Lee's had 
seen the right flank of Hooker's army, and that the road which led to 

' Life of Jackson, p. 673. Sehurz, a negro brought in from Carpeu- 
- Doubtless an erroneous reference to the tar's Farm reported that he had seen Con- 
regiment sent by Sehimmelfennig to Car- federate troops moving westward, but the 
penter's Farm (W. R., 39, pp. 628, 650). information which he gave was very indefi- 
3 B. and L., lU, 193. 194. According to nite {W. R., 39, p. 650"). 



264 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

its rear, the Brock Road (Map 15), was not held by Confederate cavalry 
further north than the Orange Plank Eoad, if that far. It would seem 
that Fitzhugh Lee considered and represented the Federal right flank 
as resting somewhere in the angle formed by the Orange Plank Road 
and the Brook Road. Rev. Mr. Lacy, a chaplain in Jackson's corps, 
who was familiar with the country about Chancellorsville, and ac- 
quainted with the roads in that neighborhood, stated to Lee that troops 
could be conducted around Hooker's right by way of Wilderness 
Tavern.1 On the strength of the foregoing representations Lee and 
Jackson in consultation projected a turning movement against Hooker's 
rear.^ The execution of this movement was intrusted to Jackson. Lee 
indicated its principal features and said in conclusion : ' ' General Stuart 
will cover j-our movement with his cavalry." General Jackson listened 
attentively, and his face lighted up with a smile while General Lee was 
speaking. Then rising and touching his cap, he said : ' ' My troops will 
move at 4 o'clock." Lee remarked that before he moved, if he should 
have any doubt as to whether the enemy was still in position, he could 
send a couple of guns to a spot close by and open fire, which would 
speedily settle the question. This was after midnight.^ The general 
direction of his march being indicated by Lee, it was left to Jackson to 
decide upon the route that he would take. When Mr. Lacy pointed out 
to him on a map the road that he had in mind for him to follow, Jackson 
remarked: "That is too near; it goes within the line of the enemy's 
pickets. I wish to get around well to his rear without being observed. Do 
you know no other road?" It seems probable that the road proposed by 
the chaplain was the one rrmning from Decker(A) past Welford's Fur- 
nace to the Brook Road (generally parallel to the Plank Road between 
Chancellorsville and Dowdall's Tavern) and that what Jackson objected 
to was the stretch from the Furnace to the Brook Road. To Jackson's 
question the chaplain replied that he had no perfect knowledge of any 
other road, but presumed that the one running from Welford's Furnace 
southward past Welford's House intersected the Brock Road, as the di- 
rections of the two roads were convergent. The needed information was 
soon obtained. It was found that the roads came together, affording a 
practicable route outside of the Federal outposts. This route Jackson 
decided to adopt. The bend in the road at the Furnace was held by the 

' Memoirs of R. E. Lee, by A. L. Long, ing accounts by a number of writers {Life 

p. 252; General Lee, by Fitzhugh Lee, pp. and Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. T. J. Jack- 

245, 246. son, Dabney, pp. 672, 673; Chancellorsville, 

2 Lee's report, W. R., 39, p. 798 ; Lee to Hotchkiss and Allan, pp. 41, 42 ; Memoirs 
Mrs. Jackson, Henderson's Stonewall Jack- of Robert E. Lee, Long, pp. 252, 254; 
son, II, 582; W. R., 39, p. 940; and other Stonetoall Jackson and the American Civil 
Confederate reports. War, Henderson, II, 532 ; So. Hist. Soc. 

3 The details of the interview between Papers, XXXIV, 1 ; Fitzhugh Lee's Chan- 
Lee and Jackson are deduced from conflict- cellorsville Address, ib., VII, 545). 



LEE PUZZLED 265 

main body of Stuart's cavalry and his horse artillery. The latter had 
probably been reenforced by midnight by the two detached pieces, mak- 
ing ten pieces. Wright's brigade, recalled by an order from Jackson, 
rejoined the force on the Plank Koad at 11 p.m. 

At this hour Posey received an order from Anderson to advance as 
far as he could. He succeeded in crossing the swamp, and pushed on 
to within "a short distance of the enemy's line of works." 

Since the commencement of operations this morning both sides have 
been reenforced by artillery-the Federals by 28 pieces (560 men), and 
the Confederates by 2 pieces (40 men). The losses since the opening 
of the campaign have been slight on both sides, the Federal amoimting 
to about 290 infantry, SO artillery (4 pieces), ^ and 65 cavalry, the Con" 
federate to about 100 infantry and 50 cavalry. The Federal loss in 
infantry fell wholly on Sykes' division, and the Confederate on Ander- 
son's, McLaws', and Eodes' divisions. Adding the gains and deducting 
the losses, we get for the forces about Chancellorsville at the end of the 
day the following figures : 

INFANTRY CAVALRY ARTILLERY AGGREGATE PIECES 

Federal 64,900 1,246 4,121 70,267 208 

Confederate .... 42,170 1,953 2,880 47,626 144 

Lee was still at a loss to estimate the numbers that confronted him. 
He had no knowledge of more than two corps. He probably believed 
30,000 and apprehended as many as 45,000 Federals to be intrenched or 
intrenching about Chancellorsville. 

Federal Left Wing 

Hooker's order of yesterday to Sedgwick regarding an attack or pur- 
suit was received about 11:30 a.m. Sedgwick did not observe any 
"weak point" in the enemy or any symptom of his "falling back," so 
he continued inactive. Hooker's order of to-day for a demonstration 
at 1 p.m. did not reach Butterfield until 4:55 p.m., nor Sedgwick until 
about 5:45 p.m. A feeble demonstration was made by the I and VI 
Corps after 6 p.m. The light division of the \T: Corps was sent across 
the river, its infantry relieving Russell's brigade {y\i) at the front. 
At 9 : 05 p.m. Sedgwick received from Butterfield an order from Hooker 
countermanding the demonstration as too late." 

In the expectation that Sedgwick was soon to drive the defenders of 
Fredericksburg before him, Eufus Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster of the 
Army of the Potomac, still on the north side of the Rappahannock, 
wrote to W. W. Wright, railroad superintendent at Aquia : 

Be prepared to lay the railroad bridge over the Rappahannock on short notice. 

' 41 o-ineh batterj- returned to north side of river. 
- iv. R., 107, p. 1034. 



266 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

On the completion of the telegraph line between Sedgwick's and 
Reynolds' headquarters, the flag and torch station at Fitzhugh House 
was broken up. Orders were issued for patrols on the telegraph 
lines to put to death instantly any person found tampering or in- 
terfering with them. Ten miles of telegraph wire were at Banks' 
Ford, with instruments, ready to cross there or be sent, if necessary, to 
United States Ford. The provost-marshal-general spent the day at 
United States Ford with 100 cavalry, engaged in keeping the communi- 
cations open. He reported that the telegraph wire was broken by the 
carelessness of the artillery.* 

The main train of the XII Corps moved to-day from Banks' Ford to 
United States Ford, where it connected with the troops. ^ 

At 1 : 30 p.m. Hooker received copies of dispatches from Butterfield 
to Eeynolds and Sedgwick, which, together perhaps with other reports, 
gave him the impression that one of the enemy's columns was threaten- 
ing to gain possession or command of Banks ' Ford. He ordered General 
Hunt, Chief of Artillery, to return to headquarters at Falmouth, collect 
the disposable artillery, move it to Banks' Ford, and prevent any at- 
tempt of the enemy to cross at that point. Hunt did not go to Falmouth. 
He went to United States Ford, which was then in telegraphic commu- 
nication with Falmouth, and telegraphed to Butterfield to send to 
Banks' Ford the disposable batteries near headquarters. He ordered 
the 4yo-inch battery which had ci'ossed the Rappahannock to recross, 
and return to its position at Banks' Ford, and proceeded to that point 
himself. From there he sent von Bliicher's battery of the General 
Reserve (four 20-pounders) down the river to relieve Hart's (six 3-inch 
guns), which he had called up from Traveller's Rest. While Hart's 
and von Bliicher's batteries were changing posts, Hart's battery was 
replaced at Traveller's Rest by Amsden's (~^ from Pollock's Mill.^ 
Von Bliicher's was placed in battery near the Fitzhugh House. 

The following dispatches were sent this evening : 

Hunt to Hooker, 7:20 p.in. 
Six guns are up here [at Banks' Ford], ten more will come certain, and more 
if General Sedgwick can send tliem. I have carefully examined the passes 
[crossings and approaches], and it is not practicable to prevent the passage of 
hostile troops, if a serious attempt is made, without infantry, at least a very 
strong division. General Benham has but 600 men [2. 2. II]. 

Hooker to Butterfield, 8:45 p.m. 
. . . Direct General Gibbon to send one brigade of his division to Banks' 
Ford, and have a suitable officer sent there to see that they are properly posted 

' W. R., 40, p. 333, and 39, p. 219. took position near Traveller's Rest, on 

^ lb., 40, p. 558. Widow Gray's Farm, about 10 a.m." ( W. 

2 Amsden says in his report: "Left this R., 39, p. 304). He probably left Pollock's 

position [Pollock's Mill] at 4 p.m. May 1; Mill at 4 a.m. 



BENHAM AT BANKS' FORD 267 

to prevent crossing. ... If the absence of one brigade should weaken General 
Gibbon too much, which I hope will not be the case, he must call on General 
Sedgwick for assistance. ... all the enemy's cavalry are in my immediate pres- 
ence, which I trust will enable Stoneman to do a land-olBce business in the 
interior. I think the enemy in his desperation will be compelled to attack me 
on my own ground. ... In half an hour more I shall probably have been en- 



Butterfield to Hooker, 10 p.m. 
There are now twenty-two guns of the Horse Artillery at Banks' Pord^ and a 
brigade of infantry ordered there.^ There will be in the neighborhood of thirty- 
four guns in all in the morning.*. . . Benham says if he had a full division from 
any troops, he should feel that he could defy them. If he could not defy them 
from the river with thirty-two pieces of artillery and a brigade of infantry, he 
ought to be pitched into the river himself. . . . 

There was apparently a serious disagreement between Hunt and 
Benham on one side, and Hooker and Butterfield on the other, as to the 
amount of infantry needed at Banks' Ford. 

Eegarding the strength of the enemy, a Federal spy from Richmond 
reported 59,000 rations as issued to Lee's army, and gave the forces 
about Richmond at ' ' 8000 or 10,000 troops. ' ' Butterfield telegraphed to 
Peck (7:30 p.m.): 

Hood's and Pickett's divisions of Longstreet's corps are in our front; so re- 
ported by deserters and prisoners captured to-da}^ 

Peck replied : 

There may be portions of Longstreet's troops with your opponents. If so, 
they are the first instalments. Deserters and contrabands who came in yester- 
day from Hood's and Pickett's divisions agree in all points with others that have 
fallen into our hands. . . . 

Touching this matter the following dispatch of this date from Cooper 
to Lee was probably received to-day : 

Orders were sent on Wednesday [April 29] to General Longstreet to move 
forward his command to reenforee you. He replied he would do so immediately, 
but expected to be a little delayed in gathering up his transportation train . . . 
General D. H. Hill, at Kinston, was also directed to send forward a brigade 

' W. R., 107, p. 1034. several regiments. These were left in front 

^ There were only 28 pieces of hoi-se ar- of Fredericksburg'. An additional regiment 

tillery altogether. Of these 6 were with (r^^i) was ordered to Banks' Ford. 

Pieasonton, 6 with Stoneman, and 6 with -i The heavy battery from United States 

Averell. There could not have been more Ford (B. 1. Conn.) arrived and was posted 

than 10, therefore, at Banks' Ford. The after 7 : 30 p.m., making 26 guns in posi- 

additional force at that point was probably Hon. Hart's battery of 6 gims and Kinzie's 

Graham's and Meinell's batteries of the of 4, both of the Generaf Reserve, arrived 

General Reserve (12 pieces). during the night, but were not posted. 
* 2-^ , except the picket details of the 



268 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

(Ransom's), and from his reply, it may be expected here to-night, when it will 
be immediate!}' pushed forward. . . . 

Earl}^ received an order thi.s evening from Lee,— in case troops were 
withdrawn from his front, to post a guard in his position, and with the 
remainder of his force to join Lee. Pendleton observed heavy columns 
marching over the hills back of Falmouth toward the Federal right, but 
interpreted the movement as a feint, as no train was put in motion.^ 
He probably did not report the fact to Early. 

About 10 : 30 a.m. a signal message from Port Royal announced the 
presence of two gunboats shelling that place. This, together with Sedg- 
wick's display of force in the afternoon, kej^t Early from detaching 
any of his force, except that the report from Port Eoyal caused him to 
send two batteries (x)- numbering 8 pieces, to the river bluff near 
Port Eoyal. The remainder of his artillery, numbering 56 pieces, he 
disposed between Hamilton's Crossing and the Plank Road. At 11 p.m. 
he had 46 pieces in position on this line and the other 10 in reserve in 
rear of its center.- One battery (j^^.^) of four joieces remained on the 
line of communication between Early's position and Chesterfield depot. 
There was considerable cheering along Early's front, induced, no doubt, 
by reports of the progress made by Jackson and Lee in the direction of 
Chancellorsville. The Federals endeavored to drown the Confederate 
voices with coimter-cheering. 

With a view to the moving of Hooker's supplj'-boats, the Federal 
Secretary of the Navy cabled to-day to Rear-Admiral Lee at Fort 
Monroe : ' ' Dispatch two of the four tugs sent to you from the Potomac, 
to the mouth of the Rappahannock"; and Ingalls, about to leave for 
Chancellorsville, telegraphed to Rucker (5:40 p.m.) : "Be prepared for 
transportation of forage and subsistence in light-draft vessels, if re- 
quired." 

Averell had been feebly engaged most of the day with W. H. F. Lee 
at Rapidan Station. He could distinctly hear the firing in the Wilder- 
ness, which seemed to come from the direction of Fredericksburg, where 
Hooker was supposed to be fighting Lee. Hooker, learning of Averell 's 
position, had the following message sent to him at 6 : 30 p.m. : 

General: 

I am directed by the Major-general commanding to inform you that he does 
not understand what you are doing at Rapidan Station. If this finds you at 

1 Pendleton's report, W. R., 39, p. 810. gmis of the 2d battei-y and 2 of the 4th 

These columns must have been artillery, battery of the Washington Artillery, under 

signal corps men, and provost guards, going Richardson, 4 pieces; Andrews' battalion, 

to Banks' and United States Fords. 16 pieces. 

" In position ; a section of Parkei-'s bat- In reserve : the remainder of the Wash- 

tery, 2 pieces; Frasei-'s battei-y, 4 pieces; ington Artillery, 6 pieces; Patterson's bat- 

Khett's battery, 4 pieces; Carlton's battery, tery, 4 pieces. 
4 pieces; Nelson's battalion, 12 pieces; 2 



AVERELL RECALLED 269 

that place, you will immediately return to United States Ford, and remain there 
until further orders, and report in person. 

P.S. If tliis reaches you at one o'clock in tlie morning you will start immediately.' 

In compliance with the request sent yesterday from Hooker's head- 
quarters, the 3d brigade of Stahel's cavalry division was sent to-day 
from Fairfax Court-House to Bristoe Station. One regiment (5 X. Y.) 
reconnoitered from there to Rappahannock Station, and took post at 
Warrenton Junction. 

COMMENTS 

In the advance from Chancel lor sville, the connection that was to have 
been established after crossing Mott's Run was not effected. The Con- 
federates formed but two columns. The smaller one under McLaws 
demonstrated against Hooker's front while the larger one under Jack- 
son sought to ovei'power his right. The two commands were in constant 
communication with each other. ^ATiile the Federals advanced in iso- 
lated columns, the Confederates came on practically in unbroken line of 
battle, and overlapped and turned their enemy wherever they met him. 

The Federal cavalry did not prove itself as efficient as the Confed- 
erate. When Hooker marched out toward Tabernacle Church there was 
not a trooper in advance of his columns except the pickets of the 8 Pa. 
Cavalry. AVhen this regiment was relieved by Sykes' division, it should 
have taken a post of observation on a flank of that division, or have 
occupied itself with establishing and maintaining connection with the 
adjoining columns. Instead of that, it went to the rear, leaving the two 
squadrons of Owen's 3 Va. Cavalry unopposed. 

It was a capital mistake of Hooker's to detach the cavalry corps. 
Sending it ahead of the army as the latter ascended the Rappahannock 
served the important purpose, already pointed out, of deceiving the 
enemy as to Hooker's intentions. So far its employment was judicious, 
but after it crossed the Rappahannock it should have been used to 
screen and protect the turning columns and to keep Stuart from joining 
Lee. Especially after the right wing crossed the Rapidan was the 
cavalry needed to recounoiter toward Chaneellorsville and Fredericks- 
burg, and to screen the army on the side of Spottsylvania and Rich- 
mond. In testifj'ing before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
Hooker said : 

From the place of crossing the river, Kelley's Ford, the infantrj- had about 
twenty -five miles to march to Chaneellorsville ; and the cavalry between fifty and 
sixty, to their post on the Aquia and Richmond railroad. Hence I concluded 
that they would reach their respective destinations about the same time. 

' W. R., 39, p. 1080. This dispatch was party passed through Stevensburg. where 
borne by Lieutenant Bhint of the 6 N. Y. hostile patrols were encountered, going and 
Cavalry, with an escort of 4 men. The coming {ib., 39, p. 782). 



270 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

He expected that the cavalry and the rest of the army would cross the 
Rappahannock by the morning of the 29th ; and that by the night of the 
30th Averell would have disposed of W. H. F. Lee and joined Stoneman 
near Hanover Junction. As it turned out, Averell on the night of the 
30th had not become seriously engaged, and Stoneman had not gotten 
beyond the Rapidan. The infantry was at Chancellorsville; and the 
cavalry, not half-way to Hanover Junction. This backwardness of the 
cavalry was due primarily to Hooker's tardiness in issuing his orders 
for it to march from Warrenton Junction. 



CHAPTER XIX 

MAY 2 . . - JACKSON 's FLANK MARCH AND DEPLOYMENT FOE ATTACK 

Right Wing until 8 a.m. (Map 16) 

DURING the night of the 1st and 2d, Sykes' division (f) was with- 
drawn to the Mineral Spring Road near the Chandler House, where 
it intrenched itself. Griffin's division (^) fell back into the interval be- 
tween Sykes' and Humphreys'. Hancock's (j^) formed a new line of 
which the left crossed the Turnpike perpendicularly and the right ran 
obliquely thereto, connecting with Geary's left (^) near the Plank Road. 
At 1 : 55 a.m. Hooker wrote to Butterfield : 

Direct all the bridges to be taken up at Frauklin's crossing and below before 
daylight, and for Reynolds' corps to march at once, with pack-train, to report to 
headquarters. 

He intended, it seems, to place this corps and Averell's cavalry on 
Howard's right, so as to form a continuous line from the Rappahannock 
on the left to the Rapidan on the right. 

While there was more or less discouragement, as already shown, in 
consequence of yesterday's retrograde movement, the army was gener- 
ally buoyed up with the belief that it was about to fight a great and 
decisive battle. Captain Candler, aide-de-camp to Hooker, wrote home 
at 3 a.m. : 

. . . Were attacked by Johnny Reb yesterday. Pell back at first to draw him 
on, then took a position and gave him "fits." Expect the fight to commence 
again in half an hour. We are all right. They have reenforcements from Rich- 
mond, but we can whip them anyway, for they must come out of their works and 
attack us in our own position. To-day will tell a big tale. God grant we may 
be successful. Staff and general all sound as yet. 

At or about daylight the following movements took place within the 
Federal lines : Graham's brigade {^^i) from the rear of Fairview to its 
division on the Plank Road; Arnold's battery (2:^-1) to Chandler's; one 
section of Pettit's battery {^) from Chandler's to the Irish brigade 
(i-|j) at Scott's Ford, the remainder of this battery (4 pieces) taking 
position near Chandler's; Pleasonton's cavalry, with its battery, from 



272 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Hunting Run to Chancellorsville, leaving one squadron of the 6 N. Y. 
on picket at Ely's Ford. Between 7 and 8 a.m. Carroll's brigade (.^) 
occupied the interval between Hancock and Sykes, where it intrenched 
itself in the course of the day. By request of General Meade (command- 
ing V Corps) a regiment of Mott's brigade (^70^11) ^^^ ordered at 8 
a.m. to report to General Humphreys, commanding Meade's third divi- 
sion. It was placed on Humi^hreys' extreme left to connect his line 
with the river. The Irish brigade (—) had probably withdrawn to a 
position in rear of Humphreys ' division. 

From Chancellorsville westward, the Federal line runs for the greater 
part along the crest of a ridge, constituting the watershed between the 
Rappahannock and Mattajwny Rivers. About three fourths of a mile 
from Chancellorsville is an eminence known as Fairview, which com- 
mands Chancellorsville and the Plank Road east and west. About 
three fourths of a mile southwest of Fairview is another eminence, 
which, though clear but for a solitary clump of hazel-bushes, is called 
Hazel Grove. In the depression between these two eminences is a small 
brook with swampy banks running southward. On a swell of ground 
about a mile from Hazel Grove is Dowdall's Tavern, where Howard 
had his headquarters. About half a mile beyond this point is another 
rise of ground called Taylor after the farm-house situated on it. The 
Federal line passed by the south of Fairview and north of Hazel Grove, 
with a break where it crossed the creek, and extended westward beyond 
Taylor, its right resting in the depth of the forest. Taylor overlooks 
and commands the front of the XI Corps. The enemy in possession of 
it, and the whole position of that corps, would have to be abandoned. 
It is the key-point of this part of the line. 

At sunrise Hooker, accompanied by Sickles, started from Chancel- 
lorsville on a tour of inspection along his line on the right. He found 
Birney with his three brigades on the crest of Hazel Grove between 
the XI and XII Corps, where he had taken position after consultation 
with Howard and in pursuance of Sickles ' order. All along the line he 
was greeted by the troops with hearty and prolonged cheers. 

Hooker had ordered his position to be intrenched in the hope that Lee and 
Jackson, following Burnside's example, would dash their divisions into fragments 
against them [sic], and thus become an easy prey. Lee.^^ith a broader appreciation 
of the true tactical bearing of ditch and parapet, determined to employ them as a 
shelter for his own force until Jackson's movement was completed and the time 
had come for a general advance. Orders were at once sent to General ^IcLaws 
to cover his front, extending across the pike and the Plank roads, with a line of 
breastworks; and long before daylight the soldiers of his division, with the 
scanty means at their disposal, were busy as beavers amongst the timber.' 

^ Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, by G. F. R. Henderson, 11, 530. 



LEE'S PLAN 273 

As already stated, Lee decided to endeavor to turn the Fedex-al right 
flank with a portion of his army under Jackson while demonstrating 
against the Federal left and front with the i-emainder. 

To Jackson were assigned the infantry of his three divisions and the 
8 S. Ca. of Kershaw's brigade of McLaws' division (f;hi_y Stuart's 
three regiments of cavalry, and fractions of two others, the artillery of 
the II Corps (except Dance's and Hupp's batteries of the corps artil- 
lery, and the artillery of Early's division), Alexander's battalion of the 
corps artillery of the I Corps (except Rhett's and Jordan's batteries 
and 2 pieces of Parker's battery), and Stuart's 10 pieces of horse artil- 
lery, altogether about 31,700 men and 112 pieces of artillery (88 of the 
II Corps, 14 of the I- Corps, and 10 of the cavalry). The following 
forces were to remain imder Lee, confronting the Federal left and 
front: the infantry of Anderson's division (j) except Wilcox's brigade, 
—with Dance's and Hupp's batteries of the corps artillery of the II 
Corps (8 pieces) ; the infantry of McLaws' division ({i) except Barks- 
dale's brigade and the 8 S. Ca.,— with Manly 's and McCarthy's bat- 
teries of McLaws' division, Grandy's battery of Anderson's division 
(j), and Jordan's, of the corps artillery of the I Corps, each numbering 
4 pieces; the 4 and about half of the .3 Va. Cavalry; altogether about 
13,000 men with 24 pieces of artillery. Lee thus assigned to his turning 
force about % of his infantry and fs of his artillery— retaining for dem- 
onstration about % of his infantry and % of his artillery.- 

The enemy was astir at an early hour. Between 2 : 30 a.m. and day- 
light Wilcox with his brigade and ^Moore's and Lewis' batteries (^) 
returned to Banks' Ford. Wofford moved to the left, establishing con- 
nection with the line in that direction. About daylight Iverson's bri- 
gade (.v-\j) relieved Ramseur's (^j) at the front on the Plank Road. 
At 7 a.m. Thomas' brigade (j^jj) relieved Posey's (,-^). The latter 
with Wright's (j^) took position on the left of the Plank Road near 
Decker ( a") (Map 16). 

Major Pegram, commanding an artillery battalion of Jackson's corps, 
was directed to advance as many rifled guns on the road leading from 
the right of the Confederate line to Chancellorsville as could be used, 
"for the purpose of shelling the enemy's infantry in the woods." Ac- 
cording to Major Pegram this was at 6:30 a.m. But Colonel B. T. 
Brockman of the 13 S. Ca. says, "the cannon firing opened at 5:16 

1 W. n., 39, p. 832. 

^ The numbers in each fraction were about as follows: 



Under Jackson 
" Lee . . 



INFANTRY 


CAVALRY 


ARTILLERY 


AGGREGATE 


PIECE; 


28,050 

11,981 


1,450 
500 


2.240 

480 


31,740 
12,961 


112 
24 



Total 40,031 1.950 2,720 44,701 136 



274 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

o 'clock.'" The order was probably received about 5 o'clock. Pur- 
suant thereto Brunson's and McGraw's batteries (p^) were posted be- 
tween the Plank Road and Turnpike and afterward reenforced with 2 
pieces, making a line of 10 pieces. They drew upon themselves the fire 
of two Federal batteries (Atwell's (.375^) ^^^^ probably Hampton's 
C2~in)» ^^y ^^ pieces). For about twenty minutes they kept up their 
cannonade, some of the guns shelling the woods while the others en- 
gaged the Federal batteries.- A strong line of skirmishers advanced 
from McLaws' position,^ which together with the fire of the artillery 
developed the fact that Hooker was still in the vicinity of Chancellors- 
ville and ready at least to defend himself. 

In consequence of these and other preliminaries Jackson did not 
make as early a start as he had intended to. There was some delay in 
assembling his troops.'* Colquitt's brigade took up the march from the 
vicinity of Aldrich Tavern about 5 : 30 a.m., proceeded by the Plank 
Road to Decker (A), and thence, apparently after some further delay, 
pursued its way westward toward Welford's Furnace. Colonel E. P. 
Alexander says: "Two hours after sunrise [about 7 a.m.] Lee, stand- 
ing by the roadside, watched the head of the column march by, and ex- 
changed with Jackson the last few words ever to pass between them."^ 
This was probably in the vicinity of Decker (A). 

The infantry was preceded by the 2 Va. Cavalry, and protected on 
the right by the 1 and 5 Va. Cavalry and part of the 3.® The 4th regi- 
ment and the other half of the 3d, under Wickham and Owen, remained 
behind watching the Federal left. The main column was headed by the 
Second Division (Rodes'), of which the 4th brigade (Colquitt's) was 
in front. Behind the Second Division came the Fourth (Colston's), 
and behind the Fourth the First (A. P. Hill's). In each division the 
infantry was followed by the artillery and the fighting train, composed 
of ambulances and ammunition-wagons.^ The regimental and main 
trains went by roads further to the South directed upon Todd's Tavern.* 
A detail of cavalry was attached to Jackson's staff as couriers: fre- 
quent reports were to be sent back to General Lee.* 

Right Wing from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. (Map 17) 

About 8 a.m. the column commenced crossing the high open ground 
on the east side of Scott's Run, near Welford's Furnace, and descend- 

1 W. R., 39, pp. 937, 910. ' Militan/ Memoirs of a Confederate, by 

- lb., 39, pp. 937, 938, 890, 771. E. P. Alexander, p. 330. 

=• lb., 39, p. 825. 8 Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., V, 

* Military Memoirs of a Confederate, by 371. 

E. P. Alexander, p. 333. ^ Johnny Reb and Billy Yank, by Alex- 

^ lb., p. 329. ander Hunter, p. 359; Stonewall .Jackson 

' Letters of Colonel T. T. Munford, 2 and the American Civil War, by G. F. R. 

Va. Cav., to the author. Hendei-son, II, 532. 



JACKSON UNDER WAY 275 

ing therefrom to cross the creek. Here Colquitt, by order of General 
Jackson, detached from his brigade the 23 Ga. "with instructions to 
guard the flank of the column in motion against a surprise, and to call, 
if necessary, upon any officer whose command was passing, for reen- 
forcement."* Jackson crossed the Bun at the head of his infantry, 
and declining a breakfast prepared for him at the Furnace, pushed on 
by the road leading southward. The procession of infantry, artillery, 
and wagons, rising into the clearing east of Scott's Run and sinking 
with a southward trend into the woods beyond, was soon observed from 
General Birney's lookouts in the tops of high trees about Hazel Grove.^ 
Birney ordered up a section (two guns) of Sims' battery (rm) ^^^ 
about 10 a.m. had it open fire on the column at a distance of about a 
mile and a quarter, causing the troops to "double-quick" past the point 
fired at.'* Sims brought up the rest of his battery and about 11 a.m. 
opened on a train which was then passing.-* In the meantime Turnbull's 
battery (j^j ) was brought up to Hazel Grove and parked on the edge of 
the clearing, where it was joined probably about 11:30 by Jastram's 
battery (jt^) from the vicinity of Chandler's.^ 

The peppering to which Sims subjected the enemy's column caused 
some hastening of its movement and perhaps a slight deflection of the 
line of march from the route over the high open grovmd to one concealed 
by the latter. 

"Never can I forget," says Hunter McGuire, late medical director of 
Jacksonis corps, ' ' the eagerness and intensity of Jackson on that march 
to Hooker's rear. His face was pale, his eyes flashing. Out from his 
thin compressed lips came the terse command: 'Press forward, press 
forward!' In his eagerness as he rode, he leaned over on the neck of 
his horse, as if in that way the march might be hurried. ' See that the 
column is kept closed, and that there is no straggling,' he more than 
once ordered; and 'Press on, jjress on!' was repeated again and again. 
Every man in the ranks knew that we were engaged in some great flank 
movement, and they eagerly responded and pressed on at a rapid gait."" 

Regimental conunanders were ordered to march in rear of their regi- 
ments with a guard of strong men with fixed bayonets to prevent strag- 
gling.^ 

' W. R.y 39, pp. 975, 979. some other route. Sometimes the men and 

^ There is reason for belie\-ing- that it was teams would go on the run while passing, 

seen also from one or more of the Federal That was all. Shortly the eolrnnn would 

balloons ; but it is doubtful whether any be moving as before" ( The 27 Indiana Vol. 

report of the faet reached Hooker. A Fed- Infantry, by a member of Company C, p. 

eral balloon was visible to the Confederates 318). 

as they marched over the open ground near * TF. R., 39, pp. 404, 443. 

the Funiace (Letter to the author from ' History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Ar- 

Captain Randolph Barton, Baltimore). tillery, by George Lewis, p. 159. 

' TF. R., 39, pp. 408, 443. "There would » Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, XXV, 110. 

be a temporary break m the column, as ' Histories of the Several Regiments and 

though it had stopped or was going by Battalions from N. Ca. in the Great War 



276 THE CAilPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The roads were wet enough to be easy to the feet and free from dust. 
The weather was fine, but very warm, at least for a soldier in a march- 
ing column, shut in by dense wood on either side. There was suffering 
for want of water and food.^ 

Captain Smith, Jackson's assistant adjutant-general, after starting 
the last of the heavy trains on the road from Aldrich to Todd's Tavern, 
proceeded to join his chief at the head of the column. As he slowly and 
with difficulty forced his horse along the narrow, crowded road past the 
plodding infantry, he was the target for all the chaff at their command. 
"Say, here 's one of Old Jack's little boys; let him by, boys! Have a 
good breakfast this morning, sonny f Better hurry up or you '11 catch 
it for getting behind. Tell Old Jack we 're all a-comin'. Don't let him 
begin the fuss till we get there!" and so on.- 

At a little after 9 o 'clock Hooker had completed the inspection of his 
lines. Eeturning to his headquarters, he found waiting there couriers 
from General Birney, who informed him that a column of the enemy 
was visible moving continuously across his front toward the right, ac- 
companied by trains, guns, and ambulances, and had been visible since 
8 o'clock. From his tent Hooker caught sight of one portion of Jack- 
son's column after another coming up on the divide near the Brick 
House, saw it sink into the valley of Scott's Run, and reappear on high 
open ground, going southward down the Run. This southward turn 
was suggestive of a march on Richmond. However, after watch- 
ing the movement awhile, he spread a map on his bed and carefully 
studied it, soliloquizing, says J. Watts de Peyster, somewhat thus : " It 
can't be retreat; retreat without a fight? That is not Lee. If not re- 
treat, what is it? Lee is trying to flank me." For the first time, it 
seems, he considered the possibility of Lee's attacking him, not on 
his, but on Lee's own ground. His recent inspection had revealed 
to him that his position, though strong in front, was weak on the 
extreme right. To remedy this defect, he sent the following dispatch : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Saturday, May 2, 9:30 a.m., 1863. 
To General Howard. 
General: 

I am directed by the Major-General commanding to say the disposition you 
have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. 
If lie should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground, 
and determine upon the position you will take in that event, in order that you 
may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. 

1861-5, by W. Clark, I, 191. According to Ga., "fell out of ranks exhausted, some 

Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, "all strag- fainting and having spasms; only a few 

glers were to be bayoneted" (Stonewall had eaten anything since the morning be- 

Jackson and the American Civil War, II, fore" (W. R., 39, p. 981). 
532). 2 J. P. Smith, in B. and L., Ill, 205. 206. 

* "Many," says the colonel of the 27 



JACKSON'S MOVEMENT OBSERVED 277 

He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contin- 

^^°*'^' J. H. Van Alen, 

Brig. General and A. D. C. 
We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please 
advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order 
to obtain timely information of their approach.' 

Hooker thus protected himself, as he thought, against an attack in 
flank. He did not know, as he should have known, that his right flank 
was more than 2 miles from the Rapidan, and that there was practically 
nothing in the interval to cover his communications. So he did nothing 
for the safety of the latter. His problem, as he now viewed it, was to 
meet an attack in front or flank or both. Had he risen to the occasion, 
he would have made Lee look to his own security. Rather than accept 
his present situation, he would have recognized the fault that he com- 
mitted in assuming the defensive, and have put forth his whole strength 
offensively. At 9 : 30, when he sent his message to Howard, he wrote to 
Butterfield : 

The General Commanding desires you to instruct General Sedgwick, if an 
opportunity presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success, to attack 
the enemy in his front. We have reliable information that all the divisions 
known to us as having belonged to the army at Fredericksburg except Ewell's 
[Early's] are in this vicinity. It is impossible for the general to determine here 
whether it is expedient for him [Sedgwick] to attack or not. It must be left to 
his discretion. 

It is to be observed that Sedgwick's attack as above prescribed was 
to be a real, not a pretended one. Hooker was now aware that Sedg- 

1 1 am indebted for the text of this docu- other document of the same import, but 
ment to H. M. Kellog, Esq., of Cortland, marked "Circular" and addressed : "Major- 
N. Y., who copied it from the original General Slocum and Major-General How- 
while on duty as clerk at Howard's head- ard," is given in the Report of the Commit- 
quarters on the 30th of .June, 1863. Until tee on the Conduct of the War (IV, 126). 
then, nearly two months after the cam- It is presumably this one that is given as 
paign of Chancellorsville, and forty-eight addressed to "Major-Generals Slocum and 
hours after the departure of General Howard," in Battles and Leaders of the 
Hooker from the Army of the Potomac, no Civil War (III, 219). Howard received 
record of this order had been made in the two copies of this dispatch a short time 
Letters Received book of the XI Corps apart. They made so httle impression on 
(AfiSdavit of H. M. Kellog, in The Battles him that he afterward denied having ever 
of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, by Cap- received them ( Carl Schurz in B. and L., 
tain A. H. Nelson, p. 36). The original III, 220, and in McClure's Magazine, June, 
has disappeared from the files of the War 1907; and Howard in B. and L., Ill, 196). 
Department, and can not be found. A dis- In his Autobiography (1907) Howard 
patch of the same import, but addressed : neither denies nor admits having received 
"Major-Generals Howard and Slocum," is this order. In 1874 Hooker wrote with 
given in the War Records (40, p. 360). It reference to Howard: "His offence to me 
is taken from Hooker's Letters Sent book, was forgotten when he acknowledged it" 
in which the order is annotated in red ink: (Letter to General W. G. Le Due, Feb. 24). 
"Copy furnished General Howard." An- 



278 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

wick had failed to hold Lee in his position on the Rappahannock. Sedg- 
wick was to force the position "in his front." In what direction 
he was to pursue was not stated. About 10 o'clock Manly 's and Mc- 
Carthy's batteries (,j^) opened fire from their position on the Turnpike. 
This demonstration may have drawn the attention of the Federal com- 
mander in this direction. At any rate, when General Sickles returned 
to headquarters Hooker ordered him to make a reconnaissance in front 
and to the left of Chancellorsville. ' ' Two reliable regiments led by cir- 
cumspect and intrepid commanders," the 11 Mass., Colonel Blaisdell, 
and the 26 Pa., Colonel Tilghman (o^f^), were sent out, the former in 
front of Hancock, on the Turnpike, the latter on the Plank Road, each 
accompanied by a detachment of Berdan's sharpshooters from Whip- 
ple's division (yii)- "^^^ ^^ ^^- ^°^^ ^ ^^^ prisoners who reported that 
they had missed the road and that they were marching toward the 
Federal right. 

Meanwhile Lee was cahnly waiting for the accomplishment of Jack- 
son's manceuver. Fully appreciating, and resolutely facing, the possi- 
bility of failure, he wrote to President Davis : 

I find the enemy in a strong position at Cliancellorsville and in large force ; 
his communications extend to the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely 's Fords, and to 
the Rappahannock at United States Mine Ford. He seems determined to make 
the fight here, and, from what I learn from General Early, has sent up troops 
from his position opposite Fredericksburg.^ 

It is plain that if the enemy is too strong for me here, I shall have to fall 
back and Fredericksburg must be abandoned. If successful here, Fredericksburg 
will be saved, and our communications retained. I may be forced back to the 
Orange and Alexandria or the Virginia Central road, but in either case I will be 
in position to contest the enemy's advance upon Richmond. I have no expecta- 
tion that any reenforcements from Longstreet or North Carolina will join me in 
time to aid in the contest at this point, but they may be in time for a subsequent 
occasion. 

I am now swinging around to my left to come up in his [the enemy's] rear. 

I learn from prisoners taken that Heintzelman's troops from Washington are 
here- and the enemy seems to have concentrated his strength for this effort. If 
I had with me all my command, and could keep it supplied with provisions and 
forage, I should feel easy, but as far as I can judge the advantage of numbers 
and position is greatly in favor of the enemy. 

Lee's artillery was disposed in two fractions of 12 pieces each: 
Grady's, McCarthy's, and Manly 's batteries (^^, o) with McLaws on 

1 Lee refers here to the movement of the fences of Washington, had not left his 
III Corps. command. None of his troops had joined 

2 Heintzelman, commanding- the de- the Army of the Potomac. 



SICKLES ORDERED FORWARD 279 

the Turnpike; Jordan's, Dance's, and Hupp's (f, ^) with Lee on the 
Plank Road. 

McLaws had orders from Lee to "hold his position, as General Jack- 
son would operate to the left and rear, ... not to engage seriously, 
but to press strongly as soon as it was discovered that General Jackson 
had attacked."! As the troops between Semmes' brigade and the 
Plank Road marched off to follow Jackson, Kershaw's brigade came 
into the front line and, together with Semmes' and the artillery, occu- 
pied the space between the Plank Road and the Turnpike. Lee on the 
left and McLaws on the right, each had 8 pieces of artillery in position 
and 4 in reserve. Lee's 8 were posted by Major Hardaway, Anderson's 
chief of artillery, as follows : 2 pieces on the Plank Road, 2 on a road 
further to the left leading into the Plank Road, and 4 distributed along 
the Welford's Furnace Road at intervals of about 400 yards to com- 
mand the hollows leading into Scott's Run. McLaws' 8 (^^) were 
posted between Semmes' and Wofford's brigades on the left of the 
Turnpike. His reserve battery (^\) had been withdrawn on account of 
the pieces not having sufficient range.^ 

About 11 o'clock Sickles received several reports in quick succession 
from Birney to the effect that a column of the enemy was moving to- 
ward the Federal right. He consequently, with Hooker's approval, 
joined Birney at Hazel Grove. The movements of the enemy indicated 
to Sickles a retreat on Gordonsville or an attack upon the Federal right 
flank— perhaps both, for if the attack failed, the retreat might be car- 
ried out. Sickles hastened to report the movement through staff officers 
to Hooker, and proposed that he use his whole corps in following up the 
enemy and attacking his columns. He communicated the substance of 
this message to Howard on his right and to Slocum on his left, inviting 
their cooperation in case Hooker should accede to this proposition. 
About noon Hooker sent him orders to "advance cautiously toward the 
road, followed by the enemy, and harass the movement as much as 
possible, "3 with Birney 's and Whipple's divisions (l^), but refused to 
let him have Berry's (j^). Hooker's dispatch of 9:30 a.m. reached 
Howard a little after 12. Howard' in the meantime had sent the follow- 
ing dispatch, which reached Hooker about 11:30: 

Headquarters 11th Corps, May 2, 10 m. to ll'o'k [10:50 a.m.]. 
Ma J. Gen. Hooker. Com 'd 'g Army. 
General: 

From Gen. Devens' headquarters [Taylor] we can observe a column of in- 
fantry moving westward on a road parallel with this on a ridge about li/> to 2 m. 
south of this. I am taking measures to resist an attack from the west. 

Respectfully, q q g^^^^^^ 

Maj. Gen. 
1 W. R., 39, pp. 825, 826. ^ lb., 39, p. 883. ^ jj ^ 39^ p ggg. 



280 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The distance of the column referred to, from Devens' headquarters, 
was 2 miles or more.^ What these "measures to resist an attack from 
the west" consisted in. Hooker could only conjecture. He probably 
conceived them to be a refusal of Howard 's right, and pictured to him- 
self a division or more of this corps thrown back and prolonged toward 
the Rapidan. All that was done, so far as can be learned, was to place 
the reserve artillery, as it arrived, in position facing west (Map 17 )2 
and to send Captain Castle of the Signal Corps toward the west to 
watch the movements of the enemy.3 This was about 11 o'clock. The 
captain established a station in the vicinity of von Gilsa's line on the 
extreme right. About noon Lieutenant Keen opened a signal station at 
Dowdall's Tavern (Howard's headquarters) to communicate with Cas- 
tle. These two stations were in communication with each other until 
about 6 o'clock this evening, when, as we shall see, the movements of 
the enemy broke them up.'* 

About noon the 26 Pa. was withdrawn from its forward position on 
the Plank Road and returned to its brigade (^[n), leaving the 11 Mass. 
of the same brigade on the Turnpike, cooperating with Hancock's ad- 
vance skirmishers under Colonel Nelson A. Miles of the 61 N. Y. Volun- 
teers. 

At noon Sickles received Hooker's order for harassing the enemy. 
He brought up two battalions of sharpshooters under Colonel Berdan 
to be deployed as sldrmishers and as flankers, so as to get all possible 
Imowledge of the enemy's movements and of the approaches to his line 
of march ; he communicated again with Slocum and Howard, and was 
assured of their prompt cooperation;^ and hastily ordered Birney "to 
follow the enemy, pierce the column, and gain possession of the road 
over which it was passing."" About 12: 30 Hayman's brigade (i^jf^y 
covered in front and on both flanks with skirmishers from Berdan 's and 
his own, pushed across Scott's Run, heading for the point on the road 
which had been reached by the fire of the artillery. Jackson's corps 
artillery, followed by its ammunition-train and other trains, was now 
passing the Furnace. Orders were sent back for the rear portion of 
the column to take the road which turns south at a point east of the 
Furnace and joins the Furnace Road beyond the Welford House. 
Brooke's battery of four 12-pounder Napoleons (^) was taken out of 
the column. One piece was hastily thrust out to the right with orders 
to fire one charge and retire, thus giving time for the other pieces to 
take position on a hill south of the railroad cut. The single piece fired 
three rounds of canister, double-shotted, from the right of the road, 

^ W. R., 39, p. 386. = lb., 39, p. 386. 

= 7b., 39, p. 651. « lb., 39, p. 408. 

^ lb., 39, p. 231. ' Except the 37 N. Y., which remained 

'' 76. between Bimey's right and Howard's left. 



SICKLES ADVANCES 281 

and fell back to join the other three pieces, which in the meantime had 
taken position at Welford's House. This was about 2 p.m. 

The 23 Ga. (t-^-^), covering the flank of Jackson's column, had not 
suffered from the Federal artillery, which had aimed only at the 
column; it was therefore quite fresh, but it was altogether too weak to 
resist the force directed upon the Furnace. Lee had directed Anderson 
to send a brigade to resist the further progress of the Federal column. 
Anderson about noon sent Posey's (j^j) with orders to dislodge the 
enemj'.' About 1 p.m. its 2:)ickets were driven in. Its skirmishers, how- 
ever, delivered such an effective fire that Birney had to order up Gra- 
ham's brigade d-iii) to the support of Hayman's. At the same time 
Sickles ordered Whipple's division to come within supporting distance 
of Birney 's. Best soon perceived that he was greatlj'^ outnumbered and 
would not be able to maintain his position. So, leaving about 40 men as 
rear-guard, he withdrew about 2 p.m. with the remainder of the regi- 
ment toward the cut of the unfinished railroad. 

At the time of Birney 's advance against the Furnace (12:30-1 p.m.) 
the fraction of the 3 Va. Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Carter was 
on picket duty at the Furnace. Carter himself carried to the rear of 
Jackson 's column a report that the train was attacked and in danger of 
being captured. A similar report was sent to Lee's headquarters. As 
a consequence the 14 Ga. of Thomas' brigade was sent back "to the 
assistance of the artillery-train,"- and Wright's brigade (~j) started 
from the Plank Eoad toward the Furnace to support Posey. About the 
same time Ward's brigade (j-%j) moved out to support Hayman's and 
Graham's brigades, and "Whipple's division (^) commenced arriving at 
Hazel Grove as reserve.^ 

Jackson's column kept moving on. The cavalry guarding its right 
flank had here and there come in sight of Federal pickets and patrols, 
and generally maintained toward them an attitude of observation or de- 
fence. The advance-guard had not met a hostile soldier when about 
1 p.m., as it approached the Orange Plank Road, the 2 Va. Cavalry, still 
leading the way, caught sight of a Federal vidette, who quickly disap- 
peared. On reaching the Plank Road, the Confederate cavalry turned 
to the right and followed the road as far as Hickman's place, where it 
dismounted to rest.'* Soon afterward one squadron went further down 
the road, and meeting a picket of Federal cavalry, dislodged it and 
pursued it some distance, returning thereupon to Hickman's. The 
officer commanding this detachment reported to Colonel Munford that 

^ TF. R., 39, pp. 798, S51, 871. This bri- - Two pieces of Lewis' batteiy of this 

gade left one regiment (48 IVtiss.) behind di\dsion remained, it seems, in the vicinity 

as skirmishers, which reduced it to three of Chancellorsville (TF. B., 39, p. 726). 
regiments. * The name Wolstry on the map. near 

= 76., 39, p. 913. Hickman's, should read Wolfrey. 



282 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

he had got a view of the right of the Federal line; this report was 
promptly forwarded to General Fitzhugh Lee. Soon afterward Jack- 
son arrived with the head of the infantry, and went in person with 
Fitzhugh Lee to the high ground on which Burton's Farm is situated, 
to reconnoiter the Federal position. Here, only a few hundred yards 
from him, he saw a line of intrenehments extending along the Turnpike, 
with abatis in front, and stacked arms in rear, and back of these, sol- 
diers in groups, laughing, chatting, and smoking. One can imagine his 
satisfaction at pex"ceiving that the enemy was thus unconscious of his 
proximity. But one may reasonably believe, too, that this satisfaction 
was mingled with disappointment. He had expected to find the Orange 
Plank Road clear and to advance by it against the enemy's rear. He 
found that it was occupied by Federal pickets and that an advance by 
it would bring him obliquely against the Federal front. So far from 
being in the enemy's rear, he was not even on his flank. He saw that 
the enemy's line extended westward beyond the junction of the Turn- 
pike and Orange Plank Road as far as the edge of the wood beyond 
Taylor ; he may have learned from Fitzhugh Lee that the Turnpike was 
free from the enemy in the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern, but he could, 
not tell how far the Federal line extended toward that point. It was 
plain, however, that to take it in rear he would have to extend his turn- 
ing movement to the Turnpike. Having given about five minutes to 
observation and reflection, he turned toward his courier, saying: "Tell 
General Rodes to move across the Plank Road and halt when he gets 
to the old Turnpike. I will join him there."' One more look at the 
Federal line, and he rode rapidly down the hill. Lee was directed to 
manceuver his two squadrons at Burton as if preparing to charge the 
opposing cavalry. 

About 2 p.m. the march was resvuned along the Brock Road toward 
the Turnpike. At the same hour Archer turned back with the last two 
brigades, his own and Thomas' (ytx)^ ^^ S(> to the protection of the 
trains, and Geary, in the Federal center, was ordered by Hooker to 
move out on the Plank Road with a portion of his command (^) "for 
the purpose of cutting off the train of the enemy, who was supposed to 
be retreating toward Gordonsville. " 

The 12 Va. Infantry was detached from McGowan's brigade as a 
guard to trains and prisoners.^ 

Right Wing, 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. (Map 17) 

The 40 men of the 23 Ga. left at the Furnace were captured by Ber- 
dan's sharpshooters. The main body of the regiment fell back toward 

' Fitzhugh Lee's Chancellorsville Ad- Since the departure of Archer's and 

dress. Thomas' brigades, McGowan's brigade was 

= History of McGowan's Brigade, by F. the rearmost one in Jackson's column. 
J. Caldwell, pp. 76, 77; W. B., 39, p. 906. 



SICKLES CALLS FOR SUPPORT 2S3 

the railroad cut, where it arrived and established itself about 2 : 30 p.m. 
It had in the meantime been joined by two companies of the 14 
Tenn. and perhaps two companies of the 7 Tenn., which had 
been marching to overtake the columns and had turned back from 
some point southwest of Welford's House, before reaching the col- 
umn, to assist in protecting the train.^ About 3 p.m. the 14 Ga., 
marching back from Thomas' brigade, took position on the left of the 
main Furnace Road, at the point where a road comes into it from the 
north, to jirevent the Federals from cutting off the rear of the column 
by that road. Hayman's and Graham's brigades (j— jii) started to go 
past the Furnace in pursuit of the retiring 23 Ga., which brought them 
under a galling fire of musketry poured into their flanks by Posey's 
brigade, and the fire of Brooke's battery (j^) at Welford's House. This 
caused them to halt and wait for artillery to engage that of the enemy. 
Birney ordered Sims' battery (jt^^u) to move to the Furnace. But the 
chief of artillery of the corps disapproved of moving it on account of 
its being already in position, and sent an order to the chief of artillery 
of the division to send one of the other two batteries to the front. Turn- 
bull 's battery (f^n) went forward with the guns and limbers only, the 
caissons being left behind. 

About 3:30 p.m. the last regiment of Birney's division on Howard's 
left (37 i^'iTi) moved out to join its brigade. 

Wright's brigade, on arrival, took position on Posey's right; its place 
on the left of the Plank Road was taken by Mahone's brigade (j^j). 
While Turnbull's battery was coming up, the Federal skirmishers de- 
veloped Best's position in the railroad cut. 

About 2 : 45 p.m. Sickles sent word to Hooker that it was practicable 
to gain the road by which the enemy was marching and break his 
column, adding that, as he must expect to encounter a heavy force and 
stubborn resistance, and bearing in mind Hooker's admonition to move 
cautiously, he would not advance until the support from the XI and XII 
Corps closed up on Birney's right and left.^ At the same time he wrote 
to Howard and to Slocum : 

I am advancing a strong line of two brigades to ascertain whether the enemy 
is retreating. General Birney reports that he has reached a brigade of the 
enemy in rifle-pits, posted, as I think, to cover the retreating column. I will 
attack if the enemy is not stronger than the reports so far represent him, and 
occupy the road by which he is retreating. 

Please support my advance. 

This message was received by Howard at 3 p.m. Slocum received his 
at 3 : 30. The latter referred the matter to Hooker. Howard replied 
that he had no troops to spare. 

1 W. B.. 39. pp. 934, 929. = lb., 39, pp. .386. .387. 



284 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Archer reached the Welford House and assumed command there 
about 3 : 30 p.m. By this time the train was virtually saved. No part 
of it was lost except a caisson taken at the Furnace.^ But it was still 
necessary to hold the position for some time to enable the train to gain 
a safe distance. So General Archer, while he proceeded to withdraw 
and follow Jackson, ordered Colonel Best to hold his position until 
ordered by him to leave it. Best replied that he might hold it if his 
flanks were protected, especially his left.- This was about 4 : 45 p.m. 

More or less of a demonstration had been kept up all along the line 
to the right of Posey. But about 3 : 15 p.m. a specially vigorous attack 
was made along the Turnpike by Wofford's brigade of McLaws' divi- 
sion against Hancock's advanced line held by Colonel Miles. It was 
kept up for about an hour. About 4 p.m. Perry's brigade, on the ex- 
treme right of the Confederate line, closed in to the left until it con- 
nected with McLaws ' right. 

While the Confederates on the TurnpUie had pressed the Federal 
lines as already stated, the force on the Plank Eoad had been subjected 
to Federal aggression. General Geary had considered the movement 
prescribed for him about 2 p.m. of sufficient importance to be conducted 
by himself in person. Accordingly, with 2 regiments of his first bri- 
gade, his second brigade (together 7 regiments), and Atwell's 6-gun 
battery (j-^) from Muhlenberg's line, he advanced about 500 yards, 
when he discovered the enemy drawn up and intrenched with a number 
of cannon. Only two pieces of his own artillery could come into action. 
They were soon crippled by a combined fire of infantry and artillery. 
Some of his infantry, too, was badly shaken. He was still facing these 
conditions when, about 4 : 30 p.m., he received an order to retire. In 
the meantime Atwell's battery had been replaced in Muhlenberg's line 
by Pettit's four pieces (j-^).^ Muhlenberg picked up the two pieces of 
Lewis' battery (^jjj) near Chancellorsville "not subject to any orders," 
and placed them "in position covering that occupied by the artillery of 
the First Division under Captain Best."* This section, and Atwell's 
battery on its return, gave Muhlenberg 20 pieces. 

About 4 p.m. Pleasonton's cavalry, still waiting at Chancellorsville 
for something to do, was ordered forward to cooperate with the 
III Corps. It proceeded accordingly by way of Hazel Grove to- 
ward Sickles' line.^ The 8 Pa. was placed in advance, and on the 
march Pleasonton posted its commander. Major Huey, as to the 

^ TF. R., 39, p. 980; Berdan's U. S. mand operated together as a brigade, and 

Sharpshooters f by C. A. Stevens, p. 251. the only time that it was under the direct 

- W. R., 39, p. 980. command of General Pleasonton, from the 

^ His other two pieces were Avith the Irish passage of the Rappahannock to the end 

brigade. of the campaign. For the movements of 

* W. R., 39, p. 726. the cavalry to-day, see the following au- 

'^ This was the only time that the com- thorities: Pleasonton, TV. R., 39, p. 774; 



BARLOW TO SUPPORT SICKLES 285 

duties that were to devolve on him. He said that the impression was 
that the enemy was retreating, and that the cavalry was to charge 
through his lines, open communication with Sedgwick, and harass the 
rear of the enemy's column; that the 8 Pa. would take the advance, and 
he would follow with the remainder of the brigade, including Martin's 
horse battery. 

About 4 p.m. Howard received an order from Hooker to send a bri- 
gade to the support of Sickles ' corps. He at once went forward, accom- 
panied by von Steinwehr with Barlow's brigade d-xi), except the two 
companies of the 33 Mass., left on the road to Ely's Ford. The men left 
their knapsacks stacked in their camp. 

Let us now look at Howard 's dispositions in detail. His First Division, 
commanded by Devens, comprised two brigades, an unattached com- 
pany of the 8 N. Y., and one battery of six guns. The 1st brigade (von 
Gilsa's) numbers four regiments, the 2d (McLean's) numbers five. 
Von Gilsa 's brigade was on the right with two regiments, and two com- 
panies of another regiment, thrown back at right angles to the Pike, 
the men standing about three feet apart, or one to every five feet, and 
covered only by a slashing of small trees and bushes. In the angle on 
the road two guns were posted to enfilade the road, which here passed 
through dense wood. About 1000 yards out on the Turnpike was a 
picket formed of two bodies of sharpshooters, each of about the strength 
of a company, one on each side of the Turnpike,— the whole without 
support. On the left of the 1st brigade was the 2d, with three regiments 
in the front line and two, the 75 0. and 25 0., in support; the former 
regiment was well in rear of the 2d brigade, with instructions to act as 
reserve for the 1st brigade, if necessary.^ On the left of the First Divi- 
sion, aboiit half a mile from the two guns already mentioned, were the 
other four guns of the battery trained on the Plank Road. In the 
vicinity of the Taylor House, division headquarters, was the flag and 
torch station communicating with Howard's headquarters at Dowdall's 
Tavern. Next to the First Division was the Third, commanded by 
Schurz. It had the same organization as Devens'. The 1st brigade 
(five regiments) was in line connecting with Devens' left, with two 
regiments (82 111., 157 N". Y.) in second line. Of the other brigade (four 
regiments) one regiment (119 N. Y.) was in line somewhat in advance 
of the other regiments; one (75 Pa.) was on picket, and two (26 Wise, 
58 N. Y.) were on a road leading to Ely's Ford facing west, and covered, 
like von Gilsa's brigade, with slight abatis. An unattached regiment 
of this division (82 0.) stood in rear and to the left of these two regi- 

Devin, ib., p. 781; Martin, ib., p. 786; Chancellorsville, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 51; 
Huey, *., p. 784, and Charge of the 8 Pa. and B. and L., Ill, 183-185. 
at Chancellorsville, p. 12; The Battle of ^ Trials and Triumphs, by Hartwell Os- 

born, p. 64. 



286 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ments, also facing west. The latter three regiments, 26 Wise, 58 N. Y., 
and 82 0., were placed as above described by Schurz on his own re- 
sponsibility. Schurz's battery was posted near the Wilderness Church 
to command the Plank Road and some open ground adjoining it. To 
the left and front of this division, and slightly overlapping it, was the 
line of von Steinwehr's division (~), which was now formed of Busch- 
beck's brigade of four regiments (o-^) and the divisional battery; the 
remainder of the division, Barlow's brigade, being detached.^ 

Howard's infantry regiments were stronger than those of any other 
corps. They averaged on the 30th of April about 450 men. His corps 
comprised more artillery in proportion to infantry than any other corps 
except the I. On the front facing south, about 2200 yards in length, 
he had 20 regiments (about 8600 infantry) and 16 guns. Facing west 
he had 5 regiments, about 2200 infantry and 3 batteries of corps artil- 
lery (18 guns). Exclusive of Barlow's brigade, the corps numbered 
about 10,500 effectives.^ The corps artillery was near the edge of the 
wood in rear of the intrenchments running north and south. Busch- 
beck's brigade, being next to these intrenchments, might be considered 
as available for occupying the latter. It will be observed that there were 
three distinct, though feeble, lines of resistance facing west, which may 
be designated as von Gilsa's, Schurz's, and Buschbeck's. Between the 
left of the XI and the right of the XII Corps was a gap about a mile 
wide caused by the advance of Birney's division and Barlow's brigade. 
As the right did not rest upon any obstacle, the rear of the army was at 
the mercy of any respectable force that should march aroimd that flank. 
"As we were situated," says Schurz, "an attack from the west or north- 
west could not be resisted without a complete change of front. ... It 
was almost impossible to manceuver some of our regiments, hemmed in 
as they were on the old Turnpike by embankments and rifle-pits in front 
and thick woods in the rear, drawn out in long, deployed lines, giving 
just room enough for the stacks of arms and a narrow passage. This 

^ On the map accompanying Schurz's re- the part taken in it by the XI Corps, — 

jjort all four regiments of Buschbeck's bri- according to which the 29 N. Y. was in re- 

gade (29 and 154 N. Y., 27 and 73 Pa.) serve on the north side of the Plank Road 

are shown as in a line of rifle-pits south of and the battery was distributed in sections 

the Plank Road, and von Steinwehr's bat- along the line. According to Schurz and 

tei-y as in rear of tlie regiment on the right. to Wiedrich, commanding the battery, one 

According to von Steinwehr's report the 29 section was kept in rear of the line (ib., 

N. Y. was sent from the line of rifle-pits 39, pp. 647, 651). 

south of the road to the north side of 2 These figures include the pickets, many 

the road before the attack commenced, of which were destined to be cut off from 

to fill the place vacated by Barlow's their regiments or prevented from joining 

brigade (^^fi- ^^- ^- 39' P- 645). The them until after the impending action, 

author has adopted for Buschbeck's bri- Except for the Third Division, which fur- 

gade and two thirds of von Steinwehr's bat- nished the 75 Pa., the picketing seems to 

tery the disposition given by Hamlin in his have been done by regiment, each regiment 

minute account of the battle, especially of sending out one or two companies. 



FEDERAL RECONNAISSANCES 287 

Turnpike Road was at the same time the only line of communication we 
had between the different parts of our front. ' ' ^ 

The danger gathering about the Federal right flank should have been 
well known to Howard and to Hooker. Captain Castle, from his signal 
station on Howard's right, sighted the enemy's column, and reported 
the fact to Howard. He stated subsequently that his information was 
not credited, and that no attention was paid to it.- Between 11 and 12 
o'clock there had been skirmishing along the line of McLean's brigade 
(rii) c^^'^^f^ by aggressions of Confederate cavalry. The pickets of 
l3evens' division (^) brought in two men who stated that they had been 
sent out from another portion of the line as scouts, and that the enemy 
was moving in great force upon the Federal right flank. They were 
immediately sent to corps headquarters, under charge of a trusty 
sergeant, with orders that, after reporting to General Howard, they 
should at once proceed to the headquarters of the major-general com- 
manding the ai'my.^ 

Several reconnaissances, made by a small body of cavalry placed at 
Devens' disposal, discovered early in the afternoon bodies of the 
enemy's cavalry moving upon his right. In one case the party was 
fired on, and the fact was iimnediately reported by its commanding 
officer to the corps commander.* General Schimmelfennig, command- 
ing Schurz 's 1st brigade, made several reconnaissances in his front and 
in front of General Devens' division, especially on the Plank Road and 
through the wooded country south of it. These reconnaissances made 
with infantry, in bodies not larger than a regiment, were necessarily 
confined to a narrow zone, but they brought the fact to light that there 
were hostile skirmishers at a distance of from II/2 to 2 miles in con- 
siderable number. The enemy's column which had been observed 
marching westward had disappeared, but reports from Hooker's head- 
quarters indicated that it was harassed by Sickles in flank and rear. 
Sickles' artillerj', too, was heard, but not for long, and when it ceased 
it seemed to Schurz and others that Sickles' operation had been checked 
or given up. But Devens and Howard continued to believe that it was 
progressing successfully. Devens was lying down resting at the Tay- 
lor House. About 1 o 'clock, and again about 2, Colonel Lee, command- 
ing the 55 O. of Devens' 2d brigade, came to his headquarters with a 
messenger from the picket line, who reported that the enemy was mov- 
ing with infantry and artillery across the front of the division to its 
right flank. Devens said that he had no information to that effect from 

* McClure's Magazine, June, 1907, p. 164. seems to be no reason to doubt that the 
' W. R., 39, p. 231 ; Kistory of the Army two men sent by Devens to corps and 

of the Potomac, by J. H. Stine, p. 350. army headquarters saw both Howard and 

3 W. R., 39, p. 958. Hooker. 

* Devens' report, ib., 39, p. 633. There 



288 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCBLLORSVILLE 

corps headquarters, and that he certainly would have had if the re- 
ported movement were a fact. It is doubtful whether he sent the report 
to corps headquarters. 1 Colonel Friend, his officer of the day, came to 
him from the picket line and reported that a large force of the enemy 
was passing to his rear, but Devens refused to give credit to the report. 
Friend then went to the headquarters of the corps, where he was re- 
buked for his statement, and warned not to bring on a panic. He re- 
turned to the picket line, and again at 2 p.m. went to corps headquarters 
and was called a coward, and ordered to his regiment, with the remark 
that the enemy was retreating.^ Von Gilsa, commanding the 1st bri- 
gade, and Schurz, commanding the Third Division, as well as many of 
the regimental commanders, apprehended danger. Acting Major Owen 
Rice of the 153 Pa., in command of von Gilsa 's picket line, sent in the 
following message : 

On Skirmish Line, on Culpeper Road, 2:45 p.m. 
Colonel L. von Gilsa, Commanding 1st Brig., 1st Div., lltli Army Corps: 

A large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For God's sake, make dis- 
position to receive him ! 

Owen Rice, 

Act. Maj. 153 P. V. 

Von Gilsa himself carried this dispatch to Howard, and was repulsed 
with taunts and the dictum that no force could penetrate the outlying 
thickets.^ 

At 3 p.m. Major Schleiter was sent with the 74 Pa. (37^) on a recon- 
naissance up the Plank Road, with instructions from Howard's head- 
quarters to avoid everji;hing that might bring on an engagement. He 
returned with the information that the enemy was massed for an attack, 
and was sent by Schurz to report the same to Howard. He made his 
report to Howard's staff— Howard being absent— and was laughed 
at, and told not to be alarmed, for the corps commander had gone 
forward with Barlow's brigade to join Birney and capture some regi- 
ments. 

Captain Dilger, commanding a battery in Howard's corps, went out 
with an orderly on the exposed flank to reconnoiter. He ran into Jack- 
son's column advancing, and was pursued by some of his cavalry, nar- 
rowly escaping capture. Making his way by the rear of the XI Corps 
to Hooker's headquarters, he reported the result of his reconnaissance, 
and was told to go to his corps and tell his yam there. At Howard's 
headquarters he was told that General Lee was in full retreat, and that 

' The Battle of Chancellorsville, by A. C. - The Battle of Chancellorsville, by A. C. 

Hamlin, pp. 58, 144; Trials and Triumphs, Hamlin, pp. 55, 145. 

by Hartwell Osbom, p. 69. ^ Publications of Loyal Legion, Ohio 

Commanderif. 1888. I. 379. 



JACKSON CROSSES ORANGE PLANK ROAD 289 

Barlow's brigade, accompanied by the corps commander, had gone out 
to fall upon his rear.^ 

As Jackson's column proceeded across the Orange Plank Road Pax- 
ton's (Stonewall) brigade (^^J and Moody's and Parker's batteries of 
Alexander's battalion (^) were detached from it and posted at Hick- 
man's under the command of Fitzhugli Lee to support the two squad- 
rons of cavalry at Burton in covering the marching columns. With the 
exception of these two squadrons and the 2 Va., still at the head of 
Jackson's column, the brigade of cavalry was scattered along the line 
of march as flank guards. 

By 2:30 p.m. Jackson's leading regiment of infantry, the 5 Ala., had 
reached the Turnpike, followed it eastward to the vicinity of Luckett, 
and proceeded to form for attack about 6 miles from its starting-point 
in the morning, having marched about 12 miles. 

Hooker had quite recovered from his apprehension of the morning, 
and was bent upon following the retreating enemy. The following cir- 
cular letter was sent to the corps commanders : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
May 2, 2:30 p.m., 1863. 
General : 

The Major-Gen. Com'g desires that you replenish your supplies of forage. 
provisions, and ammunition to be ready to start at an early hour to-morrow. 

Your obdt. servant, 

J. H. Van Alen, 

Brig. Genl. & A. D. C- 

' These particulars are deduced from When they reported to Howard, it would 

statements some of which do not quite seem from regimental histories that he 

agree. See The Battle of Chancellorsville, wholly disapproved of these expeditions, 

by A. C. Hamlin, Chapter VI, and notes 7 He said that he 'commanded the corps, and 

and 8, pp. 143, 144; also Sehurz's report, his subordinates were usurping his func- 

TF. B., 39, p. 654. tions' " (Doubleday). See also The 25 

An eminent authority says: "It is pass- Ohio Volunteer Infantry, by E. C. Gulp, 

ing strange that in spite of incessant re- p. 63. 

ports of Jackson's advance, and the fact Howard's purpose in aceompanj-ing Bar- 
that two deserters came in about 2 p.m. and low was "to examine the ground between 
were sent to General Howard's headquar- his left and Sickles, thmking that if the 
ters, who confirmed the reports of our battle became general in that quarter he 
scouts, and gave all details of the move- might have to move his entire corps to the 
ment. Howard nevertheless left his com- support of Sickles." Having attained this 
mand at 4 p.m. to accompany Barlow's bri- purpose, he returned at a gallop to his 
gade. Nor did he keep Hooker infonned headquarters at Dowdall's Tavern (Captain 
of the reports received. General Howard Hartwell Osbom, Military Order Loijal 
speaks in the Xational Tribune of the pick- Legion, Commandert/ of Illinois, IV). 
ets he threw out, but in every case they - I am indebted for this document to 
seem to have been sent out by his subordi- Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bruce, 
nates without his knowledge; in other author of The 20th Regiment Mass. Vol, 
words, all knowledge of Jackson's move- Infantry. 
ments was obtained by independent scouts. 



290 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

As this message was going out Jackson arrived at Luckett's and sent 
the following dispatch to Lee : 

Near 3 p.m., May 2, 1863. 

General: 

The enemy has made a stand at Chancellors [Dowdall's Tavern], which is 
about 2 miles from Chaneellorsville. I hope as soon as practicable to attack. 
I trust that an ever-kind Providence wiU bless us with great success. 

Respectfully, 

T. J. Jackson, 

Lt. Gen. 

P S The leading division is up, and the next two appear to be well closed. 

T. J. J. ' 

The wording of this dispatch can hardly be explained without the as- 
sumption of former dispatches sent back by Jackson to R. E. Lee, 
representing the Federals as falling back. It seems to confirm the inti- 
mation given in the preceding chapter that Jackson believed the Federal 
right flank to lie somewhere in the angle formed by the Orange Plank 
Road and the Brock Road. 

About 4 p.m. the Confederate videttes showed themselves to von 
Gilsa's picket, and were fired on by the latter. This occurrence, which 
was signaled to Howard's headquarters, brought on a brief skirmish in 
which the two guns with von Gilsa's brigade participated by firing their 
two charges without orders.^ Howard had no suspicion of danger. 

The following message went to Butterfield at 4 : 10 p.m. : 

The Major-General commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the river 
as soon as indications will permit ; capture Fredericksburg with everything in it, 
and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to 
save his trains. Two of Sickles' divisions are among them. 

Again he does not say in what direction the enemy is to be pursued, 
from which we may infer that by pursuing the enemy he means march- 
ing on Hanover Junction, or Richmond. It would appear that he did 
not himself believe everything that he said in this dispatch, but felt 
justified in sending it as a means of hastening Sedgwick's movements. 
He could not have known that Sickles was among the enemy's trains, 
as Sickles never was among them. But he probably believed that the 
movement observed and reported by Sickles indicated the retreat of a 
portion of Lee's army, and hoped that by the time his dispatch would 
reach Sedgwick the retreat would be converted into a rout.* At this 

'Dabney's Life of Jackson, p. 679; B. of Signal Officer, W. R., 39, p. 231; re- 
ared L., ni, 206. ports of Generals Devens and Sehurz, ib., 

= These particulars are also deduced pp. 634, 654. 
from conflicting statements. See report ^ Referring to a report from Sickles on 



JACKSON FORMS FOR ATTACK 291 

time "there was a general feeling in the army that Lee's army was 
running away."i Late in the afternoon, probably about 4: 20, a party 
of cavalry went out on the Pike, but soon returned, and the captain in 
command reported to Devens at the Taylor House that he could go but 
"a little ways," as he met a large body of infantry. Devens replied 
impatiently: "I wish I could get some one who could make a reconnais- 
sance for me." The captain replied: "General, I can go further, but I 
can not promise to return. ' ' The cavalry was ordered to bivouac.'^ 

Jackson formed his available force in three lines perpendicular to the 
Turnpike and extending about a mile on each side of it. In the first 
line he deployed the Second Division, except Ramseur's brigade (g^), 
which was to form in the second line. He gave Colquitt (.rVi) the right' 
Iverson („-^i) the left,* Doles (, Vi) the right center, and O'Neal (^) the 
left center. This line was covered with sharpshooters deployed "as skir- 
mishers about 400 yards to the front, and charged with preventing 
communication with the enemy.* The second line was formed of the 
Fourth Division (Trimble's command by Colston), except Paxton's" 
(1st) brigade, which had been detached, and Nicholls' (4th), » which 
formed by mistake in the third line. To the right of the second line 
Ramseur's brigade („^j) was formed in support of Colquitt's (~), 
overlapping it by the front of one regiment." To the left of the firsthand 
second lines the 23 N. Ca. of Iverson 's brigade (-^) was formed as 
flankers in column of route, with skirmishers on its left. 

which the dispatch was based, he testified ing of the coming storm" (The Battle of 
a year later before the Committee on the Chancellorsville, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 16). 
Condiict of the War : "At the time this ^ The distance of the second line from 
news [that the enemy was retreating] was the first is given by Colston, commanding 
received by me, I was of the impression the second line, as about 200 yards; Colo- 
that the general was mistaken, but never- nel H. A. Brown, commanding a regiment 
theless felt that no harm could follow from in Colston's brigade (iii), and Brigadier- 
its transmission to General Sedg-wiek." General Ramseur, commanding the brigade 
^ WaiTen's testimony, Rep. of Com., IV, on the right of Colston's division, give it 
45. as about 100 yards (IF. R., 39, pp. 1004, 

2 The Battle of Chancellorsville, by A. C. 1032, 995). 
Hamlin, pp. 60, 145. The cavalry is called Hamlin in his Battle of Chancellorsville 

a squadron, and a few lines further on is (p. 16) gives it as about 100 paces. Hotch- 

referred to as a squad (p. 60). It was kiss and Allan give it as 200 yards (Chan- 

probably a small company. cellorsville, by H. and A., p. 47). It was 

^ Iverson had left his skirmishers, say probably about 150 yards, 
one regiment, behind when he started on * The distance of this brigade in rear of 
the march in the morning, and was not re- the first line is given by its commander, 
joined by them until late at night {W. R., General Ramseur, as about 100 yards. Ac- 
39, p. 984). cording to Rodes, commanding the first 
* "Jackson's orders were canied out so line, Ramseur's brigade was formed about 
accurately by these men [on the skirmish 100 yards from the first line and in con- 
line] that although over ten thousand men tinuation of the second. It may be assumed 
rested on their anns for two hours or more to be in the second line or about 150 yards 
within a mile of the Army of the Potomac, in rear of the first, 
not a man deserted or escaped to give warn- 



292 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

In the third line Pender's brigade d-u) was deployed in rear of War- 
ren's (i'li), its right near the Turnpike. Nieholls' brigade (j;^) took 
position on a line with it beyond the left of the first line.' Heth's bri- 
gade (,-Ti) when it came up was ordered to form on the left of the 
second line, but before it did so, the second line advanced. It was then 
placed in the third line, on the left of Pender's brigade (j-n)," or be- 
tween that brigade and Nieholls' d^)- Lane's brigade (j^) was in rear 
of these lines in column of route. On either side of Lane was a line of 
skirmishers to prevent straggling. Two pieces of Stuart's artillery 
were placed in the first line on the Turnpike and four others in rear, 
ready to relieve them (Breathed 's battery and half of Moorman's). 
The width of the road did not allow of more than two pieces being in 
action at once. The 2 Va. Cavalry took position on the left of the in- 
fantry with oi'ders to cover its flank and, when the advance commenced, 
to proceed to seize and hold the road to Ely's Ford. The object of this 
movement was apparently the interception of Federal detachments 
either retreating toward the ford or advancing therefrom.* The forces 
thus arrayed for attack aggregated about 26,500 men* and 6 guns. In 
addition thereto Carter's battalion of artillery (20 pieces, yi) took 
position in an open field on the right of the road. The remainder 
of the artillery (except Brown's battalion, and two batteries of 
Alexander's battalion left with Paxton) formed in column of pieces 
on the road. When the lines advanced. Carter's battalion filed into 
the road at the head of this column of artillery. Brown's battalion 
(except Dance's and Hupp's batteries, left with Lee), McGowan's bri- 
gade except the 12 Va., Archer's and Thomas' brigades (y^), and Iver- 
son's skirmishers were also marching up from the rear. Paxton 's 
brigade was at Hickman's. 

The men took their positions in silence, orders were transmitted in a 
low voice, the bugles were still ; the soldiers abstained from saluting 
their general with their usual cheers. Each brigade commander received 
positive instructions as to what he should do. Each line was to push 

'In the official reports the position of of his line, second (ib., p. 1004). Lieuten- 

Nicholls' brigade is variously given. Colo- ant Hinrichs, Colston's chief engineer, 

nel Williams, who commanded the brigade, says : "General Nieholls on coming up 

says that it was formed "in the rear, with fonned on the left of General Pender's 

the right resting near the Plank Road," brigade (1%) by mistake, which threw 

meaning, it seems, as a fourth line, with its him in the rear of our line" (ib., p. 1009). 

right on the Turnpike [W. R., 39, p. 1037). - lb., 39, p. 890. 

According to Captain Willett, commanding ^Memoirs of the Confederate War, by 

the right regiment of the brigade, his regi- H. von Borcke, II, 227; Letters from Colo- 

ment fonned part of the "second line of nel T. T. Munford (at the time commanding 

battle," "in rear and to the left of Rodes' 2 Va. Cav.) to the author, 

division" (ib., p. 1038). Colston, com- * 25,983 infanti-y, 400 cavalrj-, 120 artil- 

manding the Fourth Division, says that lerj'. 
Nieholls' brigade was on the "extreme left" 



JACKSON'S INTENTIONS 293 

ahead, keeping the road for its guide. When any portion of the first 
line needed reenforeements, the officer commanding this portion was to 
call for, and receive, aid from the line in his rear without further in- 
structions. Jackson expected to come upon positions at right angles to 
Hooker's main line and to overlap them on both flanks. The position 
at Taylor's House was to be carried at all hazards, as it commanded the 
second position of the Federals at Dowdall's Tavern. If the Federals 
showed a determined front at Dowdall's, the infantry was to halt until 
the artillery could come up and dislodge them. Under no other circum- 
stances was there to be any pause. Jackson intended that when he had 
advanced far enough to establish connection with Lee, say to the vicinity 
of the Old School-House, a portion of his force should be directed upon 
Chandler's so as to take the elevation of Fairview and the whole posi- 
tion of Chancellors\al]e well in rear, and favor his purpose of severing 
Hooker's communications with the fords of the Rapidan and Rappa- 
hannock and driving his routed army upon the latter river. 

The soimd of the tiring on the Plank Road and on the Turnpike 
reached the point where Jackson was watching the formation of his 
lines. Captain Moorman of the horse artillery ventured to ask him 
whose firing it was. Jackson asked: "How far do you suppose it is?" 
"Five or six miles," was the answer. "I suppose," said Jackson, "it 
is General Lee." ' 

While Geary was retiring up the Plank Road Slocum received 
Hooker's consent to his sending assistance to Sickles. Consequently 
about 4:30 p.m. Williams' division {^) moved out to support Birney 
on his left (Map 18). A considerable interval between Birney (~) and 
Williams (~) remaining unoccupied. Sickles sent AVhipple with his 
division (~) to occupy it. Williams was to proceed 2 or 3 miles 
through the woods, so as to strike the rifle-pits and other temporary 
works of the enemy (Anderson) on the flank and rear, and then, coming 
around from the south, sweep both sides of the Plank Road toward 
Chancellorsville. He arranged with Whipple to move well to the right, 
in order to strike the enemy as far as possible from Chancellorsville, 
and to connect closely with Whipple 's lef t.^ Williams and Wliipple both 
went forward without artillery, Williams having left his in the line of 
the XII Corps, and T\niipple his at Hazel Grove, with the exception of 
one section (2 pieces) left in the vicinity of Chancellor sville,^ besides 
which Williams left the 28 N. Y.* (1. 1. XII) in his intrenchmeuts and 
the 13 N. J. (3. 1. XII) at Hazel Grove, and Whipple left the 110 Pa. 
(2. 3. Ill) at Hazel Grove. Berry's division (j^) was a good deal scat- 

1 So. Hist. Soc. Papers, XXX, 111. •* Comprising but four companies, num- 

2 ^r ji 39, p. 678. bering about 107 men. The rest of tlus 

3 A section of Lewis' 10 N. Y. Battei-y regiment was detached as provost guard 
(TT. R., 39, pp. 726, 1127, 162). and train guard. 



294 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

tered. The 11 Mass. (1st brigade) was still in position in front of 
Hancock. Of the four batteries of this divisiqn, three were at the 
junction of the Ely's Ford and United States Ford Roads; the other 
battery (j^^fi) ^^^ '^^^ brigade (o-^) were at United States Ford. The 
remainder of the division (two brigades except one regiment) was held 
in reserve at Chancellorsville. 

About 5 p.m. Sickles i-eceived from Hooker an order to assail the 
enemy on his right flank and check his advance— accompanied with the 
notice that he must rely upon the force that he had, as Berry's division 
(^j) could not be spared to reenforce him. At the same time Barlow's 
brigade, accompanied by Howard and von Steinwehr, reached Birney's 
right wing (j^), where it found the latter 's sharpshooters engaged. 
Barlow at once reported to Birney that he had completed the connection 
between the latter 's division and the XI Corps. ^ At this time (5 p.m.) 
Turnbull's battery (j-^n)* ordered up from the rear, was at Welford's 
Furnace, firing upon Brooke's battery (^); and Pleasonton reported to 
Sickles near the Furnace with his three regiments of cavalry and bat- 
tery of horse artillery.^ 

1 Birney's report, W. B., 39, p. 408 ; ^ A squadron of the 6 N. Y. was left on 

Howard's report, ib., p. 630; von Stein- picket at Ely's Ford, 
wehr's report, ib., p. 645. 



CHAPTER XX 

MAY 2 (continued) . . . JACKSON 's ATTACK. SICKLES ' NIGHT ATTACK 

5 to 6:10 p.m. (Map 18) 

AT 5 o'clock Jackson inquired of Kodes at the Luckett Farm: "Are 
x\. you ready?" "Yes," Rodes replied, and nodded to Major Black- 
ford, commanding his sharpshooters, or line of skirmishers. The mass 
in rear of the skirmishers was soon in motion, the center following the 
Turnpike; but on account of the command not being promptly trans- 
mitted to the skirmishers on the left, these failed to advance, and the 
first line, coming up on them, caused some confusion. This necessitated 
a general halt to straighten out the lines and allow the skirmishers to 
gain their distance to the front.^ About 5:15 the lines moved silently 
forward again, and buried themselves in the depth of the forest; in a 
moment— so close had they been to the enemy— their skirmishers were 
engaged by the sharpshooters of the XI Corps on the Turnpike. Silence 
and secrecy were now discarded. For a mile on either side of the Turn- 
pike the bugles rang out clear and loud in the evening air, and a mighty 
roar of human voices shook the forest, starting the deer and other ani-/ 
mals from their lairs. As swiftly as the dense brushwood would permit, 
the first line pushed forward, followed by the second and third. The 
men had their clothing almost torn from their bodies, but still the lines 
swept on in tolerable order and with great enthusiasm. The Federal 
picket fell rapidly back, firing and giving the alarm to the forces in 
rear. The two pieces of Stuart's artillery in the first line galloped well 
out to the front and fired two shots which went whizzing down the Pike 
and finally struck the ground in front of the Taylor House. The guns 
that had fired were then passed by others ready to fire. Breathed, com- 
manding the artillery at the front, was directed to advance with the 
infantry, "keeping a few yards in rear of the line of skirmishers." 

^ Authorities differ as to the hour when of it give it as 5 or 5 : 30. Hotchkiss and 
Jackson advanced to the attack. Rodes Allan say, "Just before 6 o'clock." Cap- 
gives it as 5 : 15, Colston as "6 o'clock pre- tain Poland, chief of staff of the Federal 
cisely," Hill as "about 6 p.m." (W. B., 39, III Corps, gives it as about 3 p.m., and 
pp. 941, 1004, 885). Colonel Vandeventer, Colonel Brooke, commanding Hancock's 
commanding Jones' brigade (jij), gives it 4th brigade, as about 4 p.m. A. C. Hamlin 
as 4 p.m. The other brigade commanders gives it as about 5 p.m. {Battle of Chan- 
ot Jackson's corps who make any mention ceUorsviUe, p. 65). 



296 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

This he could not do, on account of the narrowness of the road and its 
obstruction bj- fallen trees and other obstacles. He was able, however, 
to keep up an almost continual fire from one or two guns.' Howard's 
troops with "stacked arms" were preparing their evening meal and 
making themselves comfortable for the night. They had time, however, 
to seize their guns, take their places in ranks, and occupy the positions 
assigned them.- Colonel Lee, commanding the 55 0., mounted his horse 
and galloped to the right, where he found von Gilsa ready to receive the 
attack, but not aware of the extent of Jackson's front. He rode thence 
to the Taylor House and found Deveus mounted and uncertain as to 
what to do ; and there was no one to tell him, his corps commander hav- 
ing just left Barlow's brigade, about 2 miles away, to return to the 
corps. Lee asked permission to change front with his regiment. "Not 
yet," was the reply, and he galloped to the right of his regiment, where 
he found it raked by the fire of the artillery and infantry coming down 
the Pike. The two regiments of von Gilsa in the road, exposed to the 
same fire, began to break. Lee again rode at the top of his speed to 
Devens, and asked permission to change front. After some time he 
was dismissed with a wave of the hand. The enemy marched steadily 
on, and Doles' brigade {^^) encountered von Gilsa 's. The front which 
the latter presented facing the enemy was something of a surprise to 
him. From the Burton hilltop Jackson had observed Schurz's and von 
Steinwehr's divisions and part of Devens', but had not seen von Gilsa 's 
little brigade, hidden by the trees, on the extreme right of the Federal 
line.* Two of Doles' regiments were detached : one by the right, against 
the two regiments parallel to the Turnpike; one by the left, against and 
around the outer flank of the face perpendicular to it. The other two 
regiments assailed the latter in front (Sketch 2). Von Gilsa 's two 
pieces of artillery fired several times, and seeing that resistance was 
useless, tried to limber up and retreat. But before they could do so the 
horses were shot down and the pieces captured. The two regiments 
facing south, exposed to a withering fire in front, flank, and rear, broke 
up without firing a shot. About half of them formed in rear of the two 
regiments facing down the Pike. The joint force of about three regi- 
ments stood its ground long enough to fire three rounds and went to 
pieces. Having run about 400 yards, they came upon the 75 O., which 
had changed front and moved up to von Gilsa 's assistance. A few at- 
tached themselves to this regiment, which now confronted two brigades 
of the enemy and Stuart's two guns on the Pike, the latter playing 
upon it with canister. For ten minutes this single regiment with its 
few rallied supports attempted to breast the fiery tide. Its colonel was 
killed, its adjutant wounded, and 150 of its rank and file struck down. 

> W. R., 39, p. 1050. 2 J Watts de Peyster, A. C. Hamlin. 

" A. C. Hamlin in Stories of Our Soldiers, collected by the Boston Journal, pp. 34, 38. 



JACKSON ATTACKS 297 

The survivors retreated to a new line formed by the 25, 55, and 107 0., 
supported by the 17 Conn., in the vicinity of the Taylor House. This 
position was soon enveloped by three brigades of the enemy and sub- 
jected to a rapid fire of canister at short range. 

Howard had got back to his headquarters before a sound or other 
indication of the conflict had reached it. "There was no news for me," 
he says, "except what the scouts brought, and what General Devens 
had frequently reported, that Lee's columns had been crossing the 
Plank Road obliquely, between 2 and 3 miles ahead, and apparently 
aiming toward Orange Court-House. Had I then been familiar with 
the routes as I am now, I should have distrusted the conclusion. ... It 
was already 6 o'clock. Hearing the sound of a skirmish toward Devens' 
position, I moimted with my staff and rode toward a high ridge. "^ 

There on the Taylor height he saw the startled game scampering 
and scurrying across the fields, and then his disordered and disheart- 
ened men with their shooting and yelling pursiiers, who, on every side, 
came swarming out of the thickets which Howard had pronounced to 
be impenetrable. "It was a terrible gale. The rush, the rattle, the 
quick lightning from a hundred points at once; the roar redoubled by 
echoes through the forest ; the panic, the dead and dying in sight, and 
the wounded straggling along; the frantic efforts of the brave and 
patriotic to stay the angry storm."- The hapless commander exerted 
himself bravely to check these disastrous consequences of his own 
neglect and disregard of orders. Lieutenant-Colonel Dickinson of 
Hooker's staff urged him to direct a fire upon the fleeing mass, but he 
replied : " I will never fire on my own men. ' ' Putting away his revolver, 
he took up a national color and held it against his heart with the stump 
of his lost arm. Captain Dessauer, another staff officer, fell by his side. 
His own horse reared and fell with him, but without doing him any 
serious injury. After a hopeless struggle of ten or fifteen minutes the 
fragments of his line retreated rapidly and tumultuously toward the 
Wilderness Church. Devens' four pieces of artillery lately at the 
Taylor House were taken in flank and rear, and before they could get 
away, were all captured. They had not fired a shot. Von Steinwehr, as 
he returned from the Furnace, dropped behind Howard, and at 6 :10 p.m. 
was still on his way to the corps, but he knew from the sound of the 
firing that the corps was attacked. Schurz had given way before Jack- 
son's left wing, and was falling back on the woods in rear of Hawkins' 
Farm. The reserve artillery was waiting for its front to be cleared to 
open fire. In about one hour Jackson had wrecked Devens' division 
and gained possession of the first point of vantage, the elevation on 
which stood Taylor's Farm, and of Howard's second line of defence. 
Hawkins' Farm. 

^ Autohiographij of Gen. 0. O. Howard, I, 368. 370. -lb. 



298 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The right center, left center, and left of Jackson's original formation 
presented a solid front for another advance, but the right was far to 
the rear. How did this happen"? ^Tien Jackson's three lines had ad- 
vanced but a few hundred yards Colquitt, commanding the brigade on 
Bodes' right (^TTi), received a report from his skirmishers that a body 
of the enemy was on his right flank. His orders and the principles of 
tactics required him to transmit this report to the second line, and keep 
right on with the rest of the first line. His own brigade "was least ob- 
structed either by woods or the enemy. It could have moved most rap- 
idly, and might have narrowed the enemy's avenue of escape."^ He 
sent word to Ramseur that the enemy was attempting to turn his right, 
and instead of continuing to advance, and keeping abreast of Doles, 
moved his brigade by the flank to the right, halted it, and threw his 
right regiment back into position to meet an attack. Eamseur on re- 
ceiving Colquitt's message naturally and properly conformed to these 
movements. He could not pass Colquitt. Paxton with his five regi- 
ments of the Stonewall brigade, and Stuart with his two squadrons of 
cavalry, were condemned to inaction until Colquitt resumed his ad- 
vance, as the latter had the right of way. Thirteen regiments, about 
5000 men, were thus practically eliminated from Jackson's force. 
After a while Colquitt again sent word to Ramseur that the enemy was 
threatening his right flank. Ramseur replied in effect that the firing 
indicated a sharp fight with General Doles, and that Ms impression 
was that Colquitt's support was necessary there, and that he would 
take care of Colquitt's right flank. Regarding the character of the 
opposition which had caused Colquitt to halt, that officer says in his re- 
port: "The enemy's force proved to be a small body of cavalry, which 
galloped away as soon as the regiment advancing toward them was 
discovered. " 2 Hamlin says in his Battle of Chancellorsville (pp. 145, 
146) : "A few moments after the advance had commenced, Colquitt 
struck a strong, determined picket reserve, and noticed some cavalry 
on his right front, and conceived the singular idea that Sickles had 
moved his forces to the right and was then threatening his flank. Why 
he should entertain this idea is very strange, as Stuart with his cavalry 
and the Stonewall brigade of infantry were both on the Plank Road to 
his right, and guarding it from all attacks from that quarter. Besides 
this force, the brigades of Archer and Thomas (f^) were still in the 
rear, guarding the trains, and Colquitt ought to have known that 
Sickles could not have reached him without first disposing of these 
forces. . . . The men who made this resistance, which proved of such 
great importance to the Federal army, belonged to the Fifty-fifth Ohio, 
but the cavalry Colquitt saw were probably some of Stuart's men, 

' Military Memoirs of a Confederate, by E. P. Alexander, p. 335. 
-W. R, 39, p. 975. 



COLQUITT'S BLUNDER 299 

dressed in the United States uniform, who were halted at the Burton 
Farm, for no evidence can be found of any cavalry of ours stationed at 
that point. ' ' ' 

About 5:30 the skirmishers from Archer's brigade that were guard- 
ing Best's left at the railroad cut were withdrawn. Best received 
orders from Archer to "move out quickly," but it was too late. Bir- 
ney's skirmishers had placed themselves across the railroad cut on his 
left and nearly surrounded him.- Best himself and a few of his officers 
and men escaped, but his regiment as an organization was compelled to 
lay down its arms and march off into the Federal lines as prisoners.'' 
Being commiserated by Pleasonton's cavalry, one of them defiantly 
spoke up: "You may think you have done a big thing just now, but 
wait till Jackson gets around on your right." He was laughed at for 
his supposed bravado. It was not imagined that he would betray Jack- 
son's movement, had he known anything about it."* 

Soon after 5 p.m. the artillery duel between Turnbull's battery at 
Welford's Furnace and Brooke's battery at the Welford House was de- 
cided by the exhaustion of Turnbull's ammunition. His battery re- 
turned to Hazel Grove, and Jastram's was ordered up to replace it. 
Sims' battery (j-^) was still in position at Hazel Grove. Sickles, not 
deeming it "quite time for the effective employment of cavalry in the 
attack," ordered Devin to report with the 6 N. Y. to Birney, and 
Pleasonton to send the remainder of the cavalry brigade back to the 
open space at Hazel Grove to await orders. Accordingly, the 6 N. Y. 
went to the front, and the brigade to the rear. Pleasonton in person 
remained with Sickles to receive reports from the front, and Huey re- 
mained with Pleasonton to be further posted. Howard and von Stein- 
wehr, on seeing Barlow in position, started back to rejoin their corps. 

Posey and Wright had about all that they could do to stand their 
ground. Any diversion in Jackson's favor could only be made by the 
forces on their right. McLaws on the Turnpike, and Lee and Mahone 
on the Plank Road, were impatiently waiting for the sound of Jackson's 
guns. A shade of anxiety was visible on the faces of both. It was 
probably nearly 6 o'clock when Mahone exclaimed: "Thank God! 
There are Jackson's guns," and all along the line, from Anderson's 
guns on Mahone 's left to Perry's brigade on the right, the artillery and 
infantry cooperated vigorously in "feeling the enemy."® At 6 p.m. 

1 The Federal infantry picket numbered p. 980). See also Colquitt's report, ib., 

about 40 men (Papers of Loyal Legion, 39, p. 977. 

Commandery of Illinois, IV, 189). The * B. and L., Ill, 183; Berdan's U. S. 

cavalry may have been a detachment of Sharpshooters, by C. A. Stevens, p. 251. 

Pleasonton's. "■ W. R., 39, pp. 799, 826, 862, 878 ; War 

^ W. B., 39, p. 980. Talks of Confederate Veterans, by G. S. 

' Best gives his loss in prisoners as 26 Bernard, pp. 72, 73. 
officers and 250 enlisted men ( TT. E., 39, 



300 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Grandy's battery (-pj), which had too short a rangefor use in McLaws' 
position, was brought over to the Phmk Koad. From there it was sent 
off by Lee to the artillery depot at Chesterfield, its horses being unfit 
for service.^ 

All this time Sickles at the Furnace did not hear a sound of the grand 
attack on the right, nor did a single fugitive or assailant show himself 
to him. About 5 p.m. Captain Comstock, Hooker's chief of engineers, 
and General Warren, his chief of topographical engineers, started out 
together from army headquarters "to examine the line." They had 
got to the vicinity of Hazel Grove, when a heavy fire of musketry began 
on the right, and caused them to hasten in that direction.- Meeting 
fugitives of the XI Corps, Warren sent his aide to inform Pleasonton 
and Sickles of the rout of the XI Corps and then turned back toward 
Fairview. Comstock started to report to Hooker. 

About 5 : 30 the head of Reynolds ' corps (rr^)? coming up from below 
Fredericksburg, crossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, 
stacked arms near it, and proceeded to rest and refresh itself.^ The 
Second and Third Divisions were approaching the ford, followed at a 
distance of several miles by the First Division. 

Lowe, the Federal aeronaut, having observed the depletion of the 
lines of Fredericksburg, already related, wrote to Butterfield at 
5 : 30 p.m. : 

Nearly all the enemy's force have been withdrawn from the opposite side. I 
can only see a small force in the neighborhood of their earthworks. 

I can not at this time get a sufficient elevation to tell what road they take, but 
should judge, by the appearance of army wagons moving toward Chaneellors- 
ville road, that the troops are moving that way also. 

6:10 to 6:30 p.m. (Map 19) 

Jackson's next important objective was Dowdall's Tavern. Between 
him and this point Schurz's division and the fragments of Devens', to- 
gether with the brigade and battery of von Steinwehr's division, formed 
a line of defence extending from Wilderness Church southward and 
eastward around Dowdall's Tavern and northward along the edge of 
the wood facing Hawkins' Farm. These forces may be roughly 
estimated at 5000 men, about 3000 of whom were facing westward. 
One of the corps batteries, some distance in rear, threw its shot over 
the heads of the infantry at the masses of the enemy about Hawkins' 
Farm. Again the Confederate ranks resounded with the command and 
signal to advance. As they approached Schurz's position and felt its 
strength, Rodes called upon Colonel Warren, commanding a brigade 
in his rear, to support him. The troops of the second line had pressed 

1 W. R., 39, p. 884. - Rep. of Com., IV, 45. ^ jy j?., 39, p. 279. 



JACKSON AT DO WD ALL'S TAVERN 301 

on so ardently that they were already witliiu a few steps of the first antl 
iu some places mixed up with them. AVarren's and Jones' brigades 
pushed on with, and through, the first line. After a contest of about 
twenty minutes, or about 6:30 p.m., Jackson's exultant battalions 
planted their colors on Schurz's second position (Map 19). Colquitt 
on receipt of Ramseur's message put his command in march toward 
the sound of the firing. He was followed by Ramseur, Paxton, and 
Stuart. These troops were too far behind to overtake those engaged, 
and oould do no more than occupy the conquered positions. 

About 6: 10 p.m., when Jackson took Schurz's second position, Birney 
cleared the railroad cut of the enemy. Sickles still knew nothing of the 
conflict on the Federal right. The moment seemed to him opportune for 
Pleasonton to pursue. He was about to send a staff officer to bring up his 
brigade when an aide-de-camp from General Howard rode up, and re- 
ported that the XI Corps had yielded the right flank of the army to the 
enemy, who was advancing rapidly, and indeed was already in Sickles' 
rear. He did not credit this statement until the aide-de-camp sent by 
General Warren shortly afterward confirmed it, and asked, in the name 
of General Howard, for a regiment of cavalry to check the movement. 
He sent staff officers to recall Birney and AVliipple, and directed 
Pleasonton to comply with Howard's request. Pleasonton ordered 
Huey to report with his regiment to Howard. At 6 : .30 ]).m. Huey was 
on his way to his regiment. 

While Jackson was rolling up and crushing the Federal right. Hooker 
with his two aides, Candler and Russell, sat on the veranda of the 
Chancellor House, enjoying the summer evening. Now and then a shot 
came from the south and east, where Lee was keeping up a show of 
force, but nothing occurred to give them anxiety. Not a sound of the 
fighting at the Taylor Farm or even at the Wilderness Church had 
reached them. Not an officer from the forces attacked had come to 
them for aid, or to warn them of the impending danger, and so the 
hours passed until between 6:15 and 6:30 (about the time when War- 
ren's aide-de-camp reported to Sickles), when the sound of distant 
cannonading came to their ears, which they attributed to the move- 
ments of Birney 's force. In Hancock's line it was thought that Stone- 
man's cavalry or some other Federal force had come up in the rear of 
a body of the enemy and was driving it toward the Federal lines. The 
shells, which came sailing through the air toward Chancellorsville from 
the northwest, were thought to be fired by pursuing Federals. Hooker 
and his staff were listening attentively and speculating as to the result 
of Sickles' operations, when Captain Russell stepped out in front, and 
turned his glass, with some trepidation, it would seem, in the direction 
of Dowdall's Tavern. A moment later he shouted to General Hooker: 
"Mv God, here they come!" meaning Birney 's men. Hooker and his 



302 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

aides sprang upon their horses, and rode some distance down the Plank 
Road before they reached the ambulances and fugitives from Devens' 
division, and heard from them that the whole rebel army had bi'oken 
loose upon the flank and rear of the Federal line.^ Captain Best, chief 
of artillery of the XII Corps, began collecting what artillery he could, 
and massing it on the height of Fairview facing westward, in which he 
was assisted by Warren on his arrival.^ From Chandler's to United 
States Ford the Federals had two lines of communication : one by the 
Mineral Spring Road and the road along the river; one by the Ely's 
Ford Road and the road branching from it to the right, known as the 
United States Ford Road. Meade on his own responsibility sent Sykes 
with his division (^,) to cover these roads. The exact position taken 
by Sykes can hardly be determined from the official reports. General 
Meade says: "I moved Sykes from the left to the right, and pushed him 
out on the road to Ely's Ford in front of [beyond] the road to the 
United States Ford, to cover and hold the same in case the enemy 
should advance, as I feared, by that [Ely's Ford] road."^ General 
Sykes says: " ... I took position at double-quick to cover the ap- 
proach from Ely's Ford to Chancellor sville, my right resting on the 
road to the United States Ford. ..."■* General Ayres, commanding 
Sykes' first brigade, says: "... moved on the pike, and took a posi- 
tion across the road and facing the ford [Ely's] " ^ From these state- 
ments and those of the other brigade, and the regimental, commanders 
it appears that the line was a thin or disconnected one ; that it crossed 
the Ely's Ford Road between the Little Hunting Run and the junction 
of the roads from Ely's Ford and United States Ford, and that it ex- 
tended on the right to near the United States Ford Road, and on the 
left to the vicinity of Chandler's (Map 21). The time when this move- 
ment took place is given as about when the XI Corps broke ; as " even- 
ing," "dusk," "dark," and "night," and by the clock as 5, 6, and 
7 p.m. It was probably about 6 : 15 p.m. The position taken was imme- 
diately intrenched. In the meantime the fleeing men of the XI Corps 
I'ushed upon it in an uncontrollable torrent. Little attempt was made 
by Sykes' men to halt and detain them. Jackson's bristling battalions 
might at any moment come dashing at the lines, when a contingent of 
these spiritless fugitives would prove an element of weakness rather 
than of strength.* Sykes' place on the Mineral Spring Road was taken 
by Barnes' brigade on the right of Griffin's division (j^). Albright's 
brigade of French's division , (3^)^ was hurried forward, leaving their 

1 The Battle of Chancellors i-ille, by A. C. ■* lb., 39, p. 526. 

Hamlin, pp. 54, 148; and Memoranda of ^ lb., 39, p. 529. 

Colonel Thomas L. Liverraore. 5 N. H. " The Fifth Army Corps, by W. H. 

Volunteers. Powell, p. 450. 

= Rep. of Com., IV, 57. '' 1 Del. and 132 Pa. The other regriment 

" W. R., 39, p. 507. (4 N. Y.), whose time had expired, but who 



COMMOTION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE 303 

knapsacks, overcoats, and blankets behind, and put in position to sup- 
port Carroll's (oy). A portion of it was placed across the road to 
Chancellorsville to check the retreat of the XI Corps, which it did ' ' by 
arresting their flight, forming them into companies, and sending them 
to the rear. ' ' ' 

As these changes were taking place and the main body of the I Corps 
was crossing the river at United States Ford and going into camp, 
General Reynolds, who preceded the corps, leaving Doubleday in com- 
mand, reported to Hooker at Chancellorsville about 6 : 30. Here a 
military band was playing the national airs as a means of checking the 
disorder and encouraging the troops. The roads were crowded with 
panic-stricken men flying in one direction and reserves advancing in 
another.^ Had he arrived a little earlier he would have been told to 
bivouac with his two" leading divisions to-night near United States 
Ford, and proceed in the morning to take position on Howard's right. 
He was directed instead to place his available troops on the "ground 
vacated by a portion of the XI Corps." ^ Captain Candler and Captain 
Paine of Hooker's stai¥ were sent to Doubleday with orders for him to 
march rapidly to the front. Reynolds proceeded to join his corps. 

6:30 to 7:10 p.m. (Map 20) 

Schurz fell back upon Buschbeck's line. The two reserve batteries 
not yet engaged came into action— one on the left of Schurz 's battery, 
south of the Plank Road; one in BuSchbeck's rifle-pit, north of the 
Plank Road; and the corps battery previously in action ceased firing 
on account of the exhaustion of its ammunition. About this time the 
corps artillery was all ordered to withdraw to Chancellorsville. 
Schurz 's and von Steinwehr's batteries fell back to the Buschbeck line, 
the former having lost one piece and the latter two pieces, making a 
total loss for the corps of nine pieces, or 25 per cent, of its artillery. 
Captain Dilger, commanding Schurz 's battery, put one gun in the Plank 
Road; this being all the artillery that he could use, he sent his four 
remaining pieces to the rear under charge of a lieutenant, with orders 
to report to the first artillery officer he should meet. Captain Wied- 
rich, commanding von Steinwehr's battery, took his four pieces back to 
near Chandler's and proceeded to refit it.* The infantry on Busch- 
beck's line now consisted of Buschbeck's brigade of four regiments, 
two regiments and two companies of Schurz 's first brigade, three regi- 

volunteered to remain through the fight, had ^ Hooker and other officers were under 

been on special duty as guard to the corps the impression that the position lately 

hospital at Chandler's since the 1st. held by the XI Corps inclined more than 

^ Eistori/ of the 1st Regiment Delaware it did toward the Rapidan {W. B., 39, pp. 

Volunteers, pp. 66, 69. 225, 263, 279, 282, 288, and maps, pp. 673, 

" The Fifth Army Corps, by W. H. Pow- 683). 
ell, p. 450. * lb., 39, p. 647. 



304 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ments of his second, and his unattached regiment, altogether ten regi- 
ments and two companies, besides fragments of Devens' division 
(Map 20). This whole force may be estimated as 4000 men. The work 
was but a shallow shelter trench, and many of the men were badly 
shaken ; on the other hand, the line was not 1000 yards in length, and 
among its defenders were entire regiments which were perfectly fresh. 
If the foregoing estimate is correct, there were more than four men of 
fairl}' good morale to the running yard; these men were capable of 
standing off all the infantry that Jackson had in front of them or could 
possibly put there. But Jackson had reckoned on just such a case as 
this, and he was prepared to meet it. With his broad mass he assailed 
the Federal line along its whole front and converged with crushing- 
force upon both its flanks.' About 7:10 p.m. he gained possession of 
this third and last line of Howard's corps. The latter retired in two 
bodies : one of five regiments, under Schurz, north of the Plank Road ; 
one of four, under Buschbeck, south of it. Dilger with his single piece 
of artillery, supported by two companies of infantry, and a cavalcade 
of officers forming a sort of mounted escort for it, took the Plank Road. 
The first halting-place or line of defence for these troops was one 
formed by the works covering the right of the XII Corps, and con- 
structed by the men of Williams' division (xn)- These were stout bar- 
ricades of logs, with abatis on the western side and extending from the 
south of the Plank Road to a point about 400 yards north of it, with a 
break of 100 yards at the road. Troops prolonging the line beyond the 
works, assuming that these were adequately manned, would derive 
some advantage from resting their left flank on a fortification. The 
whole line may be designated for convenience as the line of Slocum's 
Log Works. The only troops in the works were the four companies of 
the 28 N. Y. which had been left in them to guard the baggage of Wil- 
liams ' division when it moved out to support Sickles ' corps. About % 
of a mile in rear of this line the plateau of Fairview constituted the last 
point of vantage for the defence. Here Captain Best was engaged in 
placing his batteries. 

About 6:30 p.m. Jastram's battery (i-jti) arrived at the Furnace, 
and about the same time Birney received orders from Captain Moore 
of Hooker's staff "to advance rapidly." ^ Leaving two of Jastram's 
pieces at the Furnace, he promptly advanced with his three brigades 
and the remainder of Jastram's battery. Placing his four pieces in 
position, he wasted some ammunition on the retreating column, and 

1 "Along this line the contest raged for ably" (The Battle of Chancellorsville, by 
some time. Hooker states that it was an A. C. Hamlin, p. 76). 

hour [6:10 to 7:10] ; but the actual fight- ^ jjigtory of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Ar- 

ing did not last over twenty minutes, prob- tillery, by George Lewis, p. 162; W. R., 39, 

p. 408. 



BIRNEY RECALLED 305 

then, about 7 p.m., without orders from Sickles or from Hooker, pre- 
pared to go into bivouac. At this moment he was informed by Lieu- 
tenant-Cobnel Hart, Sickles' adjutant-general, that the XI Corps had 
given way in disorder, and that Sickles ordered his immediate return. 
He withdrew in good order, leaving two regiments (f7i^[> 2roii) ^^ 
position south of the railroad cut as rear-guard, and sent an order to 
Barlow to follow him. By this time he had caught the sound of the 
infantry and artillery fire on the Plank Road.^ Soon afterward he met 
Devin coming to report to him with the 6 N. Y. Cavalry, and ordered 
him to return with his regiment, and ascertain whether the Plank Road 
was open to Chancellorsville.- Barlow had lost all touch with the 
troops on his right and left, and was marching on alone in search of 
Birney or Jackson in the direction of Orange Court-House. ^Vhipple 
and Williams received orders to withdraw, the former from Sickles, 
the latter from Slocum, about the time when Birney received his from 
Hooker, or about 7 p.m. 

Buschbeck, as he fell back, halted in line of battle on the edge of the 
wood to check pursuit. Not being pressed, he filed his brigade into the 
road and went on toward Chancellorsville, covered in rear by Dilger 
with his piece of artillery.^ 

About 6:45 p.m. the 8 Pa. mounted and, headed by Major Huey, 
started off for the Plank Road in column of twos.^ The roar of battle, 
which rolled on past Chancellorsville, through the Federal lines, and 
out in feeble accent to the enemy on the Turnpike, had not broken the 
stillness of Hazel Grove, or if it had, had not disturbed the serenity of 
the few troops assembled there. 

No one in the regiment except its commander. Major Huey, knew 
where it was going. As the column entered the forest which extends 
about a mile south of the Plank Road, the ofiicers and men saw halted 

1 Four Tears in the Army of the Poto- 99, 105). A. B. Wells, late captain in the 

mac, by P. R. de Trobriand, p. 441. regiment, says with reference to it: "This 

- W. R., 39, p. 781. was at twenty minutes past six in the even- 

3 "Dilger's resolute action while retreat- mg. I remember it, for I looked at my 

ing with his single gun, supported by the watch . . ." {ib., p. 71). T. E. Carpenter, 

tw"o companies of brave Irishmen of the late captain in the regiment, gives it as 

Sixty-first Ohio, keeping the enemy at bay "about half-past six o'clock in the evening" 

and "the Plank Road free from active pur- (*., p. 78). Huey gives the time when 

suit, forms one of the bright and pleasing Sickles gave the order to Pleasonton as 

episodes of this ill-fated campaign, but "half-past six o'clock— not later" (ib., pp. 

which has not received even at this Tate day 14, 15). This must make the time when 

[1896] the least notice whatever" (The Huey put the order into execution later than 

Battle of Chancellorsville, by A. C. Hamlin, half-past six. According to Hamlin, Huey 

p_ 78). received the order "shortly" before seven 

* The time of day is given by C. A. and put it in execution some time after 

White, late Adjutant of the 8 Pa. Cavalry, seven (see his Battle of Chancellorsville, 

as "shortly after six o'clock" (The Charge pp. 82, 142). 
at Chancellorsville, by Pennock Huey, pp. 



306 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

by the roadside, in the opening called the Vista, caissons, guns, car- 
riages, and other material, belonging to the Federal troops who had 
gone down to the Furnace. None of the soldiers and camp-followers 
there seemed to l)e aware that a conflict had taken place in the vicinity 
or that the least danger was impending. Not a straggler from the line 
of battle had yet reached this spot to give the alarm. And so Huey and 
his men marched along with their sabers in their scabbards and their 
pistols in their holsters. Being, as they thought, well within their own 
lines, they had no regular advance-guard or flankers. About a third of 
a mile from the Plauiv Road a narrow road or path coming from near 
Dowdall's Tavern joins the road leading directly from Hazel Grove to 
the Plank Road. As Huey reached this point he saw several men in 
gray uniforms moving about in the twilight some distance from him, 
but he took them to be Federal scouts dressed in Confederate gray, and 
passed on. As he approached the Plank Road he saw, to his astonish- 
ment, grouj^s of Confederates in his front between him and the Plank 
Road, moving in the direction of Chancellors\'ille, and others on his 
left approaching his left flank. It flashed upon him that he had marched 
up against a part of Lee's army, that it was too late to retreat, that the 
best thing he could do would be to break through the crowd in his front, 
gain the Plank Road, turn to the right, and fight his way to Chancellors- 
ville. He instantly ordered his men to draw sabers and follow him at 
a gallop. This was about 7 : 30 p.m., about the time when Stuart started 
off for Ely's Ford. When he struck the Plank Road he saw, to his 
dismay, a crowd of Confederates blocking the way on the right. The 
XI Corps had all gone by, and he was in the midst of the enemy's ad- 
vance troops, the main body being to his left, but out of sight. He led 
the column in the direction which seemed to be that of least resistance, 
or to the left. After he had gone about 100 yards he was met with a 
murderous volley from concealed troops in the woods. He turned his 
staggered eolunm to the right, and passed on eastward.* 

At 7 p.m. Seeley's battery (^-^yj) took up the march from United States 
Ford for Chancellorsville.^ Berry was still near the Chancellor House 
with two of his brigades. The noise of the rapid flight and the close 
pursuit of Jackson's troops was borne to the ears of his men, first in 
faint, indistinct murmurs, constantly increasing in volume until it 
seemed as though pandemoniima had broken loose. Then came the fugi- 
tives, frantic and terror-stricken, blindly pushing their way through his 
steady ranks. In the midst of the rout and tumult Hooker hurried up. 

^ The Battle of Chancellorsville, by A. C. The other two pieces may have been left on 

Hamlin, p. 92. See also Papers of Mil. the north side of the Rappahannock, but 

Hist. Soc. of Mass., V, 212. the author assumes that they were left on 

^ It appears that in the impending battle the south side, in the vicinity of United 

this battery had but four pieces engaged. States Ford. 



BERRY PUT IN 307 

"General," lie shouted, "throw your men into the breach— re- 
ceive the enemy on your bayonets— don't fire a shot— they can't see 
you ! ' ' 

Berry at once advanced at double-time with his 1st and 2d brigades.^ 
Hooker, sitting on his white horse, a familiar sight to his old division, 
watched them go hurrying by— remarking from time to time as he 
looked down into their upturned faces: "Receive them on your bayo- 
nets, boys! Receive 'em on your bayonets!"^ Hays' brigade (~), 
ordered to support Berry's di\^sion, followed at double-time. There 
can hardly be a severer test of discipline and esprit de corps than the 
one to which these troops were now subjected. Berry's division was 
the largest and one of the best in the Army of the Potomac, and the 
II Corps, from which came Hays' brigade, was making a splendid 
record. Through the surging rout of the XI Corps these sterling organ- 
izations forged their way, iinchecked and unshaken, toward the mass of 
yelling and firing assailants. Berry was ordered "to cover the rear 
of the XI Corps, and if possible to seize and hold at all hazards the 
high ground which had been abandoned by that corps." ^ 

General Reynolds, on reaching United States Ford, was joined by 
Captains Candler and Paine of Hooker's staff, and about 7 p.m. took up 
the march with his two divisions, accompanied by these two officers as 
guides, his 1st brigade. Second Division, in front. Through the dark 
woods, with here and there a moonlit opening, in and out among 
wagons, ambulances, and gun-carriages, they pushed slowly but steadily 
on. A regiment (j-^j) was deployed across the road, and as it ad- 
vanced, drove back hundreds of fugitives of the XI Corps. RejTiolds 
left behind near the ford one regiment of infantry (1:^1) and all his 
artillery. 

Williams was getting into position to cooperate with Whipple and 
Birney in pressing Anderson back upon the Plank Road, when about 
7 p.m., as Jackson was carrying Buschbeck's position, he received an 
order to reoccupy his log works at once. Apprehending that some 
disaster had happened to the corps on his right, he ordered his brigades 
to retire in good order, but without loss of time. 

^Major-General Hiram G. Berrii, by commanding the 16 Mass., g:ives it as 6:30 
Edward K. Gould, pp. 258, 297. The re- p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Westbrook, com- 
ports show a great diversity of statement manding the 120 N. Y., gives it as sun- 
as to the hour of the receipt and execution down. A. C. Hamlin, in his Battle of 
of this order. Captain Poland, Berry's Chancellorsville, indicates on his maps that 
acting assistant inspector-general and chief it was about 7 p.m. 

of staff, and Captain Tyler, commanding ^ Men and Things I Saw in Civil War 

the 74 N. Y., give it as 4 p.m. Both of the Daiis, by James F. Rusling, p. 303. 

brigade commanders and Colonels McLangh- "'Hooker's testimony, Bep. of Com., IV, 

lin and Famum, commanding the 1 Mass. ]26; Hooker's letter to Ross, B. and L., Ill, 

and 70 N. Y., respectively, give it as 5 or 223. 
about 5 p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Merriam, 



308 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

7:10 to 8 p.m. (Map 21) 

The XI Corps continued its retreat to the position of Fairview with- 
out making any stand on the line of Slocum's Log Works. Buschbeck 
started to do so south of the Plank Road, and was ordered by a staff 
officer to continue his march.' 'When Schurz reached the line Busch- 
beck had doubtless abandoned it, as he moved faster than Schurz. 
From Slocum's Log Works Schurz retreated by the Bullock Road. 
Eodes' and Colston's men went over the works of Buschbeck 's line to- 
gether, becoming mingled in inextricable confusion. They proceeded 
with apparently inexhaustible ardor and endurance to the edge of the 
woods beyond the works. Here about 7 : 15 p.m. Rodes brought them to 
a halt (Map 21). In his official report he accounts for this action by the 
statement: "The right becoming entangled in an abatis near the 
enemy's first line of fortifications, caused the line to halt, and such was 
the confusion and darkness that it was not deemed advisable to make a 
further advance."- He sent word to Jackson urging him to push for- 
ward the comparatively fresh men of the third line in order that his 
own line might be reformed. A portion of the Confederate force failed 
to hear or to heed the command to halt ; parts of three brigades pushed 
on up the Plank Road or in the woods on either side of it, thus forming 
an advance body of foragers or groimd scouts, but there was no line of 
skirmishers. Paxton had taken position in the rifle-pits of Buschbeck 's 
old line. Colquitt and Ramseur had halted near Dowdall's Tavern. 

About 7:30 Barlow, about a mile below the railroad cut, with his 
brigade, was overtaken by the bearer of Birney's order recalling him. 
He at once proceeded to return. 

On the opposite side of the battle-field the Second and Third Divisions 
of the I Corps were advancing from United States Ford. At 8 o'clock 
the First Division, on the north side of the river, was about 4 miles from 
the ford. 

Colonel Munford, with the 2 Va. Cavalry, had got within sight of 
Ely's Ford, having skirmished with some Federal cavalry, probably the 
squadron of the 6 N. Y. left in the vicinity of the ford. He sent back 
reports of his progress to Jackson,'' who perhaps communicated them 
to Stuart. At any rate, about 7 : 30 p.m., Stuart, seeing nothing else for 
him to do, proposed to Jackson that he "take some cavalry and infantry 
over and hold the Ely's Ford Road." The proposition was approved 
and acted upon.* 

Jackson's artillery having arrived at the front under Crutchfield, 

1 The Battle of ChanceUorsville, by A. C. * W. R.. 39. pp. 799, 887; Chancellors- 

Hamlin, pp. 77, 97, 148, 149. ville, by Hotehkiss and Allan, pp. 57, 58 ; 

= TF. R., 39, p. 941. The Battle of ChanceUorsville, by A. C. 

^Private letters of Colonel Munford to Hamlin, pp. 81, 181; Memoirs of the Con- 

tbe author. federate War, by H. von Borcke, II, 227. 



BARLOW RECALLED 309 

Chief of Artillery, the horse artillery, about 8 p.m., withdrew from its 
advanced position on the Plank Road, leaving there Captain Moorman 
with 2 pieces which had not been engaged. The men and horses in 
general were exhausted, not having been fed for forty-eight hours.* 

Huey, pushing eastward through the woods with a formed remnant 
of the 8 Pa. Cavalry, outstripped the Confederate troops marching on 
the road, and striking the ^Mountain Road, led his men to the Plank 
Road, where he met Captain Best, Chief of Artillery of the XII Corps, 
placing his artillery in position. He requested the captain not to fire 
his guns down the road, as many of his men were still in the woods 
trying to work their way out. The rear of the column, hearing the 
attack on the head, turned to the right out of the road on which the 
column marched from Hazel Grove, and made its way through the 
woods and over or past the intrenchments of the XII Corps to the Fair- 
view plateau. The regiment, on assembling, took position to support 
Best 's artillery, but from this duty it was soon relieved by the infantry. 
It then fell back to Chancellorsville, where it was formed in a line of 
skirmishers for the purpose of intercepting and gathering up strag- 
glers.^ 

]\Iost of the fugitives of the XI Corps preceded the formed or intact 
bodies under Schurz and Buschbeck. The remainder kept coming in 
until late in the night. But besides the swarms of XI Corps men which 
issued from the Plank Road and the roads on each side of it, a current 
of fleeing soldiery of two other corps reached Chancellorsville from the 
direction of Hazel Grove. To account for this fact it is necessary to go 
back a little in the narrative. When the 8 Pa. started to report to 
Howard it left at Hazel Grove the battery attached to Pleasonton's 
cavalry, 6 pieces; the three batteries of Whipple's division (jfj), 16 
pieces; 3 the 17 Pa. Cavalry, and the 110 Pa. Infantry. Everything was 
quiet there, when suddenly a sharp fire of musketry broke out from the 
woods in the direction of the XI Corps. Captain J. F. Huntington, the 
senior artillery officer present with Whipple's three batteries, assumed 
command of them, and proceeded to place them in position.^ Pleason- 

' W. R., 39, p. 1050. Huey's book (p. 31) that the regiment 
^ This account of the movements of the while in line of skirmishers at Chaneellors- 
8 Pa. Cavalry is substantially, and in large ville occupied the River Road and Turn- 
part verbatim, that given by A. C. Hamlin pike and the span between them. The road 
in his Battle of Chancellorsville, pp. 90-92. to United States Ford was ban-ed by the 
The author was favored, however, in the head of the I Corps. 

preparation of it by the use of a manu- ^ These batteries numbered IS pieces, 

script article by Colonel T. A. Dodge, U. S. Two pieces were with Muhlenberg on the 

Army, retired, entitled "A Romance of Plank Road (W. R., 39, p. 726). 
Chancellorsville," and of Major Pennock * Captain von Puttkammer, the chief of 

Huey's history of the event. He, moreover, artillery of the division, had left the field 

consulted the official reports, W. E., 39, pp. to look for orders,— which led to his trial 

772-789. It appears from a map in Major by court-martial, and dismissal from the 



310 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ton's battery (Martin's) formed not far from Huntington's, making a 
total of 22 guns ready to fire. Before the line was formed a mass of 
fugitives, together with caissons, guns, ambulances, beef-cattle, mules, 
etc., came surging out of the Vista, and dashed through the incomplete 
formation, nearly carrying it away.^ Soon afterward, the line mean- 
time being formed, a regiment of the enemy's infantry (j-^), about 
200 strong, issued from the woods. At once the 22 guns opened fire 
with canister. The assailants were probably surprised, having reason 
to believe that everything in this quarter was well started to the rear. 
They quickly retreated to the woods, taking with them a gun of Turn- 
bull's battery ( J— Ijj), three caissons, and the whole mule-train of small- 
arms ammunition of the III Corps. The forementioned mass of fleeing 
men, animals, and material was made up of Birney's park of artillery, 
which was left at Hazel Grove, camp-followers, and fugitives of the XI 
Corps. As it went through Williams' division (j^j), which was trying 
to regain its old position in the log works, it was increased by a con- 
tribution from that organization. 

A few moments after Dilger with his pieces of artillery and escort 
passed Slocum's Log Works, the Confederate advance troops (foragers 
or ground scouts) arrived there, surrounded the four companies of the 
28 N. Y., and demanded their surrender. Escape seeming impossible, the 
colonel complied, ordering the men to lay down their arms. Sixty-seven 
men were thus taken prisoners." The rest, numbering about 40 men 
who escaped, retired rapidly through the woods,^ joining in their flight 
the portion of Huey's cavalry retreating south of the Plank Road. The 
demoralized crowd carried with it the 13 N. J., also of Williams ' divi- 
sion. ( — ^i)i which had been left in reserve at Hazel Grove.^ The 
stampede is thus described by Captain Osborn, Chief of Artillery of 
Berry's division (j|j) : "As we passed General Hooker's headquarters, 
a scene burst upon us which, God grant, may never again be seen in the 
Federal army of the United States. The Eleventh Corps had been routed, 
and were fleeing to the river like scared sheep. The men and artillery 
filled the roads [sic], its sides, and the skirts of the field; and it appeared 

sei-\ice (J. F. Huntington, in letter to bis section into position, a caisson without 

Major Huey, The Charge of the 8 Pennsyl- drivers came tearing- through, upsetting his 

vatiia at Chancellorsville, p. 65). right piece, and severely injuring one of 

1 With reference to this incident. Lieu- his drivers, earrjdng away both detach- 

tenant Martin, commanding the battery of ments of his horses, and breaking the cais- 

lioi-se artillery, says in his report : "Car- son so badly as to necessitate its being left 

riages, wagons, horses without riders, and upon the field" (TT. jB., 39, pp. 787, 788). 

panic-stricken infantrj' were rushing ^ History of the 28 Regiment N. Y. State 

through and through my battei-y, overturn- Volunteers, by C. W. Boyee, p. 54. 

ing guns and limbers, smashing my cais- ^ W. R., 39, p. 693. 

sons, and trampling my horse-holders under * This regiment was rallied about dark 

them. and formed in rear of Ruger's brigade 

"While Lieutenant Browne was bringing {rju) (^- ^■> ^^' P- ^15). 



"THE FLEEING DUTCHMEN" 311 

that no two or one company could be found together. Aghast and 
terror-stricken, heads bare and panting for breath, they pleaded like 
infants at the mother's breast that we should let them pass to the rear 
unhindered. ' ' ' 

The hospitals of the XI Corps had been formed in rear of their re- 
spective divisions. The retreat of the corps compelled their hasty 
evacuation; all the wounded who could walk were sent to the rear on 
foot, the more severe cases were carried in ambulances. Small parties 
of slightly wounded men, "scattered all through the woods," were col- 
lected and sent to hospitals finally established on the north bank of the 
river, from which they were transported to those at Brooke's Station. 
A number of medical ofiBcers were taken prisoners, among whom was 
Surgeon George Suckley, Medical Director of the corps.^ Birney's 
division { — ) had its hospital in the Old School-House on the Plank 
Road, about a mile west of Chancellorsville. "The fleeing Dutchmen," 
says Medical Director Sim, "actually ran over our hospital." The 
wounded had to be carried on stretchers to the new hospital established 
at Chandler's, where for a while the enemy's shells came thick and fast. 
A mmiber of the surgeons ran away, and did not stop until they got 
about a mile beyond the river.'' One of the hospitals of the XII Corps 
was also run over by the XI Corps and ruined.* 

' ' Some of the fugitives, ' ' says General Francis A. Walker in his life 
of General Hancock, "were so completely beside themselves with fear 
that they ran past the Chancellor House, down the Fredericksburg 
Pike, through Hancock's line, and into the hands of the Confederates 
without being stopped. One ingenuous German approached Hancock 
and begged to be directed to the pontoons. The answer he received has 
been handed down by tradition, but it is best not to put it into cold and 
unsympathetic type ! " ^ 

An officer of the III Corps writes: "The officers of other corps made 
themselves speechless by striving to rally the 'flying Dutchman,' who 
was no longer an illusion, but a despicable reality; and the cavalry with 
their sabers, generals and staffs with revolvers, and artillerists with 
whips and rammers, vainly attempted to stop the disgraceful flight, 
which was finally checked by the Rappahannock. 'Var ish de pon- 
toons?' 'Der wash too many mens for us.' 'I ish going to mine com- 
pany,' they continually exclaimed. . . . The Germans sought to escape 
the censure which the whole army justly bestowed upon them, by tear- 
ing the badges from their caps, — for the crescent was recognized as the 

' TT. B., 39, p. 483. * Medical Recollections of the Army of 

^Medical Becollections of the Army of the Potomac, by Jonathan Letterman, p. 

the Potomac, by Jonathan Letterman, p. 134. 

133. 5 General Hancock, in Great Coniman- 

'< W. R., 39, p. 401. ders Series, p. 83. 



312 THE CAIVIPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

insignia of a poltroon,— and giving the niimber of one of the reliable 
corps, if they were questioned about the command to which they be- 
longed."' Many of these men had thrown away their arms. A number 
of them, however, with arms, were placed in the trenches of Geary's 
line.- 

Kodes galloped up the Plank Eoad some distance and satisfied him- 
self that there was no line of battle between his troops and Fairview. 
He apparently did not overtake Buschbeck (^^j). Schurz (|j), who 
had halted on the Bullock Road, was concealed from him by the woods. 
Williams (x-n), Berry (jfj), and Hays had not yet reached their posi- 
tions (Map 21). 

Buschbeck (o-^) reached the field of Fairview about 7 : -15 p.m., and 
posted his brigade, together with rallied soldiers of Devens' and 
Schurz 's division (^f), in front of the line of guns which Best was still 
engaged in forming (Sketch 3). Dilger found his four pieces in posi- 
tion with Best's guns, and united his single piece with them. Busch- 
beck 's brigade numbered about 1000 men, and the men with Schurz 
from 1200 to 1500.=* On a line with Buschbeck (^i), in front of Best's 
guns, were 150 men of McLean's brigade (i;^), and other men of the 
XI Corps, making, together with the men under Schurz, from 3500 to 
4000 men available for action.* On his return Bodes communicated the 
result of his observation to Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery, 
who sent three pieces up the Plank Road about half a mile beyond 
Dowdall's Tavern to fire on Fairview.® These pieces opened fire ac- 
cordingly about 8 p.m. Best replied with a fire of four pieces." At 
this time the positions of the Federal forces were as follows : Pleasonton 
with the 6 N. Y., 17 Pa., and Martin's battery at Hazel Grove. Devin 
did not go northward beyond this point with the 6 N. Y.. but sent a 
detachment of infantry from here on to ascertain if the Plank Road 
was open to Chancellorsville. This detachment, of course, was brought 
to a halt by the enemy. Behind Pleasonton, at Hazel Grove, was Whip- 
ple's division (jfj), and behind Whipple's, Birney's (^), accompanied 
by Jastram's battery (1. Ill), forming up. About a mile south of the 
unfinished railroad was Barlow's brigade (^t^), marching south, still 
looking for Birney or the enemy. Berry with his two brigades (2^1) 
had taken position between the Plank Road and the Bullock Road 
(Sketch 3), and proceeded to intrench.' Williams' division (^) had 

'^ Three Tears in the Armi/ of the Potomac. liaving suffloient range (W. R., 39, p. 

by H. N. Blake, late Captain 11 Mass., p. 180. 1050 ) . 

= W. R., 39, p. 734. *> Two sections of Dimick's batteiy. See- 

^ The Battle of Chancellorsville. hx A. C. ond Division. Ill Coips (TF. R.. 39, p. 

Hamlin, pp. 80, 126. " 483). 

^ lb., pp. 77, 78. ' He foiinecl a line of works ■whieh will 

^ Moorman's pieces were not used, not be referred to as Berry's Log Works. 



CRUTCHFIELD OPENS FIRE 313 

returned to its corps, but not to its former position. Its 2d brigade 
was in the old works on Geary's right ; the 3d and 1st brigades extended 
the line northward toward, but not to, the Planlv Koad. The left regi- 
ment of the 3d brigade, the 27 Ind., was formed astride of the old works, 
the eight right companies inside, the other two outside, of them facing 
west. Colonel Colgrove of this regiment got Lieutenant Lewis to place two 
of his 12-pound Napoleon guns (1. 3. Ill) on a piece of high ground on 
his left to enfilade a ravine that extended along his front.^ In rear of 
these guns, as support, he put about 200 men of the 110 Pa. (3. 3. Ill), 
placed at his disposal by an officer of that regiment.^ On the right of 
AVilliams' line were Buschbeck's brigade and other fragments of the 
XI Corps. When the division had been in this position about fifteen 
minutes, the 1st brigade, on the right of the line, was sent forward 
through the darkness to retake its original position, where it had left 
its knapsacks. It advanced in line of battle with skirmishers in front, 
and arrived behind the barricades, or log works, south of where they 
were occupied by the enemy, without knowing that the enemy was in 
possession of any i^ortion of them. 

About dark Perry's brigade of Anderson's division (j^) moved, by 
order of General Lee, from the right of McLaws' to the right of its 
own division (Map 22). 

8 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. 
Sickles was now undecided as to whether he should conform to the 
retreat of the Federal right or maintain his position. His last com- 
munication from Hooker was the order to attack, which he received 
about 5 p.m. To open communication with him he sent Lieutenant- 
Colonel Hart, his assistant adjutant-general, with a small mounted 
escort, detailed by General Pleasonton, taking the precaution of seeing 
that no orders, communications, or memoranda, of a nature to be of 
value to the enemy, should be found upon him in case of his capture. 
Colonel Hart reported back, probably about 9, with orders for Sickles 
to hold Hazel Grove. He was then sent to inform Hooker that a por- 
tion of Whipple's ammunition (mule) train, some of the caissons of his 
batteries, and two or three of his cannon were in the woods occupied by 
the enemy, between Sickles' line of battle and the Plank Road, and that 
to recover these, as well as the line of the Plank Road, he would, with 
Hooker's sanction, make a night attack, if supported by the line of 
Williams' and Berry's divisions (j.^, j^). 

In rear of Crutchfield's gims, A. P. Hill's division {\) moved up the 
Plank Road to deploy, but as it approached the artillery it was raked 
by the fire from Fairview, and forced to seek shelter on the side of the 

1 These pieces came from Hazel Grove. ^ W. B., 39, p. 711. 



314 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

road. Lane stated that he could not deploy unless the artillery firing 
ceased, and asked General Hill to stop it. Colonel Crutchfield after a 
delay of about fifteen minutes was ordered to stop firing. The Federal 
artillery ceased firing; A. P. Hill's division commenced deploying in 
front of Eodes' and Colston's, and the latter to withdraw and reform.^ 
The only part of Hill's division immediately available was Lane's bri- 
gade, which had followed the three lines by the road in column. The 
two brigades which had been deployed in the third line (Heth's and 
Pender's) had taken to the road. It is not easy to see why they could 
not have kept in line as well as the other brigades, but as they did not, 
it would have been better had they marched in column from the start.- 

By 8:45 p.m. Lane's brigade (j^jj)had deployed on either side of the 
Plank Road just in advance of Slocum's Log Works, with two or three 
guns in the road. He did not know of the existence of the log works, 
or he would have taken position behind them. One of his regiments 
(33 N. Ca.) was posted in line of skirmishers as a picket from 200 to 
300 yards in advance of his main line. 

About 8 : 30 p.m. Schurz with his five regiments retired to the vicinity 
of Chancellorsville.* Hooker learned that the enemy was in possession 
of the high ground that Berry was to have seized, and that he (Berry) 
had consequently established his line ''in the valley on the Chancellors- 
ville side of that high ground. ' ' The ground occupied by Berry was a 
ridge which in the hands of the enemy would command an open ground, 
or plain, that extended back to Fairview. As soon as Hooker learned 
of Berry's position, he directed General Warren and Cajitain Corn- 
stock to lay out a new line of defence to the rear of the one which he 
then held, and to do it that night, as he would not, he said, be able to 
hold the line which he then held after the enemy should renew his 
attack in the morning.* The new line, which he pointed out on a map, 
extended from Chandler's along the Mineral Spring Road, and along 
the Ely 's Ford Road and the Little Hunting Run. 

Albright's brigade (3;^) was withdrawn to its former bivouac be- 
tween Chandler's and Chancellorsville,^ leaving Berry's right flank "in 
the air." Berry dispatched an aide and patrols to the right in search 
of troops who were supposed to protect that flank or connect with it. 
These troops could not be found. He reported to Hooker and was in- 
formed that the II Corps would connect with his right. At 9 p.m. Hays 
reported to him with his brigade (^) and was placed obliquely about 
300 yards in rear of the second line facing southwest (Plan 2),*^ on 

1 So. Eist. Soc. Papers, XXX, 112. * Hooker's testimony. Rep. of Com., IV. 

- It seems that Heth took to the road on 127. 

Iiis own responsibility, and that Pender was ' History of the 1st Regt. Del. Vols., pp. 

ordered to do so {W. B., 39. pp. 890, 935). 66. 69. 

^ lb., 39, p. 657. « W. R., 39, p. 389. 



PLAN 2 



BERRY i^Tfr) 

I MASS 74 NY 120 NY 71 NY 70 NY 72 NY 26 PA 



II N J 16 MASS 



HAYS (3^ 



FORMATION OF liFRRYS FIRST AND SECOND BRIGADES 
AND hays' BRIGADE 

between f).30 p.m. and midnight, May 2, 1863 



The nambrrs lirhm- tlir lin/'s nt'Bcriys rrcjinifrit.s stand 
rorBru)<nli's to wliirli llir /■ri/i/lirnts Ix'toru/ 



REYNOLDS COMING UP 315 

account, no doubt, of the threatening appearance of things on the Plank 
Road. Between his right and the troops on the Ely 's Ford Road was a 
gap of about 600 yards (Map 22). The seven regiments in his front 
line on the right of the road took up about 700 yards, or about 2 yards 
to a man. With the regiments in the second and third lines there was 
less than a man to a yard. On the left of the road Berry connected with 
Slocum. The 11 Mass. of Berry's 1st brigade was still on the Turnpike 
in front of Hancock. Neither Jackson nor Hill nor Lane was aware of 
the line of battle formed by Berry and Hays, to say nothing of Sykes (^) 
on the lilly's Ford Road, and the two divisions under Reynolds 
(Y) plodding on by the road from United States Ford in pursuance now 
of the following order : 

Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863, 8:15 p.m. 
Major-General Reynolds: 

The general commanding understands that General Meade has sent General 
Sykes' division on [to] the Hunting Run. He [Sykes] will establish his line on 
that [stream], resting on the Rapidan, and extend it in the direction of Chan- 
cellorsville, along the line of the Chancellorsville and Ely's Ford Road, as far 
as he can defend it. The general desires that you connect your right with Gen- 
eral Sykes' left along the same line or road. 

J. H. Van Alen, 

Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. 

The First, or rear, Division of this corps (j) halted about 9 p.m. on the 
north side of the river about 2 miles from United States Ford.^ 

The Confederate commanders were under the impression that the 
Federal infantry was back of the guns at Fairview except for a line of 
skirmishers, or pickets, which they knew to be nearer. Where the 
Federal picket line crossed the Plank Road were two pieces of Lieu- 
tenant Dimick's battery {^^), thrown out from Fairview and com- 
manded by the lieutenant; at the corresponding point of Lane's line 
were the three forementioned pieces of Crutchfield's. Lane in placing 
his regiments had cautioned them to keep a sharp lookout for the 
enemy, as he was far in advance and alone, and they must be prepared 
to repel an attack. As soon as his line was formed he went to report 
for further orders. Wlieu he called out in the darkness for General Hill 
he was answered by Jackson. He found the latter at the jimction of 
the Bullock Road, Hazel Grove Road, and Plank Road, where he had 
intended to change direction toward the rear of Chancellorsville. But 
Jackson did not order any change of direction. He had not yet estab- 

1 The Itinerary of the I Corps { W. R., see reports of the mspector-general and of 

39, p. 257) represents the First Division as brigade and regimental commanders {ib., 

crossing the river ahead of the other two pp. 261, 263, 264, 266, 268. et seq.). 
divisions. For my authority to the contrary 



316 THE CAjVIPAIGN OF CHANCELLOR SYILLE 

lished connection with Lee. This he meant to do by pushing Lane's 
brigade straight on toward Chancellorsville. While Lane and Lee en- 
gaged the attention of the enemy in that direction, Jackson with Heth's 
and Pender's brigades (jnra) on the Plank Koad, and others at hand 
ready to follow, would deliver a thrust in Hooker's rear. Colquitt was 
still in the vicinity of Dowdall's Tavern. Paxton was in rear of his 
left. Archer's brigade (jt^'jj) went into bivouac about 9 o'clock at the 
intersection of the Brook Road and Germanna Plank Road.' Jackson's 
front had contracted from about 2 miles to about half a mile. He 
probably did not know or rightly estimate the force that the Federals 
put forth in the course of the day beyond the Furnace, and thought that 
Lane in advancing on Chancellorsville would leave that force at a safe 
distance behind him or to his right. In answer to Lane's application 
for orders he raised his arm in the direction of the enemy and ex- 
claimed: "Push right ahead, Lane; right ahead." This was about 9 
p.m. Lane at once rode along his line to prepare for the movement; 
he was on the extreme right, ready to clasp hands with Anderson on 
Lee's left, and was about to give the signal to advance when one of his 
bravest officers begged him not to do so until he could ascertain whether 
the troops and trains heard moving on his right and rear were Lee's or 
Hooker's. While General Lane was considering what he should do, a 
Federal officer came up along Slocum's Log Works from the right 
flank, waving a handkerchief and demanding information as to what 
troops were in his front. The officer proved to be the colonel of the 
128 Pa. of the 1st brigade of Williams' division, looking in the darkness 
for the former position of his regiment in the log works. He was 
promptly seized and brought before General Lane. After a moment's 
conversation with him. Lane had a patrol sent into the woods on the 
right to ascertain how much of a hostile force was concealed there. 
About as the patrol disappeared on Lane's right, a Federal officer, 
probably General Knipe, rode up in the woods in his front, and called 
out for General Williams, commanding his division. This drew the fire 
of a part of Lane's skirmish line (33 N. Ca.) ; the fire was returned by 
portions of the Federal line confronting it. Part of Lane's line of 
battle fired a volley at the Federal officer and incidentally into the rear 
of the line of Confederate skirmishers. This made the latter rush for- 
ward for shelter, and this rushing forward gave the Federals the im- 
pression that a charge was being made and caused a number of Federal 
regiments to fire into the woods. Soon after Lane left Jackson, about 
9 p.m., the latter was joined by Hill and some of his statf, and Jackson 
gave Hill his orders in the brief sentence: "Press them; cut them off 
from the United States Ford, Hill ; press them. ' ' Hill replied that none 
of his staff were familiar with the country. Jackson turned to Captain 
' ir. B., 39, p. 929. 



JACKSON RECONNOITERS 317 

Boswell, his chief engineer officer, who was well acquainted with all the 
roads and paths, and ordered him to report to Hill. Then, about as 
General Ivnipe had started toward the Confederate lines, he went with 
Hill and a number of staff officers out in advance of Lane's line of battle 
to look and listen, or reconnoiter. The party was jDreceded by a 
mounted orderly as a point. When this man, having passed through 
the line of the 33 N. Ca., came into view to the Federal troops across 
the Plank Road, an attempt was made to capture him. As he turned 
and galloped away, making his escape, a desultory fire was sent after 
him. 

Jackson with his party had halted in rear of the 33 N. Ca. After 
listening for a while to the sounds coming from the Federal lines— the 
ringing of axes in the building of log works and abatis, and the voices 
of officers giving commands— he turned his horse about and went back 
toward the Confederate lines. He had halted a second time to listen, 
when, about 9 : 15, the sound of the firing caused by General Knipe's call 
for General Williams and by the appearance of his orderly in front of 
the Federal lines broke upon his ears. A moment before, the colonel of 
the 18 N. Ca. of Lane's brigade, with his adjutant, had gone forward 
on the Plank Eoad to consult with the colonel of the 33 N. Ca. At the 
soimd of this firing these officers dashed back on the Plank Road to 
regain their positions in line. Jackson and his party hurriedly left the 
Plank Road, and pursued their way to the rear through the woods on the 
right, or north, side of the Plank Road. The Confederate troops were 
now keenly alert, having been warned against a possible attack by the 
Federal cavalry.^ The thumping of hoofs and the clanking of sabers 
produced by Jackson and the forementioned colonel with their escorts 
caused an impression in the line that a charge was about to break upon 
it. The order was given to fire and repeat the firing. The returning 
party was at this time not more than 20 paces from the line,- and could 
perhaps be vaguely descried through the darkness. The fire of the 
North Carolina mountaineers, some of which may have been aimed at 
indistinct, shadowy forms, but most of which was delivered unaimed 
in the direction of the approaching sounds, was fearfully effective. 

1 Memoirs of R. E. Lee, by A. L. Long, the 8 Pa. Cavah-y under Major Huey. . . . 
p. 257. Randolph Barton, Esq., of Balti- This encounter was most unexpected to 
more, at that time on Greneral Paxton's both sides. An attack from, or an en- 
staff, writes to the author : "I have a de- counter with, cavalry in that dense country 
cided impression, almost a conviction, that seemed to be as unlikely as an attack from 
when Jackson's assault had carried us to a gunboat. But I am sure that the feeling 
east of Dowdall's Tavern, a rumor ran of a possible attack after Huey's affair had 
through our immediate command, of a cav- impressed the army, and I think our men 
airy attack, and that we must look out for had become supei-sensitive on the subject." 
cavalry. This rumor had, no doubt, filtered - Memoirs of R. E. Lee, by A. L. Long, 
through from the front, and undoubtedly p. 257. 
refeiTed to the remarkable experience of 



318 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Captain Boswell and his horse fell dead. One of the orderlies was 
killed and one wounded. Jackson received three balls at the same in- 
stant. One penetrated the palm of his right hand, a second passed 
around the wrist of his left hand, and a third passed through the left 
arm half-way between the shoulder and elbow. It splintered the bone 
to the elbow-joint, and severed the artery. His horse, frantic with 
terror, plunged into the wood and rushed toward the Federal lines. An 
overhanging bough struck him violently in the face, tore off his cap, and 
nearly unhorsed him ; but recovering his seat, he managed to seize the 
bridle with his bleeding hand, and turn his horse toward the road. In 
spite of this he would probably have been carried into the Federal lines, 
had not Lieutenant Wynn of his staff, whose horse had also broken 
toward the Federal lines, caught Jackson's horse by the bridle and 
stopped it about 100 yards from a line of Federal skirmishers. The 
voices of the latter, says Lieutenant Wynn, could be distinctly heard. 
The lieutenant, with the aid of Captain Wilbourn, took Jackson from 
his horse, and laid him imder a tree. Then giving him some water, he 
got on his horse, reported to General A. P. Hill, and after taking the 
latter to Jackson, proceeded to the rear for an ambulance. In the 
meantime Jackson's broken arm was bandaged with a handkerchief. 
Soon afterward members of his staff started to bear him to the rear. 
The party, swollen by the arrival of officers desiring to render him as- 
sistance, drew the fire of Dimick's two guns on picket. This was taken 
by the artillery at Fairview as a signal that the enemy was advancing 
in force, and immediately, or about 9:30 p.m., it commenced firing by 
the light of the moon with canister over the heads of the Federal in- 
fantry at the Confederate lines of battle.' It was in this iron tempest 
that Stonewall Jackson gave his last order. General Pender, who had 
not deployed his brigade /pjj), expressed to him a doubt as to his ability 
to hold his men in their position in the road. Pushing aside the men 
who supported him, Jackson stretched himself to his full height, and 
answered feebly, but distinctly enough to be heard above the din: "You 
must hold your ground. General Pender; you must hold your ground, 
sir." Still more exhausted by this effort, he asked to be permitted to 
lie down for a few moments ; but the danger from the fire and of cap- 
ture by the Federal advance was too imminent, and his aides hurried 

1 Captain Best gives the number of guns guns; the artillery of Berry's (2d) division, 

in his line, or mass, as 34 (TF. R., 39, p. Ill CoiTis (except Seeley's battery and one 

675) ; General Hunt gives it as 38 {ib., p. section of Dimick's. in front on the Plank 

249) ; A. C. Hamlin, in his Battle of Chan- Road) {ib., pp. 483, 484, 162, 249, 488) - 

cellorsville, p. 104, gives it as 43. It eon- 16 guns; one section of Hill's battery and 

sisted of the artillery of the XII Corps, Dilger's battery of the XI Corps {ib., pp. 

except Atwell's and Hampton's batteries 249, 167, 656, 657)— 7 guns; total 37 guns, 

and Muhlenberg's section of Crosby's bat- Dimick's battery was on and to the right of 

tery (TF. R., 39, pp. 675, 721, 249)— 14 the Plank Road. The other batteries were 



JACKSON WOUNDED 319 

him on. A litter having been obtained, he was placed on it, and the 
bearers passed on as rapidh' as the thick woods and rough ground per- 
mitted. One of the bearers, shot in the arm, let go the handle, and the 
general was thrown from the litter upon his wounded arm. For the 
first time a groan escaped him. His aide, Captain Smith, sprang to his 
side. As he raised his head, a bright beam of moonlight made its way- 
through the thick foliage and rested upon the pale face of the sufferer. 
The captain was startled by its great pallor and stillness, and cried out: 
"Oh, General, are you seriously hurt?" "No," he answered; "don't 
trouble yourself, my friend, about me," and presently added something 
about winning the battle first, and attending to the wounded afterward. 
Again he was placed on the litter ; and the party turned from the wood 
into the road and carried him a few hundred yards to where Dr. Mc- 
Guire was waiting for them with an ambulance. Having readjusted the 
bandage so as better to stop the fiow of blood, the doctor placed him in 
the ambulance, which already contained Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson's 
chief of artillery, who was woimded by Best's artillery, and went with 
them to the hospital at Wilderness Tavern.^ Crutchfield was succeeded 
by Colonel Alexander, commanding a battalion of the I Corps, and 
senior artillery ofiicer present. 

We left Lane awaiting the return of a patrol from his right. In a 
few moments it returned, bringing with it 150 or more men of the 
128 Pa. (1. 1. XII), who had become bewildered in the dark forest, and 
surrendered to it.- Wliile their colonel, previously taken prisoner as 
already stated, was protesting against the capture of these men as an 
abuse of the handkerchief of truce, the Federal batteries commenced 

on the left of the Plank Road, with Wins- around Richmond, and at Cedar Run, Bull 

low's on the right (TF. B., .39, p. 487). Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. After 

^ Lee's Last Campaign, with an Accurate the general was lifted from him the horse 
History of Stonewall Jackson's Last was turned loose and dashed into the Fed- 
Wound, by Captain J. C. Goi-man, p. 56; eral lines. The saddle being an ordinary one, 
Chaneellorsville, by Hotchkiss and Allan, free from the housing and trappings of an 
p. 56; Stonewall Jackson and Chancellors- officer, he was not I'ecoguized as Jackson's 
ville, by J. P. Smith, Papers of Mil. Hist. horse, and was turned over to the cavalry. 
Soc. of Mass., V, 372-374; Stonewall Jack- In the coiu-se of the siunmer of 1863 Gen- 
sow and the American Civil Wnr, by G. F. eral Stuart captured a squad of cavahy, 
R. Henderson, II, 553-558; The Richmond and among its horses one was recognized 
Howitzers in the War, by a Member of the as Little Sorrel. In 1879 this horse was in 
Company, pp. 73 et seq.; The Battle of the possession of Captain J. G. Morrison, 
Chaneellorsville, by A. C. Hamlin, pp. 109 fonuerly of Jackson's staff, and one of 
et seq.; and manuscript letters of Confed- whose sisters Jackson had married (Manu- 
erate officers in the possession of Captain script lettere from Captain Morrison and 
I. P. Gragg, U. S. Volunteers. General D. H. Hill to Captain I. P. Gragg, 

The horse which Jackson rode was called U. S. Volunteers). 
by the soldiers "Little Sorrel" and by the - The Battle of Chaneellorsville, by A. C. 

staff "Fancy." Jackson captured him at Hamlin, p. 112; So. Hist. Soc. Papers. 

Harper's Ferry in 1861, and rode him dur- XXX, 113. 
ing the Valley campaign, at the battles 



320 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

their firing. At tliis the Federal prisoners and the Confederate in- 
fantry sprang together to the safe side of the log works, where they 
remained in a temporary informal truce, waiting for the artillery storm 
to blow over. Williams' 1st brigade, attacked on its right and rear, 
returned to its position in the division line, and there took ground to the 
right so as to connect with Berry's left (Map 22). 

About 9 p.m. the corps artillery of Couch's corps, numbering 12 
pieces, and 3 pieces of Thomas' battery (,^j) under Thomas were placed 
in position by Captain Comstock of the engineers "to the right of 
the Plank Road and beyond the Chancellor House. ' ' ^ 'V^Hio commanded 
these pieces is not known. The group will be considered as Comstock 's. 
Together with Muhlenberg's 20 pieces and Hancock's 3, it made the 
pieces in position about Chancellorsville number 38. 

About this time Barlow's brigade commenced arriving at Hazel 
Grove. The two divisions of the I Corps were still coming up from 
United States Ford. A member of the 13 Mass. (3. 2. I) writes of this 
march : 

Tramp, tramp, all day xintil nearly 8 o'clock at night, when we filed down be- 
tween the hills to the ford, which we crossed on pontoons, and then half a mile 
further, when, tired and weary, we gladly received the order to halt for the 
night. Our bivouac fires were scarcely lighted and preparations made for sleep 
when the drums were sounded, followed by orders to "fall in!" and then 
"f-o-r-w-a-r-d, march!" and at a good round pace we started for Chancellors- 
ville, wondering what had happened to necessitate this sudden change in our 
programme. Something serious, for mounted officers were hurrying about with 
orders urging forward the troops. We had not long to wait, however, before 
we got some idea of the disaster which had overtaken the army. Very soon we 
saw men of the XI Corps hurrying to the rear, many of them panic-stricken 
with fear. Orders were received to drive back to the front all men who were 
not wounded. ..." Halt, there ! Where in hell are you going ? ' ' was frequently 
heard, followed by "Turn back, you cowards." - 

At 9 p.m. Hooker had the following dispatch sent to Butterfield and 
to Sedgwick, imder the impression that the latter was still on the north 
side of the Rappahannock : 

The major-general commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the 
Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once take 
up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you [he] connect [s] with 
us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with on the road. 
He will leave all his trains behind, except the pack-train of small ammunition, 
and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He will probably fall upon the rear 
of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between us we will use him up. 
Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not 

' TT. R., 39, pp. 726, 309. 
- Three Years in the Army, by C. E. Da\'is, Jr., p. 203. 



HOOKER'S INTENTIONS 321 

to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest messenger. Send word that it is delivered 
to General Sedgwick. 

Testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker 
said: 

. . . T was of the opinion that if tliat portion of the army advanced on Lee's 
rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would 
take the road that Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and thus 
open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, 
would have to retire by way of Gordonsville. . . .* 

Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as prac- 
ticable, for the purpose of being in readiness to cooperate with the movement 
which had been ordered to be made on our left." 

. . . When I gave the order to General Sedgwick I expected that Lee would 
be whipped by manoeuver. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off 
on the same line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpeper 
and Gordonsville road, placing me 50 or 60 miles nearer Richmond than himself.' 

To the question: "Did you expect General Sedgwick to form a junc- 
tion with you?" he answered: 

No, sir: but I expected that while he attacked Lee's rear, I would attack him 
in front, and compel him to move off toward Gordonsville.* 

General Warren says : 

By our leaving a sufficient force in front of the right wing of the enemy 
[under Lee] to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force was to be 
thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of annihilating it.'* 

From all this evidence, it may be concluded : 

1. That Hooker meant, if forced from his present line, to take up and 
hold his new or second one. 

2. That if Hooker attacked at all, it was to be against the left flank 
of Lee's left wing, under Stuart; or against Lee's front; the latter in 
case Sedgwick should attack Lee. 

3. That with Stoneman operating against Lee's communications with 
Richmond, Hooker was trying to force Lee to retreat upon Gordons- 
ville. 

The Federal telegraph line was extended to-day from the Red House 
near United States Ford to near Hooker's headquarters, but before it 
could be put in operation, wagons tearing down the road to the ford at 
a full gallop knocked down many of the poles. Trees in which the 
wires were placed were cut down to open a way for stalled wagons. 
The line was thus rendered imserviceable. 

' Rep. of Com., IV, 131. ' Rep. of Com., IV, 145. 

- Testimony, ib., 127. For memoranda * lb., 148. 

of Hooker's see W. R.. 40, p. 339. ' W. R., 39. p. 201. 



322 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

9:30 to 11 p.m. (Map 22) 

Best's guns kept up a destructive fire with intermissions until 10 
o'clock. Shots fired from some of the rifled pieces of Jackson's corps 
passed over the heads of the Federals and fell in rear of the Con- 
federates beyond them. Reverberations of the conflict reached the 
Federal camps on the north side of the Rappahannock. Among the 
victims of the Federal gunnery was A. P. Hill, who had shortly before 
succeeded Jackson in command. 

When the Federal artillery ceased firing Lane's prisoners were sent 
to the rear. Soon afterward General Pender informed Lane of the 
accident to Jackson and the wounding of Hill, and advised Lane not to 
attack. Hill sent Rodes information that he himself was disabled and 
that the command of the corps devolved upon Rodes,^ who was next in 
rank. 

This morning Averell, who was still at Rapidan Station, opposed by 
a Confederate rear-guard, received Hooker's order of the 1st inst. re- 
calling him, and proceeded to execute it. He sent off the following 
report : 

En route to United States Ford, May 2, 1863, 7:20 a.m. 
Captain Candler, A. D. C, etc.: 

Your dispatch of yesterday, stating that the major-general commanding did 
not understand what I was doing at Rapidan Station, was received at 7:05 a.m. 
to-day, and I have the honor to state in reply that I have been engaged with the 
cavalry of the enemy at that point and in destroying communications, and beg 
to inclose a copy of an order received from headquarters cavalry corps.^ 

Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
William W. Averell, 

Brigadier-General. 

About 10: 30 p.m. he arrived at Ely's Ford with his command of 3400 
sabers and 6 guns (Averell's division, Davis' brigade of Pleasonton's 
division, and Tidball's battery), and went into bivouac on the north 
side of the river, confronted on the south side by Stuart with his avail- 
able cavalry and the 16 N. Ca. infantry, numbering together about 
1000 men.3 The squadron of the 6 N. Y. lately on picket at Ely's Ford 
had fallen back toward United States Ford. Stuart prepared to attack. 
In tlie meantime Rodes held a conference with the other division com- 
manders (Colston and Heth) and decided that it would be unadvisable 
to attempt to carry out a night attack. One of the reasons was that 
the troops were considerably shaken by the fire of the Federal artillery. 
The "confusion and disorder" among them, especially on the Plank 

1 W. R., 39, p. 942. 3 Von Borcke gives the strength of the 

-Dated April 30, turning the enemy over infantry alone as about 1000 men (Mem- 
to Averell (p. 228 ante). oirs of the Confederate War, II, 228). 



STUART TO SUCCEED JACKSON 323 

Eoad, were such as to necessitate his placing guards across the road to 
stop stragglers.! Another was the apprehension of danger to his right 
and rear from the direction of Hazel Grove. But the one to which he 
doubtless gave the greatest weight was the general uneasiness and per- 
haps dismay and paralysis likely to result from the loss of Jackson. 
It was decided to attack in the morning. Jackson's idea of taking 
Chancellorsville in rear was not known to Rodes or his advisers. 
Moreover, Captain Boswell, the ofiBcer assigned to Hill to guide him to 
the rear of Chancellorsville, was killed or mortally wounded by the fire 
which wounded Jackson. Rodes made his disposition with a view to 
throwing his force directly upon Chancellorsville. His first line was to 
be formed of Hill's (now Heth's) division. About 9:45 p.m. Pender 
deployed his brigade (^A.) on Lane's left, and about 11 p.m. Thomas 
deployed his(i4i) on Pender's left. The other brigades were not yet 
up. But while Rodes was making these preparations, steps were being 
taken to give the corps another commander. About 10 p.m. Hill, who 
had remained in a litter near the line of battle, and had, as already 
stated, turned the command of the corps over to Rodes, sent to Ely's 
Ford for Stuart to come and take command of it. Rodes says that 
Stuart was sent for by Major Pendleton, Jackson's assistant adjutant- 
general. ^ Hill and R. E. Lee say that he was "sent for," but do not 
specify by whom.'' Stuart says that the message was borne and deliv- 
ered to him by Captain Adams of General Hill's staff.* A Southern 
writer says that Jackson upon the wounding of Hill "expressed a de- 
sire that General Stuart should direct the subsequent movements of his 
corps." But he adds that General Rodes had already dispatched a mes- 
senger to Stuart.^ According to another Southern writer, Jackson was 
not instrumental in transferring the command of his corps to Stuart, 
but was in a measure responsible for it. He might have prevented it, 
but permitted it, and acquiesced in it." 

The brigadiers of General Jackson's corps, after determining to offer the tem- 
porary command to General Stuart, sent Captain Wilbourn [Jackson's signal 
officer] to General Lee to announce what had been done, and to request that he 
would himself come to that side and assume the direction of affairs !' 

Captain Wilbourn was accompanied on this errand by Captain 
Hotehkiss, one of Jackson's topographical engineer officers. 

On the side of the Federals, Reynolds' two divisions continued mov- 
ing up from United States Ford, catching more and more of the din and 

1 Rodes' report, W. R., 39, p. 942. ' Life of Stonewall Jackson, by A Vir- 

2 lb. ginian, p. 255. 

'^ lb., 39, pp. 885, 799. " Life of Lieutenant-General T. .J. .Jack- 

* lb., 39, p. 887. son. by Dabney, II, 474, 475. 

' lb., p. 478. 



324 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

roar of the contest in front of Fairview. At last, not far from Chand- 
ler's, they halt and load their pieces, but only to unload them, and be off 
in obedience to another order : 

ChanceUorsville, Va., May 2, 1863, 9:45 p.m. 
General Reynolds: 

The orders for the position of your corps and Sykes' divisions were communi- 
cated to you under the impression that General Sykes was already on Hunting 
Run. This is not the case ; hence the general desires that you will hold the right 
of the line extending along Hunting Run and resting on the Rapidan, and that 
General Sykes' right will rest on your left along the Ely's Ford and ChanceUors- 
ville road. The general desires that you make yourself particularly strong where 
this road crosses Hunting Run. 

J. H. Van Alen, 

Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. 

As their shuflling footfalls pass on down the moonlit road, the thickets 
are awakened with cheers and the strains of the grimly humorous 
Northern song: "John Brown's body lies a-mouldering in the grave." 

About 10 p.m. Mott's brigade (.54n)» except the 7 N. J., started from 
the United States Ford for ChanceUorsville, and Sickles received 
through Colonel Hart permission to make his proposed attack. The 
colonel was sent to commimicate with Williams and Berry, and returned 
at 11 with the rejDort that those officers were ready.' This report ap- 
pears to have been erroneous and unwarranted. General Berry, who 
was killed next day, left no report of his action or understanding in the 
matter; the report of Captain Poland, his chief of staff, contains no 
mention of it, nor is there any reference to it in the report of General 
Carr, who succeeded Berry, or in that of either brigade commander 
present.^ General Williams says : 

During the evening a staff oiBcer of General Sickles' corps communicated to 
me the intention of attacking the enemy on his [the enemy's] right flank in the 
woods with at least one brigade of that corps [Sickles']. On account of the posi- 
tion of most of my line, at right angles to the position of General Sickles' troops 
on the left, and from the evident danger of confusion and mishap in the darkness 
of the night, I asked this officer to have the attack deferred until I could com- 
municate with General Sloeum, who was then at the headquarters of the army. 
The attack, however, began before I could see General Sloeum. . . .* 

General Euger, commanding Williams' 3d brigade, heard unofficially 
that a night attack was talked of, but had no official notice regarding it.* 
The other brigade commanders and the corps commander General Slo- 
eum appear to have been unprepared for it.^ 

1 W. R.. 39, p. 389. 3 jj,^ 39^ p 679. = lb., 39, pp. 686, 698. 670. . 

= lb., 39, pp. 450, 445, 461, 462. * lb., 39, p. 709. 



REYNOLDS APPROACHING 325 

About 11 p.m. the XI Corps was reorganized in the vicinity of Chan- 
cellorsville.i Regarding the artillery of this corps, the battery of the 
First Division (Dieckmann's) was lost. The battery of the Second 
Division (Wiedrich's) lost two pieces; the remaining four were still at 
Chandler's, refitting and recuperating. The battery of the Third Divi- 
sion (Dilger's) lost one piece; the remaining five pieces were in the line 
of artillery at Fairview. Here, too, was one section of Hill's "West Vir- 
ginia battery of the reserve, or corps, artillery." The other two bat- 
teries and the remainder of Hill's battery were probably at Chandler's. 

Regarding the situation about Fredericksburg, Van Alen wrote to 
Butterfield at 10 p.m. : 

General Sedgwick's dispatch [of 8 p.m. to Butterfield] has been received. It 
does not alter in any sense the character of the instructions sent General Sedg- 
wick [at 9 p.m.]. They must be fully carried out to the very letter. This is 
vitally important. Gibbon must cross the river to-night. 

11 p.m. to 12 p.m. (IMap 23) 

Sickles, having authority for his night attack, and, as he understood, 
assurance of cooperation from Williams and Berry, ordered Birney to 
advance. Pursuant to this order, Birney 's 2d and 3d brigades (Ward's 
and Hayman's) were formed one in rear of the other, or in two echelons. 
In the first line of the first echelon were the six regiments of the 2d bri- 
gade, except the 20 Ind., which had not yet returned from its position 
south of the railroad cut. In this echelon were also the 63 Pa. of the 
1st brigade (Graham's) and the 17 Me. of the 3d. These two regiments 
followed the 40 N. Y. of the 2d brigade, and the three regiments marched 
by the road and the open space on each side of it (the Vista) in column 
of companies at full distance.^ On their right the other regiments of 
the first echelon (2d brigade) formed a line of companies at deploying 
intervals, each company in column of fours. The second echelon was 
about 100 yards in rear of the first, and consisted of the four remaining 
regiments of the 3d brigade, also in company columns of fours at de- 
ploying intervals. The lines advanced by the light of the moon, with 
bayonets fixed and pieces uncapped, and with orders not to fire until 
the Plank Road and Slocum's Log Works were reached.'* There were 
no skirmishers or ground scouts in advance, and the enemy's position 
had not been located. The center of the Federal mass rushed into the 

' Sehurz's report, W. R., 39, p. 657. Dilger's five and Hill's two pieces took po- 

2 lb., 39, p. 249. sition there. 

Wan-en says in his report : "To the ^ The average company was about 40 

credit of the artillery of the Eleventh Corps strong, or the equivalent of a platoon in 

that came off the field, it went into battle the U. S. Army of to-day on a war footing, 

on this line [Fairview] with the greatest as contemplated in its present drill regu- 

alacrity" (TF. B., 39, p. 200). It does not lations. 
seem probable, however, that more than * Birney's report, TF. B., 39, p. 409. 



326 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

interval between the Federal and Confederate lines; the right struck 
the center of Williams' division (~); and the left, the right of Lane's 
brigade (j-^). Receiving the cross-fire of friend and foe, the troops, 
despite the injunction to the contrary, opened fire, and dashed through 
the darkness at whatever might be in front of them. Those on the right 
charged a battery of the XII Corps before they discovered that they 
were attacking friends.^ The three regiments in column of companies 
had to change, on reaching the end of the Vista, into a column of fours. 
The two foremost regiments were thrown into considerable disorder, 
but were reformed, and this portion of the line produced some conster- 
nation in Lane's brigade. But it was repulsed. The troops in the 
center, practically beating the air, reached the Plank Road, but could 
not hold it. Slocum says: "As I had not been informed that a night 
attack was contemplated by our forces, I supposed on hearing the firing 
that the enemy were advancing on Williams' division, and at once 
opened upon them with our artillery. General Williams also fired upon 
all lines that made their appearance in his front. I have no information 
as to the damage suffered by our troops from our own fire, but fear 
that our losses must have been severe." ^ But Best, who commanded 
the artillery, says: "So far as I can learn, and I am happy to record it, 
not one of our men was killed by our fire or indeed woimded. ' ' Ruger, 
whose brigade (i-4n) was nearest Sickles' corps, reports that when the 
attack occurred he gave orders to his regimental commanders to keep 
their men steady, and not to fire unless fired into, as he "believed the 
attack was by Federal troops." ^ These orders were obeyed as well as 
could have been expected. A volley of bullets whistling over the heads 
of the 3 Wise, of Ruger 's brigade started that regiment partly to firing 
and partly to running, and the fleeing portion caused the 13 N. J., in its 
rear, to fire into it. The firing of the 3 Wise, was kept up briskly for 
about half an hour.* Knipe's brigade, on Ruger 's right, repulsed two 
advances of the enemy,^ and Berry's line, one." General Williams, de- 
scribing the operation in a private letter, says : 

A tremendous roll of infantry fire, mingled with yellings and shoutings, 
almost diabolical and infernal, opened the conflict on the side of Sickles ' division. 
For some time my infantry and artillery kept silent, and in the intervals of the 
musketry I could distinctly hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, 
evidently having hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the mean- 
time Sickles' artillery opened fire over the heads of the infantry, and the din of 
arms and inhuman yellings and cursings redoubled. All at once Berry's division, 
across the road on our right, opened in heavy volleys, and Knipe, commanding 
my right brigade next to the road on the south, followed suit. 

Best began to thunder with his thirty-odd pieces. In front, and on the flank, 

1 W. B., 39, pp. 430, 437. - 7b., 39, p. 708. "■ lb., 39, p. 687. 

" lb., 39, p. 670. ^ lb., 39, pp. 715, 720. « lb., 39, p. 449. 



SICKLES' NIGHT ATTACK 327 

shell and shot and bullets were poured into these woods, which were evidently 
crowded with rebel masses preparing for the morning attack. . . . 

Human language can give no idea of such a scene — such an infernal and yet 
sublime combination of sound and flame and smoke, and dreadful yells of rage, 
of pain, of triumph, or of defiance. 

As Sickles' two brigades fell back from the Plank Road, portions of 
them were thrown into confusion, and ran to the rear, apparently as 
much panic-stricken as any of Howard's men had been, having to be 
rallied at the point of the bayonet.' 

The start and the return of these troops were witnessed by Barlow's 
brigade (j^j), which had formed up at Hazel Grove (Map 23). The 
brigade had lost all its knapsacks by leaving them in its camp near 
Dowdall's Tavern. 

What sort of support Sickles expected from Berry's and Williams' 
lines can only be conjectured, but it is safe to say that it was something 
aggressive, and was not furnished. For this, Berry does not seem to 
have been at all responsible. Williams, in the absence of his corps com- 
mander, should have made all necessary arrangements for action by his 
division. But in spite of faults and mishaps, Sickles' night attack jus- 
tified itself. The gun and three caissons which had been lost in the 
Vista were retaken and brought in. Sickles took up and held a more 
advanced iDosition. He did not gain the Plank Road, and so could not 
establish the desired connection with the main force under Hooker. 
But he got where he could cut a road that would answer his purpose. 
His pickets formed connection on their right with those of the XII 
Corps. 

We left Stuart preparing to attack Averell. Before his preparations 
were completed he received Hill's message to the etfect that both Jack- 
son and Hill had been wounded, and that the command of Jackson's 
corps devolved upon him. His infantry, the 16 N. Ca., having already 
deployed, he ordered it to fire three rounds into the enemy's camp, and 
then retire and join its brigade. Without awaiting the result of this 
fire, and leaving Fitzhugh Lee and his cavalry to guard the road from 
Ely's Ford, he hastened to assume the responsibility so unexpectedly 
devolved upon him." 

Across the Rapidan Averell's men had lighted fires, made coffee, and 
were enjoying their pities, some had already lain down to sleep, when 
they were startled by a rattle of musketry and a rain of bullets. The 
horses stampeded, creating confusion among the men. The men rushed 

^ The Three Years' Service of the 33d observation between the left of Stuart's 

Mass. Infantry Regiment, by A. B. Under- infantry and Ely's Ford. The 16 N. Ca. 

wood, pp. 68, 69; W. R., 39, p. 418. rejoined its brigade (rn)at 3 a.m. (TF. R., 

2 Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalrii. by Mc- 39, p. 937). 
Clellan. p. 235. The cavalry remained in 



328 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

for their arms and returned the fire until it stopped.^ It was necessary 
to wait for morning to try to recover the scattered horses. 

Averell received the following communication from Butterfield, sent 
probably before Jackson's attack: 

The major-general commanding has directed that you report to him in person 
with your entire command, save one regiment. This regiment you will direct, in ac- 
cordance with the commanding general's instructions, to be employed in patrolling 
the country between the Aquia Eailroad and Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 
This regiment must be kept well thrown out, for the purpose of giving timely notice 
of any raids, and destroying an.y guerilla parties that may invade that district. . . . 

Similar instructions to the above were sent you when your command was at 
Rapidan Station. Up to this time they have not been complied with. The 
major-general commanding directs it to be done immediately. 

Best's artillery and Berry's infantry covered themselves with hasty 
intrenchments. About midnight the 7 N. J. started from Humphreys' 
left and the 11 Mass. from Hancock's front to rejoin their respective 
brigades (i^^).' 

Reynolds, with his two divisions (^), was toiling on, harking to the 
diapason of musketry and artillery on the Plank Road, and pondering 
on a sound as of infantry volleys coming for a short time from the direc- 
tion of Ely's Ford. The noise finally subsided, and the tired soldiers 
of both armies lay down, looking up through the dark foliage at the 
moon and stars, and lulled by "the weird, plaintive notes of the whip- 
poorwills, which were never known to sing so long and loud as they did 
that Saturday night at Chancellorsville. ' ' ^ 

As it appeared that the Chancellor House would be under fire, all the 
wounded, except five or six severe cases which were likely to be injured 
by being moved, were sent to-day to the corps hospitals in the vicinity 
of Potomac Bridge. 

In the course of the day the Federal right wing gained by reenforce- 
ment about 9000 men and 45 pieces of artillery. Estimating the losses 
at about 3000 men and 8 pieces of artillery. Hooker had at midnight 
under his immediate command about 76,000 men with 244 pieces of artil- 
lery. The Confederates received no reenforcements. They lost one 
battery of 4 pieces, sent away by General Lee, one regiment of infantry 
detached from McGowan's brigade, and about 1250 men killed, wounded, 
or missing. This left them at midnight, under Lee and Stuart, facing 
Hooker, about 43,000 men with 132 pieces of artillery.* 

' History of the 3 Pa. Cav., by Committee, pp. 232, 233. 

2 W. B., 39, pp. 478, 452. ^ siocum and his Men, by Committee, p. 164. 

* INFANTRY CAVALRY ARTILLERY AGGREGATE 

Federal 70,207 1,175 4.841 76,223 

Confederate 38,470 1,933 2,640 43,043 

Captured pieces are not couuted. 



CHAPTER XXI 

MAY 2 (continued) . . . THE LEFT WING. COMMENTS 

A T 5 :05 a.m. Butterfield telegraphed to Hooker : 

Dispatch dated 1:55 o'clock [a.m.] for removement of Reynolds and 
bridges just received 4:55 o'clock [a.m.]. . . . Copy has been delivered to 
Sedgwick.^ It cannot be complied with as regards before daylight. 

The bridges could hardly be taken up without attracting the attention 
of the enemy and indicating to him that he was free to move upon Chan- 
cellorsville, for taking up the bridges meant withdrawing all the Federal 
troops from the south side of the river. But the troops were needed at 
Chancellorsville. An attempt had, therefore, to be made to get them there, 
and at the same time to keep the enemy from going in that direction. 
Reynolds' Second and Third Divisions, on the north bank, were put in 
motion up the river, and his First Division, on the south bank, was 
ordered to recross and follow them. Newton's division [^) came down 
from Franklin's Crossing to cover these operations and make a show 
of force, but could not prevent the enemy's artillery from firing with 
effect at the division recrossing the river. Sedgwick at 8 : 55 a.m. sent 
the following report to Butterfield : 

General Reynolds' movement will be a little delayed in consequence of the 
heavy shelling they have given him. His infantry have been in motion for some 
time, and the whole movement will be puslied.- 

He received the following dispatch from Reynolds, sent at 11 : 05 a.m. : 
The troops are all [back] across [the river] and moving up the road. The 
bridge is on this side and being taken apart. The enemy interfered in no way 
except with his artillery, one shot striking the bridge while the troops were cross- 
ing, delaying us until a new boat could be put in. I report that pontoon bridge 
will be piled on this side and left. There are no trains to haul them off.' 

The bridge material was guarded by Wheaton's brigade (3;^) from 
Franklin's Crossing.^ 

Revniolds remained at the crossing below to superintend the with- 

1 Butterfield's dispatch transmitting the = Ih.. 107, p. 1034. ^ Ih. 

order was marked 5 a.m. {W. R.. 40, p. ■» For the story of a curiously eiTOneousde- 

361). Sedgwick received it at 5:25 a.m. scription of this operation, the reader is re- 

{ib., 39, p. 558), and Reynolds at 7 a.m. ferred to Campaigns of the Army of the Po- 

{ib. 39, p. 254). (omac,by William S-winton, p. 274,foot-note. 



330 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

drawal of his First Division, and having done so, proceeded to overtake 
the head of his column. He was in doubt, it seems, as to whether he 
should direct his march with regard primarily to rapidity or to con- 
cealment. On this point he was advised by ButteriSeld as follows : 

In regard to j'our line of march, the general indicated no route. Under present 
circumstances the shortest line would seem to be the one [for you to take], but 
you must consider whether the fire your troops would receive from the enemy's 
artillery while passing along the River road, the guns of the enemy in position, 
etc., would make it proper for you to diverge for a short time to avoid it; time is 
everything. . . . 

The head of his column was already directed upon Hartwood Church 
to proceed thence to United States Ford. There was no attempt made 
to conceal the march, and it was observed, at least in part, by the 
enemy. Pendleton says that he and Barksdale united in a note to 
Early stating that the Federals "appeared massing troops toward 
Falmouth." ^ Barksdale says: "appearances indicated that the enemy 
were leaving their encampments on this side the river, and were march- 
ing to reenforce Hooker. " ^ Early makes no reference to the movement 
or to the note mentioned by Pendleton. Reynolds was probably in the 
vicinity of Falmouth when he received from Butterfield the following 
dispatch : 

The telegraph operator just reports that the rebels are evacuating Banks' Ford 
and moving toward the firing [Chancellorsville].^ It may be that this ford will 
be opened at any time and the bridge[s] thrown over. Keep yourself in com- 
munication with me as far as possible, to be advised of this. It would seem to 
be proper, if an opportunity occurs, that you should cross there, and reenforce 
General Hooker, and so shorten the line. You had better send a staff officer ahead 
to Banks' Ford, if communication is opened there, and communicate with Gen- 
eral Hooker. 

Reynolds went to the ford himself, but finding that no bridge had 
been thrown, made no change in his line of march. 

On the withdrawal of Reynolds' corps (I) the only Federal troops 
left on the Confederate side of the Rappahannock below Fredericks- 
burg were Brooks' division (j-^^) and Burnham's light division /^ty) with 
Williston's battery (jt^). 

At Franklin's Crossing the enemy was much more threatening than 
he was at Reynolds'. The danger of recrossing the river and taking up 
the bridges in the presence of the enemy, together with the significance 
of such action to the enemy, determined Sedgwick to leave things as they 
were, until he could hear from headquarters. He wrote to Butterfield : 

I have not dared to take up the bridge at Franklin's Crossing. Reynolds' 
bridge ought not to be taken away until after dark ; it may cost the loss of many 

' W. R., 39, p. 811. = lb., 39, p. 839. ' This report was without foundation. 



REYNOLDS RECROSSES RAPPAHANNOCK .1.31 

boats. Will pontoon wagons be sent to take them at dusk? Shall the bridges 
at Franklin's Crossing be taken up at dark witliout further instructions? Please 
communicate [answer]. 

This message was delivered to Butterfield and repeated by him to 
Hooker at 10 a.m. In a dispatch of 2 : 30 p.m. Van Alen said to Butter- 
field: "The bridge [s] can be taken up at such time as General Sedgwick 
thinks best." Under this authority the three bridges were left, one 
piled on the bank of the river at Fitzhugh's Crossing, the other two 
spanning the river at Franklin's Crossing. 

The telegraph line was extended this morning by a spur from Eng- 
land to the vicinity of Scott's Ford. The regiment and brigade ordered 
to Banks' Ford ( ^ l^^^ , ^-^j) arrived there at an early hour, also a signal 
party which established a flag and torch station to open communication 
with the troops on the south bank as they approached the ford. But 
only Confederate troops showed themselves. Wilcox with his brigade 
(j^) and two batteries (^) arrived on the south bank about the same 
time as the Federals on the north bank. The Federal regiment left at 
Falmouth (3^-^) took post probably between Banks' Ford and United 
States Ford to guard the telegraph line.* 

Wilcox received an order from Lee to leave a small force to watch 
the ford, if in his judgment the enemy did not intend to cross there, 
and move up the Plank Road, reporting the fact to Ijee. But the move- 
ments of Federal troops on the opposite side of the river determined 
him to remain at the ford.- 

At 10 : 13 a.m. Butterfield wrote to Hooker inquiring whether General 
Gibbon was to move to-day with his division to Banks ' Ford or to wait 
until the ford was uncovered. At 2 : 30 p.m. he received the reply : 

... no orders have been sent for General Gibbon's division to move to Banks' 
Ford. The order was only for one brigade of his division. 

Butterfield wrote further: 

To G-ibhon. 10:20 a.m. 

Two bridges ready to be thrown across [at Banks' Ford] whenever the ford is 
uncovered. Stoneman's cavalry is supposed to be in the enemy's rear, on the 
line of his railroad.^ . . . 

To Booker, 2:10 p.m. 

. . . Supplies of Howard's, Sloeum's, and Meade's infantry expire a.m. of 
Monday [May 4] , unless replenished from the trains. All quiet here. 

' TT. It., 39, p. 519; Maine in the War 'For approximate position of Stone- 

for the Union, by W. E. S. Whitman and man's cavalry see Map 22, sketch in upper 

C. H. True, p. 492. right-hand comer. 

2 W. R., 39, p. 855. 



332 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The trains were still on the north side of the river, waiting for the 
opening of Banks' Ford and the crossings below. Reynolds' trains 
moved to the vicinity of Hamet, about 21/2 miles from Hartwood 
Church. 

When Lee decided upon Jackson's flank march it may have occurred 
to him that he might favor it by making a feint of withdrawing his 
whole army toward Richmond or Gordonsville or both. At any rate, 
there were movements among his troops to-day that had more or less 
the effect of such a stratagem. Back of Fredericksburg, as Early and 
Pendleton were standing about 11 a.m. on Lee's Hill, watching the 
movement of Reynolds' corps, the rear of which had recrossed the 
Rappahannock and marched about half an hour on the way to United 
States Ford, Colonel Chilton, Lee's chief of staff, came up and deliv- 
ered verbal orders for one brigade and 8 or 10 pieces of artillery to be 
left at Fredericksburg as a guard,— the remainder of the infantry to 
march to join Lee, and the remainder of the artillery to be returned to 
the depot at Chesterfield. Early had for some time been deliberating 
as to whether, imder his instructions of yesterday, he should withdraw 
two of his brigades and send them to reenforce Lee. He now had no 
discretion in the matter. His orders were peremptory. The defence of 
Fredericksburg and the heights back of it was committed to Hays' bri- 
gade (3-^) and a regiment of Barksdale's, and 15 pieces of artillery, 
numbering about 2500 men. The remainder of the infantry moved to 
the Plank Road and started for Chancellorsville ; 22 pieces of artillery 
were put on the march for Chesterfield depot, and 11 others were with- 
drawn from position and held in readiness to follow. While the pieces 
were being withdrawn, a display of artillery horses and carriages was 
made as if bringing up instead of taking away guns. The withdrawal 
of the infantry in full view of the enemy could not be disguised. It 
may have been ascribed by the Federals to Stoneman's cavalry, which 
was thought to be capable by itself of determining Lee to retreat. Re- 
gai'ding this cavalry, there were plenty of rumors and conjectures, but 
no authoritative reports. In the hope of obtaining one, Butterfield tele- 
graphed at 11 : 30 a.m. to Keyes at Yorktown : 

Our cavalry ought yesterday to have been in rear of the enemy on the Rich- 
mond and Fredericksburg road, at its crossing of the Pamnnkey, or in tliat vicin- 
ity, and have destroyed it. Use every possible means to get any information, and 
telegraph it to us, and oblige. 

Things are very lively here now. 

After the Confederate infantry, withdrawing from their line, had as- 
sembled on the Plank Road and advanced about a mile toward Freder- 
icksburg, Early received a letter from Lee expressing apprehension 
that his wishes had been misunderstood, and stating that he had not 



CHILTON AT FREDERICKSBURG 333 

intended to require a withdrawal, but to leave the question of such a 
movement, as he did in his order of yesterday, to Early's discretion,— 
to be decided "according to the force and movements of the enemy near 
Fredericksburg." By this time it was late in the afternoon. The 
column was immediately faced about and marched back toward the 
heights. 

On the north side of the Rapi^ahannock numerous dispatches were 
sent to report movements in rear of Fredericksburg : 

Gibbon to Butto-ficld, 3 p.m. 
Reports from my picket line on the right state that the rebels are withdrawing 
their pickets all along the river above the dam. 

Lowe to Butterfield. 4:12 p.m. 
The enemy have entirely withdrawn their advance lines with the exception 
of a small picket force.' 

About 3 p.m. the flag and torch station at Seddon's was broken up, 
and the telegraph line drawn in from Reynolds' to Sedgwick's head- 
quarters. 

Hooker's dispatch of 4: 10 p.m. ordering Sedgwick to cross the river, 
and reporting Sickles among the enemy's trains, reached Sedgwick at 
6 p.m. Sedgwick supposed that Hooker when he sent this dispatch had 
a substantially correct idea of Sedgwick's position on the south side of 
the Rappahannock between Franklin's Crossing and Fitzhugh's Cross- 
ing. He was puzzled, therefore, at being directed to combine a move- 
ment on Richmond with the capture of Fredericksburg. He thought 
that possibly the pursuit which he was to make was not to be directed 
by the Bowling Green Road, as previous dispatches had indicated, but 
by the road to Gordonsville. He accordingly sent a request for in- 
formation. 

In reply he received the following dispatch, sent by Butterfield at 
7 : 05 p.m. : 

The major-general coiiniianding directs you to pursue the enemy on the Bowl- 
ing Green road. 

He now knew that the capture of Fredericksburg, if expected of him 
at all, was subordinated to the pursuit of the enemy, and he believed 
that a march on Richmond would cause the evacuation of the heights 
and town of Fredericksburg. He therefore ordered his Second and 
Third Divisions to cross at his lower bridge, or near Mansfield, and 
had his First Division, Brooks', and one regiment of the light division 
(_JL_) push across the River Road, driving the enemy back behind the 

1 w. R., 107, p. 1035. 



334 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

railroad, and so open the way to the Bowling Green Road. At 8 p.m. 
he reported to Buttertield : 

General Brooks (^) has taken the Bowling Green road in front of him; is 
still skirmishing, and will advance as long as he can see, and will then take posi- 
tion for the night. 

Newton ( — ) is moving in the direction of Hamilton's crossing, and at daylight 
the entire corps will be in motion. 

Sedgwick thought that the Bowling Green Road went through Hamil- 
ton's Crossing. By BoivUng Green road he meant River road. When 
he wrote this dispatch Newton's division was in the act of crossing, 
about half of it having crossed. Howe's division was in rear of New- 
ton's, waiting for a chance to cross. Sedgwick doubtless intended that, 
under cover of Brooks' division, the remainder of the corps should file 
off by the Bowling Green Road toward Richmond, and Brooks bring up 
the rear. Butterfield believed that an attack upon almost any point of 
Early's line ought to succeed, and that an attack upon some point of it 
was about to be made.^ 

According to the instructions sent by Van Alen at 10 p.m., Butterfield 
transmitted to Sedgwick at 10:10 p.m. the instructions contained in the 
dispatch of 9 p.m. to march through Fredericksburg on Chancellorsville. 
These reached Sedgwick at 11 p.m. ; those of 9 p.m. sent directly 
to him had not come. If there had been a bridge at Fredericksburg in 
the possession of the Federals, he would not have hesitated to recross 
the river where he was and cross it again at Fredericksburg. But 
there being none, recrossing and crossing again would have been an 
all-night operation. It was light enough for the enemy to fire with 
effect upon a party attempting to lay a bridge. It would therefore be 
necessary, before a bridge could be laid, to drive the enemy away from 
the opposite bank. To do this from the south bank meant stealing a 
passage above or below the enemy, as was done at the first battle of 
Fredericksburg. Sedgwick decided not to recross, but to march by the 
south bank to Fredericksburg. His four divisions were to march in the 
following order: Newton(|j), Burnham (^j), Howe (^), Brooks (^) ; 
Burnham's division had been attached to Newton's." At midnight, or 

^ He wrote : ing well. Sickles is in the enemy's trains. 

To Sedgwick, 8 p.m.: "Their horses are Sedgwick is pursuing here. Be ready to 

poor. They cannot but be panic-stricken spring with your full suppUes whenever 

if you give them a sharp blow in the night. you receive the order. Expect it at any mo- 

Your opportimities are grand beyond ques- ment." 

tion. I know you will unprove them." 76., To ffoupi ; "Have all your material, men, 

8:25 p.m.: "Can't you take Fredericksburg and everything ready to move to-night with 

to-night, so we can commence railroad and [construction] train to commence work in 

telegraph, and pontoon bridge, by day- the morning, if required. I may telegraph 

light?" you at any moment." 

To Gibbon, 8: 25 p.m. : "Everything work- " " W. R., 39, p. 563. 



INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEDGWICK 335 

an hour after Sedgwick received his orders, the 1st brigade of Newton's 
division (Shaler's), which was to form the advance, having thrown out 
a line of skirmishers, drew out into column of march, and pushed on in 
the direction of Fredericksburg. Considering that his troops had to be 
roused and formed, and his orders issued and transmitted, the time 
spent in initiating the movement was perhaps not excessive. The 1st 
brigade was followed by the 3d (Wheaton's), and this by the 2d 
(Browne's). Butterfield, about when he received and transmitted the 
9 p.m. dispatch from Hooker directing Sedgwick's movement, sent to 
Sedgwick a negro who knew the Plank Eoad to Chancellorsville, and 
wrote or telegraphed : 

To engineer officer: To be ready to lay the pontoon bridge brought 
up from Fitzhugh's Crossing by midnight, place to be indicated. > 

To Gibbon (received 11 p.m.) : To get under way soon and cross the 
river to Fredericksburg to-night, taking care not to come into contact 
with Sedgwick. 

To Sedgivick : To push on without delay, taking care not to come into 
contact with Gibbon; to seize citizens and put them to death if they 
failed to put him on the right road. 

Captain Razderichin of Hooker's staff- was sent from Chancellors- 
ville to deliver verbally and explain the instructions forwarded by tele- 
graph. He instructed Sedgwick that he was to fall upon Lee's rear at 
daylight. At midnight Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick: "It seems to be 
of vital importance that you should fall upon Lee's rear with crushing 
force. . . . Give your advance to one who will do all that the urgency 
of the case requires." General Warren, Hooker's chief of topograph- 
ical engineers, who knew much of the road which Sedgwick was to 
march over, left Hooker's headquarters about 10: 30 p.m. to join Sedg- 
wick and guide his column from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. 
He was charged, no doubt, too, with keeping Hooker posted as to the 
progress of Sedgwick's movement. 

At 11 p.m. General Gibbon broke up his headquarters, and moved in 
person down to the river near the Lacy House, where the engineers 
were at work laying a pontoon bridge, but these were fired on by the 
enemy in Fredericksburg, and forced to suspend work. 

It was night before the Confederates, withdrawn this forenoon 
from the heights of Fredericksburg, reached them on their return; at 

* This bridge had been moved by teams bridges at Franklin's Crossing were not 

to the Lacy House. Benham says in his moved until the 3d. 

report that it was moved on the 3d (TF. i?., Butterfield thought that by midnight 
39. pp. 214, 215), but this dispatch and the Sedgwick might be in possession of Fred- 
following one (('&., 40, pp. 360, 368) ericksburg. 

seem to show that it was moved on the 2d, - A volunteer aide-de-camp not appointed 

though not laid until the 3d. The two in orders (The Campaign of Chancellors- 
ville, by T. A. Dodge, p. 169). 



336 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCBLLORSVILLE 

11 o'clock Early was still engaged in reestablishing and adjusting his 
lines. Much of his artillery, it seems, went too far to be recalled; at 
any rate, only a portion of it was brought back. 

The participation of the Federal War Department in the direction of 
operations led to the following correspondence : 

Ilalleck to Dix, 10 a.m. 

... If, as is supposed, the mass of Longstreet's troops has joined Lee, the 
demonstration agreed upon [against West Point] should be immediately made.^ 

Dix to Ilalleck 

. . . deserters from Pickett's division state that they saw Pickett yesterday, 
and that no brigades have gone from Longstreet's command. . . . One of the 
deserters— a Texan— says that Hood was there [before Suffolk] yesterday. 
Jenkins' division is before Suffolk. - 

The substance of the latter dispatch was communicated by Peck 
directly to Hooker. 

Schenck telegraphed to Stanton : 

... it is desirable I should know whether [whatever?] you can tell me of Gen- 
eral Hooker. The night is full of rumors. 

Stanton replied : 

You may rest assured that General Hooker's operations are progressing suc- 
cessfully and in all respects as desired unless you are otherwise advised by this 
department. 

Any mishap you will be promptly notified of, but, for obvious reasons, details 
of his movements and position cannot be given while in successful progress. 

That the Confederate public was better posted than it should have 
been on the general situation of the Army of the Potomac may be in- 
ferred from the following communication : 

Washington, D. C, May 2, 1863, 11 a.m. 
Major-Gencral Hooker: 

We can not control intelligence in relation to your movements while your gen- 
erals write letters giving details. A letter from General Van Alen [aide-de- 
camp] to a person not connected with the War Department describes your posi- 
tion as intrenched at ChancellorsviUe— can't you give his sword something to do, 
so that he will have less time for the pen? 

Edwin M. Stanton. 

comments 

Jackson's flank march was as brilliant an operation as Hooker's 
grand turn. His manoeuver, like Hooker's, was little favored by secrecy 

' W. R., 26, p. 682. 
* Jenkins caminanded a brigade of French's division on the Blackwater. 



COMMENTS 337 

or concealment, and owed its success particularly to being mistaken for 
a retreat. The principal circumstances which led to this mistake were : 

1. Statements of deserters the daj^ before. 

2. The direction of Jackson's march after he turned off the Furnace 
Road. 

3. The expectation that Lee would retreat in consequence of the op- 
eration of Stoneman's cavalry. 

4. The indications about Fredericksbui'g that the Confederates were 
retreating from there,— due to the misinterpretation of the verbal order 
sent by Lee to Early. 

While the Confederate cavalry under Stuart was feeling the Federal 
lines and driving back their patrols and scouting parties, the Federal 
cavalry was for the greater part Ijang idle in camp.* Just before Jack- 
son rushed upon Howard's right a reconnoitering party of Howard's 
cavalry went into the woods in front of the 26 Wise. On returning 
about ten minutes later, it informed the officers of this regiment that "it 
was all right," and then went quietly to rest behind Hawkins' Farm." 

Jackson's attack, which was to give effect to his manoenver, ter- 
minated without having attained its object. Lee's separate fractions, 
by their skilful and vigorous cooperation, had dealt Hooker a stagger- 
ing blow, but not a finishing one. They were now themselves in a most 
critical position. The force which held them at bay might turn against 
either one and overpower it. It was particularly to prevent such a 
situation that Jackson had issued his explicit orders that there should 
be no pause in the advance. He had no doubt expected that before dark 
he would join hands with Lee and be thanking God with him for the 
complete rout of the Federal army. He meant that the Federals 
should be given no time in which to recover from their first surprise 
and confusion. In this he was disappointed by the halting of his lines 
as stated about 7 : 15 by General Rodes. 

It is harder to find a commander who will require of troops all that 
they are capable of than to find one who will not call upon tliem for 
more than they are capable of; how rarely and imperfectly, too, are 
troops prepared by drill or field exercise for doing anything in a state 
of disorder! Neither Rodes nor Colston asserts or implies that the 
trooiDS were exhausted or incapable of another effort. They account 
for their halting by the two conditions of confusion and darkness.^ If 
Jackson had been at the front, the advance would have continued. 
What the effect would have been is a question on which historians dif- 
fer. With Map 21 and the foregoing account before him, the reader 
may be able to answer it to his satisfaction. 

Had Jackson not been wounded and disabled, he might have carried 

1 The 8 Pa. took this occasion to change = W. E., 39, p. 654. 

its organization from a three-battalion to a ^ lb., 39, pp. 941, 1004. See also Colston 

two-battalion regiment. in B. and L., Ill, 233. 



338 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

out his purpose of resuming the advance, coupling with it a movement 
against Hooker's line of retreat. But he would not have gone far. A 
good part of his force would have been checked or paralyzed by the 
artillery at Fairview or the infantry in front of it and at Hazel Grove 
(Map 22). The remainder would have brought up, more or less of it 
in column, against the lines of Berry and Williams, and been at least 
repulsed. What was perhaps possible at 7 : 15, when Bodes brought the 
lines to a halt, was no longer feasible at 9, when Jackson was ready to 
resume the advance. 

Had Sickles been supported as he should have been in his movement 
beyond the Furnace, he would have sent Jackson's column flying towai'd 
Richmond. He has been criticized for causing a gap in Hooker's line, 
which left the XI Corps without support. The officer responsible for 
this gap was the one who remained behind, and not the one who ad- 
vanced ; that was Howard and not Sickles.' That Sickles was not cut 
off from Hazel Grove was due to Colquitt's blunder. 

It may be asked whether Sedgwick would not have done well to have 
departed further from his instructions than he did, to have attacked 
Early's right, and made a bee-line for Chancellor sville? He did not 
know the roads to Chancellorsville, and had no guide. He may have 
thought that he would find his way more easily, and would more readily 
procure a guide, going through Fredericksburg than going straight 
across country. He may have felt bound to go to Fredericksburg to 
open a crossing there for Gibbon. Would it not then have been better 
to roll up the enemy's line toward Fredericksburg than to risk a march 
by the flank along the front of his line to that point? Sedgwick prob- 
ably asked himself such questions, but under the representations of the 
enemy's weakness and the urgings to make haste which came to him 
from Hooker and Butterfield, he thought himself bound to disregard 
any danger or difficulty there might be in an immediate and direct 
march upon Fredericksburg. The result was the singular spectacle of 
a body of troops practically on its enemy's flank moving to the enemy's 
front in order to attack him. But this apparent blunder was perhaps 
good luck. The center of the enemy's line was the most weakly manned, 
and probably, all things considered, the most vulnerable. The enemy 
expected, both from recent indications and from the course of the first 
battle of Fredericksburg, that the Federal attack would be made against 
his right. But there is no evidence that this expectation was known to 
the Federals. 

^ "General Hooker's plan of operations cation so as to prevent the junction of their 

for the day, as I understood it, was to forces, and then gather his army in hand, 

allow this movement of the enemy [Jack- and fall upon the two wings of the enemy 

son] to develop itself until he [Lee] had in detail and destroy them both" (Sickles, 

divided his army, then to put my corps, Bep. of Com., IV, 6). 
■well supported, on Lee's line of communi- 



CHAPTER XXII 

MAY 3 . . . BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLB UNTIL 9 A.M. 

Preparation (Map 23, Plan 3) 

STUART arrived from Ely's Ford about midnight.* The command 
of Jackson's troops was formally turned over to him by General 
Hill, though he himself had previously yielded it to General Rodes.^ 
How this treatment of General Rodes was taken by that officer is best 
told in his own words : 

I yielded the command to General Stuart, not because I thought him entitled 
to it, belonging as he does to a different arm of the service, nor because I was 
unwilling to assume the responsibility of carrying on the attack, as I had already 
made the necessary arrangements and they remained unchanged, but because. 
from the manner in which I had been informed that he had been sent for, I 
inferred that General Jackson or General Hill had instructed Major Pendleton 
to place him in command, and for the still stronger reason that I feared that the 
information that the command had devolved on me, unknown except to my own 
immediate troops, would, in their sliaken condition, be likely to increase the 
demoralization of the corps. General Stuart 's name was well and very favorably 
known to the army, and would tend, I hoped, to reestablish confidence. I yielded 
because I was satisfied the good of the service demanded it.^ 

Stuart heard of Sickles' "midnight" attack, and was informed that 
there was much confusion on the Confederate right owing to the fact 
that certain troops there had mistaken friends for the enemy and fired 
into them. Apprehending that the Federals would repeat their attack, 
and the Confederates their mistake, he decided to suspend operations 
until daylight.* He had no intimation from Jackson that the latter was 
aiming at the White House (Chandler's). No one under Jackson knew 
of his intention of gaining Hooker's rear except A. P. Hill, his second 
in command.^ The Confederates, it seems, did not know by what 
troops they had been attacked on their right, or that Sickles had re- 
turned from the Furnace. They apprehended a hostile force being 
somewhere in that direction, but seemed not to suspect the proximity 

^ Stuart erroneously says 10 p.m. (ir. B.. * lb., 39, p. 887. 

39, p. 88). See McClellan's Campaigns of ^Stonewall Jackson and the American 

Stuart's Cavalry, pp. 235, 247, 248. Civil War, by Lieutenant-Colonel Hender- 

2 W. R.. 39. pp. 887, 942. son, II, 560. 

2 76., 39. pp. 942, 943. 



340 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

of so large a force as Sickles'. T. J. Leigh, aide-de-camp to General 
Ward, was taken prisoner between 12 and I'a.m. Some of the enemy 
said to him in a very confident tone: "We got Dan Sickles' corps cut 
off, and we '11 capture the whole of them." ^ 

All through the night Confederate troops came up from the rear and 
took their places in the new lines. About 12 p.m. McGowan (^^jj) formed 
on Lane's right, obliquely to Lane, so as to face Sickles. Brocken- 
brough, commanding Heth's brigade (j^), formed it in rear of Pen- 
der's and Lane's, in irmnediate support of the center. Archer's bri- 
gade (j^i) broke up its bivouac about midnight, and took up the march 
for the front. In rear of A. P. Hill's (now Heth's) (1st) division, 
Colston's (4th) division formed an irregular second line.- Rodes' 
(2d) division was at Dowdall's Tavern, reformed or reforming.^ At 
3 a.m. the 16 N. Ca. rejoined its brigade (Pender's ^^j) from Ely's 
Ford. The cavalry, under Fitzhugh Lee, was in observation between 
Ely's Ford and the left of Stuart's infantry. 

Stuart dispatched Major Pendleton, Jackson's assistant adjutant- 
general, to inform Jackson of the situation, obtain his views upon it, 
and learn his wishes. Jackson had been conveyed to the corps hospital 
at Wilderness Tavern. Chloroform having been administered to him, 
a round ball, used with the Springfield musket, was removed from his 
right hand, and his left arm amputated two inches below the shoulder. 
He was recovering from the effects of these operations when, about 
3:30 a.m.. Major Pendleton arrived at the hospital, and asked to see 
him. At first the surgeon declined to permit an interview, but the 
major urged that the safety of the army and the success of the cause 
might depend upon his seeing him, and he was permitted to do so. Pen- 
dleton briefly explained the condition of affairs, and asked what should 
be done. Jackson was at once interested, and asked, in his quick, rapid 
way, a number of questions. When they were answered he remained 
silent for a moment, evidently trying to concentrate his thoughts. He 
seemed to have succeeded, but it was only for a moment. Presently he 
answered very feebly and sadly: "I don't know, I can't tell; say to 
General Stuart he must do what he thinks best." 

Stuart doubtless heard from Hill of Jackson's purpose of turning the 
position of Chancellorsville ;* but, as previously stated, the officer who 

^ TT. R.. 118, pp. 624, 625. * Hunter McGuire, late medical director 

2 A. P. Hill in his report places his divi- of Jackson's corps, says : ". . . after the 

sion in the second line (W. R., 39, p. 886). battle, when still well enough to talk, he 

But see Heth's report (ib., p. 891), and [Jackson] told me that he had intended, 

Colston's {ib., pp. 1005, 1008). after breaking into Hooker's rear, to take 

^ The 12 S. Ca. of McGowan's brigade and fortify a suitable position, cutting him 

and 23 Ga. of Colquitt's were absent,— the off from the river and so hold him until, be- 

former guarding prisoners, the latter cap- tween himself and General Lee, the great 

tured. Federal host should be broken to pieces. 



STUART SUCCEEDS JACKSON 341 

was to have guided the column in this movement was killed or mortally 
wounded. Besides, he must have doubted the feasibility of this opera- 
tion. Having decided not to act until morning, he could not expect to 
find the direct way to Hooker's rear unguarded. Moreover, a move- 
ment by his left would take him further away from Lee. He decided to 
consult Lee. In the meantime he ordered Colonel Alexander, his senior 
artillery officer, to occupy with artillery all points along the line bearing 
upon the Federal position. In this duty Alexander was engaged most 
of the night. He placed Marj-e's and Branson's batteries of Walker's 
battalion (1. II), numbering 8 pieces, in two lines about 300 yards apart, 
on and near the Plank Eoad, the second line to fire over the first and 
the adjoining infantry. The other three batteries of Walker's battalion 
and Page's battery of Carter'sbattalion(2. II)— -18 pieces— were posted 
or massed on or near roads leading to Hazel Grove, to support or ac- 
company infantry advancing upon that point.' This left him a reserve 
of 96 pieces, without counting the 10 pieces of horse artillery which were 
sent to the left to cooperate with the cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee in 
guarding against an attack from Ely's Ford. The corps artillery was 
parked near Dowdall's Tavern. 

The messengers from Jackson's corps, Captain Wilbourn and Cap- 
tain Hotchkiss, making a wide detour to avoid Sickles' scouts and pick- 
ets, reached General Lee's headquarters between midnight and three 
o'clock this morning, and found the commander-in-chief resting upon a 
bed of straw. When he heard of General Jackson's misfortune, he ex- 
claimed with emotion : ' ' Thank God it is no worse ! God be praised he 
is still alive!" Then he added: "Any victory is a dear one that de- 
prives us of the services of Jackson, even for a short time." When re- 
minded that General Rodes was now the senior officer in the corps, he 
said he was a gallant, efficient, and energetic officer. But he acquiesced 
in the selection of General Stuart to lead the troops on that day.^ One 
of the officers remarked that he believed it was General Jackson's inten- 
tion to have pressed the enemy on Sunday, had he been spared. General 
Lee said quietly : ' ' These people shall be pressed to-day. ' ' He wrote to 
Stuart : 

3 a.m. It is necessary that the glorioiis victory thus far achieved be prosecuted 
with the utmost vigor, and the enemy given no time to rally. As soon, therefore, as 
it is possible, they must be pressed so that we can unite the two wings of the army. 

He had no fear. It was then that I heard would hardly have thought of directing his 

him say: 'We sometimes fail to drive them main force toward Hooker's communica- 

from position, they always fail to drive tions. J. B. Jr. 

us'" (So. Hist. Soc. Papers, XXV, 110). ^ Alexander and Pegram differ in their 
It would seem that Jackson never knew of reports as to the strength and disposition 
Colquitt's blunder and the danger of an of this artillery (W. R., 39, pp. 823, 938). 
attack from the direction of Hazel Grove. " Life of Lieut enant-General T. J. Jack- 
Had he known the situation as it was, he sow, by R. L. Dabney, II, 479. 



342 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Endeavor, therefore, to dispossess them of Chaneellorsville, which will permit 
the union of the whole army. 

I shall myself proceed to join you as soon as I can make arrangements on this 
side, but let nothing delay the completion of the plan of driving the enemy from 
his rear and from his position. 

I shall give orders that every effort be made on this side at daylight to aid in 
the junction. 

This dispatch of Lee 's suggested, if it did not require, a movement to 
Hooker's rear. Stuart probably requested to be enlightened on this 
point. At any rate, at 3 : 30 a.m. Lee wrote him again : 

I repeat what I have said half an hour since. It is all-important that you 
still continue pressing to the right [toward me], turning, if possible, all the 
fortified points, in order that we can unite both wings of tlie army. Keep the 
troops well together, and press on, on the general plan, which is to work by the 
right wing, turning the positions of the enemy so as to drive him from Chan- 
eellorsville, which will again unite us. Everything will be done on this side to 
accomplish the same object. Try and keep the troops provisioned and together, 
and proceed vigorously. 

When Lee wrote this dispatch he perhaps did not fully realize the 
difference of the present situation from that in which Jackson had been 
able to "press on," "turning the positions of the enemy." Instead of 
overlapping the enemy, the lines under Stuart were now overlapped 
themselves. At Hazel Grove, on Stuart's right. Sickles had Birney's 
and Whipple's divisions C^), Barlow's brigade (o-^i), 20 of the 22 
guns with which Huntington and Martin opposed Jackson the evening 
before, and the 18 guns of Birney's division (nj)— 38 guns. On Stuart's 
left and front the Federal lines had been materially strengthened and 
extended. About 1 a.m. Eeynolds arrived with his infantry (^^) on the 
ground which he was to occupy, and proceeded, with the guidance of 
Captain Candler and Captain Paine of Hooker's staff, to put it in line. 
This was accomplished between 3 and 4 a.m. His men had marched 
through heat and dust since the previous morning, carrying eight days' 
rations, about 23 miles, without a halt of more than twenty minutes. 
Some of them were too tired to eat. But numbers of them had to go on 
picket, and most of the remainder were put to work intrenching. One 
4-gun battery (j-f) arrived at the front about 2 a.m., but at 5 a.m. had 
not been put in position,^ and no other battery of the corps had come up. 
To supply this deficiency, Atwell's battery of 6 guns (j-sn) "^^.s taken 
from Muhlenberg and sent to report to General Reynolds; and the 
available artillery of the XI Corps, consisting of its three batteries of 
corps artillery and Wiedrich's battery (numbering some '20 pieces), re- 
ported also to Eeynolds and was posted on his line. 
1 W. R., 39, p. 286. 



PLAN OF ATTACK 343 

Sykes' infantry (2. V), contracting its line, took position along the 
Ely's Ford Road, on the left of the I Corps, covering the road to United 
States Ford, its left near the junction of this road and the Ely's Ford 
Road. The infantry of Griffin's division (y) formed on Sykes' left, 
connecting him with Chandler's (Map 23). At 5 a.m. Humphreys' in- 
fantry (3. V) was moving up toward Chandler's. Wadsworth's divi- 
sion (i) reached United States Ford and commenced crossing about 
3 a.m. At 5 a.m. its four brigades were taking up positions, the 2d and 
•ith in support of Sykes (|), and the 1st and 3d in support of Robin- 
son (5^). The battery which crossed the river with it (j— ,) joined the 
artillery park, it seems, at the Red House. 

The infantry of the XI Corps formed on the ground vacated by that 
of the V. Schurz (3. XI) took the left, von Steiuwehr (2. XI), with only 
Buschbeck's brigade, the center, and Devens (3. XI) the right. 

Seeley with 4 guns of his battery (.r4ij)i together with Mott's bri- 
gade {tt^), including the 7 N. J., arrived at the front about 2 a.m. 
Mott's brigade took position in rear of Williams' line on the left of the 
Plank Road. The battery was held in reserve near Chancellorsville. 
The 5 pieces of Dilger's battery (1. XI) and the 2 pieces of Hill's went 
from Best's line at Fairview to United States Ford. Of the 34 pieces 
of the II Corps at the front, 27 (including the 15 of Comstock's line) 
were sent by the corps commander, General Couch, pursuant to an order 
from Hooker, to the Red House near United States Ford.^ The 4 N. Y., 
a 6-gun battery of Berry's di^asion, was sent from Best's line by order 
of General Hooker to the ford, to be unhorsed and dismantled to refit 
other batteries of the division." So, through the gray of the morning, 
40 guns and caissons went rumbling past the sleeping camps, rocking 
and reeling, further and further away from the impending battle. 
Bailey's battery (j-^) of 4 gims, in Best's line, was broken up. Two 
pieces were sent to General Meade, and 2 to Muhlenberg. Hampton's 
battery {^-^) of 6 guns was sent from Muhlenberg to Best. This left 
Muhlenberg with 10 pieces and Best with 26, without counting the 2 
pieces of Dimick's in line with the infantry." 

Chancellorsville was covered on the east, or the side of Fredericks- 
burg, by Hancock's division ( \-^) and Carroll's (1st) brigade of French's 

1 W. E., 39, pp. 309, 360, 380: ib., 40, Memoranda, p. 359; B. and L., Ill, 167. The 
pieces of the II Corps left at the front were the 4 of Pettit's (1. 1. 11) with Muhlenberg, 
and the 3 of Thomas' (2. 1. II) with Hancock. 

2 W. R., 39, pp. 406, 484, 485. 

3 Muhlenberg Pettit (.tVi) 4 pieces. Lewis (3^) 2 pieces, 

Bailey (r4n) - pieces, Crosby (r^) 2 pieces. 

Best Winslow (riri) 6 pieces, McLean (,-7^) 6 pieces, 

Dimick (j-^i) 4 pieces, Winegar(riii) 6 pieces, 
Crosby (rlii) 4 pieces. 



344 . TPIE CA]VIPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

division (-), on the south by Geary's and part of Williams' divisions 
( — ), and on the west by the remainder of Williams' division (except 
the 10th Maine battalion), Berry's division (A), Hays' brigade (gA_), 
and Mott's brigade {ir^n)- The 10th Maine battalion (three companies) 
was placed on guard at the rear to prevent the escape of stragglers.^ 

Before dawn the 11 N. J., on the left of Berry's second line, was 
moved to the left, where it rested on the Plank Road. The 11 Mass., 
on arriving from in front of Hancock, was placed on the right of this 
regiment. The 16 Mass. was moved to the right in support of the 26 Pa. 
The 73 N. Y. was relieved by the 3 Md..of Slocum's corps, and placed in 
the second line. It was ordered to take position on the right of the divi- 
sion, and its commander says in his report that it did so. But the re- 
ports of other commanders indicate that it did not, and that it was 
practically lost.- It must, however, be reckoned as a part of Berry's 
available force. The 7 N. J. of Mott's brigade (^tJij) '"'^s detached to 
the left to complete the connection between Sickles and Slocum. The 
formation of the opposing forces on either side of the Plank Road about 
5 a.m. is shown in Plan 3. The infantry, including Birney's and Whip- 
ple's at Hazel Grove, numbered in effective officers and men about 
21,500. Stuart's infantry numbered about 26,500.^ The new lines 
formed during the night and morning, extending from near Hazel Grove 
generally northward to the right of Reynolds' corps, had been or were 
being strengthened with rifle-pits or log works, except, it would seem, a 
portion of Williams ' line.^ These works were about 3 feet high, made 
for men to fire over kneeling, and were covered with abatis. 

The chief obstacle in the way of Lee's junction with Stuart was the 
presence of Sickles with his command on the height of Hazel Grove. 
There were other considerations which made Hazel Grove an important 
objective to the Confederates and a valuable possession to the Federals. 
It was but little inferior to Fairview in elevation, and was an excep- 
tional position from which to prepare an attack upon that point. It 
was in prolongation of the line formed by Geary's and a portion of 
Williams' divisions (|j-J) south of Chancellorsville. In the hands of the 
enemy, it would command this front with an enfilade and reverse fire. 
The eastern face of the Federal front under Hancock and the western 
one under Berry and Williams may be regarded as refused flanks of the 

1 History of the First- Tenth- Twenty-ninth Maine Regiment, by Major J. M. Gould, 
pp. 345, 346. = W. R., 39, pp. 468, 469. 

' Federals Confederates 

Hays 1,400 Heth 10,382 

WiUiams 2,928 Rodes 8,460 

Sickles 17,338 Colston 7,690 

Aggregate 21,666 Aggregate 26,532 

* The 27 Indiana Vol. Infantry, by a Member of Company C, p. 343. 



PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE 345 

southern face. Should either of these refused flanks be forced, or the 
artillery fire from Hazel Grove prove too much for the southern face, 
or an attack from the south succeed in breaking it, the defences of 
Chancellorsville would crumble away. To the Federals Hazel Grove 
afforded an opening by which to sally and roll up the separate wings of 
the enemy, cutting them both oft" from their lines of retreat. 

In the dead of night an aide was posted to Hooker's headquarters to 
report the situation at Hazel Grove and request instructions, suggest- 
ing that the lines of the army be changed so as to take in this important 
position.^ T^Hien the aide arrived General Hooker was asleep. General 
Van Alen, whom he found on duty and in charge of headquarters, would 
not wake him.- He directed the aide to wait. Toward morning Van 
Alen was prevailed upon to deliver the message, when Sickles was sent 
for at full speed.^ Perhaps Hooker went out toward Hazel Grove to 
meet Sickles. At any rate, it seems that he went to Hazel Grove, and 
there in person at daylight ordered Sickles to evacuate Hazel Grove, 
and march his command by the most practicable route to Fairview, and 
occupy the new line of intrenchments along the skirt of the woods per- 
pendicular to, and on either side of, the Plank Eoad, his artillery to 
occupy the field works on the crest of the hill in rear of the line of 
battle ; ■* in other words, to reenforce the face occupied by part of the 
XII Corps, Berry's division (j?j), and Hays' brigade (^-ni). Hooker 
then with his few attendants walked down from the hill and opening of 
Hazel Grove through a little gully into the field beyond and on toward 
Chancellorsville. He was silent and seemed very thoughtful.^ No 
doubt he was thinking of Sedgwick, who was to be in Lee's rear by day- 
light. It was then daylight, and no sign or rumor of SedgTvick's ap- 
proach. 

5 to 7 a.m. (Maps 24, 25) 

Sickles, on receiving his orders, sent out a regiment ( i, i"ni )to make 
a road leading over a swamp on his right through Slocum's line to Fair- 
view, and proceeded to withdraw his troops. At the head of his column 
went the artillery, except Huntington's battery of Whipple's division, 
which, with Graham's brigade, was to cover the movement. Next went 
Whipple's division, moving off by the left flank and rear; lastly, Bir- 

^ The 27 Indiana, by a Member of Com- had been Hooker's confidential aide-de- 

pany C, p. 343. camp in all his campaigns, Captain Will- 

- The Battles of Chancellorsville and iam L. Candler of Boston, Mass. Two Bays 

Gettysburg, by A. H. Nelson, p. 62; Two of War, by H. E. Tremain, p. 365; W. R., 

Days of TFar.'by H. E. Tremain, p. 365. 40, p. 249. 

^ General Van Alen, without experience ■* TV. E., 39, p. 390. 

or qualification, had been allowed to as- '•> The Three Years' Service of the 33 

sume the duties of acting chief of staff in Mass. Infantry Regiment, by A. B. Under- 

th.? field, displacing a brilliant and capable wood, p. 70. 
ofiicer— though much junior in rank— who 



346 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ney's division followed Whipple's. Barlow with his brigade („-xi) ^^^^ 
Sickles to join his corps. 

Before daylight Perry's brigade d— j )on Anderson's right was put in 
motion toward the left and rear to clear the country, if necessary, of 
the enemy, and feel for Jackson's corps (Map 24). About daylight 
three rifled pieces of Jordan's battery (Alexander's battalion, I), and 
Posey's briuaik' (5-7), marched by the west side of Scott's Run to the 
Furnace. Finding the country clear of the enemy, this force went on 
past the Furnace in advance of Perry's brigade toward Hazel Grove. 
At the same time Mahone's brigade (^j) on the right, its right resting 
on the Plank Road, gained ground to the front; and Wright's (j^), be- 
tween Posey's and Mahone's, conformed roughly to the movement of 
Posey's, the whole line pivoting on Mahone's. These movements were 
through a dense wood and shrubbery, making regular alignments im- 
possible, and progress in any formation slow and fatiguing. No two of 
these four brigades were in sight or hailing distance of each other. Mc- 
Laws on the Turnpike felt Hancock's skirmish line with skirmishers. 

At early dawn Stuart's men were under arms, but not ready to ad- 
vance. Rodes was to issue rations, and in the meantime the lines on the 
right of the Plank Road were to be straightened out perpendicularly 
thereto.^ About 5 : 30 Lane started to execute a partial wheel to the left 
that should bring his brigade into line with the troops on its left. Mc- 
Gowan and Archer moved out straight to their front. These move- 
ments were hardly started when Stuart ordered his whole first line to ad- 
vance, and the second and third lines to follow. Accounting for this 
action, he says in his I'eport: "... when, as a preliminary to an 
attack. I ordered the right of the first line to swing around and come 
perpendicular to the road, the order was misunderstood for an order 
to attack, and that part of the line became engaged. ' ' " Colonel Perrin, 
commanding McGowan's brigade, says: "I received orders to advance, 
which was done, . . . the plan of the advance not having been com- 
municated to me."^ Archer makes no mention of orders, but says: 
"about sunrise we moved forward to the attack."^ It can hardly be 
doubted that McGowan and Archer understood the orders which they 
received, and carried them out, but that they were not the orders which 
Stuart meant them to receive, and which Lane did receive. It is prob- 
able that Stuart gave his orders to Lane in person, and sent them to 
McGowan and Archer verbally, by a courier or staff officer, who deliv- 
ered them incorrectly. But if they had been delivered correctly, the 
result would have been the same. The lines could not be straightened 
out without a fight. Had the movement been delayed a little longer 
the Confederates might have occupied Hazel Grove without firing a 

' W. R., 39, p. 887. 3 lb., 39, p. 907. ■• 2b., 39, p. 925. The sun rose red rmd 

- lb. clear; not a cloud was to be seen. 



SICKLES WITHDRAWS PROM HAZEL GROVE 347 

shot. About 6 a.m. the skirmishers alouo; Stuart's whole front started 
forward, followed by the first line of battle (Heth's division, including 
Broekenbrough's brigade). None of the second line (Colston's) started 
forward at this time. \Mnle five of Heth's brigades were still working 
their way through damp thickets of black-jack and entanglements of 
swamp trees and vine, Archer's brigade on the right came upon and 
pressed Sickles' rear-guard at Hazel Grove. Graham's brigade, after 
firing a few vollej's, which checked their advance to some extent, re- 
tired rapidly,— closely pursued, and subjected to a hot fire. Hunting- 
ton's battery, with a regiment on each flank, covered this movement to 
the last moment, and brought up the rear, losing 3 pieces. 

Sims' battery, 4 pieces of Jastram's,^ and 4 of Seeley's took posi- 
tion in the line of guns at Fairview. These three batteries num- 
bered 14 pieces, making the number of guns at Fairview 40.- One sec- 
tion of Lewis' battery was held in reserve at Chancellorsville, and 
Turnbull's and von Puttkammer's batteries (1. Ill, 3. Ill) at Chand- 
ler's; Huntington's 3 pieces (3. Ill) and a section of Jastram's were 
sent back to United States Ford. Pursuant to an order from Hooker, 
the two regiments of cavalry reported to him, and were formed as skir- 
mishers "in rear of the line of battle to prevent any stragglers passing 
through."^ They had plenty to do. OiBcers forgot their dignity and 
ran away as well as privates. Most of them were stopped unless 
wounded.* By Pleasonton's order Martin's battery of horse artillery 
took position behind Hooker's headquarters at Chancellorsville, and 
moved thence to United States Ford. 

In the V Corps, Humphreys' infantry (3. V) formed in rear of Grif- 
fin's (1. V), with instructions to support GriflBn, Sykes, or French. 
Wadsworth's division (^i) completed its deployment as support of Rob- 
inson's, Doubleday's, and Sykes' divisions (^, ^). At 6 a.m. Thomp- 
son's 4-gun battery (,7^) was posted near the right of the line covering 
the road to Ely's Ford. At 7 a.m. it was joined by Hall's 6-gun battery 
(2^) . About this time two of the batteries of the XI Corps (probably 
Jahn's, 2 N. Y., and de Beck's, K, 10.), hearing the sound of battle on 
their left, shamefully abandoned their positions and ran toward United 
States Ford.s 

In front of Berry's and Williams' Log Works the woods had been 
cleared for a space varying in width from 50 to 100 yards. Up to that 
clearing an advancing enemy would be more or less concealed from 

1 History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Ar- posted there, I refer to the artillery at or 

tillery, by George Lewis, p. 171. near tliat position as one mass or line. 

- 1 have been unable to detennine the " W. R., 39, p. 782. 

exact location of all the batteries. They * History of Battery B, 1 N. J. Artillery, 

were not in one line, nor were they all on by Michael Hanifen, p. 55. 

the height of Fairview. But for conve- ^ W. R., 39, pp. 255, 276, 277, 279. 
nience, as they cooperated with the artillei^y 



348 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE 

view, and the crossing of it was a matter of a few seconds, but this 
would bring him to the abatis, where he would be delayed. On this de- 
lay the defence relied for overwhelming the assailants with fire, pend- 
ing which the proximity of the lines to each other would make the fire 
of the guns at Fairview dangerous to friend as well as to foe. The pre- 
ponderance of the Federals in artillery could hardly be turned to ac- 
count over its own infantry except by firing upon the enemy's supports 
and reserves. This was in a measure prevented and in a measure 
favored by the woods. It was prevented by the concealment which the 
woods afforded, and favored by the obstruction which these presented 
to the movement of troops. It was further favored by the large dis- 
tances between the Confederate lines. While the Federal infantry was 
about 300 yards deep, the Confederate infantry had a depth of about 
1300 yards. 

When Archer's brigade, following up Sickles' rear-guard, arrived 
at the Farm-House at Hazel Grove, it halted a few minutes to reform 
its broken line, and before its formation was thoroughly restored, 
turned to the left, and proceeded to attack the section of Slocum's line 
under command of Colonel Ross (Plan 3). It was sharply repulsed. 
After a feeble attempt at another advance, it retui'ned about 6 : 45 a.m. 
to Hazel Grove to await reenforcements. 

The Confederates crowned the height of Hazel Grove with 31 pieces 
of artillery,! which enfiladed the southern front of the XII Corps, and 
made itself felt in Euger 's lines on the west front ; at the same time it 
poured a heavy fire upon Fairview. On the Plank Road were about 30 
pieces— of which say 20 were in action between Dowdall's Tavern and 
Slocum's old works, directing their fire upon Fairview. The Confed- 
erates thus had about 51 pieces in action to the 40 under Best, with the 
advantage of a converging fire opposed to a diverging one. On the 
other hand, the Federals had the advantage of command, or height, and 
their pieces were generally intrenched, while those of the Confederates 
had no cover but that afforded by the ground. For an artillery duel 
the advantage of position was with the Federals; for firing upon the 
enemy's infantry the advantage was, on the whole, with the Confed- 
erates. 

By the time that Lane had completed his change of front he had 
orders to attack. Accordingly, without halting, he went on with the 
troops on his left toward the Federal line in his new front. This sepa- 
rated him from McGowan. The latter inclined to the left, separating 
himself from Archer, and overlapping Lane. But as he proceeded he 
again became separated from Lane. McGowan, Archer, and Lane were 

^ Crenshaw's, Davidson's, and McGraw's (except Eubank's and Rhett's batteries, 1 
batteries (n), 12 pieces; Page's battery (f), piece of Jordan's battery, and 2 pieces of 
6 pieces; and Alexander's battalion (II) Parker's), 13 pieces. 



THE CONFEDERATES OCCUPY HAZEL GROVE 349 

then advancing each without support on his right or left.' McGowan's 
brigade (j-^) came upon the rear regiment (37 N. Y.) of Hayman's 
brigade (f-^) as it was about to take up the march, attacked it in front 
and on the left flank before a proper fighting formation could be ef- 
fected, and threw it into disorder, disabling many of its officers. 
Further on it encountered the 7 N. J. of Mott's brigade and Ruger's 
brigade (j-xn)) which had advanced. After a musketry duel of about 
half an hour's duration and an attack upon its right flank, McGowan's 
brigade was thrown back in disorder to Slocum's Log Works, closely 
followed by Ruger's brigade, and on the left of the latter by the 7 N. J. 
(Map 25). 

Lane's brigade was supported by the right wing of Brockenbrough's 
(40 and 47 Va.), and Pender's by the left wing (22 and 55 Va.). Lane 
and Pender threw themselves upon the center of the Federal line on 
and near the Plank Road. Here, with its right resting on the road and 
forming the right of Slocum's line, was the 3d regiment of Maryland 
Volunteers, composed largely of new men. These green Marylanders 
could not stand the yell and rush of Lane's veteran North Carolinians, 
and gave way in unseemly haste. The foremost Confederates cleared 
the works and took a number of prisoners.- Others turned upon 
Dimick's section of artillery, which had fired volley after volley of can- 
ister into the enemy's ranks, and silenced it. The guns now try to save 
themselves. One is sent off before the enemy can seize it. The other 
falls temporarily into his hands. Dimick, struck in the foot, conceals 
his wound, but in a moment is disabled by a shot in the spine, from 
which he is to die in a couple of days. 

Captain Poland, Berry's cMef of staff, tries in vain to move forward 
the 115 Pa. of Mott's brigade (j^-Vi)-'' The fight abandoned by the 3 Md. 
and refused by the 115 Pa. is taken up by the 5 and 8 N. J.* Lane's 
brigade is checked, but stands its ground, firing defiantly and threat- 
eningly at its new opponents. The right wing of Brockenbrough's 
brigade, instead of reenforcing it, halted and remained well in rear of 
it. Lieutenant Sanderson of Dimick's battery (H, 1 U. S. Artillery) 
galloped up with a limber, and gallantly withdrew the remaining gun 

1 W. R., 39. pp. 902, 904, 907, 921. (ib., p. 450). General Carr calls it "an 
-Lieutenant-Colonel G. P. Robinson, injudicious retreat" (ib., p. 445) ; and Gen- 
commanding the 3 Md., says in his report : eral Sickles "a premature and hasty retire- 
"I was forced from my position by superior menf (ib., p. 392). Captain J. G. Lang- 
nimibers, but retired in good order to the ston, commanding the 8 N. J. Volunteers, 
rear. . . . my regiment, being composed of says of the 3 Md. : ". . . at the first volley 
a good many new men, stood the fire well" from the enemy [it] gave way in confusion 
(W. R., 39. "p. 703). Captain J. S. Poland, and fell back" (ib., p. 4S0). 
chief of staff of Beny's division, charac- ' lb., 39, p. 450. 
terizes this movement in his report as a * lb., 39, pp. 473, 475, 478, 445. 
"premature and precipitate withdrawal" 



350 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

of Dimick's section amid a storm of musketry.' Pender's right now 
moved upon the exposed flank of Berry's division, the extreme left of 
which was held by the 1 Mass., resting on the Plank Road, supported in 
rear by the 11 N. J. Captain Poland, discovering the enemy crossing 
the Plank Road, ordered Colonel McAllister, commanding the latter 
regiment, to advance and force him back, "but unfortunately," says 
Poland, "my authority was questioned at an untimely moment."^ 
Colonel McAllister sent his adjutant to his brigade commander. General 
Carr, to find out whether he should advance or remain in his position.^ 

Sickles' infantry brought in from Hazel Grove was placed generally 
in support of the artillery at Fairview. Berdan, on the right of the 
Plank Road, a little in rear of the guns, detached four companies to the 
right of Berry's line and by 7 a.m. went with the remainder of his 
force to their support (Map 25). 

Hayman's brigade f j-fji) had lost the greater part of the 37 N. Y. 
This regiment was thrown, as previously stated, into confusion by 
McGowan's brigade. It was rallied about 100 strong in rear of Chan- 
cellorsville, and was marched thence without authority to the vicinity 
of United States Ford by its lieutenant-colonel, and did not rejoin the 
brigade until after the battle.^ 

Averell at Ely's Ford sent an officer with a party of 20 men to ex- 
amine the enemy's position in his front. He meant to throw his divi- 
sion upon the enemy's flank or rear, "if there was any chance of strik- 
ing it."^ A considerable portion of his command had been out since 
daybreak, gathering up the horses that were scattered over adjoining 
fields by the fire of the 16 N. Ca. the night before.® 

7 to 7:30 a.m. (Map 26) 

Berry directed Captain J. B. Greenhalgh, his senior aide, to ride to 
General Hooker's headquarters, and inquire whether he was to con- 
tinue to hold his position. Greenhalgh galloped away. Wliat answer 
he got was never known to his chief in this world. General Berry had 
a custom that is rare among division commanders, of giving his orders 
in person when it was possible to do so. He told his staff to remain 
where they were, while he crossed the Plank Road to communicate with 
General ]\Iott. His officers remonstrated and offered to go in his stead, 
pointing out that the enemy's sharpshooters were posted in the trees 

^ TF. H., 39, p. 450. The two pieces weie paign each regiment was furnished with a 

sent to the rear. branding-iron, with a number and letter 

- lb., 39, p. 450. ^ 7b., 39. p. 457. upon it, and the horses were branded on 

■» Ih., 39, pp. 433, 442. the hoof of the right fore foot. 3 P. or 16 

'" Ih., 39, p. 1079. P., as the case might be (ih.). This may be 

" History of the 3 Pa. Cav., by Commit- the origm of the present practice in our 

tee, pp. 232-234. The horses were not army, of branding cavalry horses on one 

marked for identification. After the cam- hoof. 



BERRY KILLED 351 

and sweeping the Plank Road with their unerring rifles. The general 
replied that he preferred to give the order in person, and started on his 
way. He crossed the Plank Road in safety. On reaching General Mott, 
he conversed with him a short time, and started to return. He had 
gained the Plank Road, and was recrossing it, having nearly reached 
the place where his staff officers were standing, when, from the trees in 
which the North Carolina sharpshooters were posted, came a wreath of 
smoke, followed by the sharp crack of a rifle. Major-General Hiram G. 
Berry had fought his last battle. The minie-ball struck him in the arm 
close to the shoulder, passed downward through his vitals, and lodged 
in his hip.' He fell in the center of the road. At 7: 26 o'clock, with a 
group of sympathetic staff officers and comrades by his side, and the 
embattled lines of his division about him, he breathed his last at the age 
of thirty-eight, one of the most promising young generals that the Civil 
War had produced. 

Captain Poland, on seeing Berry fall, sent an officer to General Carr, 
lately commanding the 1st brigade, with notice that he commanded the 
division. Carr at once ordered the 11 N. J., on the left of his second 
line, to supi)ort Dimick's section of artillery. The 1 Mass. fell back, 
carrying with it or closely followed by the 11 Mass., both more or less 
shaken and broken. These regiments reformed about half a mile from 
the front line, probably in rear of Hays' brigade and the artillery at 
Fairview. The 11 N. J. remained covering the right flank of Mott's 
brigade. The hostile irruption was stayed on the left of the Moimtain 
Road, but not on the right. The remainder of Carr's line, consisting of 
the 2d brigade and the 26 Pa. and 16 Mass. of the 1st brigade, broke off 
regiment by regiment from the left as Pender and Thomas in succession 
threatened to crush its flank, and fell back in a northerly direction. In 
the meantime Knijie's brigade (f4ii)^^''' (*rippled by the departure of 
the 46 Pa. and portions of the 5 Conn, and 128 Pa.- Ward was sent 
with his brigade (, jjj)to form on the right of General Carr and act as 
his support. Not finding Carr, he reported to French, who placed him 
near Chandler's. Carr had gone to the left of the Plank Road, where 
he found Mott's brigade advancing ui)on the enemy in two lines. Lane's 

^Major-General Hiram G. Berry, by (*., 39, pp. 688, 690, 692, 695, 696). 

Edward K. Gould, pp. 266, 267; and Cap- General Williams, the division commander, 

tain Poland's report, W. R., 39, p. 450. says that three regiments of this brigade, 

- These troops were marched without "soon after the fight began, moved to the 
orders or authority, by Lieutenant-Colonel breastworks." It would appear, however, 
Betts of the 5 Conn., to United States Ford, from the reports of the brigade and regi- 
wliere they were taken charge of by Gen- mental commanders, that the regiments that 
eral Patrick, Provost-Marshal-General. remained on the field, with the possible ex- 
moved across the river, and placed on ception of the 5 Conn., were in reserve from 
guard over prisoners (W. R., 39, pp. 689, beginning to end of the fight (ib.. 39, pp. 
696). The brigade was thus reduced to two 680,681,696). Every regiment of the bri- 
weak regiments, the 5 Conn, and 128 Pa. gade lost its commanding officer yesterday. 



352 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

brigade had suffered from the artillery at Fairview: Struck now by 
Mott's brigade in front and threatened by the 123 N. Y. and Ruger's 
brigade in flank and rear, it wavers, breaks, and dissolves (Map 26). 
One regiment, the 28th, rallies and reforms in rear of Slocum's Log 
Works. The other four regiments go on to a safer distance. Brocken- 
brough's right wing goes back to Slocum's Log Works. 

Ruger's brigade, which had followed the retreating remnants of Mc- 
Gowan's, Lane's, and Brockenbrough's brigades (\^\~), stood up in the 
open within a stone's throw of these troops, now on the safe side of Slo- 
cum's Log Works, and went to loading and firing as fast as they could. 
Colonel Colgrove of the 27 Ind. says : " I can safely say that I never wit- 
nessed on any other occasion so perfect a slaughter. Many of them 
made no attempt to get away, but threw down their arms and came 
into our lines. I think I am safe to say that we took from 150 to 200 
prisoners, and sent them to the rear.''^ 

A Confederate writer says: "The onslaught of the enemy was daring 
and obstinate. They pushed upon the very works, and one color-bearer 
even planted his flag upon them."^ General McGowan was wounded 
standing upon the works. Colonel 0. E. Edwards, who succeeded him, 
was soon wounded also, when Colonel D. H. Hamilton took command of 
the brigade. 

7:30 to 8 a.m. (Map 27) 

Pender's brigade (j^), followed by the left wing of Brockenbrough's 
(or)> penetrated to the line of Hays' brigade (rrn), but there, with 
the exception of its left regiment, the 13 N. Ca., was brought to a halt 
by a combined fire of infantry and artillery. The 13 N. Ca. and Thomas' 
brigade (.r^), less exposed, went on, struck the right of Hays' line, par- 
tially broke it, and threw the line back on its left (Map 27). General 
Hays was taken prisoner with all his staff except one oflScer. A fleeing 
color-bearer barely saves his color by tearing it from its staff. 

Stuart's first line, numbering about 10,000 men, practically unsup- 
ported by artillery, had forced the Federal first line, manned by about 
9000 infantry, intrenched, and materially supported by artillery. The 
five regiments to which the assailants were now reduced seemed about 
to sweep away the last infantry protection on the right of the Federal 
artillery, and break in a surging mass on the flank and rear of the guns 
at Fairview, when their victorious progress was arrested by opposition 
from two directions. In their front Franklin's brigade had come into 
line, with orders to repulse any attack and cover the artillery at all 
hazards. On their left and rear went up the savage roar of a Federal 
charge. About 7 o 'clock this morning, General French, by authority of 

^ W. B., 39, p. 712 ; The 27 Indiana, by = Caldwell, History of McGowan's Bri- 

a Member of Company C, pp. 334, 335. gade, p. 81. 



THOMAS AND PENDER REPULSED 353 

his corps commander, withdrew the 7 W. Va., 4 and 8 0., and 14 Ind. 
of Carroll's brigade (3 ',,) from the rifle-pits on Hancock's left, leaving 
to hold this portion of the line the 24 and 28 N. J. of the same brigade. 
The four forementioned regiments he drew up in a single line of battle 
in a plain in rear of their former position, facing obliquely toward the 
Plank Road, which was concealed from him by the woods. On his right 
he formed Albright's brigade (34i)to support the left of a line of guns 
of the V Corps. Hooker came up and noticed these dispositions. 
Masses of troops were arriving from the front and forming in rear of 
French's lines. The situation seemed to have aroused Hooker's com- 
bativeness. At any rate, he dispatched a staff officer to French with an 
order for him to move forward with his division, "attack the enemy, 
and drive him through the woods. "^ It was about 7: 30 when French 
received this message. In a moment his eager men were stripped to 
light fighting order, and striding in line of battle across the plain. At 
the verge of the surrounding woods, receiving some of the enemy's fire, 
they fired once, and dashed forward with a cheer. Thomas' men, 
threatened in flank and rear, turned and ran, receiving volley after 
volley, well put in by Carroll's Western regiments, the 14 Ind., 4 0., and 
7 W. Va. Through some mistake the 8 0. remained behind supporting 
the artillery. French brought up on Carroll's right the 132 Pa. and 1 
Del. of Albright's brigade (37%)- and the last regiments of Carroll's 
(24 and 28 N. J.),^ and drove Thomas' and Pender's brigades over 
Berry's Log Works back upon Slocum's Log Works and Jones' artil- 
lery (Map 28), making several hundred prisoners and releasing a bat- 
talion of the III Corps captured by the enemy. Brockenbrough's left 
wing, after a sturdy effort to breast the tide of Federal success, its left 
flank being turned, joined the retreat. 

South of the Plank Road, Lane's and McGowan's brigades were still 
hugging the log works for protection against Ruger's line. In rear of 
them Williams' and Garnett's brigades of the second line halted within 
supporting distance, but rendered no active support.* By Ruger's ad- 
vance south of the Plank Road and French's advance north of it, 
Stuart's first line was completely shattered. It devolved on the second 
line to hold the present position until the third line, which was coming 
up under Rodes, should warrant another general advance. The second 

' W. R., 39, p. 363. or rather encumbered, by a portion of Gen- 

'^ The other regiment was. as previously eral Colston's command, for instead of 

stated, on guard duty at the corps hospital. pushing rapidly to the right and occupying 

^ The places of these regiments on Han- the position, they took refuge (many of 

cock's left were filled by troops falling them) in rear of my line and annoyed my 

back from other commands {W. E.. 39, p. regiment very much by tiring over their 

363). heads, in some instances wounding my men, 

* The colonel of the 1 S. Ca., McGowan's and in one instance killing one of my best 

brigade, says: ". . . we were reenforeed, subalterns" (ib., 39, pp. 902, 903). 



354 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

line was hard pressed ou the right by linger 's left; to meet this danger 
Paxton's brigade was ordered to the right of the Plank Koad and 
directed upon Slocum's Log Works. At the same time Garnett's bri- 
gade was ordered to advance.^ Rodes had directed his brigade com- 
manders to push forward until the enemy was encountered, and "en- 
gage him vigorously, moving over friend and foe alike, if in the way. ' ' 

On the extreme right of the third line Colquitt's brigade (^j) had 
been ordered to support Archer (j^Vi)- Being too late for that, it was 
ordered toward the left to relieve the ijressure there. Doles' brigade 
/_l-\ broke into halves. One half, under Colonel Mercer, drifted to the 
right and was ordered by Stuart to support the artillery at Hazel Grove 
in conjunction with Archer's brigade. The other half moved on in 
touch with Kamseur, who, with the rest of Colston's line, reached the 
front about 8 a.m. 

Paxton, with the Stonewall brigade {^^), came upon the lines cower- 
ing six; and eight deep behind Slocum's Log Works. ^ "At this point," 
says Colonel Funk of the 5 Va., "we found a large number of men of 
whom fear had taken the most absolute possession. We endeavored to 
persuade them to go forward, but all we could say was of but little 
avail." The brigade prepared to proceed, if necessary, alone. As soon 
as the lines were formed, it crossed the works, passing in part over 
McGowan's men, and advanced, accompanied on its right by Garnett's 
brigade. "We will show you," said Colston's men to McGowan's, 
"how to clear away a Yankee line." Before they crossed the works. 
General Paxton and Colonel Garnett fell, mortally wounded. Gallantly 
do surviving officers cheer and lead on, and bravely are they followed. 
Major McKim of the division staff is killed, two other members are 
wounded. The line pushes on through a terrific fire to within 70 yards 
of Ruger's line, but only to break and rush back in disorder to where 
it started from. General Paxton is succeeded by Colonel Funk, and 
Colonel Garnett by Colonel Vandeventer. 

Ruger, having been in action nearly three hours and having repulsed 
three separate assaults by fresh troops (Archer's, McGowan's, and 
Paxton's), had reported that his ammunition was nearly exhausted. 

As no ammunition could be furnished him, Graham was sent with his 
brigade to relieve him.'' By this time the two pieces of Lewis' battery 
had probably retired from Slociim's western front and taken position 
near Chancellorsville. About as Paxton advanced to the support of 
Lane and McGowau, J. M. Williams advanced to the support of 
Thomas and Pender. 

Upon the death of Berry, the command of his division /j|j) devolved, 
as already stated, upon General Carr, who assumed it at 7 : 30. But 

^W. R.. 39, pp. 1005, 1006. ^b., 39, p. 1006. "lb., 39, pp. 409, 709. 



REVERE 'S DEFECTION 355 

General Revere, commanding the 2(1 brigade, thought that he succeeded 
to the command of the division, and before 8 o'clock he marched his 
own command, which went by the inspiring name of the "Excelsior 
Brigade," and part of the 1st brigade, the larger part of nine regi- 
ments, off the field, and proceeded with this force to the vicinity of 
United States Ford, on the ground that the division needed to be reor- 
ganized and supplied with ammunition and rations, and that it was 
necessary that it intercept stragglers. > The remainder of Carr's divi- 
sion reformed about 8 a.m. in rear of Franklin's brigade, and was there 
joined by Ward's brigade. Reynolds had still two batteries of his 
corps (^j) and two of the XI Corps, about 20 pieces, on his line. At 
8 a.m. these pieces and the 6 of Atwell's battery (st^j) sent him from 
the XII Corps were in position; Stewart's, Leppien's, and Ransom's 
batteries (^-p ^), numbering 17 pieces, were moving up to report to 
him. 

8 to 8:15 a. in. (Map 28) 
The artillery at Fairview could hold its own against any front attack 
of infantry. Its immediate danger was that the artillery at Hazel 
Grove would break down the bulwark of the XII Corps on its left or 
that a body of infantry would gain a lodgment on its right. Another 
danger, no less serious, was beginning to threaten it. The ammunition, 
both in the infantry and in the artillery, was running short. Repeated 
and urgent requests for a fresh supply sent to army headquarters met 
with no response, or with the impatient reply: "I can't make ammuni- 
tion. ' ' - The artillery was being reduced to canister, which could not 
generally be fired over its own infantry, and would not reach the 
enemy's artillery. About 8 a.m. a limber and caisson exploded, mor- 
tally wounding the battery commander. Captain Hampton. 

On the offensive, artillery is essentially an arm of preparation. It 
enables a commander to shake the enemy's infantry without exposing 
his own. Its principal function is the facilitation of the infantry at- 
tack. This requires that its fire be concentrated on the point determined 
upon for that attack. For the artillery to fire upon one point while the 
infantry attacks at another is a squandering of tactical power. That is 

1 W. R., 39, pp. 446, 452, 460. 462. Gen- tice have let it stand without ordering the 
eral Revere was tried by a eourt-martial, trial of the other officers who had taken 
of which General Hancock was president, their commands to the rear without author- 
on charges of misbeha\dor before the enemy ity ; and this he doubtless deemed on politi- 
and neglect of duty, preferred by General cal grounds to be inexpedient. The pro- 
Sickles. He was found not guilt;/ of both ceedings in the case of General Revere, 
charges, but guilty of "conduct to the together with that officer's comments 
prejudice of good order and militai-y dis- thereon, were published in the form of a 
cipline," and sentenced to dismissal. Presi- pamphlet entitled "A Statement of the Case 
dent Lincoln approved the sentence, but of Brigadier-General .Joseph W. Revere." 
afterward revoked it, and accepted General ^ Histori/ of the 11 Arm;/ Corps, by F. 
Revere's resignation. He could not in jus- A. Walker, p. 242. 



356 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

about what is taking place between Hazel Grove and Chancellorsville. 
Stuart's artillery is for the greater part pounding away at the south 
face of the Federal salient, while his infantry is straining every nerve 
to break through the west face. Anderson's disjointed line of from 
one to two men to the running yard has driven in the Federal skir- 
mishers. Its left, without connecting with Archer, has passed by the 
position of Plazel Grove and gone on toward the Federal salient. Its 
right is bracing itself for a general assault. 

When Pender and Thomas were driven back, Hays withdrew to 
Chandler's, leaving Franklin and Berdan, supported by Ward and 
Carr, covering Best's right. Allabach's brigade of Meade's corps {.j^r) 
formed line of battle along the Ely's Ford Koad, with some artillery 
between its two wings (Map 28). > Meagher's brigade {^^) arrived 
from the rear, and took position between Chandler's and Chancellors- 
ville, facing west. Ward's brigade formed on its left. 

About 8 a.m. Geary, pressed by Lee's infantry on his left and raked 
from right to left by Stuart's artillery at Hazel Grove, received an 
order to retire and form at right angle to his former line." By 8 : 15 his 
1st brigade (Candy's) had been withdrawn and ordered to take position 
as support in rear of Muhlenberg's line of guns.'- 

8: 15 to 8: 45 a.m. (Map 29) 
Jones, with his artillery on the Plank Road, was startled by the 
swarms of men in butternut that came tearing out of the woods across 
the road a short distance in front of his guns. Judging from appear- 
ances that their pursuers were not far behind them, he ordered the 
pieces that were in the road to load with canister, and to fire "at the 
word." As soon as French 's men appeared he gave the word. A peal 
hushing the din of musketry, a harsh fluttering and ripping in the thick- 
ets, and the hurrahing, onrushing men in blue were scurrying back. But 
having gained their distance, they halted and settled down to a lively 
musketry duel. Jones ' batteries went forward on or near the Plank Road 
to occupy the log works, but found them occupied by Federals, and were 
compelled to retire to their former position. North of the Plank Road 
Stuart's third line passed through the second line, most of which re- 
fused to advance.* About this time Colonel O'Neal, commanding 
Rodes' 1st brigade, was wovmded and succeeded by Colonel Hall. This 
brigade broke into two parts. One part, under Hall, followed by many 
men of Brockenbrough 's, drifted to the right and encountered the fire 
of Mott's men and the 11 N. J. on their right. The other part, under 

> TF. R., 39, pp. 508, 547, 555, 513, 1123, commanding Williams' 2d brigade, was dis- 

1007. abled about 8 a.m., when General Knipe 

^ lb., 39, p. 731. The records do not assumed the command of this brigade in 

show from whom this order was received. addition to that of his own. 

= lb.. 39, pp. 734, 735. Colonel Ross. * Th.. 39, pp. 952, 956. 



RUGER RELIEVED 357 

Colonel Pickens, halted at Berry's Log Works. Colquitt's brigade, on 
its way to the left, was ordered back to the right. 

Rnger, being relieved by Graham, withdrew to Chaneellorsville and 
thence to United States Ford. He probably carried with him the men 
of the 110 Pa., leaving on his left the 7 N. J. of Mott's brigade, and on 
his right the 123 N. Y. of Ross' brigade. 

Ramseur (s-^ij), after vainly urging the troops in Slocum's Log Works 
to advance, went with his brigade (except the 30 N. Ca., detached to sup- 
port a battery at Hazel Grove) against the Federal infantry in his 
immediate front. This brought him against the right flank of Graham 's 
brigade (Map 29). 

Meanwhile Doles with half of his brigade should have supported 
Ramseur 's right, but in marching through the dense wood he had lost 
connection with Ramseur. Passing by Graham's left, he went toward 
the line lately commanded by Colonel Ross and now commanded by 
General Knipe. The heavy fire of the enemy made it impossible for 
Williams to get pack-mules to the front. So the only way of supplying 
ammunition to his infantry was to bring up fresh troops. He sent to 
Slocum for reenforcements, but none came. Soon afterward he was 
assured by Sickles that troops of the III Corps had already been sent 
to replace his line.' Bowman had sent a couple of regiments to occupy 
the works on the right of Ross' line. Doles took the combined line in 
flank and rear, making many prisoners. The regiments lately under 
Ross, literally without ammunition," broke away in some disorder from 
the right and joined Ruger's brigade. Doles went on past the left of 
Best's artillery toward Chaneellorsville. 

About 8:30 Colonel Sewell, commanding the 5 N. J. of Mott's bri- 
gade (o— III), was informed that General Mott was wounded, which left 
him in command of the brigade. He rode to the right of the Plank Road 
in search of General Berry. General Knipe tried to bring a couple of 
regiments of Sewell 's brigade up to the breastworks from which the 
5 and 8 N. J. were firing upon Hall and Ramseur, but could not do so. 
He says: "Just at this moment a regiment of red-legged Zouaves [the 
114 Pa. of Graham's brigade] came pell-mell from our left, with less 
than half their number of the enemy close at their heels. I endeavored 
to arrest the fugitives and induce them to defend themselves from be- 
hind the rifle-pits over which they had just retreated. This, however, I 
could not accomplish. ' ' * 

^ W. R., 39, p. 680. meiit that the Confederate writer Caldwell 

2 76. referred in describing the fight at Slocum's 

^ lb., 39, pp. 687, 688. The commander old works: "A regiment of Zouaves was 

of this regiment was tried by court-mar- particularly impetuous, but even they were 

tial on the charge of misbehavior before forced to give way after frightful losses, 

the enemy, and honorably acquitted (*.. and leave their disabled comrades behind 

39, p. 410). It seems that his regiment did them." 
its full duty. It was probably to this regi- 



358 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE 

8:45 to 9 a.m. (Map 30) 

The withdrawal of Ross' line uncovered the rii^ht of Geary's. 
Geary's right brigade (Greene's) gained ground to the right and threw 
back two regiments (60 and 102 N. Y.) for its protection on that side. 
Doles' half brigade, repulsed by these two regiments, veered to its left 
and went on, protected by the crest of the hill, past the left of the artil- 
lery at Fairview, in rear of Geary, to the rear of Sickles (Map 30). 
Coming under the fire at close range of some of the artillery about 
Chaucellorsville and observing a large force of infantry moving toward 
its right, it faced about and hastened back to Slocum's Log Works. 

Graham's right flank and then the rest of his brigade gave way. On 
reaching Williams' old line it made a stand, which compelled Ramseur 
to hold back nearly half of his brigade. The other half, however, drove 
before it the 5 and 8 N. J. and 123 N. Y., and occupied the intrench- 
ments vacated by these troops on Graham's right (Map 30). 

Sewell, on learning of Berry's death, returned to the left of the Plank 
Road. With the support on his right of the 11 N. J., he stood his ground 
in rear of the lost intrenchment until nearly 9 o'clock, when the pres- 
sure from Hall, reenforced or supported by Pender, Thomas, and 
others, together with a scarcity of ammunition, compelled him to 
I'etire to the rear of the artillery. 

Knipe fell back to Chaucellorsville, and thence to United States Ford, 
with what was left of his brigade and Ross'. 

The artillery at Fairview had been gradually reduced by the with- 
drawal of batteries out of ammunition to 20 or 30 pieces. It was now 
generally free to use its canister, and so to take care of itself, in front, 
but was imperfectly protected by infantry on its flanks. Hall's men, 
accompanied on their left by five companies of Iverson's brigade under 
Colonel Christie, surge around the Federal right, and compel Dimick's 
guns north of the Plank Road to retire. Skirmishers and sharpshooters 
get within 100 yards of Winslow's battery on the new flank. They plant 
their colors by the side of the road, and commence picking off his horses. 
He loads with canister and blows them back. Again and again they re- 
turn, to be as often repulsed. The artillery sustains a notable loss in 
the death of Lieutenant F. B. Crosby. This young officer was a type of 
the best American volunteer. After the battle of Bull Run he gave up 
the practice of law to accept a second lieutenancy in the 4 U. S. Artil- 
lery. He was assigned to Battery F, and was soon i^romoted for good 
conduct and ability to be first lieutenant. On the appointment of Cap- 
tain Best, his commander, as chief of artillery of the XII Corps, Crosby 
became commander of the battery. He was pitting his guns against 
masses of infantry coming on with high, shrill rebel yells— red, blue- 
crossed battle-flags tossing here and there above them— when a bullet 



BEST'S ARTILLERY IN PERIL 359 

from the right of the battery, probably a sharpshooter's, found its billet 
in his breast. Five minutes later, at half-past 8 o'clock, his brief, honor- 
able career was ended. His last words were: "Tell my parents that I 
die happy. Lord, forgive my sins."* 

Colonel Morgan, Hancock's chief of artillery, received orders from 
Hooker to bring up all the batteries of the corps that had not been en- 
gaged. He had to go to United States Ford for them, as they had all 
been sent there pursuant to Hooker's order. Captain Randolph, chief 
of artillery of the III Corps, sent to Chandler's for von Puttkammer's 
11 N. Y. Battery (3. Ill), but it could not be got to the front.- The 5 Me. 
battery (2. I), on its way to the I Corps, was diverted by General 
Hooker toward Chancellorsville. The following description of the 
situation was received at 8 : 45 a.m. : 

United States Ford, May 3, 1863. 
General Buttcrfield. Headquarters Camp Falmouth: 

A most terrible bloody conflict has raged since daylight. Enemy in great force 
in our front and on the right, but at this moment we are repulsing him on all 
sides. Carnage is fearful. General Hooker is safe so far. Berry is killed. I 
return to the front, but will keep you advised when in my power. Our trains are 
all safe, and we shall be victorious. Our cavalry has not come up. 

RuFUS Ingalls, 

Chief Quartermaster. 

This message was sent by telegraph. The line to United States Ford 
was put in working order during the night, and a station opened about 
a mile in rear of Chandler's at 8:30 a.m. The last sentence of the 
message probably refers to Stoueman, but may refer only to Averell, 
who, it will be remembered, had been imder orders, since the evening of 
the 1st, to return immediately to United States Ford, and report in 
person at Hooker's headquarters. He was still at Ely's Ford and had 
not reported. 

General French, having been hotly engaged for about an hour, dis- 
covered that the enemy was taking a position on his right to flank him. 
His corps commander. General Couch, being far away, and Hooker, as 
he thought, comparatively near, he sent a report of the fact to be deliv- 
ered to Hooker. For some reason it was delivered to Meade, who 
directed Humphreys to order a brigade of his division to French's sup- 
port. Humphreys designated Tyler's (3;^.).^ About 9 a.m. this brigade 
went into action on French's right, causing Williams to extend his line 
and change front to the left (Map 30). 

1 Memorial of Lieutenant Franklin Butler to the eye of the general commanding in 

Crosby, 4 U. S. Artillery. another way, I will not enlarge upon it 

= Captain Randolph says: "I regret to here" (W. B.. 39. pp. 406, 485). 
report the disgi-aceful conduct of Captain ^ lb., 39, pp. 363, 508, 54(, 550, 552, 

von Puttkammer. As the matter has come 553. 



360 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The 5 Me. Battery {f-^) arrived at the front and went into action, 
dividing its fire between the enemy's advancing infantry and Jones' ar- 
tillery. It suffered heavily from both. About 9 a.m., all its officers 
being killed or wounded, the command of the battery was given by 
Couch to Lieutenant Kirby, whose battery of corps artillery was in 
reserve. 

Colquitt, on his way to Stuart's right, was again ordered to the left. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE AFTER 9 A.M. AVERELL ORDERED RELIEVED 
FROM COMMAND 

9 to 9:30 a.m. (Map 31) 

WHILE Ramseur threatened Graham's right, Graham advanced 
his left against Ramseur 's right. This movement was checked 
for a time by a charge made by the 30 N. Ca., as it came over to join 
Ramseur from Hazel Grove, but was favored later by a charge against 
Ramseur 's right made by the 7 N. J. falling back on Graham's left. The 
latter regiment captured the colors and a large part of the personnel, 
including the colonel, of the 2 N. Ca. Colonel Francine, commanding 
the 7 N. J., now went to the rear, taking with him 400 men of the 
brigade and leaving 300 with Sewell. Francine had fought his regi- 
ment gallantly, and was under the impression that Sewell was wounded, 
and he in command of the brigade. He had been advised by his surgeon 
to retire from the field, having lost his voice, but had no excuse, it seems, 
for taking over half of the brigade with him.' 

Vandeventer's brigade had not advanced. Ramseur went back and 
personally exhorted and ordered its officers and men to take position 
on his right, but in vain. He then reported to General Rodes that un- 
less the enemy was driven from his right he would have to fall back. 
Rodes made repeated efforts to bring up troops from the rear, but none 
would move forward. About this time Stuart rode up to Funk's 
brigade and in his usual happy manner ordered a charge. The order 
was obeyed with the characteristic enthusiasm of the Stonewall brigade. 
This attack in front, with Ramseur 's pressure on the right, started Gra- 
ham's brigade, about 9: 15, on a disorderly retreat to Ohancellorsville. 
Hayman's brigade (,-4ri)' ^^d by Birney himself, covered Graham's 
movement with a charge, which broke the formation of Hayman's bri- 
gade, and caused its withdrawal to Chandler's. From there a portion 
of the 17 Me. under the regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Merrill, marched without authority to the river to reform.- Carr's bri- 
gade withdrew to Chandler's. 

The Stonewall brigade took position on Ramseur's right (Map 31), 

' W. It., 39, pp. 445, 474, 478. - 26., 39, pp. 433, 436. 

361 



362 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

and Ramseur's brigade, with depleted ranks and empty cartridge-boxes, 
withdrew to the rear of Slocum's Log Works, leaving behind it the 30 
N. Ca., which took position on Funk's right. 

Geary was engaged in establishing his new line, perpendicular to 
his old one, when about 9 a.m. Hooker rode up to him and directed 
him to resume his original position and hold it at all hazards, promis- 
ing to support him by an attack in force on Stuart's left flank. Candy's 
men put their caps on their bayonets, swung them over their heads, and 
rushed with wild cheers back to their old lines. Geary's other two 
brigades (Kane's and Greene's) had received orders to retire. While 
the 1st brigade returned to the left of the original line, the 3d brigade, 
on the right of the latter, left its intrenchments and went to the rear, 
covered by two of its regiments, the 60 and 102 N. Y. On the opposite 
side of the field Tyler was pushing back the Confederate left, and Col- 
quitt moving to its support. 

About 9 a.m. the remnant of Best's artillery was compelled, by the 
fire it was receiving from the enemy's infantry on its right, the immi- 
nent danger of similar treatment on its left, and a shortage of ammuni- 
tion, to abandon the position of Fairview.^ At the same time Pettit's 
battery was withdrawn from Muhlenberg's line to Chandler 's,^ and 
O'Donohue's 3 pieces from Hancock's line to Muhlenberg's, which left 
Muhlenberg 9 pieces. A number of Best's pieces went into action be- 
tween Fairview and Chancellorsville, forming with other artillery a 
cordon of 24 pieces about Chancellorsville.'' 

Sickles sent to Hooker his senior aide. Major Tremain, with a most 
urgent appeal for support. Hooker, on the porch of the Chancellor 
House, saw him coming, and bent over the rail in his eagerness to hear 
Tremain 's report, when a solid shot struck the pillar against which he 
had been leaning, splitting it from end to end, and throwing one half of 
it violently against his body and head. He fell senseless, and for a few 
moments was thought to be dying, but under the care of his medical 
director he soon revived sufficiently to show himself to his troops. By 
great force of will, and with the assistance of his staff, he mounted his 
horse and started to the rear. In the meantime a rumor that he was 
killed had spread through the ranks. Couch, the senior corps com- 
mander, had heard it, and hastened to the Chancellor House, thinking 
to himself: "If he is killed, what shall I do with this disjointed armyl" 
He was overjoyed at coming upon Hooker niounted and with his staff 
also in their saddles. Briefly congratulating him, he went on with his 
duties at the front. Hooker was not again fit to exercise command dur- 

1 W. B., 39, pp. 405, 675. ^ Muhlenberg 9 pieces, Lewis 4 pieces, 

^ lb., 39, p. 349. Pettit's battery was Jastram 2 pieces, Seeley 4 pieces, Kirby 

joined at Chandler's by the section detached 5 pieces. 

yesterday to sei-ve with the Iiish brigade. 



BEST'S ARTILLERY RETIRES 363 

ing the campaign. Nearly all the rest of the day he suffered pains 
which deprived him of the use of his faculties. His right side was par- 
tially paralyzed, and was livid for weeks afterward.' But as he rode 
away from Chancellorsville he said nothing to Couch about relinquish- 
ing command, nor did he give him any orders. "This," says Couch, 
"was the last I saw of my commanding general in front."' It was the 
last time that Hooker was to be at the front in command of an army. 
On riding to the vicinity of Chandler's he had a violent return of pain. 
He became faint, and would have fallen from his horse had not his staff 
rushed to his side and helped him to the ground. A blanket was spread, 
and he was laid upon it. Some remedy was acbninistered to him, and 
he again revived. Proceeding to moimt, he was scarcely on his feet 
when a solid shot from Hazel Grove struck the blanket in the spot where 
he had been lying. Being assisted into the saddle, he rode in paroxysms 
of pain to a less exposed position near Chandler's. Probably about this 
time he received the following dispatches from Butterfield: 

6:45 a.m. 

Sedgwick's prospects here look unfavorable from reports. He is not out of 
Fredericksburg. 

7:05 a.m. 

Sedgwick still in front of Fredericksburg, as far as I can judge. Trains were 
running up all night to vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing. It may be that the 
enemy were reenforced. 

Hooker telegraphed : 

To Sedgwick, 9:15 a.m. 

You will hurry up your column. The enemy's right flank now rests near 
the Plank road at Chancellorsville, all exposed. You wiU attack at onee. 

To Butterfield 

Communicate with Sedgwick. "We are driving the enemy and only need liim to 
complete the job. 

Would the forces at Chancellorsville preserve this opportunity for 
Sedgwick? Their defence could not last much longer. The ever- 

^ The paralysis with which during his all the sense out of him. For the remainder 

later years his entire right side was affected of the day he was wandering, and was un- 

was the result of this blow (The Battle of able to get any ideas into his head ex- 

Chancellorsville, by S. P. Bates, pp. 126. cepting to remain in the extreme front and 

127; Medical Becollections of the Army of under as much fire as could be possibly 

the Potomac, by Jonathan Lettennan, p. found. In fact, at no time of trip after 

137). Sunday did he seem to be compos mentis" 

Captain Candler, Hooker's aide-de-camp, (Manuscript). 
wrote home on the 7th : "The blow which ' B. and L., Ill, 167. 

the General received seems to have knocked 



364 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

aggressive Sickles wanted to make a counter-attack, but Couch refused 
to permit it. "It would not have been difficult," says Sickles, "to re- 
gain the lost ground with the bayonet, as I proposed to do, but the at- 
tempt was not deemed expedient (for the want of supports to hold it) 
by the senior officer present upon that part of the field, upon whom the 
direction of operations in front had devolved in the temporary absence 
of the genei"al-in-chief."^ 

Meade had been hoping for orders or permission to strike a blow at 
Stuart's left. By his own order. Colonel Webb of his staff had ridden 
to the left of Stuart's line, and seen it moving forward across his front. 
He went with Webb to Hooker's tent, and urged that he and Reynolds 
be allowed to attack the enemy's left, and sweep him from the front of 
Couch, stating what Webb had seen. Reynolds also besought Hooker 
for permission to attack, but Hooker, renouncing what offensive designs 
he may have entertained, positively refused to allow it. He disap- 
proved of Meade's action in sending Tyler's brigade (j-^) to the relief 
of French, and ordered him not to send any more troops forward.^ 

Pursuant to an order received soon after 9, Caldwell, commanding 
Hancock's 1st brigade, reported to Hooker northwest of Chandler's 
with the available troops of his brigade and Zook's brigade (p^), from 
500 to 600 men.* He deployed a company facing Chancellorsville to 
arrest the crowd of fugitives and stragglers going down the road. 
About 9 : 30, Hooker, who, in great physical pain, was on his horse, 
visiting his new lines, ordered him to advance across the open field and 
through the woods beyond. 



9:30 to 10 a.m. (Maps 32, 33) 

Hall's and Christie's men swarmed over the works of Fairview, but 
the troops on their left and rear gave way. French's infantry, with 
the support of Tyler's on its right, and of other infantry and the 5 Me. 
Battery on its left, forced the Confederates north of the Plank Road 
back in confusion upon such supports as they could find. In vain does 
Hall call upon the fugitives to come to his support. One of their officers 
tells him that "the d d scoundrels" will not fight. All efforts to 

^ IF. R., 39, p. 393. force, was to meet him at once, and the I 

^Ih., 39, p. 508; Life of General G. G. Corps was also to attack him and envelop 

Meade, by R. M. Bache, pp. 272, 273 ; Gen- him, and if necessary more forces were to 

era! Meade, by I. R. Pennypacker, pp. 122, be drawn from the left of our line, leaving 

^23; Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., ni, only force enough to hold Lee's forces in 

219 et seq. Warren says : "We expected that check" {Rep. of Com., IV, 46). 

Jackson's force would assault us in the ^ This left in Hancock's main line about 

morning at Chancellorsville, and the inten- eight companies of the 140 Pa. of Cald- 

tion was that General Sickles, with all his well's brigade and none of Zook's brigade. 



NUMBERS ENGAGED 365 

rally them fail.* The Federals crowd iu on his flank and rear. Frank- 
lin's brigade, lately forced back and thrown into some confusion by the 
enemy's impetuous advance, i-allies, and, accompanied by a remnant of 
Sewell's brigade on its left, dashes back at the artillery position, re- 
covers a number of cannon that the enemy had seized, and hurls him 
out of the works, taking the flags of Hall's 5 Ala. and 26 Ala. and many 
prisoners. The Confederates reform along Berry's Log Works, with 
their left thrown back to confront Tyler (:\lap 32). 

Caldwell went forward, accompanied on his left by Meagher with his 
Irish brigade. As he did so, he met French falling back with Carroll's 
brigade. Meagher had not gone far before he came under the fire of 
Jones' guns, which broke up his column. He returned to his position 
as support of the 5 Me. Battery.- 

Diagonally across the field the Stonewall brigade advanced, broke the 
Federal line, and captured a Federal flag. While exulting in the pos- 
session of this trophy and the commanding position of Fairview, 
from which the Federals could be seen fleeing toward Chancellorsville, 
Colonel Funk, commanding the brigade, observed a Federal coluimi 
moving to gain his flank. He sent an ofScer to urge forward all sup- 
ports within reach. The 26 Ala. of Hall's brigade made a charge, 
recovering its lost color. Other regiments came up on his left, but re- 
tired before they had fired a volley. Being thus unsupported and 
threatened on every side, his force reduced about 30 per cent, and with- 
out ammunition, he fell back to Williams' old works, Jwrs de cojubat 
(Map 33). 

The Federals, though they had lost some ground, had beaten back all 
the men that Stuart had sent against them. But this they had only been 
able to do by throwing in fresh troops. Against Stuart's 26,500 infan- 
try they had had in action from first to last the following forces of the 
same arm : 

Sickles, Williams, and Hays 22,894 

Carroll and Albright 2,276 

Tyler 1,711 

Meagher 1.150 

Caldwell 550" 

Total 28,581 

About 9: 45 a.m. Geary's 2d brigade followed the 3d toward Chancel- 
lorsville, leaving the 1st and two regiments of the 3d (60 and 102 N. Y.) 
at the front. On the left of Geary, the Federals had not yielded an inch. 
Hancock's advance line of skirmishers, or picket line, facing toward 
Fredericksburg, was still under the command of Colonel Nelson A. 

^W R 39, p. 054. = Ih.. 39, pp. 1044, 410, 328, 327. 

•'' 7b., 39. pp. 313. 319. 



366 THE CAJVIPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Miles of the 61 N. Y. Volunteers. It consisted this morning of the fol- 
lowing troops : 

6 companies of the 148 Pa. of Caldwell's brigade (j^). This was a new regi- 
ment, in its first fight. It was commanded by Colonel James A. Beaver, who 
was to become in after years the Governor of Pennsylvania. 

66 N. Y. of Zook's brigade [^^). 

64 N. Y. of Brooke's brigade (j;^)- This was John R. Brooke, later Gover- 
nor-General of Cuba. 

Al)Out 8:45 a.m. this force was increased by 250 men of the 145 Pa., 
also of Brooke's brigade. It was vigorously attacked on its left and 
pressed along its whole front by the troops under McLaws. Every 
effort to break it with infantry failed. The enemy then opened on it 
with artillery, but with no better result.^ About 9 : 15 a.m. Colonel 
Miles was shot through the abdomen and taken, more dead than alive, 
from the field. As he was carried on a blanket into the Chancellor 
House he saw General Hooker, covered with dust, going out on the other 
side of the building.^ 

Hooker had been momentarily expecting to learn that Sedgwick had 
come up in Lee's rear." Having no thought of attacking if Sedgwick 
did not attack, or of reenforcing the troops that he had in action, and 
unwilling to suffer further loss on an uncertainty as to Sedgwick's coop- 
eration, he decided to abandon the field. About 9 : 30 a.m. one of his 
staff officers rode up to Couch and requested his presence with Hooker. 
Couch turned to Hancock, near by, told him to "take care of things," 
and rode to the rear. Near Chandler's he came upon three or four tents, 
around which, mostly dismounted, were a large number of staff officers. 
Meade was present, and perhaps other general officers. Hooker was 
lying in a tent by himself. Raising himself a little as Couch entered, 
he said: "Couch, I turn the command of the army over to you. Y'ou 

1 W. B., 39, pp. 331, 332, 826, 830, 834. Miles has done so. Prov-idence should spare 

^ In his report after the battle the bri- his life ; and I earnestly recommend that he 

gade commander paid this handsome tribute be promoted, and intnisted with a com- 

io the youthful colonel of the 61 N. Y. mand commensurate with his abilities" 

(Miles was then only twenty-four yeare (TF. jB., 39, p. 321). 

old) : Colonel Miles was spared to distinguish 

"I greatly regret to report that Colonel himself in many another battle, and des- 

Miles was severely, if not mortally, wounded tined to attain, and for many years to fill, 

on Sunday morning (May 3) while ban- the highest and most honorable position in 

dling the picket line with masterly ability. the army of the United States. 

I have had occasion heretofore to mention ^ Eep. of Com., IV, 148. It is not clear 

the distinguished conduct of Colonel Miles how he expected to be informed of this 

in every battle in which the brigade has event. With Lee between him and Sedg- 

been engaged. His merits as a military wick, he could hardly be reached by mes- 

man seem to me of the highest order. I senger, and with such a noise as there was 

know of no terms of praise too exaggerated about Chancellorsville, a firing by Sedg- 

to characterize his masterly ability. If wick in Lee's rear might not have been 

ever a soldier earned promotion. Colonel beard and recognized in Hookei-'s line. 



COUCH IN COMMAND 367 

will witliclraw it, and place it iu the position designated on this map," 
as he pointed to a line traced on a field-sketch.' In his official report 
(TF. R., 39, p. 307) Couch says: 

I was called to the Chandler House briefly to take command of the army, 
simply acting as executive officer to General Hooker in fulfilling his instructions, 
which were to draw in the front, and make some new dispositions.^ 

As Couch came out of the tent he met Meade, who looked at him in- 
quiringly as if at last to receive the long-wished-for order to "go in." 
Colonel Davis, Hooker's assistant inspector-general, broke out: "We 
shall have some fighting now. ' ' But alas ! the words were hardly out of 
his mouth when a messenger dashed off with orders for Sickles to retire 
to the new line. Hancock received word that, after Sickles had retired, 
he and Geary would be ordered to follow him. 

Hancock faced his main line about, forming two sides of a square, 
one fronting west toward Gordonsville, and one east toward Fredericks- 
burg, about % of a mile apart. Geary with a brigade and a half held 
the approach from the south. 

The two regiments of cavalry near Chancellorsville withdrew again 
and formed a line of skirmishers in rear of Chandler's to intercept 
stragglers.^ The other regiment of cavalry, the 8 N. Y., had probably 
by this time started, by Pleasonton's order, to cross the river at 
United States Ford and do picket duty, as we shall see, on the north 
side. 

Colquitt came up on the Confederate left and pressed Tyler's right. 
Tyler sent twice for ammunition, but got none. Reporting his situa- 
tion to French, and asking him for orders, he was told to retire when 
his ammunition was exhausted. This soon occurred, when he yielded 
to Colquitt's increasing pressure, and fell back to Meade's Hue. 

On the south Anderson's disjointed line had worked its way through 
thickets and gullies and over slopes and ridges to the southern front of 
the Federal position. As his men crowd over Geary's breastworks, 
Lee rides up to Archer at Hazel Grove, and orders him to advance with 
the fraction of Doles' brigade attached to his own, which he promptly 
does. At the same time the troops under Stuart push forward on the 
right and left of the Plank Road. Sickles' line is forced out of the 
works of Fairview.* Anderson's men arrive on the height compara- 
tively fresh and secure its possession. The Confederate infantry that 
reached Fairview was soon followed by artillery from Hazel Grove, 
which cooperated with Jones' artillery on the Plank Road and artillery 
south of Chancellorsville under Hardaway. The Federal artillery at 

1 Couch, B. and L., Ill, 160, 170. * It does not appear that Sickles had 

2 TI-'. B.. 39, p. 307. " lb.. 39, u. 782. received Hooker's order to withdraw. 



368 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Chancellorsville was reduced by the withdrawal of Lewis' battery to 
18 pieces, but these were full of fight. The 4 pieces of Seeley's and 2 
of Jastram's were astride of the Plank Road, and near them was the 
section of Bailey's, withdrawn from Muhlenberg's line. Lieutenant 
Seeley loaded his guns with canister, and reserved his fire until the 
enemy was within 350 yards of his position, when he opened on them 
with terrible effect, making them break and take to the cover of the 
woods. He followed them with solid shot until the ammunition in his 
limbers was exhausted. The debris of his battery was then drawn 
from the field to the cheering of his men, and under the fire of three of 
the enemy's batteries. His loss in personnel was 1 officer and 45 men 
out of a total of 3 or 4 officers and 120 men.' The two pieces of Jas- 
tram's had lost so many horses that one piece had to be removed by 
hand and the other abandoned. 

Projectiles from the edge of the Fairview plateau on the west, and 
McLaws' lines on the east, passed over both of Hancock's lines; 
others from the Plank Road, on the south, enfiladed them. At 10 a.m. 
Pettit's battery (II), brought back from Chandler's, was placed in 
position at Chancellorsville. Its fire was combined with that of Lep- 
pien's 5 pieces (2. I) and the 3 pieces of Thomas' battery (^), making 
a fire of 14 pieces, which was directed upon the artillery enfilading Han- 
cock's lines. Four additional pieces probably fired on the enemy's 
infantry. It was not long before one of Pettit's caissons exploded. But 
this did not divert the gunners from their furious work. Stripped of 
all superfluous clothing, like imps of darkness, jumping back and forth, 
and in and out, among their devilish implements, as these recoiled with 
dripping muzzles from their deadly blasts— swabbing and ramming, 
priming and sighting, bracing themselves with eager ears for the sharp 
signal Fire— they had no thought but for the fierce task of sending as 
much death and destruction as possible into the enemy's ranks. The 
wounded lying and reclining about the Chancellor House gloated over 
their execution. 

After the loss of Huntington's 3 guns Hooker still had between 
United States Ford and Fairview 246 pieces of artillery. Lee had to 
oppose to them only 132. Yet the line of guns at Chancellorsville was 
greatly outnumbered by the artillery combating it,^ and this was not its 
only disadvantage. 

1 In his report Lieutenant Seeley says of McGraw's battery (4 pieces), Carter's 

that his loss in men was probably greater battalion (20 pieces), and Mcintosh's 

than that of any other battery in the war battalion (20 pieces), altogether 44 pieces 

(W. B., 39, p. 490). (ih., p. 938), to which should be added 3 

^ Colonel Carter gives the number of Con- pieces of Jordan's battery, making 47 

federate pieces in action at Fairview alone pieces (ih., pp. 821, 878). Hancock gives 

as "some twenty-five" {ih., 39, p. 1000). the distance of these pieces from bis lines 

According to Major Pegram, they consisted as about 900 yards (ib., p. 313). 



GEARY RETIRES 369 

Colonel Morgan, chief of artillery of the II .Corps, says with refer- 
ence to the position of the Federal artillery : 

I do not think it could have been held by any number of guns I could have 
placed in the contracted ground near the Chancellor House. The enemy's posi- 
tion was greatly superior, and our batteries were subjected to a direct, enfilading, 
and reverse fire. 

Regarding the direction of the artillery fire he says : 
I understand that some dissatisfaction has been expressed that the batteries 
near the Chancellor House did not disregard the artillery fire against them, and 
turn their attention to the rebel infantry in the woods near by, but from whose 
fire they [the batteries] were suffering little or nothing. My own judgment is 
that the only thing that could have enabled us to hold the ground was to have 
silenced the enemy's batteries.^ 

After Sickles, Geary was ordered to withdraw, and passed in an 
orderly column to the rear. This left Hancock holding the field alone, 
except for the remaining artillery. Despite the fact that the southern 
flanks of his lines, which had been covered by Geary, were entirely ex- 
posed and the enemy's infantry only a few hundred yards from them, 
the 18 pieces of artillery kept the enemy from advancing. It was still 
of great importance to gain time; to hold the enemy at bay until the 
roads leading to the rear should be cleared of troops, and the broken 
and disordered brigades should be reformed. This necessity pressed 
strongly upon General Couch, and nobly did he set himself to discharge 
the duty. His example was superb. Of slight stature, and usually of a 
simple and retiring demeanor, he became sublime as the passion of 
battle and the high-mounting sense of duty took complete possession of 
every power and faculty, every thought and feeling, every limb and 
nerve. His horse was killed; he was himself twice hit. Nobly, too, 
was he seconded by the chief of his First Division, General Hancock, 
whose horse was killed, and who was only able to secure a remount on 
an animal hardly large enough to allow the general's feet to clear the 
groimd.- 

Meade directed or authorized Captain Weed, his chief of artillery, 
to collect "all the available batteries," and place them "in position 
around Chandler's to cover the withdrawal of our troops and check the 
advance of the enemy." While this was being done. Hooker directed 
Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery of the I Corps, in the absence of 
General Hunt, chief of artillery of the army, to take command of all the 
artillery.* It should he remembered that, under Hooker, Hunt had 

1 W. R. 39, p. 310. Wright was placed in general command on 

^History of the II Army Corps, by F. the 2d. According to his own statements 
A. Walker, p. 246. (PP- 252, 253) this action was not taken 

3 W. R.,'39, pp. 253, 255, ,381. Hunt is until the 3d. 
in error in stating (p. 250) that Wain- 



370 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

been allowed only administrative control of the artillery. This ap- 
pointment of an officer to command the artillery was a radical change 
of organization in the presence of the enemy. Wainwright could exer- 
cise but a nominal command over the greater part of it, scattered and 
intermixed as it was. Weed's line, when formed, extended about 500 
yards on each side of a salient in front of Chandler's. It comprised 56 
guns, 28 on the right, 24 on the left, and 4 in the angle. ' 

Hooker had probably received the following dispatch from Butter- 
field: 

8:45 a.m. Sedgwick at 7:40 o'clock reports about making combined assault 
on their works : Gibbon on right ; Newton center ; Howe on left. If he fails, will 
try again. 

This dispatch and no sound of firing in Lee's rear may have given 
Hooker to believe that Sedgwick was checked or advancing with unnec- 
essary caution. At any rate, at 10 a.m. he repeated his order of 9 : 15 
for Sedgwick to hurry up his column and attack at once. 

10 a.m. to 1 p.m. 
A little after 10 a.m. Hancock received an order from Couch to with- 
draw. He transmitted it to his artillery, and sent Colonel Morris, who 
had succeeded Miles in command of the pickets, the following order: 

"We will soon withdraw our lines. You will have your command ready to 
follow the movement without delay, and without further instructions, when you 
see our line falling back. In doing so, use the utmost care not to anticipate our 
movement, and the greatest judgment and coolness in withdrawing your line. 
Do not let it l)e done hurriedly or with confusion.- 

Pettit's battery was finally silenced, having drawn upon itself the fire 
of about 18 of the enemy's pieces. It was about to be manned by in- 
fantry when orders came for the latter to retire. The battery was 
brought away by hand. Bailey's section soon followed it. 

Under the destructive fire to which it was subjected the 5 Me. Battery 
was abandoned by its men with the single exception of Corporal James 
H.Lebroke. The horses had all been killed or wounded, and it looked 
as if the pieces were about as good as lost. But under the orders of 
their officers, men of the 116 Pa. of Meagher's brigade, and of the 140 
and 53 Pa. of Zook's and Brooke's brigades, rushed at the guns, and, 
under a galling fire, pulled them by prolonges out of the stiff yellow 
clay in which they were stuck, and went with them back into the Federal 
lines. Kirby lay on the ground with a fractured thigh watching the 
operation. Men came to him to move him from the field. "No," he 
said; "take off that gun first." And the last of his five pieces was car- 

' W. R., 39, pp. 508, 512. = 26., 39, p. 318. 



CHANCELLORSVILLE ON FIRE 371 

ried to a place of safety.' About 10: 30 a.m. the artillery had retired, 
leaving Lieutenant O'Donohue of Thomas' battery in the hands of the 
enemy, mortally wounded. - 

About 11 o'clock Allabach, by order of General Humphreys, threw 
back the two left regiments of his brigade [—) perpendicularly to the 
road to Chancellorsville, and advanced in line of battle with these regi- 
ments, under a severe tire of shell and canister, as far as the edge of 
the wood near Chancellorsville, to cover the final withdrawal. During 
this movement, which was efTected between 11 and 12— and for some 
time before— the Chancellor House was subjected to more or less of 
the enemy's artillery fire. Missiles pierced the walls or stuck in the 
brickwork ; shells exploded in the upper rooms, setting the building on 
fire; the chimneys were demolished, and their fragments rained down 
upon the wounded about the building. All this time the women and 
children (including some slaves) of the Chancellor family, nineteen per- 
sons in all, were in the cellar. The wounded were removed from in and 
around the building, men of both armies nobly assisting one another in 
this work. The people in the cellar were rescued and cared for by 
Colonel Dickinson of Hooker's staff. The only avenue of escape from 
the house was the road leading to United States Ford, which for some 
distance extended through an open field. One by one those who had 
been at the house, and who were able to do so, including the women and 
children, ran the gauntlet of the fire by which this field was swept. At 
the edge of the woods they crossed the line of Allabach 's men, lying on 
the ground awaiting orders to advance.^ The dry leaves, abatis, and 
dead wood of the surrounding forest caught fire, and many of the poor 
cripples whom it was intended to save were forgotten or overlooked, 
and perished miserably in the flames. Their cries and groans suc- 
ceeded, as the fighting subsided, to the fiendish yells and savage shouts, 
the frightful fusillades and awful detonations, that during the last five 
hours had rent the air of this beautiful Sabbath morning. "It was 
pitiful," says Caldwell, "to see the charred bodies hugging the trees, 
or with hands outstretched, as if to ward off the flames. We saw 
around some of them little cleared circles where they had evidently 
raked away the dead leaves and sticks to stay the progress of the fire. 

1 W. R., 39, pp. 310, 327, 328, 329, 314, the 23d President Lincoln had sent him a 

337, 347. The last shot from this battei-y general officer's commission in recognition 

was fired by Corporal Lebroke alone. Cap- of his brilliant abilities, undaunted courage, 

tain Leppien died on the 24th of May, on and faithful service (Iliston/ of the II 

the amputation of his wounded leg, re- Army Corps, by F. A. Walker, pp. 245, 

ceiving his promotion to a lieutenant-colo- 246). 

nelcy of volunteers on his death-bed (Maine ^ W. R., 39, pp. 307, 309. 
in the War for the Union, by W. E. S. ' History of the First- Tenth- Twenty- 
Whitman and C. H. True, p. 412). ninth Maine Regiment, by Major J. M. 

Lieutenant Kirby died on the 28th. On Gould, p. 347. 



372 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCBLLORSVILLE 

And there were ghastly wounds there— heads shot off or crushed, bodies 
and limbs torn and mangled, the work of shells. The smoke and stench 
were stifling. ' ' ^ 

The withdrawal was accomplished between 11 and noon. The two 
divisions of the II Corps, Hancock's on the right and French's on the 
left, connected on the right with the V Corps, to which Tyler's bri- 
gade (^) had returned, and on the left with the XI Corps. Allabach's 
two regiments remained in their forward position. By an error in the 
direction given one of the retiring regiments (27 Conn.), the entire 
body present, consisting of eight companies and most if not all of the 
field ofiBcers, was marched into the enemy's lines and taken prisoner. 
The capture of this regiment is claimed by General Wright for his 
brigade (— ), and by Lieutenant-Colonel Holt, commanding the 10 Ga. 
of Semmes' brigade (.7^), for his regiment. Wright gives the number 
of men captured, without counting officers, as from 600 to 700. Holt 
gives the aggregate (officers and men), including a fraction of another 
regiment, as 340. According to the Federal official returns, the killed, 
wounded, and missing in the regiment from the 1st to the 3d of May 
aggregated 291.^ On the whole, the Federal withdrawal was as well 
executed as could have been reasonably expected.^ 

At 10 a.m., about as Hancock received the order to fall back, his chief 
of artillery started out from United States Ford with three batteries : 
Arnold's (.5-^), Kirby's (j'^), and Cushing's (-), numbering 18 pieces, 
intending to "put in" every gun that could be worked, but as the head 
of the column arrived at the Chandler House he met the corps falling 
back. 

General Lee rode to the front of his pursuing lines. 

His presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable outbursts of enthu- 
siasm which none can appreciate who have not witnessed tlieni. 

The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the 
wounded, crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, all 
seemed possessed of a common impulse. One long, unbroken cheer, in which the 
feeble cry of those who lay lielpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of 
those who still fought, hailed the presence of the victorious chief. 

His first care was for the wounded of both armies, and he was among the fore- 
most at the burning mansion, where some of them lay. But at that moment, when 
the transports of his troops were drowning the roar of battle with acclamations, 
a note was brought to him from General Jackson.'' 

' Colonel Hamilton of the 1 S. Ca. refers ' History of the II Army Corps, by F. 

to his bivouacking: on the night of the 3d A. Walker, p. 247; Couch, B. and L., Ill, 

"in a swamp, with dead, dying, and roasted 170; Military Memoirs of a Confederate, 

Yankees" (W. R., 39, p." 905). See also by E. F. Alexander, p. 349. 

History of McGowan's Brigade, by J. F. J. * Address by Colonel Charles Marshall, 

Caldwell, p. 84. Soldiers' Memorial Meeting, Baltimore. 

- W. R., 39, pp. 869, 838, 176. 



LEE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE 373 

In the most unpretending words Jackson stated that he had been 
disabled by his wounds, and had accordingly transmitted his command 
to the general next in rank, A. P. Hill. He congratulated Lee upon the 
great victory which God had that day vouchsafed to his arms.^ Lee at 
once dictated the following reply : 

Headquarters, May 3, 1863. 
Gener.u. Thomas J. Jackson, Commanding Corps. 

General: I have just received your note informing me that you were wounded. 
I can not express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I 
should have chosen, for the good of the country, to be disabled in your stead. 
I congratulate you upon tlie victory, which is due to your skill and energy. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 

The rattle and rumble of the conflict was distinctly heard at the hos- 
pital. Jackson made frequent inquiries about the fighting, and listened 
with interest to the accounts that he was able to obtain of the perform- 
ances of particular officers or organizations. When Lee's message was 
read to him, he remarked : ' ' General Lee is very kind, but he should give 
the praise to God." In the early part of the day he suffered in his right 
side, but in the evening the pain had left him, and he was thought to be 
doing well. 

The falling back of the Federal lines brought the hospitals of the II 
and III Corps at Chandler's within reach of the enemy's shells, by 
which several men were killed or wounded. The hospitals were moved 
further to the rear, in part to near Compback's Mill and in part to the 
brick house near United States Ford. Great difficulty was experienced 
in removing the wounded for want of ambulances, plenty of which were 
parked on the north side of the river. While the surgeons were actively 
engaged in dressing wounds, extracting bullets, etc., the enemy's shells 
again found them out, causing a stampede among the wounded who 
were able to get away, and a considerable perturbation among the poor 
fellows who could not. The hospital at the brick house became the prin- 
cipal one of the army. A medical depot was established on the north 
side of the river, near where the ambulance corps was parked. Men able 
to walk were sent there afoot. As many as possible of these went on by 
ambulance to the hospitals on Potomac Creek.^ 

COMMENTS 

The chief advantage that the defensive has over the offensive is its 
superiority of fire. As an offset thereto the offensive has the privilege 

^ Life of Lieutenant-General T. J. - Recollections of Medical Director Lettemian, 

Jackson, hy R. L. Dabney, II, 488. and Report of Medical Director Sim, III Corps. 



374 THE CAJVIPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

of determining the time and the point of attack. The defensive has to 
be strong at every point, the offensive has to be strong at but one point. 
A commander who attacks when and where his opponent expects him to 
suffers all the disadvantages of the offensive without realizing its char- 
acteristic advantage. Hooker expected an attack from the direction of 
Jackson's advance on the 2d. Stuart's attack was made in that direc- 
tion and in what tacticians call the parallel order— m lines parallel to 
those of the enemy— against the straight line formed by the western 
face of the Federal angle. His infantry was formed, as under Jackson, 
in division lines, one in rear of another. 

The Comte de Paris, commenting on the Confederate formation for 
attack, or order of battle, on the 2d and 3d of May, says: "In giving 
their whole front to a single division and forming the other divisions in 
rear of it in successive lines, Jackson and then Stuart, as has been seen, 
introduced at the first serious encounter a great complication into their 
order of combat. The brigades, the regiments of the different lines, 
were soon mixed up, and each part of the front found itself under the 
direction of chiefs whom chance brought to it, whilst the division com- 
manders could not embrace all the movements of their commands. This 
inconvenience, so serious in marching in battle formation through a 
thick wood, would have been avoided if each division had been formed 
three lines deep, thus presenting but a small front to the enemy.'" 

A corps marching on a single road, as Jackson's was, can by the use 
of division lines cover its front with a line of battle in less time than it 
can by the formation of divisions with brigade front. But there was not 
the same justification for this formation to-day that there was yester- 
day, and there was more to be gained to-day by having the divisions 
in compacter form. Perhaps, however, the retention of the original 
formation may be justified by the general weariness of the troops and 
the importance of their resting before daylight. 

As compared with brigade lines, the division lines, in rear of one 
another, are less handy or mobile, but may compensate for the lack of 
mobility by greater unity and strength. This possible advantage was 
forfeited by the distances between the lines. Had the three lines at- 
tacked together, or supported each other closely, they would probably 
have won the field with the first rush. But about an hour elapsed after 
the first line went into action before the second became generally en- 
gaged ; and there was as long a period after this before the third line 
came up to the first and second lines. This was not "Stonewall Jack- 
son's way." 

The preparation by the artillery had, on account of the topogra])hy of 
the battle-field, to be directed against the south face of the Federal 
angle, held by Slocum. This circumstance, the danger of a counter - 

^ History of the Civil War in America, by the Comte de Paris, V, 159, 100. 



COMMENTS 375 

attack from the Federal right, Lee's injunction to Stuart to "work by 
the right wing," and the presentation of a salient in the Federal line 
opposite Hazel Grove, combined to demand a massing of Confederate 
infantry against Hazel Grove and Slocum's right or front, leaving, say, 
a division astride of the Plank Road as a feint. The first thing to do 
was to take Plazel Grove as a position for the artillery. After the artil- 
lery had fired a sufficient length of time to produce the desired effect, 
and not before, the mass of the infantry should have been thrown upon 
the point thus prepared for attack, and the rest launched as a diversion 
or demonstration against other points of the enemy's lines. Had this 
mode of operation or some approximation to it been adopted and car- 
ried out, the battle would have been decided in about half the time which 
it actually consumed ; and hundreds of the devoted victims of its car- 
nage and conflagration would have survived it. 

It was not left to the writer of this history to be the first to criticize 
the operations of the II Corps under Stuart. The contemporary criti- 
cisms that they evoked stirred him to write to Lee on the 9th of May, 
soliciting a vindication of his generalship. Lee replied, with his char- 
acteristic tact: 

... In the management of the difficult operations at Chaneellorsville, which 
you so promptly undertook and creditably performed, I saw no error.s to correct, 
nor has there been a fitting opportunity to commend your conduct. I prefer your 
acts to speak for themselves, nor does your character or reputation require 
bolstering up by out-of -place expression of my opinions. 

A general who should think of adopting the tactics that Lee and Stuart 
employed at the battle of Chaneellorsville should be sure, before doing 
so, that he realizes the conditions under which these tactics succeeded— 
the mental collapse of the enemy's commanding general, and a lack of 
ammunition. To try them on a commander in his senses, whose troops 
are supplied with ammunition, would be to court defeat and invite 
disaster, as was to be shown a couple of months later at the battle of 
Gettysburg. Lee and Stuart won the battle because : 

1. Their bad tactics were opposed by worse tactics on the part of 
Hooker ; 

2. Hooker's careful provisions for the supply of ammunition' proved 
ineffective. 

Referring to the ammunition supply. General Abner Doubleday says : 
"There should have been some staff officer specially charged with this 

1 "G. 0. No. 30, March 25, 1863 : the eartridge-boxes : for artillery, 250 

". . . Division ordnance oflficers will be roiuKls, wnth that in the ammunition-chest, 

held responsible that the following supply . . . 

of ammunition is kept constantly on hand : "The wagons containing the reserve am- 
For infantry, 140 rounds, with that in the nuuiition will be under the control of the 
cartridge-boxes ; for cavalry, 100 rounds of division ordnance oflficers. Ammunition- 
carbine and 40 rounds pistol, with that in wagons will be distinguished by a horizon- 



376 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

subject, but there seemed to be uo one who could give orders in relation 
toit."i 

This is a singular statement to be made by a historian who partici- 
pated in the campaign as a division commander. Lieutenant Flagler, 
the chief ordnance officer of the army, was on the field, so were the 
ordnance officers of the several corps and divisions. These officers were 
specially charged with seeing in their respective spheres to the supply- 
ing of ammunition, and were competent to give orders regarding it. 
There was an abundance of ammunition between United States Ford 
and Chancellorsville. Why was it not forwarded and distributed to the 
troops? General Williams, as already stated, considered it impossible 
to get ammunition across the fire-swept zone in rear of the lines. But 
General Geary, commanding the other division of Slocum's corps, says, 
referring to his ordnance officer, Captain G. M. Elliott: 

By dint of great exertion he had succeeded in bringing forward a large supply- 
train of ammunition, the arrival of which was most opportune. Many divisions 
besides our own had expended their entire stock, and could not have continued 
the action had it not been for the timely supply afforded by the foresight and 
energy of Captain Elliott, who prosecuted his duties under the hottest fire.- 

And Birney, commanding Sickles ' First Division, says : 

Lieut. C. H. Graves, Fortieth N. T., the division ordnance officer, kept us well 
supplied with anununitioii.^ 

In Hancock's division ammunition was brought to the firing-line by 
Captain H. H. Bingham, division judge-advocate, and by the pioneers of 
the 64 N. Y.* Hancock says nothing about lacking ammunition, nor does 
any of his brigade commanders, nor his corps commander. French says : 

Lieut. W. E. Potter, ordnance officer, was indefatigable, brave, and zealous. 
His department was never better served.'^ 

tal stripe, 6 inches wide, painted on each "In time of action, division ordnance ofB- 
side of the cover; for artillery ammunition, cers will be careful to get explicit instruc- 
red; for cavalry, yellow; for infantry, tions from their division commanders in 
light blue. The wagons will also be dis- regard to the disposition to be made of 
tinctly marked with the number of the their trains, and they will themselves re- 
corps and division to which they belong and main with their trains to attend to the issue 
the kind and caliber of ammunition con- of ammunition. If it should be necessary 
tained. The main depot for the anny will during a prolonged action to replenish the 
be designated by a crimson flag marked trains, the division ordnance officers will be 
'Ordnance Depot, U. S. A.' Upon the informed where the ammunition can be ob- 
march, or when the brigades are widely taiaed. . . ." (W. R., 40, pp. 156, 157). 
separated from each other, the wagons con- ^ Chancellorsville and Gettyslmrg, p. 49. 
taining the reserve ammunition for each ^ W. R., 39, p. 732. See also Knap's 
brigade may, at the discretion of the divi- report, ib., p. 772. 
sion commander, be turned over to the bri- ^ 7b., 39, pp. 410, 411. 
gade quartermaster, who will draw his sup- * lb., 39, pp. ,317, 344, 349. 
plies from the division ordnance ofiBcer. ^ lb., 39, p. 364. 



COMMENTS 377 

In the V Corps, Tyler's brigade ran out of ammunition, but there was 
apparently a sujiply for it with the division. Referring to the ammuni- 
tion for which Tyler had asked, Humphreys says : ' ' This it would have 
been impracticable to distribute had it been with the brigade, and it 
would probably have fallen into the hands of the enemy, had it been 
sent, so close was the brigade pressed by them. General Tyler was 
therefore directed to withdraw when his ammunition was expended." ^ 

The lack of ammunition was a serious factor in Tyler's brigade, in 
Berry's and possibly Whipple's divisions, in Williams' division, and in 
Best's line of guns. But it can hardly be considered as general. 

Its two fundamental causes were : 

1. IneflSciency on the part of certain ordnance officers. 

2. Division of responsibility between the quartermaster's and ord- 
nance departments in the handling of ammunition-trains." 

Stuart's attack made up in spirit for wHat it lacked in skill. His first 
line, without any material support from the second or third, forced 
Williams' intrenchments, and penetrated in part to his and Berry's 
last infantry reserves. This feat may be accepted as a signal proof of 
the valor of our Southern countrymen. But the battle was not decided 
by native valor. That quality did not count for as much as the artificial 
valor, the combination of steadiness and obedience, which come of mili- 
tary training and experience. On the part of the Confederates there 
was no such wholesale marching to the rear as there was on the part of 
the Federals. The Federal organizations that were taken off the field 
by their officers without authority must have numbered over 5000 men. 
The individual skulking probably came up to an equal number. This 
discreditable showing should be ascribed to inefficiency on the part of 
officers rather than to poltroonery among the men. Say what one will 
about the man behind the gun, he is about what his officers make him. 
Good officers will make good soldiers of almost any kind of men; the 
best men under poor officers will make but indifferent soldiers. On the 
morale of the opposing armies Hooker expressed himself as follows: 
"Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as was 
also our infantry, except in discipline, and that, for reasons not neces- 
sary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file 
vastly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army has 
by discipline alone acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency 
unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not 
been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in 
the other rebel armies. ' ' ^ 

The fire of Pegram's artillery from Hazel Grove on Slocum's flank 

' W. B., 39, p. 547. after the campaign (Journal of the Mil. 

* This defect of administration was rem- Service Inst, of the U. S., XIII, 302). 
edied by a reorganization of the artillerj' ■' Rep. of Com.. IV, 113. 



378 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

and along his line was annoying and effective, but could not prove deci- 
sive. It was the giving way of Williams' division and Graham's brigade 
on his right, under the pressure of Stuart's infantry, accompanied or 
followed by the assaults of Anderson's infantry in his front, and not 
the flanking and raking fire of Pegram's guns, trying as that was, that 
forced Geary out of his intrenclmients ; and so with the Federal artil- 
lery, it was the loss of their infantry supports and the approach of the 
enemy's infantry on their flanks, rather than the lack of ammunition or 
the execution of the enemy's artillery, that made Best's guns retire 
when they did. With the canister left in their chests they might have 
held out some time longer against front attacks. 

The position to which Hooker retreated, like the one he abandoned, 
had the general form of an angle. The left side was occupied by the II 
and XI Corps, the right by the I and V. The III Corps was formed at 
the salient, or between the H and V Corps, except the portion under 
General Revere, which did not return from United States Ford until 
about 3 p.m. The XII Corps was assembled in a central position as a 
general reserve. The artillery by 12 m. formed four groups or masses, 
one of 26 pieces on the left under Captain Randol, chief of artillery of 
Humphreys' division (y); one of 48 pieces in the center under Weed, 
chief of artillery of the V Corps ; and two groups, one of 10 and one of 
18 pieces, on the right, imder Wainwright, chief of artillery of the I 
Corps. Four pieces of Waterman's battery stood between Weed's and 
Randol 's masses, and 140 lay in reserve between Chandler's and United 
States Ford (Appendix 16). 

In the course of the day the Federal right wing was reenforced by 
about 7700 men with 6 pieces of artillery and lost about 8400 men and 4 
pieces of artillery, which left it numbering about 75,500 men with 246 
pieces. 

The Confederates lost about 8800 men, which reduced them to about 
34,000 with 132 pieces of artillery.i 

The Confederate forces formed on Chancellors^^lle as a center and 
extending therefrom to the right and left in the general direction of the 
Plank Road and Turnpike. Colston was in the center with two brigades 
on each side of Chancellorsville; Rodes some distance to the left of 
Colston. On Colston's right were Anderson's and McLaws' divisions, 
and Heth 's division was on the left of Rodes. 

Lee had no idea that' the Federals were in position to give battle. He 
had mistaken Hooker's withdrawal to his new lines for a retreat. He 
was about as badly deceived to-day by Hooker's retrograde movement 

I INFANTRY CAVALRY 

Federal .... 69,618 1,175 

Confederate . . 30,013 1,933 

The losses were insi^iifieant after 12 m. 



ARTILLERY 


AGGREGATE 


4,714 


7,5,507 


2,300 


34,246 



LEE HEARS FROM FREDERICKSBURG 379 

as Hooker was yesterday by Jackson's manceuver. Regarding the cam- 
paign as decided, he announced its successful termination in the follow- 
ing bulletin : 
President Davis: Milford, May 3, 1863. 

Yesterday General Jackson, with three of his divisions, penetrated to the rear 
of the enemy, and drove him from all his positions from the Wilderness to within 
1 mile of Chancellorsville. He [the enemy] was engaged at the same time in 
front by two of Longstreet's divisions. This morning the battle was renewed. 
He was dislodged from all his positions around Chancellorsville, and driven hack 
toward the Rappahannock, over which he is now retreating. Many prisoners 
were taken, and the enemy 's loss in killed and wounded large. 

"We have again to thank Almighty God for a great victory. I regret to state 
that General Paxton was killed, General Jackson severely, and Generals Hetli 
and A. P. Hill slightly wounded. 

R. E. Lee, 

Genenil Commanding. 

He was on the point, about 12 : 30 p.m., of throwing his 34,000 men 
against Hooker's 75,000, when his hand was stayed by the ominous 
tidings that the Federals had carried the heights of Fredericksburg 
and were advancing in his rear by the Plank Road. He rode up to 
McLaws, and directed him to march with Kershaw's brigade, and 
Manly 's battery of his division, and Mahone's brigade of Anderson's, 
to meet the enemy. Learning afterward that an aide-de-camp of 
General Sedgwick's, captured near Banks' Ford, reported two corps 
under Sedgwick,^ he directed McLaws to take the remainder of his 
division, which he did. Later Alexander with his battalion of artillery 
was ordered to McLaws ' sui:)port. 

Averell with his division crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford at 1 p.m., 
proceeded to United States Ford, and reported to Hooker, who placed 
him in support of Howard, on the left near the river. The following 
order was issued probably not long afterward, but was not received 
to-day: 

Camp near , May 3, 1863. 

Brigadier-General Pleasonton will assume command of the division of cavalry 
now held by Brigadier-General Averell. The latter will, on being relieved, report 
for orders to the Adjutant-General of the Army. 

By command of Jlajor-General Hooker : 

J. H. Van Alen, 
Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. 

[P.S.] General Pleasonton will please deliver the above to General Averell. - 

Wliile Lee's detachments were marching toward Fredericksburg, and 
Averell with his cavalry toward United States Ford, was perhaps the 

' W. R., 39, pp. 801, 826, 844, 888. -lb., 30, p. ]080. 



380 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

most critical time for Lee during the campaign. It was a grand chance 
for Hooker to make a decisive counter-attack. Hooker had apparently 
forgotten President Lincoln's parting injunction: "In your next fight, 
put in all your men." The I Corps, except a small part of its artillery, 
and three fourths of the V Corps, had not been engaged at all. These 
forces with 8000 reliable men of the XI Corps, and the 3400 men under 
Averell, formed a fresh army about 35,000 strong, which if thrown, with 
the support that was available, against Stuart's tired men, should have 
wiped them off the field. But there was not the necessary leadership. 
Couch did not for a moment exercise supreme command. To do so he 
would have had to supersede Hooker against the latter 's wishes, and 
without the sanction of the chief of staff or the chief medical officer. 
It does not appear that he had any information from either of these 
officers to the effect that Hooker was disabled. Hooker was not officially 
reported among the wounded. It looks as if the medical director failed 
to do his full duty toward freeing the army of its disqualified and incom- 
petent commander. 

On a rumor that Fitzhugh Lee had crossed the Upper Rappahannock, 
the 8 Pa. Cavalry was sent across the river, and for a nimiber of hours 
picketed the road from Hartwood Church to Kelley's Ford. Not find- 
ing any enemy, it returned to United States Ford, where it bivouacked 
for the night. ^ 

About nightfall the 17 Pa. Cavalry was sent by Pleasonton's order to 
the north side of the Rappahannock at United States Ford to supply 
itself with rations and forage. It did not return during the campaign. 
The 6 N. Y. was kept in rear of the line of battle. The squadron which 
had been picketing Ely 's Ford, having been completely cut off from the 
army, fought its way through the enemy's skirmishers, and rejoined the 
regiment. 

Before we go back to the VI Corps, which we left at midnight just 
taking up the march for Fredericksburg, let us rim our eyes over the 
following reports of Hooker's recent operations and present prospects: 

May 3, 1863. 
General Humphreys, 
Commanding 3d Division [V Corps] : 

. . . Everything goes well. Sedgwick has Fredericksburg. Sickles is in 
Jackson's rear. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 
, Fred T. Locke, 

Assistant Adjutant-General [V Corps]. ^ 

'History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865, by S. P. Bates, III, 165; The 

Charge at Chancellorsville, by P. Huey, p. 73. 

= W. R., 107, p. 1036. 



FEDERAL REPORTS 381 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 3, 1863, 12:45 p.m. 
General Bidterfield: 

I think we have had the most terrible battle ever witnessed on earth. I tliink 
our victory will be certain, but the general told me he would say nothing just yet 
to Washington, except that he is doing well. In an hour or two the matter will 
be a fixed fact. I believe the enemy is in flight now, but we are not sure. 

Rupus Ingalls, 

Chief Quartermaster. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, near Chancellorsville, 
1 :25 p.m.. May 3, 1863 ; by orderly to U. S. Ford, thence 
by telegraph 3:30 p.m. Received at 4 p.m.^ 

His Excellency A. Lincoln, President United States: 

We have had a desperate fight yesterday and to-day which has resulted in no 
success to us, ha^dng lost a position of two lines, which had been selected for our 
defence. It is now 1:30 o'clock, and there is still some firing of artillery. We 
may have another turn at it this p.m. I do not despair of success. If Sedgwick 
could have gotten up, there could have been but one result. As it is impossible 
for me to know the exact position of Sedgwick as regards his ability to advance 
and take part in the engagement, I can not tell when it will end. We will en- 
deavor to do our best. My troops are in good spirits. We have fought desper- 
ately to-day. No general ever commanded a more devoted army. 

Joseph Hooker, 

Major-GeneraU 
' Rep. of Com.. IV, 22.5. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

MAY 3 . . . SECOND BATTLE OF FKEDEKICKSBUEG. ENGAGEMENT AT 
SALEM CHURCH 

Battle of Fredericksburg (Map 34, Plans 4 and 5) 

SEDGWICK'S orders required liim to be in the vicinity of Chancel- 
lorsville at daylight. The night was bright moonlight, but the fog 
which hung heavily over the river and the adjacent country made an 
atmosphere i^eculiarly difficult to see through. Under the most favor- 
able sky, and assuming that he met with no resistance, and that his 
corps already possessed the marching power for which it was later to 
be distinguished, Sedgwick would have done well to cover the 10 miles 
between the head of his column and "the vicinity of Chancellorsville" 
by a night march of about five hours ' duration. For daylight comes at 
this time of the year in Virginia at about 5 o 'clock. 

As soon as the head of his column moved away from the vicinity of 
the bridge it found itself opposed by hostile skirmishers. At the same 
time Brooks, facing the heights, was sharply pressed as if to find out 
whether the force behind him was withdrawing. Under these circum- 
stances the progress of Sedgwick's column was necessarily slow and 
cautious. It was about 2 a.m. when the advance reached the outskirts 
of Fredericksburg and commenced driving the enemy through the town. 
A negro came into the lines and reported that the heights were occupied 
and the enemy was cutting the canal to flood the roads. The investiga- 
tion which followed caused a considerable delay. In the meantime the 
troops, as they arrived, were halted in the streets. It was about 3 
o 'clock when the Second and Third Divisions took up the march. About 
this time General Warren, coming from Hooker's headquarters, crossed 
the river and joined Sedgwick near Franklin's Crossing, where Sedg- 
wick's bridges were still down, and proceeded with him toward Fred- 
ericksburg. He gave Sedgwick another copy of Hooker's last ordei', 
and explained to him "somewhat confidentially" the exact position of 
things at Chancellorsville, that he might know the importance of the 
order.^ About 4 o'clock the head of the Second Division reached Hazel 
Run, and that of the Third Division, Deep Creek. 

1 Rep. of Com., IV, 46. 
382 



SEDGWICK REACHES FREDERICKSBURG 383 

Butterfield used all his influence and authority to secure vigorous 
cooperation on the part of Gibbon and Sedgwick, and kept Hooker 
posted as to the progress made. He wrote: 

To Gibbon, 12:20 a.m. 
Push everj'thing to get that bridge over. If j'ou are likely to fail with the 
bridge, keep your ammunition dry, and push over the ford, if practicable. You 
must cross to-night. 

1:45 a.m. 
If it is foimd to be entirely impracticable to lay a bridge or cross at the fords 
near Falmouth, you can go via Sedgwick's [Franklin's] crossing, where the two 
bridges remain. . . . 

To Sedgwick, 1:45 a.m. 
Captain Razderichin 's (aide-de-camp of General Hooker's staff) explanations 
will tell you how necessary it is that you should push through every obstacle in 
your path. The enemy will no doubt make every effort to delay and stop your 
force by a smaller one, that their main force may be used upon the right wing of 
our forces [at Chancellorsville]. 

At 2 o'clock Gibbon's division moved to the banks of the river directly 
opposite Fredericksburg. Twenty-five men of the 19 Mass., and an 
equal number from the 20 Mass., having volunteered therefor, were 
designated to cross over in boats, drive the enemy from rifle-pits near 
the city, and cover the laying of the bridges.^ At the same point of 
crossing as before, with pontoons ready to be slid into the water, the 
detachments lay waiting for daylight to enter upon their perilous duty. 
Opposite these Massachusetts men, on the right bank of the river, were 
the same riflemen from Mississippi who opposed them in December. 
Everything indicated a repetition of the contest at this point." Dis- 
patches were sent as follows : 

Butterfield to Hooker, 2:25 a.m. 
General Sedgwick just reports three regiments threatened his left flank and 
have engaged his pickets ; [that] there is still a force in Fredericksburg ; that he 
is marching as rapidly as possible, but can not reach you by daylight. 

Butterfield to Sedgwick, 2:35 a.m. 
. . . Everything in the world depends upon the rapidity and promptness of 
your movement. Push everything. . . . 

Barstow, Assistant Adpttant-General. Falmouth, to Sedgwick, 3:15 a.m. 

Gibbon telegraphed at 2 : 40 o'clock that he is putting his pontoons [brought up 
from Reynolds' Crossing] in the water just above the Lacy House without oppo- 
sition. The two guns were Gibbon 's answer with canister to a volley of musketry 
from the opposite shore. No firing since. 

1 W. R., 39, p. 358. 
= The 20th Regiment Mass. Vol. Inf.. by G. A. Bruce, p. 250. 



384 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Gibbon was permitted to put his pontoons in the water, but was still 
prevented by the enemy's fire from laying a bridge. 

Van Alen to Butterfield, 4:10 a.m. 

The general commanding directs me to say that any force in front of General 
Sedgwick must be a small one, and must not check his advance. 

In spite of Butterfield 's and Hooker's assurances, Sedgwick was not 
convinced that the force in front of him was "a small one." Having 
halted and faced it from column of route, he had Newton on his right, 
Burnham as right center, Howe as left center, and Brooks on the left. 
The Confederate position may be considered as divided, like the Federal 
line, into four sections: right, right center, left center, and left (Map 
34) ; the right extending from Hamilton's Crossing to a point known as 
the Brick Cabin (5600 yards) ; the right center, from the Brick Cabin to 
Hazel Run (1650 yards) ; the left center, from Hazel Run to the Plank 
Road (900 yards) ; the left, from the Plank Road to the Rappahannock 
(3200 yards). The position was fortified from one end to the other.* 

Perhaps the strongest section topographically was the left center, 
Marye's Hill (Plan 4). The artificial defence at the base of it consisted 
mainly of a stone fence partially covered in front with earth thrown up 
from behind. This intrenchment was already famous as the position 
against which Burnside's columns were shattered in the battle of Decem- 
ber, 1862. From the Pike to the Plank Road and beyond it a shelter 
trench was constructed in prolongation of the stone wall. The low 
ground in front of this trench beyond the Plank Road had been flooded 
and thus rendered difficult, if not impracticable ; the low ground to the 
left or east of the Plank Road was naturally boggy and difficult. In 
general the land behind the town formed an open plain extending back a 
quarter of a mile to the base of the ridge.^ 

1 In a letter of April 26. Major A. S. thus giving natural flanking arrangements ; 

Pendleton of Jackson's staff described the and from the tops of the hills frown the 

fortifications as follows: redoubts for sunken batteries and barbette 

"The greatest destruction, and change in batteries ad libitum,— tur exceeding the 

the appearance of the country, is from the number of our guns; while occasionally, 

long lines of trenches and the redoubts where the trenches take straight across the 

which crown every hillside from ten miles flats, a redoubt stands out defiantly in the 

above Fredericksburg to twenty miles be- open plain to receive our howitzers, and 

low. The world has never seen such a for- deal destruction broadcast to the Yankees, 

tified position. The famous lines at Torres should their curiosity tempt them to an 

Vedras could not compare with them. As investigation" (Memoirs of William Nelson 

I go to Moss Neck I follow the lines, and Pendleton, D.D., by his daughter Susan P. 

have a ride in the trenches. These are five Lee). 

feet wide and two and a half deep, having - I visited this position in September, 

the earth thrown toward the enemy, making 1897, and, from what I saw and heard, am 

a bank still higher. They follow the eon- satisfied that the stone wall was at both 

tour of the ground and hug the bases of battles substantially as it was before the 

the hills as they wind to and from the river, war. I saw other walls in the country 



PLAN 4 



Plan 




Sections 




DIAGRAM OF STONE WALL AT FREDERICKSBURG 



Scale for Plan 



Scale for Sections 



MARYE'S HILL 385 

General Sedgwick directed Newton to feel the enemy's position, and 
learn what he could regarding the nature of the defences, and number 
of men and guns, etc., behind them. Newton's leading brigade was not 
available, being engaged in clearing the town of the enemy. So the next 
brigade in the column, the 3d, was designated for the reconnaissance. 
Its commander. General Wheaton, selected the 62 N. Y. and 102 Pa. for 
his first line, deployed them in the gray of the morning just below a 
crest about 450 yards from the stone wall, and about 4 o'clock, sup- 
ported by one or two batteries, the first in position, marched upon the 
enemy. He intended that his other three regiments, which were a short 
distance in rear, should follow when these two had got the distance 
usual between lines of battle, or about 200 yards. Before they had done 
this they were fired on by infantry and artillery with terrible effect, and 
compelled to fall back. They halted and lay down. The remaining three 
regiments and McCarthy's battery (-^-j) now came up on a line with 
them. The brigade thus reenforced maintained its position, but was 
hors de combat so far as assaulting the stone wall was concerned. Sedg- 
wick rode out near the left of the line and witnessed the repulse of his 
men. The enemy, perceiving a commanding officer whose presence indi- 
cated authority, directed their fire upon him. After a few seconds of 
delay Colonel McMahon, his adjutant-general, ventured to suggest to 
him to retire from his exposed position. Sedgwick replied, "By Heaven, 
sir, this must not delay us, ' ' and slowly turned his horse and rode back 
into the town. 

During the few moments that he stood gazing at the enemy's works 
his plans for carrying Marye's Heights were completed. Gibbon was 
to attack on the right, Howe on the left, and Newton to demonstrate 
against the front. Beyond Newton, on the extreme left. Brooks was to 
hold the enemy in check. ApiDrehending a general counter-attack, 
which might endanger his communications, he wrote to Butterfield at 
5 : 30 a.m. : 

My command is all in Fredericksburg, and I have no men [at work] on the 
bridges. These bridges should be taken up as soon as possible. We are warmly 
engaged on Sumner's old ground ^ and on the right. 

On this report officers of Hooker's staff at Falmouth issued orders in 
his name : 

^Yilliams to Engineer Officer at FranJclin's Crossing : 

. . . proceed immediately to take up the two bridges at Franklin's Crossing, 
and relay them in the vicinity of the Lacy House. The transfer must be made 

about Fredericksburg eovered, as this one flimensions given are my own measurennents 

undoubtedly had been, by the earth exca- or estimates. J. B. Jr. 
vated in digging draining-ditches along the ' Referring to Brooks' position and the 

road. Plan 4 represents the wall and the battle of Fredericksburg, December, 1862. 

road as I conceive them to have been. The This sentence, it will be observed, contra- 



386 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

in the most expeditious manner possible, and it is suggested wliether time might 
not be saved by floating the boats up to the point indicated. The bridges will 
be removed one at a time. 

Butterfield to Sedgwick, 6:20 a.m. 

Have telegraphed your dispatch [of 5 : 30] to General Hooker. You know how 
much depends on your pushing, and of course will do everything in your power. 

It was probably left to Sedgwick to designate the exact places where 
the bridges were to be laid as well as to furnish troops of the line to 
assist in laying them and to guard them. They were promptly towed up- 
stream, accompanied on the right bank by the artillery that had covered 
them below, and by Sedgwick's main train. The latter on arrival was 
parked near the Lacy House. In the meantime the leading detachments 
had proceeded to cross. Two boats were taken from their carriages, 
pushed into the stream, and manned. The orders were to wait until the 
gims of Sedgwick's skirmishers were heard. The oarsmen were ready, 
and at the first sound of fire the boats pulled out into the stream. The 
firing increased and was now heard well into the city. The men of 
Sedgwick's corps were occasionally seen as they moved in and out 
among the buildings in their work of driving out the enemy. Just as 
the sun east its first rays over the waters, the men landed on the Fred- 
ericksburg shore at the same place where two regiments landed on 
December 11, 1862.i 

About 5 'clock Colonel Johns with the 7 Mass. took a defensive posi- 
tion in a cemetery, and the Federals came into complete and secure pos- 
session of the town. The special service of the 19 and 20 Mass. regi- 
ments thus became unnecessary. General Sedgwick crossed in a boat 
to the Stafford shore, and held a conference with General Gibbon. As a 
consequence, the bridge which was brought up yesterday from Fitz- 
hugh's Crossing was laid just above the Lacy House between the hours 
of 5 : 15 and 6 : 30. The two bridges from Franklin 's Crossing were laid 
somewhat later— one near the Lacy House, the other below the ruined 
railroad bridge.- As soon as the first bridge was laid at the Lacy House, 
Gibbon crossed on it, with his two brigades (1st and 3d), numbering 
about 3400 men, and two batteries (^ \j, 3— jj), numbering 12 guns, 
which gave Sedgwick about 24,400 infantry and 11 batteries, or about 

diets the opening one and so prohibits the 215), these two bridges and the bridges 

suspicion that Sedgwick meant to deceive from Fitzhiigh's Crossing were laid at the 

Butterfield into believing that the whole of same time. But it would seem from the 

the VI Corps was in Fredericksburg. text of his report (ib., p. 214), the fore- 

' History of the 19th Regt. Mass. Vol. going dispatches, and other evidence, that 

Inf., by Committee, p. 203; History of the they were laid as stated, the single bridge 

20 Mass., by G. A. Bruce, p. 251. first, and the couple of bridges some time 

' According to Benham's Tabular State- afterward. J. B. Jr. 
ment of Bridges Laid, etc. (TF. R., 39, p. 



PLAN 5 



Brick 
Cabin 



Hazel Plank 
Hiin Road 



5100 yds 


2000 yds 


1000 yds. 


3200 yds. 


6100 inf 


1300 inf 


900 inf. 


3300 inf 


1.2 per yd 


.65 per yd 


.9 peryd 


1 per yd. 


6770 inf 


5260 inf 


8970 Inf 


3400 inf. 


1.3 per yd. 


2.6 per yd 


9 per yd. 


I.I per yd 



Xear 

Eappahaiinork Whole Fron 
Riwr 



10700 yds 



11600 inf 
1.1 per yd. 



24400 inf 
23 per yd 



DISPOSITIONS AT FREDERICKSBURG NLVY 3, 1863. 



T/lf fronts (tfthr scvertil sections and f?ie front of" tlir ivfiotc 
positittn (irr mcosiii'fd us straiqfif lines. or aittiiK/ ofl' tfif hcitds 



'■ Inrfiidijit/ reserve ofXewtnn's (livision 



CONFEDERATE DISPOSITIONS 387 

25,600 men and 66 guns. Of Gibbon's 1st brigade the 19 Me., lately de- 
tached to Banks' Ford, returned to-day to Falmouth, where it remained 
as a camp guard. The 2d brigade remained at Banks' Ford. There 
were no bridges now below Fredericksburg. 

In compliance with Lee's order of yesterday, Wilcox prepared this 
morning to march toward Chancellorsville, leaving about 50 men and 2 
pieces of artillery at Banks' Ford and taking with him about 1700 in- 
fantry, the remaining pieces of his two batteries,' and 50 cavalrymen 
(15 Va.); but learning of Gibbon's movements between the river and 
the canal, he directed his march toward the canal, taking with him all 
his artillery (8 pieces). Arriving behind Taylor's Hill, he left his force 
there, and went on to Marye's Hill, where he conferred with General 
Barksdale. 

The Confederate infantry was disposed as follows (Map 34, Plan 5) : 
on the right, between Hamilton's Crossing and Brick Cabin, Gordon's, 
Hoke's, and Smith's brigades of Early's division (about 6100 men) ; 
in the right center, between Brick Cabin and Hazel Run, one regiment 
of Hays' brigade, same division, and two regiments of Barksdale 's 
brigade of Anderson's division (about 1300 men) ; in the left center, 
between Hazel Run and the Plank Road, two regiments of Barksdale 's 
brigade (about 900 men) ; on the left, between the Plank Road and the 
Rappahannock River, part of Wilcox's brigade and four regiments of 
Hays' brigade (about 3300 men). These forces, aggregating about 
11,600 men, gave the Confederates a little more than 1 infantryman per 
yard. The Federals had more than 2 infantrymen per yard. 

The Confederate artillery on the field numbered 48 pieces, of which 42 
were in position as follows: 16 in two batteries on the right (Andrews') ; 
12 in the right center (Fraser 4, Patterson 4, Carlton 4) ; 7 in the left 
center, including the piece on the Plank Road (Parker 2, Washington 
Artillery 5) ; and 7 on the left (Washington Artillery 1, Penick 4, 
Moore 2).- The Federals had 66 pieces on the south side of the river; 
these could be more or less supported by the 40 pieces on the north side, 
among which were 12 guns of position (20-pounder Parrotts and 41/2- 
inch siege-guns). 

At 7 : 40 a.m. Sedgwick reported to Butterfield that he intended to 
make a general assault. But at 9 :30 Gibbon's troops were still marching 
through Fredericksburg, and the operation was not to commence until 
all the troops were in position. In Gibbon's front was a canal which he 
would have to cross twice in order to get at the enemy. He crossed it 
once, but before he could do so the second time the enemy broke up the 

iPeniek's and Moore's (o). to Pendleton, and two of Moore's battery. 

- The six pieces not in position were four The places given on Map 34 to the pieces 

of the Washington Artillery, under Rich- in position are partly conjectural, 
ardson, moving from the right to report 



388 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

only bridge by which it was spanned, and opened on him from the 
heights with artillery. This canal was about thirty feet wide, about six 
feet deep, and under the full fire of the enemy's batteries. He could not 
cross it in line of battle; to construct a bridge and pass over it under 
the fire which would be concentrated on him, would be suicidal. He 
halted his infantry, and bringing up his artillery, replied with it to the 
artillery of the enemy. ^ 

Howe, on the left, found that to turn the line of works on Marye's 
Heights would involve his crossing the stream and gully of Hazel Run, 
and, what was more serious a matter, exposing his flank to a line in rear 
of the former and in echelon thereto. In short, the combined turning 
movement proved impracticable, and there was nothing left but to make 
a direct or front attack, supported by demonstrations on the right and 
left. The main attack was to be made by Newton, who proceeded to 
prepare for it between 9 : 45 and 10 a.m. A cannonading had been kept 
up since about 6. It now ceased altogether. The enemy plainly saw the 
preparations for the assault, and evidently did not wish to interfere 
with them. He seemed perfectly confident of his ability to repel it. 

While Sedgwick's troops were forming for the attack and the demon- 
strations, and the enemy was being "prepared" by the fire of artillery, 
the following dispatches were sent off : 

Butterfield to Sedgwick, 9:05 a.m. 
. . . General Hooker seems from the sound to be pushing this way. 

9:40 a.m. 

General Hunt reports from Banks' Ford that, from the sound, he judges that 
General Hooker is pushing the enemy toward the river [in the direction of Fred- 

^ "Gibbon's command came under fire shall forset how indignantly and even 
and lost some men; but the impossibility angrily Bumside rejected the suggestion, 
of getting across the canal which carried What came of this ignorance, on the 13th 
water from the river above the town to the of December, is a part of the history of the 
mills of Fredericksburg prevented its being war, and one of the most painful and dis- 
generally engaged. The misadventure was tressing parts of that history. And here, 
in no sense Gibbon's fault, but was wholly again, after the occupation of Fredericks- 
due to the astounding ignorance of the burg plain for four or five days in Deeem- 
Fredericksburg plain and Marye's Heights, ber of 1862, we find the staff of the Army 
which characterized all the operations from of the Potomac so ignorant of the features 
the 17th of November, 1862, down to the of that field as to allow Gibbon to be sent 
day of which we now speak. I well re- into a position which was an impossible 
member on the 12th of December, 1862, one— ordered to attack the enemy's extreme 
carrying a message to Bumside from left, he simply could not get his troops into 
Couch, saying that so far as the latter could action, because of the intervening water- 
judge from the reports of citizens, contra- course'' {General Gibbon in the II Army 
bands, and deserters, a deep trench or Corps, by General Francis A. Walker, 
canal ran around the town, between it and N. Y. Commandery, Loyal Legion, II, 304, 
the hills, which would prove a serious oh- 305). 
stacle to the passage of troops ; and I never 



HOWE FORMS FOR ATTACK 389 

ericksburg], and that the enemy appear to be evacuating their intrenchments 
at Banks' Ford. 

About 9:50 a.m.? 

... I wish to facilitate your operations in every way. Command me in any 
way, and I am at your disposal. Telegraphic communication with the general 
via United States Ford is broken. "Will advise you when restored. I am of no 
service here while the line is down. If I can aid you on the field, command me. 

P.S. My orders were to remain here, from General Hooker, but I feel like 
disobedience now. Please consider this confidential. 

10:05 a.m. 
What can I say to General Hooker of your position [and] prospects, and what 
he can expect? Telegraph is open to him partially. 

The answer to this inquiry, if there was one, is not known. About 
this time, however, Sedgwick informed Howe that an attack was about 
to be made between Hazel Eun and Fredericksburg, stating that he 
wished Howe to assist. Howe at once ' placed his divisional artillery 
where it could fire effectively upon the enemy's works without interfer- 
ing with the advance of his infantry, and formed the mass of the latter 
in three lines as follows: 

First line-33 N. Y., 7 Me., i/o of 21 N. J., and 77 N. Y. of General 
Neill's brigade (3. 2. VI), the 77 N. Y. deployed as skirmishers. 

Second line— 2 Vt., 6 Vt., and 26 N. J. of Colonel Grant's brigade 
(2. 2. VI). 

Third line— 3 Vt. and 4 Vt. of Grant's brigade, and % of 21 N. J. of 
Neill's brigade, under Colonel Seaver.- 

The 5 N. J. was placed in support of a battery.^ The two remaining 
regiments (20 and 49 N. Y.) were, it seems, similarly employed or held 
in reserve. 

Newton's men had long been standing in the streets of Fredericksburg 
listening to the rumble of the cannon at Chancellorsville, and were im- 
patient to advance. At last everything was ready. The necessary 
commands were given and transmitted. At 10 : 35 a.m. Butterfield re- 
ported to Hooker : 

Sedgwick at this moment commences his assault. He is on our old ground of 
December [1862]. The force in his front is small but active. Will post you 
speedily as to result. 

Two regiments in column of fours took the Telegraph Road ; and four 
regiments in like formation, the Plank Road. On the left of these col- 

1 He gives the time erroneously as about ^ Howe's division eomprisecl a 2d and 3d 

11 a.m. (W. B., 39, p. 599). Neill gives brigade, but no 1st. 
it as about 10 a.m. (ib., p. 608). ' W. R., 39, p. 603. 



390 THE CAJtfPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

umns four regiments marched in line of battle, under Colonel Burnham. 
Three of them formed the main or middle line; the other regiments 
formed a line of skirmishers and a third line. These ten regiments were 
taken from Newton's and Burnham 's divisions, and numbered about 
4700 men. The ten other regiments of these two divisions did not take 
part in the attack. One of them (2-3-vi) was supporting a battery of 
Gibbon's.' The other nine (about 4230 men) were available as a re- 
serve. 

The stone wall was manned by the 18 Miss, and three companies of 
the 21, altogether about 600 men. Seven companies of the 21 Miss, were 
on Marye's Hill. At the base of the hill, on a line with the stone wall, 
were two howitzers. On the hill itself were five guns, one of which was 
north of the Pike, on the Plank Road, to command that road. The 
Federal troops, in light marching order, advanced in double time at 
trail arms. The men had been cautioned not to fire a shot, whatever the 
provocation, but to trust to cold steel. The artillery on Marye's Hill 
opened on them with shot and shell, but without effect, as the pieces 
could not be sufficiently depressed. When the assailants were about 300 
yards from the stone wall, the two howitzers on a line with it, and the 
gun on the Plank Road, opened on them with canister. The right 
column, commanded by Colonel Spear of the 61 Pa., advancing on the 
Plank Road, was almost literally swept away. Spear himself was 
killed. The other colunm, commanded by Colonel Johns of the 7 Mass., 
moved unflinchingly on. It comes in sight of the stone wall with its 
fringe of gleaming muskets. An ominous silence prevails along that 
line. Its defenders are biding their time. The assailants hear only 
officers cautioning their men : ' ' Steady, you 'uns ! Hold your fire ! Let 
'em come on." On they come. They are perhaps 50 yards from the 
wall, when "crack" goes a gun, a single shot, the twitch of some shaky 
hand.^ Then "Fire" rings out, and every muzzle and cannon mouth 
leaps flame. From the rifle-pits at the base of the hill the smoke curls 
up the grassy slope and softens its dark green with shades of blue and 
gray, covering it as with a beautiful carpet. Ping, ping, zip, zip ; bullet 
and canister cut up the ground about the slender column. At first there 
was a wavering, with cries of "Retreat!" But others yelled: "For- 
ward ! don 't go back ! We sha 'n 't get so close again. ' ' The head of the 
column was broken; Colonel Johns promptly rallied it. Again it was 
broken, and again the gallant colonel succeeded in reforming it. But he 
was now badly wounded, and the command had to be taken over by Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Harlow. Colonel Burnham, commanding the line of bat- 

^ This regiment rejoined its brigade 40 yards. A private of Company T, 7 

about 1 p.m. Mass., the leading: company, gives it as 

2 In the History of Battery B, First B. within 25 yards. J. B. Jr. 
I. Artillery, the distance is given as .30 or 



MARYE'S HILL CARRIED 391 

tie on the left, fell wounded from his horse. The line and column 
recoiled some distance, and took shelter. 

In front of the stone wall, facing down the road, was a house inclosed 
by a high board fence. While the 7 Mass. was enjoying a breathing- 
spell behind the latter, some of the men, looking between the boards, 
caught sight of the enemy's improtected flank. A flag of truce was sent 
forward, probably by a brigade commander. The officer bearing it 
asked to be allowed to remove the dead and wounded in front of the 
18 Miss. Colonel Griffin, the regimental commander, without referring 
to his brigade commander, granted the request, and allowed his own men 
to show themselves while the woimded were being delivered. The feeble- 
ness and vulnerability of the defence was soon reported and passed 
along the line of the assailants.^ On the right the thrilling cry rang out : 
"Massachusetts colors to the front!" With a rallying shout from the 
color-guard the colors of the 7 Mass. were thrust forward ; in a moment 
a mass of men rushed to the board fence, and went through it pell-mell, 
directly upon the enemy's flank, giving them the contents of their mus- 
kets point-blank.2 On the left Colonel Allen of the 5 Wise, took the 
place of Colonel Bumham, and electrified his men with the words: 
"When the signal forward is given, you will start at double-quick, you 
will not fire a gun, and you will not stop until you get the order to halt. 
You will never get that order." ^ 

The charge was sounded. The first line sprang forward with a cheer, 
followed at 30 steps by the second, which was followed by the third, all 
accompanying the columns on the right. The stone wall, which had 
cost the Federal army so many brave lives, was gained and cleared. A 
short rest, a final rush, and the works on Marye's Hill shared the fate 
of the stone wall. 

Newton's reserves followed the assaulting columns up the heights, and 
secured the conquered positions. The gallant feat cost little more time 
than it takes to describe it. At 10 :50 a.m., as Lee was sweeping Hooker's 
rear-guard out of Chancellorsville, Butterfield telegraphed to Hooker: 

Am signaled that Sedgwick has carried Marye's Heights, and. officer thinks, 
captured the guns. 

Howe, as soon as he heard the firing in front of Marye's Hill, pro- 
ceeded to attack. Five of his regiments obliqued to the right, and cross- 
ing the Run, united or cooperated with Bumham 's division. One of 
them (6 Vt.) was the second regiment to gain Marye's Heights.* In- 

1 W. R., 39, p. 840; Military Memoirs of ^History of the Army of the Potomac, 
a Confederate, by E. P. Alexander, p. 351. by J. H. StiBe, p. 373. 

2 Stories of our Soldiers, eollepted from * ChaticeUorsville, Hotchkiss and Allan, 
the Boston Journal, p. 192; History of p. 82; History of the Army of the Poto- 
Battery B, 1 R. I. L. A., by J. H. Rhodes, mac, by J. H. Stine, p. 373. 

172 173. ^mw the battle Marye's Heights has 



392 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

eluding these five, there were 15 regiments (about 7500 men) that par- 
ticipated in the assault, and they were none too many. Their preponder- 
ance of 7 1/2 to 1 was none too great.' 

As Newton's regiments advanced to the assault, his batteries concen- 
trated their fire upon the stone wall, and continued to do so until the 
advancing infantry had neared the wall, when they directed it upon the 
crest beyond. Howe's batteries cooperated in like manner with his in- 
fantry. Gibbon's two batteries on the right and three of Brooks' on the 
left directed their fire also upon the enemy in their front. There were 
thus 10 batteries, or 60 guns, in action, without counting the guns on 
the north side of the Rappahannock. But it does not appear that a 
sufficient fire of artillery was brought to bear upon any one point to 
shake the enemy's infantry. 

Brooks on the left had preserved on the whole a defensive attitude. 
Bartlett's brigade in the valley of Deep Run supported two batteries 
which engaged the batteries in their front. His two other brigades, 
with a battery, prolonged the line to the river. This battery was not 
engaged. Another battery on the plateau between the Bowling Green 
Road and the river fired occasionally at the batteries of the enemy. 

The loss of the VI Corps in killed, wounded, and missing may be esti- 
mated at 1500 men, or about 7 per cent, of its strength.^ That of Gib- 
bon's command was unappreciable.^ Hospitals were at once established 
in the town, and by 2 o'clock all the wounded were collected within them. 

When Barksdale saw the Federals debouch in force and advance upon 
the stone wall, he called on Hays and Wilcox for assistance. One regi- 
ment of Wilcox's brigade and the four regiments of Hays' brigade were 
marching toward him in compliance with that request. But before they 
reached him Sedgwick's victorious columns broke over his position. 

"Upon reaching the summit of the sharp hill after passing through 
the extensive and well-wooded grounds of the Marye House, an exciting 
scene met the eye. A single glance exhibited to view the broad plateau 

been commonly understood to include the ^ The War Records (39, p. 191) give the 

two positions of Willis's and Marj'e's Hills. loss of the VI Corps for the 3d and 4th of 

^ Newton says : "If there had been a hun- May as 4950, but do not give the loss for 

dred more men on Marye's Hill we could this particular action. General Barksdale 

not have taken it" (Chancellorsville and says in his official report that the Federal 

Gettysburg, by Abner Doubleday, p. 59). papers gave the loss of the Federals in frj'ZZed 

It may safely be asserted that without and wounded as 1000, but that according to 

Howe's vigorous assistance Newton would statements from intelligent citizens it 

have failed to carry it. reached 2000 (W. R., 39, p. 840). Colonel 

About 100 men of the 20 N. Y. Volun- Cabell says substantially the same thing, 

teers (Neill's brigade) refused to cross the Medical Director Letterman gives the 

Rappahannock on the plea that their term wounded alone in this engagement as over 

of enlistment had expired. They were 1000 {Medical Recollections, p. 134:). 

court-martialed, and sentenced to hard ^ The War Records {39, p. 191) give the 

labor during the war, with forfeiture of loss of Gibbon's division during the 3d and 

all pay and allowances due them. 4th in killed, wounded, and missing as 110. 



FEDERAL LOSS 393 

alive with fleeing soldiers, riderless horses, and artillery and wagon- 
trains on a gallop. The writer hurried back to Sedgwick, who was giv- 
ing directions for Brooks and Howe to come up, and suggested that it 
was a rare opportunity for the use of cavalry. With evident regret 
Sedgwick replied that he did not have a cavalryman. The carrying of 
the heights had completely divided the enemy's forces, throwing either 
flank with much confusion on opposite roads, and it seemed as though a 
regiment of cavalry might not only have captured many prisoners, guns, 
ammunition, and wagons, but also have cleared the way for the corps 
almost as far as the immediate rear of Lee's army at Chancellorsville.'" 

Gibbon's men, after cheering the victors, marched through the city 
and out by the Pike to the rear of the Confederate defences. 

Butterfield received the following dispatch, and transmitted it as indi- 
cated to Sedgwick: 

^ ,„,..,, United States Ford, May 3, 1863, 12 m. 

Lreneral Butterfield: 

. . . We have plenty of fresh troops still left, but have gained no ground 

to-day, yet our lines are strong ; but no doubt another desperate effort will be 

made to force our position. We feel confident tliat Sedgwick must press them 

fast. Answer me here. I will take it to General Hooker. lie wants Sedgwick 

to press them. 



[Indorsement] 

General Sedgwick: 

What answer can I send General Hooker ? 



RuFUS Ingalls, 

Chief Quartermaster. 

May 3, 1863, 12 m. 
Butterfield. 



Evidently without waiting to hear from Sedgwick, Butterfield replied : 

R. Ingalls. May 3, 1863, 12 m. 

Chief Quartermaster : 
Sedgwick is by this time (12 m.) probably free from all obstacles of earth- 
works. He has carried the heights on right of Telegraph road [Marye's]. Two 
lines of his troops have disappeared in the wood on the hills, and all seems going 
well. Will advise you further as soon as I can get word from Sedgwick. 

Butterfield. 

Lieutenant Pitzer of Early's staff, who was on Lee's Hill when it was 
captured, galloped at once to General Lee, and informed him of the loss 
of that position.^ Early with his main force retreated by the Telegraph 
Road to Smith's on the Ny Eiver (Map 2), leaving Gordon's brigade to 
cover the movement at Cox's (Map 34). Barksdale rallied and reformed 
his fleeing regiments on Lee's Hill, under cover of Carlton's and Fra- 

^ Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. Jackson, " Fitzhugh Lee's Chancellorsville Ad- 

U. S. Vohmteers. B. and L., III. 229, 230. dress. 



394 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ser's batteries. From this point his brigade and these batteries fell 
back to Leach 's, where they formed line of battle and succeeded in check- 
ing the pursuit in that direction (Second Position, Map 34). The whole 
force then proceeded down the Telegraph Road to Cox's (Third Posi- 
tion, Map 34). Wilcox retired in the direction of Chaneellorsville, with 
the object of opposing the Federal advance. He tried to induce Hays 
to do likewise, but the latter, intent upon rejoining his commanding 
general, went on to Cox's. 

It would now be easy for Sedgwick to turn upon Early's force, dis- 
perse it, and destroy the depot at Hamilton's Crossing. But his orders 
required him to march with the least possible delay toward Chaneellors- 
ville. The chief advantage of breaking through an enemy's center is 
gaining access to his line of communication. But herein lies the chief 
danger of the operation. The attraction of the enemy's trains and 
depots, and the eagerness to cut off his retreat, may carry the attackers 
through and beyond the enemy's line of battle, leaving the separate 
fragments of the latter in a position to take their late assailants in rear. 
Instances are not wanting in which an attacking force, having carried 
everything before it, and gone to pillaging the enemy's camp, was itself 
attacked and put to rout. Having broken a portion of the enemy's line, 
the assailant must turn on the separate fractions and disperse them be- 
fore he can safely proceed to the enemy's rear. This principle Sedg- 
wick was required, it seems, to ignore. At any rate, he pushed on from 
Marye's Heights with Newton's division directly toward Chaneellors- 
ville. Howe was prevented by Barksdale from following him. Brooks 
had broken away from the enemy with the greater part of his division, 
and was marching with it toward Fredericksburg. Gibbon remained 
with his division (less one brigade) on the heights of Fredericksburg. 
Sedgwick did not consider himself authorized to order him forward, nor 
Gribbon to advance without orders. Sometime between 11 and 1, prob- 
ably about noon, Sedgwick found himself as far from support as he 
dared go with his single division, and halted to await the arrival of an- 
other division. At 1 p.m. Warren reported the situation to Butterfield 
as follows : 

"We have advanced with Newton's division on the Plank road as far as Guest's 
House. The heights were carried splendidly at 11 a.m. by Newton. Howe imme- 
diately afterward carried the heights to the south of Hazel Run. We have been 
waiting to get his [Howe's] di^^sion behind us before advancing, to get up bat- 
teries and stragglers, and get the brigades straightened out, which were a little 
disorganized by a successful charge and pursuit. Our loss, though honorable 
proof of a severe contest, is not very severe. The Sixth Corps is in splendid 
spirits. We captured several guns. General Howe reports a force yet in his front. 

P.S. Brooks' division were kept by the enemy's fire in position on our left, and 
after the heights were carried he had 3 miles to march to join us. He is not yet up. 



SEDGWICK DELAYS 395 

This dispatch was received and transmitted to Hooker at 2 : 30 p.m. 
Abont the time when it left Warren's hands the following one came into 
Butterfield 's : 

U. S. Ford, May 3, 1863. 
General Butterfield: 

Do not expect dispatches much from General Hooker at present. He wishes 
to hear constantly from you, but lie is too engaged. He has been slightly hurt, 
but not at all severely. No firing for an hour. Am just back from Hooker's head- 
quarters. The slaughter has been fearful on both sides. The enemy must have 
suffered most, as he has been forced to attack every time. Your last dispatch 
[12 m.?] is received and forwarded. 

RuFus Ingalls, 
Chief Quartermaster.! 

This elicited the following message : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 3, 1863, 1 :15 p.m. 
General Hooker. 
Dear General: 

I deeply regret to hear that you are even slightly wounded. I have put every 
officer and man here in use during the operations, even to the Twentieth Maine. ^ 
As I can not now by any possibility be able to join you if permitted,^ can I join 
General Sedgwick? The enemy will undoubtedl.y make a desperate effort, as his 
custom is, toward dusk, if he lasts that long. Our troops are still advancing, 
cheering lustily. A portion of Sedgwick 's force is moving to the right, on Bowl- 
ing Green road.* Haupt is at Falmouth wdth his force, ready to spring with the 
railroad bridge when ordered. Affairs seem to justify it now here. Am sending 
200 prisoners to the rear; [including] 1 colonel. While I do not know who could 
replace me here, I am heartsick at not being permitted to be on the actual field, 
to share the fate and fortune of this army and my general. 

Butterfield. 

Under the impression that Gibbon advanced with Sedgwick, Bntter- 
field wrote at 2 p.m. to Hunt : 

General Gibbon, right of Sedgwick's advance, should be about 2 or 3 miles 
from Fredericksburg, moving toward Chancellorsville. We can not now tell where 
he is. Send scouts to swim the river, and report to you. Act according to orders 
from General Hooker. Keep him advised of Sedgwick's advance, with time. . . . 
Better lose a few men as scouts than not have news and report of our advance 
on Chancellorsville Plank road. 

Sedgwick was anxious to communicate with Benham at Banks' Ford, 
as he wanted a bridge laid there. For some time his attempts to get a 

* TF. B., 107, p. 1035. ' This assertion would seem to be based 

2 This resfiment of infantiy (rlH^)? left on the dehision that Hooker was pursuing 

in camp near Falmouth on account of small- Lee. 

pox, was employed guarding the telegraph ■* No portion of Sed!2^^^ck's force was 

lin e to U. S. Ford (Report of brigade moving on or toward the Bowling Green 

commander, ih.. 39, p. 519). Road. J. B. .Jr. 



396 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

message to the ford were frustrated by roving bands of Confederate 
cavalry to which he had nothing to oppose. But he was finally success- 
ful.i 

Brooks' and Howe's divisions joined Newton's at the Guest House 
about 2 p.m. Brooks ' seemed to be in better fighting and marching trim 
than either of the other two, and was deemed the best qualified "to do 
everything that the urgency of the case required." It was therefore 
ordered to take the advance. Shortly afterward the following report 
was made to Butterfield by an aide-de-camp, whom he sent to Sedgwick 
to keep him posted as to the latter 's movements. 

2:20 p.m. Brooks' division has just moved ahead again, and other two divi- 
sions will follow shortly. Sedgwick says loss heavier than he expected, having lost 
several colonels and many field officers. "Warren thinks II/2 miles beyond this 
[beyond Guest's House, or at the Toll-House] the enemy have halted and will 
make a stand. The men show much fatigue, but Sedgwick intends to push 
vigorously. . . . 

This dispatch was transmitted to Hooker at 3 : 25. 

Brooks had with him Brown's and Bartlett's brigades (j|^) and his 
four batteries of artillery, having left Russell's brigade behind to cover 
his withdrawal. The country being open, the di^'ision was formed on a 
broad front, one brigade on each side of the Plank Road, each brigade 
in two lines, the front and flanks covered by a line of skirmishers. The 
artillery formed in column on the road between the brigades. The 
bridge that was being thrown was a portion of the one of the two 
bridges brought up from Franklin's Crossing. Its location was Scott's 
Ford, about a mile below Banks' Ford, but was commonly called Banks' 
Ford in subsequent dispatches and reports. Hooker, it seems, was op- 
posed to the laying of a bridge at this point as tending to weaken Sedg- 
wick's resolution to push on. With a view to improving his own com- 
munications, he issued an order at 2 : 30 p.m. for another bridge to be 
laid at United States Ford, authorizing the use of Comstock's canvas 
pontoons "as far as they would go." 

Wilcox had posted a small force of dismounted cavalry and 4 pieces 
of artillery on the Plank Road about three fourths of a mile west of the 
Guest House, and about a mile from Salem Church. With his main 
force he took position at the Toll-House. McLaws with his three bri- 
gades, Mahone's brigade of Anderson's division. Manly 's and Mc- 
Carthy's batteries (8 pieces), and Alexander with his battalion (14 
pieces), were marching in the direction of Fredericksburg; McLaws by 

' T. W. Hyde, Provost-Marshal and Act- mond exchange. Then General Sedgwick 

ing Aide-de-Camp on General Sedgwick's in impatience sent me. I did not take the 

staff, says: "Colonel Tompkins was sent road, but took a bee-line across country, 

there with a message. He did not return. most fortunately, for I was back in an 

Captain Farrar was sent. He came back hour, having seen no wandering rebels" 

to us some months after by way of Rich- (Following the Greek Cross, p. 129). 



McLAWS AT SALEM CHURCH 397 

the Turnpike, and Alexander by the Plank Road. Lee seemed to be 
thinking- more of Stoneman than of Sedgwick. He wrote to Seddon : 

I request that Ransom's and Pettigrew's brigades [coming up from D. H. 
Hill's command] be stopped at Hanover Junction, with orders to protect the 
railroads from the enemy 's cavalry. 

It is reported that the enemy has crossed at Fredericksburg, and driven back 
our force that was left there. I have sent back reenforcements. 

Baiile of Salem. Church (Map 35) 

About 2 p.m. McLaws arrived at Salem Church, and formed line of 
battle on the edge of a strip of wood, about 250 yards wide, pushing his 
skirmishers out to the far edge (Map 35). The ground fell away from 
his line to the Toil-Gate, where a slight rise gave command of it back to 
the wood. The intervening ground, though generally clear and open, 
was intersected by a number of ravines parallel to McLaws' position, 
which would throw disorder into lines advancing upon it and break the 
elan of a charge. From the Toil-Gate to McLaws' line was about 1000 
yards. Leaving an interval in the center for Wilcox, McLaws threw 
Kershaw's and Wofford's brigades (i-^) out to the right, and Semmes' 
and Mahone's {^^, ^^) to the left. His artillery had not yet come up. 
Hays had by this time joined Early. It was about 3 : 15 p.m., more than 
four hours after the capture of Marye's Heights; more than an hour 
after the assembly of the VI Corps at the Guest House, and the arrival 
of McLaws in the intrenched position of Salem Church ; and about an 
hour after the departure of Brooks' division for Chancellorsville, when 
Newton's and Howe's divisions took up the march, the former to follow 
Brooks', and the latter to follow Newton's. These divisions marched 
in column of route. Sedgwick's corps might have made an earlier start 
from Fredericksburg, had Newton's division, when it gained the heights, 
been thrown against the inner flank of the line confronting Howe and 
Brooks, instead of being marched on to the Guest House, where it was 
kept inactively waiting for the other divisions to break away from their 
plucky, tenacious opponents. Nothing was gained and precious time 
was lost by moving toward Chancellorsville with a single division. 
Butterfield, dissatisfied with the rate of Sedgwick's progress, started 
three times to relieve him from command. 

Hunt at Banks' Ford wired to Butterfield at 3 p.m. : 

Parties [of skirmishers] across from this command. Colonel DoulP sent over 
with directions to ascertain and report the distance of Sedgwick's and Gibbon's 
advance on the Plank road. The bridge is being thrown. 

The [telegraph] wires are across; taken by swimmers of the signal corps.= 

1 Major Alexander Doull, Inspector of insr, was of no immediate importance, and 
Artillery on General Hunt's staff, probably the instruments and wires were brought 
brevet colonel, crossed the river by swim- back in the evening" ( The Signal Corps in 
ming his horse. "'c IT'"" "/ '''«" Rebellion, by J. W. Brown). 

2 "This movement, though bold and dar- 



398 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

This dispatch was repeated to Hooker. 

Two signal stations were established to connect Sedgwick with But- 
terfield, one in a church tower in Fredericksburg, and one on the heights 
beyond, but no signal communication was opened. There was no signal 
officer with Sedgwick, his two signal officers having remained behind to 
form the station in the church tower.^ Moreover, Sedgwick understood 
that signaling was prohibited.- 

About 3:25 Sedgwick's advance came upon the dismounted cavalry 
covering Wilcox, and engaged it. Wilcox supported it with the fire of 
two pieces of artillery at the Toll-House. Brooks' division had been 
compelled, it seems, to change its formation to two parallel columns, 
preceded by a line of skirmishers, each column consisting of the main 
body of a brigade. One of his brigades had to come up and deploy, and 
a battery of artillery to open fire, before Wilcox's outpost fell back upon 
the brigade, and the Federal advance could be resumed. About 4 p.m. 
Wilcox, with his whole command, fell back upon McLaws' line, and took 
position at Salem Church. His five regiments of Alabama infantry were 
disposed for defence— the 11th and 14th on the left of the road, the 10th 
and 8th on the right, the 10th and 11th being next to the road. In the 
rear of the 10th was the 9th, of which one company was stationed in the 
school-house, a one-story building about 60 yards in front of the line, 
and one in the church. The company in the church was ordered to fire 
from the window of the ground floor and from those of the gallery. Be- 
tween the 10th and 11th regiments was an interval of from 75 to 80 
yards, which was occupied by Penick's battery of four guns. Hardly 
were these dispositions completed when the Federals were seen advanc- 

1 W. R.. 39, p. 240. pomes to General Sedg-wiek from headquar- 

^ Butterfield had written to Sedgwick : ters. 

"2:05 a.m. I don't want any signal. It "Captain Pierce, 

will betray the movement for miles. The "Signal Offleer VI Corps" 

enemy read our signals." As a conse- (TF. i?., 39, p. 220). 
quenee, Captain Cushing, the acting chief 

signal officer of the Army of the Potomac, He wrote in answer : 

who knew nothing about the order, found it "May 3, 1863, 7 : 15 a.m. 

impossible to "call" Sedgwick's signal sta- "Captain Pierce: 

tion, and thought that the officers sta- "Use your cipher to send important mes- 

tioned with Sedgwick were neglecting their sages. Tell General Sedgwick that mes- 

duty. He was about to order their arrest, sages may be sent to him giving him infor- 

when their conduct was satisfactorily ex- niation regarding position of the enemy, 

]>lained to him by the following dispatch which will not aid the enemy much, and 

borne by an orderly : may aid him. . . . 

"On the march. May 3, 1863, 4 a.m. , ,,. „ .,„ oonf''""^'' '^- ^^"^™«" 

"Captain Cushing: ( TI . iJ., 39. p. 220). 

"General S. has received an order from At 9:05 a.m. Bnttei-fleld wrote to Sedg- 

General Butterfield not to use signals, as wick: "My dispatch last night [2:05 a.m.] 

the enemy can read them. Wliat will we in regard to not using signals was intended 

do? Let us know by the nest orderly that for night signaling only, as a signal last 



BATTLE OF SALEM CHURCH 399 

ing up the Plank Road in line of battle. A 6-gun battery, accompanying 
their advance, halted at the Toll-Gate, and opened fire.' Penick's bat- 
tery at the church fired one shot in reply, and retired by order of General 
McLaws to a point several hundred yards from the church.- Moore's 
battery could not find an eligible position and so was sent to the rear. 
Manly 's and McCarthy's batteries were just coming on the field; Alex- 
ander's battalion was still far off. The Confederates at Salem Church 
and the Toll-Gate now numbered about 10,000 men and, except in front 
of Wofford on the extreme right, were covered with intrenchments. The 
battery with the Federal advance (reenforced probably by one or two 
others) shelled the woods to the right and left of the road for a short 
time. When the artillery ceased firing, Brooks' division advanced to the 
attack. 

The Confederate skirmishers are pushed back to the wood and then 
upon their line of battle. The Federals follow quickly. Reaching the 
edge of the wood, they give a cheer and rush forward to the charge. 
Within 80 yards of the enemy's line they receive his fire. They waver, 
but only for a moment. Bartlett with the 2d brigade dashes forward, 
surrounds the school-house, and captures the garrison. Pushing 
on, he delivers all the impetus of his attack on the 10 Ala., and shat- 
ters it. A little further on, and the victory will be won. Wilcox still has 
the 9 Ala. in reserve just behind this part of the line. In a moment he 
hurls it upon the advancing Federals. The Alabamians deliver a deadly 
fire at close quarters, and rush forward to gain what has been lost. Gal- 
lantly does Bartlett strive to hold the advantage he has won. A fierce 
struggle, and in turn the Federal line gives way. No time is allowed it 
to rally. Wilcox follows closely, increasing at each step the confusion 
and carnage in the Federal ranks. The school-house is reached, the cap- 
tured garrison is set free, and their captors are in turn captives. It is 
now 6 : 30 p.m. In vain do the Federals try again to turn the tide of 
battle. Once more their line is broken, and rushes in confusion to the 
rear. The field is cleared of Federal troops to the Toll-Gate.^ A fresh 
regiment of Bartlett 's brigade, just arrived from Fredericksburg, is 
drawn up across the road to stop stragglers. As the broken lines come 
back they are reformed in front of it.* Newton 's division comes up on 
the right, too late to turn the tide of battle, but reenforcing and restor- 

niaht mi.sht have informed the enemy of p. 884, but Wilcox says in his official re- 

vour movements, which it was desirable to port : "The two batteries fired some 15 or 

avoid. . . ." But this message had not 20 minutes, when ours was withdrawn for 

reached Seda'wick, and Cushing's instruc- the want of ammunition" (ib., 39, p. 858). 

tions of 7:15 Sed^ick did not consider as ^ ChanceUorsville, by Hotchkiss and 

authoritative. Allan, pp. 86, 87. 

1 W. R., 39, p. 858. ■* History of the 27th Regiment N. Y. 

2 Report of Lieutenant Penick, ib.. 39. Volunteers, by C. B. Fairchild, p. 169. 



400 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ing Brooks' line. Howe's halts in column of march, and wheels into line 
facing to the left.' 

Under the protection of skirmishers who had forded or swum the 
river, and of the artillery on the north bank, the bridge at Scott's Ford 
was completed about 4:30 p.m.- Owen's brigade (tti) immediately 
crossed it and took position to cover it, throwing out a regiment as skir- 
mishers about % of a mile beyond it. He also sent his adjutant-general 
to report to General Sedgwick, requesting that he "be assigned a posi- 
tion and be allowed to take part in the fight. ' ' In reply he was informed 
that Sedgwick was strong enough for the enemy, and was advised to 
prevent the [detachments of the] enemy from either crossing or destroy- 
ing the bridge.* 

A soldier writes : ' ' We slept in line that night with the dead of the 
day's battle lying near us. The stretcher bearers with their lamps wan- 
dered here and there over the field, picking up the wounded, and the 
loaded ambulances rattled dismally over the broken plank road. The 
pickets were unusually still, for the men of both armies were tired, and 
went willingly to rest. . . . Sedgwick scarcely slept that night. From 
time to time he dictated a dispatch to General Hooker. He would walk 
for a few paces apart and listen ; then returning would lie down again in 
the damp grass, with his saddle for a pillow, and try to sleep. The night 
was inexpressibly gloomy. Fires were not allowed to be lighted, and 
there was not even the excitement of a picket alarm to relieve the sin- 
gular stillness.""* 

When Sedgwick advanced from Fredericksburg he had with him ten 
regiments and six companies of the First Division, and his nine batteries 
of artillery ; when he made his attack he had been joined by troops from 
the rear, who brought his infantry up to eleven regiments, or about 5000 
men. Allowing for the loss at Fredericksburg, he had in the VI Corps 
about 19,.500 infantry, or about 20,500 men, and yet with 5000 men he as- 
sailed an intrenched position manned by about 10,000 practically un- 
touched by artillery. For there was hardly any preparatory artillery 
fire. While the attack was in progress the number of batteries at the 

' Doubleday says: "It was now decided flank attack being made, and night coming 

that a second attempt should be made by on, I encamped my division in the road" 

Newton's division, but Newton states that (W. R., 39, p. 600). 

the design was abandoned, because Howe's ^ Benham says in his report that this 

division, which was to support him, had bridge was laid between 3 and 4:30. In 

gone into camp without orders, and was not his statement of Bridges laid, etc., he gives 

immediately available. Before new arrange- the time of laying as 3 to 4 p.m. ( W. R., 

ments could be made darkness came on, 39, pp. 213, 215). 

and both armies bivouacked on the ground " 76., 107, p. 178. See also History of 

they occupied" {ChancellorsviUe and Get- the Philadelphia Brigade, by C. H. Banes, 

tyshurg, p. 61). Howe says: "I soon re- pp. 161, 162. 

ceived orders to throw my division to the * United States Service Magazine, V, 211. 
left to cheek a flank attack. I did so. No 



AFTER THE BATTLE 401 

Toil-Gate was increased to three, but this new line of guns did not open 
fire until the infantry came running back with the enemy after them ; the 
artillery then fired over the heads of the infantry, and by their excellent 
practice checked the pursuit. These batteries were afterward replaced 
by three others kept in reserve. Of the nine batteries of the VI Corps, 
not more than three were in action at any one time; and two (Martin's 
and McCartney's) were not engaged at all. The corps seems to have 
lost in this engagement about 1500 officers and men.^ With reference to 
the Confederates, Penick's four guns probably went into action a second 
time as the Federal infantry advanced, and expended the remainder of 
their ammunition ; at any rate, they had no ammunition with which to 
fire on the Federal infantry as they retreated. Manly 's and Mc- 
Carthy's batteries did not get into position until after the main attack 
was repulsed. Alexander with his battalion of 14 pieces did not reach 
the field until the fighting was all over. Like the ' ' Battle of Chancellors- 
ville," the engagement at Salem Church was essentially an infantry 
fight. 

The following correspondence explains itself : 

Butterfield to Hooker, 4:05 p.m. 
Gibbon's division still in and around Fredericksburg. Shall it be pushed 
after Sedgwick or remain here? 

5:30 p.m. 
[A] Captain of the Washington Artillery captured reports Hood's and Pick- 
ett's divisions as expected to-night. . . . The general impression of the prisoners 
seems to be that we shall hear from Hood before long.= 

To Gibbon, 6:20 p.m. 
General Hooker wishes you kept at Fredericksburg. 

It was not expected that Gibbon would be able to hold the heights of 
Fredericksburg in case of an attempt to retake them, and they were only 
guarded by a picket line. The duty assigned him was to keep the town, 
and preserve the bridges in the event of the VI Corps finding it neces- 
sary to return by that route. His force was stretched out from Hazel 
Run across the plain to the river above Fredericksburg, to meet an at- 
tack—should one be made— along the Bowling Green Road on the left, 
or the River Road on the right, or over the heights in front.* 

1 Bartlett reports a loss of 580 out of his Longstreet to "move back from front of 
four reaiments numbering less than 1500 Suffolk to the right bank of the Blackwater 
(TF. B... 39, p. 582). The 121 N. Y., com- immediately after dark." It is safe to say 
manded by Colonel Emory Upton, having that Lee did not expect either of these com- 
never been in action before, lost 276 out of mands or any other reenforcement to-day. 
an aggregate of 453 (ib., pp. 189. 589). ^ History of the 20 3Iass. Volunteers, by 

2 Hood and Pickett had orders from Colonel Bruce, p. 257. 



402 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Early reported to Lee that the Federals had possession of the town 
of Fredericksburg, and described his situation. Lee wrote at 7 p.m. : 

To Early 

I very much regret the possession of Fredericksburg by the enemy. I heard 
to-day of their taking the hills in rear of the city, and sent down General McLaws 
with two brigades of Anderson's division and three of his own, to unite with the 
forces under you, and endeavor to drive them back. I heard this afternoon that 
he had halted at Tabernacle Church. ... If they are attacking him there, and 
you could come upon their left flank, and communicate with General McLaws, 
I think you would demolish them. See if you cannot unite with him, and together 
destroy him. . . . 

P.S. I understand that Wilcox is w'ith him also. 

To McLaws 
I presume from the firing which I hear in your direction that you are engaged 
with the enemy. ... I have just written to Early ... to unite with you to 
attack the enemy on their left flank. Communicate with him, and arrange the 
junction, if necessary and practicable. It is necessary that you beat the enemy, 
and I hope you will do it. 

By the time this dispatch reached McLaws, Early had moved his main 
force back to Cox's, concentrating his command at that point. Lee's 
instructions contemplated an attack on Sedgwick's left flank. They 
were evidently issued under the impression that Sedgwick's whole force 
was in line of battle facing Salem Church. Such would have been the 
case had Sedgwick marched, as perhaps he should have done, in some 
approximation to a line of battle, say with his four divisions abreast or 
two abreast followed by the other two, also abreast, each division form- 
ing a line of short columns. It should be said in justice to Sedgwick 
that he might have adopted such a formation had he not been continu- 
ally urged to make speed and to abandon all thought of serious opposi- 
tion. 

Under Hooker's order of 2: 30 a portion of the unutilized bridge at 
Banks' Ford, sufficient to span the river, was forwarded to United 
States Ford, where it arrived about 10:30. The remnants of this 
bridge, and of the one already laid at Scott's Ford, were held ready to 
be laid, if necessary, as a second bridge at Scott's Ford. The bridge 
that was moved to United States Ford was not laid to-day. 

The line of signal stations in Sedgwick's rear broke up about 5 p.m. 
for lack of protection.* A telegraph line was pushed across the river 
from the Lacy House to the outskirts of Fredericksburg, but as Sedg- 
wick was constantly moving, it was not of much use.^ Supplies of am- 
munition and forage were forwarded to him to-night from his main 
train at the Lacy House. 

' W. R., 39, pp. 221, 245. = lb., 39, pp. 220, 221. 



ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION 403 

At 10 p.m. General Hunt, chief of artillery, reported in person to 
Hooker in obedience to an order from Butterfield. The service ren- 
dered by the Federal artillery would have been greater and more effec- 
tive if Hooker had kept his chief of artillery with him, and allowed him 
to discharge his proper functions. "There was no one upon the field 
whose special business it was to look for eligible positions for batteries, 
and having found them, with authority to post them there, and to com- 
mand them when so posted ; to select rifle batteries for positions requir- 
ing such pieces, and smooth-bores for service adapted to their kind. It 
was not until after disaster had befallen his army, and everything was 
in confusion, that Hooker recalled his chief of artillery, and invested 
him with authority to restore order. "^ During the battle Hooker's 
Chief of Staff, Chief of Artillery, Chief Engineer Officer, and Chief Sig- 
nal Officer were all on the north side of the Rappahannock, to observe, 
direct, and assist Sedgwick, on whose fighting the success or failure of 
the campaign was so largely to depend. Warren returned this evening 
to Hooker's headquarters, arriving there at 11 p.m. He found Hooker 
in a deep sleep and still suffering from the concussion of the morning. 
He asked him if he had instructions to send to Sedgwick, and was an- 
swered, "None." Rather than leave Sedgwick in the dark as to how 
matters stood, he wrote to him at midnight on his own responsibility : 

I find everything snug here. We contracted the line a little, and repulsed the 
assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow. If they 
will, he does not desire you to attack them again in force unless he [Hooker] at- 
tacks him [them] at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. 
Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with General 
Benham at Banks' Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place, if you 
think it best. To cross at Banks' Ford would bring you in supporting distance 
of the main body, aud would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg.^ 

Several messages passed to-day between Hooker's chief of staff and 
the President: 

Lincoln to Butterfield, 4:35 p.m. 

"Wliere is General Hooker ? Where is Sedgwick ? Where is Stoneman ? 
Butterfield to Lincoln, 4:40 p.m. 

General Hooker is at Chancellorsville. General Sedgwick, with 15,000 to 20,000 
men, at a point 3 or 4 miles out from Fredericksburg, on the road to Chaneellors- 

1 Artillery Service in the Rebellion, by in his Battle of Chancellorsville (p. 164) : 
Tidball. "This deceptive and dangerous dispatch to 

2 The abandonment of Chancellorsville, Sedgwick may be excused perhaps in war, 
and taking up a position of which the near- but it was false, and Warren was aware of 
est point is % of a mile and the center 1% it." Warren says in his official report : 
miles from Chancellorsville, Warren calls "This dispatch was written at a time when 
contracting the line a little. Referring es- I was exceedingly exhausted." 

pecially to this incident, A. C. Hamlin says 



404 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ville. Lee is between. Stoneman has not been heard from. This is the situation 
at the hour from latest reports, 4 : 30 p.m. 

The state of the supplies occasioned the following correspondence : 
Butterfield to Ingalls, 8 p.m. 

How about the question of forage for animals " How can they fare and get on ? 
The rations of the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fifth expire to-night unless replen- 
ished from trains [on north side of Rappahannock]. I telegraphed the general 
yesterday, and reply came that orders would issue to-day. Have heard nothing. 
How stands it 1 Advise me. 

Ingalls to Butterfield, 8:15 p.m. 

We can do nothing at present about forage and subsistence. If we succeed, 
we shall march at once to Fredericksburg. If we fail, we must try soon to reach 
our depots [by retreating]. The question must soon resolve itself. I propose to 
order all empty teams down to Falmouth. 

Major Rusling wrote home : 

... It has been a sad day here. General Berry was killed this morning at the 
head of our division. General Mott was again wounded ; and every colonel in his 
brigade, except one, either killed or wounded. The carnage on both sides has 
been awful. Oh, what a Sunday ! 

. . . We hope and believe that to-morrow will wind up a week's fighting with 
a great and overwhelming victory. 

At 3 p.m., as Howe and Newton started to follow Brooks toward 
Chancellorsville, Lee initiated a movement toward Hooker. In a low, 
quiet tone he gave his orders to Colston (Map 36) : 

General, I wish you to advance with your division on the United States Ford 
road. I expect you will meet with resistance before you come to the bend of the 
road. I do not want you to attack the enemy's positions, but only to feel them. 
Send your engineer officer with skirmishers to the front to reconnoiter and report. 
Don't engage seriously, but keep the enemy in check, and prevent him from 
advancing. Move at once.^ 

Pursuant to this order Colston advanced with two of his brigades on 
each side of the road and two Napoleon guns in the road between them. 
He had hardly started when he received a terrific fire of shell and 
canister from Weed's artillery. In less than two minutes 50 officers 
and men fell, killed and wounded, by his side. By this time he was 
aware that the Federals occupied a formidable position. To advance 
against it with a division so much reduced as his was, would have been 
only to insure its destruction, and would have been contrary to the 

> General Colston, B. and L., Ill, 233; and W. R., 39, pp. 1006, 1007. 



DISPOSITIONS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE 405 

instructions that lie had received. He accordingly reported to Stuart 
that he was not able to attack with any prospect of success,' and about 
3 : 45 was ordered to return with his division to his place in line. 

At 4 p.m. Anderson proceeded, by order of General Lee, with the 
three brigades then present (Wright's, Perry's, and Posey's), to the 
River Road, opposite the Federal left (Map 36), "to watch that road, 
and to threaten the enemy's communications, and his line of retreat 
from Chancellorsville." Major Hardaway with a battery of 13 rifled 
pieces was attached to this command. He selected a position near Hay- 
den's, from which to fire at the Federal camps across the river in the 
vicinity of United States Ford.^ These dispositions were completed 
about nightfall. 

It may have been in consequence thereof that about 10 p.m. the Fed- 
eral XII Corps (excepting Knipe's regiments guarding prisoners) was 
moved from its position as a general reserve to the left of the XI Corps, 
between that corps and the Rappahannock— Geary (^j) on the right. 
To make room for it, Schurz's division {-) was withdrawn from the 
left of the XI Corps, and placed in rear of Devens' division (i). 

Anderson remained quiet, watching Slocmn; and McLaws slept on 
his arms in front of Sedgwick. Early wrote to McLaws that he pur- 
posed attacking Marye's Hill and Sedgwick's rear at daylight, and 
McLaws transmitted this message to Lee. 

1 W. R., 39, p. 1007. See also the report were 3 of Hurt's, 4 of Jordan's, 2 of 
of Colonel Hinriehs, chief engineer, ib., Carter's (ft), 2 of Fry's (n), and 2 of 
pp. 1011, 1012. Marye's (n). 

2 76., 39, pp. 857, 879, 880. The pieces 



CHAPTER XXV 

MAT 4 . . . SEDGWICK FALiS BACK TO SCOTT 's FORD. AVERELL RELIEVED 

ANDERSON had prepared during the night for a demonstration 
r\ against the extreme left of Hooker's line. A large park of wagons 
was discovered on the north side of the river within range of the rifled 
artillery, and before daybreak Major Hardaway opened fire upon it 
with 10 rifled pieces. "At 3:30 o'clock," says Lieutenant-Colonel 
Woods, chief commissary of subsistence of Sickles' corps, "[I] was 
awakened by the rapid explosion of shells near where I was, some of 
them falling in the same field where the beef-cattle were, but the most 
of them falling in a cavalry camp, about Ys of a mile away, among some 
rebel prisoners, and amid the ammunition-trains of one of the other 
corps. This shelling lasted for the space of about seven minutes.^ 

' ' During this time the entire park had become the scene of the greatest 
confusion ; teamsters and drivers of ambulances were fleeing to the rear 
in great haste upon their horses, in many instances without saddles, 
boots, or hats, and every path appeared to be filled with those wearing 
the crescent. We attempted in vain to stop the incipient panic, and the 
fortunate cessation of the shells soon restored order. ' ' - Meanwhile 
Anderson pushed forward his skirmishers and found the Federals hold- 
ing and fortifying the high ridge along the Mineral Spring Road. It 
appearing therefrom that Hooker would not advance down the river, 
Lee decided that Anderson should proceed to Salem Church and unite 
with McLaws and Early. The three divisions and the corps artillery 
of Jackson's old corps, and Stuart's cavalry, about 25,000 men, were to 
remain under Stuart in front of Hooker's 75,.500 men, and the divisions 
of Anderson, Early, and McLaws, with the corps artillery of the I Corps 
and a portion of the General Artillery Reserve (about 23,000 men), were 
to be thrown against Sedgwick, whose corps now numbered about 19,000 
men. Lee was not aware that Reynolds' corps had been transferred 
from Sedgwick's command to Hooker's, and was under the impression 
that Sedgwick had two corps with him. Sedgwick believed that Early 
had been reenforced by a column 15,000 strong from Richmond and 
that it was this force or a part of it that had occupied the heights of 

^ Hardaway himself heard the crashing of the wagon bodies {W. R., 39, p. 880). 

2 lb., 39, p. 398. 

406 



CONCENTRATION AGAINST SEDGWICK 407 

Fredericksburg, cutting him off from the town.^ Thus Lee and Sedg- 
wick each estimated the other's strength in this quarter as about twice 
as great as it was. 

Sedgwick continued anxious and perplexed. At 1 : 30 a.m. he wrote to 
Hooker : 

We were checked here [near Salem Church] last night and held until dark. I 
believe the enemy have been reenforcing all night, and will attack me in the 
morning. How do matters stand with you? Send me instructions. 

At 6 : 20 a.m. he wrote to Butterfield : 

I am anxious to hear from General Hooker. There is a strong force in front 
of me, strongly posted.'' I can not attack with any hope of dislodging them until 
I know something definite as to the position of their main body and ours. I have 
sent two or three messengers to Banks' Ford, but none have returned, nor have I 
heard from the general since yesterday. 

Ten minutes later he received Warren's dispatch of midnight. He 
naturally concluded that he was not expected to do more than take care 
of himself unless Hooker attacked, but in that case he was to attack 
also. As with Hooker yesterday at Chancellorsville, he was deterred 
from falling back to a stronger position by the prospect of assistance 
coming to him from the enemy's rear. 

McLaws received the following dispatch sent at midnight by Lee's 
adjutant-general : 

I am directed by General Lee to say that he thinks well of what General Early 
proposes, if it is practicable. Such a movement would be a virtual relief to you, 
and might cause the enemy to pause or retire, and should this occur, he [General 
Lee] would desire that you press them so as to prevent their concentration on 
General Early. 

The general sa3's General Anderson is on your left [facing westward], watch- 
ing for any movement dowTi the river; has not yet heard from him; thinks his 
presence there will render your left flank secure. 

This dispatch was forwarded by McLaws to Early. 

About 7 a.m. Anderson was relieved on the River Eoad by Heth with 
three brigades of his division, and started for Salem Church. By 8 a.m. 
Early had taken the heights of Fredericksburg, leaving Gibbon in pos- 
session of the town, but severing all tactical connection between him 
and Sedgwick, and capturing six empty wagons and a number of pack- 
mules of Stoneman's that were returning to the main train at the Lacy 

1 TT. K., 39, p. 560 ; Butterfield to Hooker. folk via Ivor to Richmond (ib., 26, p. 

11:30 a.m., ib.. 40, pp. 399. 340. 1045). 

Pickett's and Hood's divisions were or- - McLaws, now numbering about 9000 

dered to-day to march from in front of Suf- men. 



408 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

House. He left Barksdale's brigade (about 1300 strong) and Andrews' 
battalion (4 batteries), altogether about 1600 men with 16 pieces, to 
hold Gibbon in check, and with the remainder of his force (about 10,400 
men) formed line facing a little west of north. He sent information of 
the state of affairs to McLaws, and waited to hear from him. 

Wliile Early retook the heights two Federal signal officers escaped to 
General Sedgwick, and established a station within his lines. The mes- 
sages went therefrom by signal either to Scott's Ford or to the vicinity 
of Falmouth, and via United States Ford, by telegraph, to within a mile 
of Hooker 's headquarters. 

Sedgwick received the following dispatch from Van Alen, sent at 
6 a.m.: 

The general commanding desires that you telegraph to him your exact position. 
What information have you respecting the force of the enemy in front and rear ? 
What is j'our own strength ? Is there any danger of a force coming up in your 
rear and cutting your communications? Can you sustain yourself acting sepa- 
rately or in cooperation with us? 

Sedgwick wrote in reply : 

8:30 a.m. 

I am occupying the same position as last night. 

9 a.m. 

... I have secured my communication with Banks' Ford. The enemy are in 
possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in 
our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. ... It depends upon the 
condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe 
reports the enemy advancing upon Fredericksburg [from the heights]. 

9:45 a.m. 

The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river whenever 
necessary. 

He formed his corps on three sides of a rectangle covering Scott's 
Ford,— with Howe on the left, Brooks in the center, and Newton on the 
right. Batteries were posted along the line at the weaker points 
(Map 37). This line, about 6500 yards in length, numbered about 3 men 
per running yard. 

The 8 Pa. Cavalry, except one squadron, which was ordered to report 
to General Schurz, crossed the Rappahannock this morning at Scott's 
Ford, and reported to General Sedgwick, who ordered it to report to 
General Howe, by whom it was sent to the rear to cover the communica- 
tions with Scott's Ford.' 

^ Tlie Charge at Chancellorsville, by Pennoek Huey, p. 73 ■. History of Pennsyh-a)iin 
Volunteers, 1861-1865, by S. P." Bates, III, 115. 



SEDGWICK'S DISPOSITIONS 409 

Gibbon had one of his two brigades in the town of Fredericksburg, 
and the other one and his two batteries on the north side of the Rappa- 
hannock at the bridges. He wrote to Butterfield that if Sedgwick had 
gone forward and he (Gibbon) was forced out of Fredericksburg, he 
would take up the bridges; and that if Sedgwick had "gone away" [by 
Scott's Ford], he "had better withdraw at once and take up the 
bridges. ' ' 

Butterfield replied : 

"Hold on to the last extremity, until further orders. Sedgwick holds 
the same position as he did." 

He wrote also : 

To Hooker, 9:40 a.m. 

... No information yet received shows more than a [Confederate] division 
in front of Fredericksburg. Should Sedgwick throw himself rapidly and boldly 
on their flank, he would capture or destroy them, if circumstances of your move- 
ments and position, and presence of enemy on his front and left, permit.^ 

To Gibbon, 10:27 a.m. 

Make your disposition so that no confusion or panic ensues. . . . Short of the 
loss of every man of your command, do not permit the enemy to cross. In case 
you retire from the town, be vigilant. I am just ordered to General Hooker and 
leaving here. Keep the fords well guarded by batteries and your picket line 
strong. Keep an eye out for the pontoon train that was reported at Hamilton's 
Crossing. = ]\Iueh may depend on you. . . . You perhaps had better take up your 
lower bridge, and get boats out of water, and hold engineer force ready to work 
on others. Use your discretion. 

At 10 : 35 a.m. Van Alen wrote to Butterfield : 

. . . Gibbon's command is to remain where it is. The bridges, of course, are 
to remain. It would seem from your dispatch that Gibbon and the enemy are 
retreating from each other. 

General Early, not receiving any message from McLaws nor hearing 
any sound of firing in his direction, sent out Smith's brigade to feel the 
Federal lines. It went up against Neill's brigade of Howe's division, 
which, with the assistance of two pieces of Martin's battery (j-^)' drove 
it back, capturing the flag of the 58 Va. Concluding that the Federals 
were too strong for him to attack alone. Early reported the situation to 
McLaws, "requesting him to move."* He stated that if McLaws 
would attack in front, he would advance two brigades, and strike 
the enemy in flank and rear. McLaws did not consider himself 

' A copy of this dispatch was sent to SedgTvick. 

^ There was no pontoon train at Hamilton's Crossing. 

^ W. R., 39, p. 1002. 



410 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

strong enough to attack in front, but he thought that if Early would 
attack in flank and rear the Federals would be obliged at least to move, 
and would probably expose a flank or other weak point. So he agreed 
to advance provided Early would attack first. He informed General 
Lee of the plan proposed and asked for reenforcement.' Lee in reply 
sent him word of Anderson's movement toward him, and McLaws, on 
receiving it, gave orders that no attack should be made until General 
Anderson arrived. In the meantime Early was also informed that 
Anderson was coming, and was not to attack until he was in position 
on McLaws' right, connecting with Early's left. Anderson arrived at 
Salem Church at 11 and reported as directed to McLaws. Lee arrived 
soon afterward, and took charge of affairs. He directed Anderson to 
form his three brigades (Posey, Perry, and AVright) on Early's left, 
and sending for Early, gave him his instructions. A general attack 
was to be made at a signal of three guns to be fired in rapid succession. 
Three of Early's brigades— Hoke's, Hays', and Gordon's— were to join 
in the assault. The other brigade, Smith's, was to be held in reserve to 
reenforce Barksdale, if necessary, or portions of the attacking line. 
Anderson's three brigades on Early's left and the two brigades on 
McLaws' right (Kershaw's and Wofford's) were also to advance at 
the signal or when firing was heard on the right. The remainder of 
McLaws' force was to maintain a defensive attitude at least until the 
enemy in its front was in retreat.- Hardaway with his rifle battalion 
of 13 pieces, 2 pieces of Parker's battery of Alexander's battalion (I), 
Penick's battery (i), and 2 pieces of McCarthy's battery, altogether 21 
pieces, took position on Smith's Hill (Map 36). 

Sedgwick had decided to hold his present position until dark and then 
fall back upon his bridges.^ He wrote : 

To Butter field and Hooker, 11 a.m. 
... If I can hold until night, I shall cross at Banks' Ford, under instructions 
from General Hooker, given by Brigadier-General Warren.* 

To Hooker, 11:15 a.m. 
. . . It is not improbable that bridges^ at Banks' Ford may be sacrificed. Can 
you help me strongly if I am attacked ? ... My bridges ^ are two miles from me. 
I am compelled to cover them above and below from attack, with the additional 
assistance of General Beuham's brigade alone." 

^ W. R., 39, p. 827. ^ Only one bridge was laid at Scott's 

2 lb. 39, pp. 802, 828, 831. Ford, but Benbam had the material for 

3 lb., 39, p. 560. layinsr another. 

* Warren's dispatch of midnight, p. 403 ' Owen's bri-ade of Gibbon's division 



ante. 



(A)- 



HOOKER'S INTENTIONS 411 

To Hooker, 1:40 p.m. 

... I have no means of judging of the enemy's force about me ; deserters say 
40,000. I shall take position near Banks' Ford and the Taylor house, at the 
suggestion of General Warren. OflQcers have already gone to select a position. 

It is believed that the lieights of Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions 
of the enemy. 

Messages now arrived from Hooker's headquarters: 
1, 10:30 a.m. 

The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you reserve, 
if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock, which 
you can hold securely until to-morrow p.m. 

2 
... I inclose substance of a communication sent last night [Warren's mid- 
night dispatch]. Its suggestions are highly important, and meet my full ap- 
proval. There are positions on your side, commanded by our batteries on the- 
other side, I think you could take and hold. The general would recommend as 
one such position the ground on which Dr. Taylor's is situated. 

Hooker. 

These dispatches would seem to sanction the withdrawal of Sedg- 
wick's corps, provided a portion of it was left in a commanding posi- 
tion south of the Rappahannock. But it is safe to say that none of them 
was written or dictated by Hooker, notwithstanding that the last one 
was signed with his name. They were doubtless all written by staff 
officers, and sent off without being shown to Hooker, who since he was 
injured at Chancellorsville had been almost continuously alternating 
between sleep and stupor. It seems that on coming to himself and real- 
izing their tenor he apprehended that Sedgwick would recross the river, 
and to prevent it, wrote or dictated the following dispatches : 
To Sedgwick, 11 a.m. 

The major-general commanding . . . does not wish you to cross the river at 
Banks' Ford unless you are compelled to do so. The batteries at Banks' Ford 
command the position. If it is practicable for you to maintain a position [on the] 
south side [of the] Rappahannock, near Banks' Ford, you will do so. . . . 

11:50 a.m. 
If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shall be of the 
character he anticipates, it is the intention of the general to advance to-morrow. 
In this event the position of your corps on the .south bank of the Rappahannock 
will be as favorable as the general could desire. 

1:20 p.m. 
I expect to advance to-morrow, which will be likely to relieve you. 
You must not count on much assistance without I hear heavy firing. Tell 
General Benham to put down the other bridge, if you desire it. 



412 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Sedgwick replied at 2 : 15 p.m. : 

I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the Rappahan- 
nock until to-morrow. 

Hooker's intentions at this time were later expressed by himself as 
follows: 

I proposed to leave troops enough where I was to occupy the enemy there, and 
throw the rest of my force down the river and reenforce Sedgwick ; then the whole 
of Lee's army except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick would be 
thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be on it.^ 

As previously stated, Sedgwick informed Benham yesterday that he 
wanted another bridge put down. He signaled to him to-day : " I wish 
the second bridge laid close by the first one."=^ At 1 p.m. Benham com- 
menced laying this bridge, using the material left over from the bridges 
already laid at Banks' Ford and at United States Ford. He reported 
to Sedgwick at 3 p.m. : 

I will have the [second] bridge done by 3:30 o'clock.^ 

But he was reckoning without Hardaway's battery of 21 guns, which, 
whether intentionally or not, dropped an occasional shell annoyingly 
near the crossing, which delayed the construction of the bridge. Points 
of direction were established for night firing from Smith's Hill upon 
Scott's Ford.* 

The reoccupation of Marye's Heights gave the Confederates control 
of the country between the Federal hospitals and the VI Corps. This 
necessitated the removal of the wounded across the river and the rees- 
tablishment of communication with the corps by way of Scott's Ford. 
By 10 a.m. the hospitals were established in tents on the north side of 
the river ; and by 11 all the wounded were removed to them. The ambu- 
lances were then dispatched to Scott's Ford, but as the pontoon bridge, 
on their arrival there, was found to be under fire, they could not cross 
the river. 

About the middle of the afternoon. Hooker was waked out of one of 
his slumbers by Pleasonton handing him a paper with the remark: 
"General, this is a dispatch from the President." He took the paper, 
and read : 

Washington, D. C, May 4, 1863, 3 : 10 p.m. 
Major-General Hooker: 

We have news here that the enemy has reoccupied heights above Fredericks- 
burg ? Is that so ? 

A. Lincoln. 

' Rep. of Com., IV, 148. ^ 7b. 

2 TF. R.. 39, p. 236. * lb., 39, p. 821. 



LEE'S PLAN OP ATTACK 413 

Having waited for some time in silence, Hooker at 4:20 p.m. had 
Pleasonton answer the message as follows : ' 

I am informed that it is so, but attach no importance to it. 

Joseph Hooker, 

Major-General. 

The bridge brought up yesterday from Banks ' Ford to United States 
Ford was laid at the latter place this morning between 10 and 11:30, 
making three bridges at United States Ford. 

Anderson got into the position assigned him about 12 m.' McLaws 
swung his two right brigades to the left, bringing his right within about 
34 of a mile of Anderson's left. This gap was to be closed as the 
troops advanced. The afternoon, however, wore away in skirmishing 
for information and getting into position.^ Excluding Barksdale's bri- 
gade and Andrews' battalion (about 2000 men), neutralized by Gibbon, 
Lee had 21,000 men confronting the 19,000 under Sedgwick.* Had he 
become aware of the thinness of Hooker's line, he might have planned 
to break through it. According to Doubleday, Lee, after personally ex- 
amining Sedgwick's position, "gave orders to break in the center of the 
Sixth Corps so as to defeat the two wings, throw them off in eccentric 
directions, and scatter the whole force. ' ' ^ But he gives no authority 
for this statement, and his own description of the action seems incon- 
sistent with such a plan. Lee's general idea seems to have been to 
crush the Federal left under Howe and drive the corps in the general 
direction of the Plank Road toward McLaws, who, together with Heth 
on the Eiver Road, was to prevent a junction of Sedgwick with Hooker. 
Anderson and McLaws' right were to press the retreating Federals to- 
ward the Rappahannock. To prevent their crossing it, Hardaway's 
artillery was to riddle their bridges, and Early's right brigade, Gor- 
don's, to push toward the crossing and intercept or harass their retreat. 

About 1 p.m. Howe received reliable information that the enemy was 
assembling a force largely outnumbering his division immediately in 
rear of Fredericksburg for another attack. In view of his repulse of 
Smith's brigade in the morning, he expected that if the enemy made a 
second attempt it would be against his left. He therefore carefnlly ex- 
amined the ground, and made arrangements, in case his left was unable 
to hold its position, to withdraw it to a position of safety. His forma- 
tion was in two lines (advanced line and main line) besides his line of 
skirmishers. His advanced line and skirmish line were formed of 

1 Pleasonton in Bep. of Com., IV, 31. ence to it that the author finds is in Lee's 

2 W. R., 39, pp. 802, 852. report {W. R., 39, p. 802). 

5 This delay is not satisfaetorily ac- * Without counting Owen's brigade at 

counted for in the records. The only refer- Scott's Ford. 

^ Chancellorsville and Gcttijsburg, p. 6.5. 



414 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Neill's brigade and two regiments (4 Vt. and 5 Vt.) of Grant's brigade; 
his main line, of Grant's brigade and 12 pieces of artillery. 

It was about 5:30 p.m. when Lee's three signal shots were at last 
fired/ and his troops advanced to the attack. Hays' brigade moved to 
the right across the front of the 5 Vt. and the 2 pieces of artillery which 
it supported. The latter had exhausted their ammunition, but the 5 Vt. 
poured a heavy enfilading fire into the enemy's ranks, and kept this uji 
until Hoke's brigade, coming up on its right and rear, threatened to cut 
it off, when it withdrew to the right of the 3 Vt. Hays struck the 
20 N. Y. in flank, front, and rear, and flung it back on Rigby's battery 
(ryi)' ■"'hieh threw this organization into such confusion that "it could 
do nothing. "2 It withdrew without firing again. The 20 N. Y. went on 
to the rear and could not be rallied.* Hoke coming up in the dusk on 
Hays ' left, the two brigades fired into each other and were thrown into 
such confusion that they had to fall back to reform. A portion of 
Smith's brigade came up to their assistance, and presumably covered 
their withdrawal.* Howe now extended his left and sent to Sedgwick 
for reenforcement. Gordon, meanwhile, had moved northward, com- 
pelling the withdrawal of Howe's skirmishers and advanced line. Howe 
was compelled to yield some ground, but at the end of the contest his 
main line was practically where it was at the beginning. Thanks to his 
preparations on his left, and to his being reenforced with a battery and 
seven regiments of infantry, he presented in his new position an effec- 
tive barrier to the enemy's progress ^ (Map 38). The attack on Brooks 
was easily repulsed, principally by his skirmishers and artillery. The 
only force that he had to oppose was Wright's brigade, as it masked the 
movements of Posey's and Perry's brigades. McLaws' two right bri- 
gades worked their way slowly and laboriously through the wood and 
underbrush in the direction of Brooks' right, but did not reach it. New- 
ton and Burnham were not molested. Hardaway, on Smith's Hill, 
opened fire with 18 pieces on 12 Federal pieces near Banks' Ford, which 
were in position to enfilade McLaws' line of battle." He states in his 
report that he disabled 6 pieces and drove 2 off the field, but, according 
to one of his battery commanders, 16 of Hardaway 's pieces were 
silenced by the Federal fire.'^ Such was the situation when, about 6 :45 
p.m., Sedgwick, in accordance with his decision of this morning, issued 
orders for a general withdrawal. General Newton, a trained engineer 

* The Federal authorities generally say 5. and two regiments of Buniham's brigade 
the Confederates 6 p.m. * " (W. R., 39, p. 561). 

" W. R., 39, p. 597. 6 76., 39, p. 881. The Confederate pieces 

^ 76., 39, p. 610. in action were 5 of Parker's and Peniek's 

* Chancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and (1. I), 2 of McCarthy's (2. I), and the 13 
Allan, pp. 93, 94. of Hardaway's mixed battalion brought up 

' His reenforeements consisted of Butler's from the River Road, except 2 of Hurt's. 
regular battery (3;^), Wheaton's brigade, ' Captain McCarthy (W. R., 39, p. 848). 



SEDGWICK RETIRES 415 

officer, was sent back to select and prepare the new line of defence. The 
movement was successfully executed. Pursuit was checked on the Fed- 
eral left by Howe, and was not promptly undertaken anywhere else. A 
dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity, and necessitat- 
ing caution to avoid collision with one's own troops.' About 9:30 Wil- 
cox with the 8 and 9 Ala. of his brigade, Kershaw's brigade, and Manly 's 
battery, began following the retreat. He was too late to interfere with 
it, but reached the river near Banks' Ford, and there succeeded in cap- 
turing a few prisoners.- 

The Federals now found themselves on high ground with shelter 
trenches in front of them and 34 pieces of artillery on the still higher 
ground behind them. Their second bridge, on which they had been 
working, was completed at 10 p.m. 

About this time Colonel Alexander of the Confederate artillery re- 
ceived orders ' ' to fire upon the ford over which the enemy was retreat- 
ing." The guns of Hardaway's rifle battalion (probably 11 pieces) 
opened fire, and continued firing one gun at intervals of twenty minutes 
until half an hour after sunrise on the 5th ;^ and Manly 's battery 
shelled the woods along the river and the ford for about half an hour 
from the advanced position occupied by Wilcox.* 

The two following dispatches show how matters were viewed by Lee 
and Sedgwick : 

Downman's House, May 4, 10 p.m. 
Major-Gener.\l McLaws. 

General: 

. . . "We cannot find any of the enemy south of the Plank road. But if we 
let them alone until morning we will find them again intrenched, so I wish to 
push them over the river to-night. . . . 

Direct Colonel Alexander to endeavor to arrest all movements [of the enemy] 
across Banks' Ford, or up the river road [toward Hooker]. Anderson and Early 
are north of the Plank road. 

I am, very respectfully yours, 

R. E. Lee, 

General. ' 

Banks' Ford, Va., May 4, 1863, 11 :50 p.m. 
General Hooker, United States Ford : 

My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north 
side of Banks' Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would withdraw it 
to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard it by retaining it 
here ? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw. 

John Sedgwick, 

-. Major-General. 

1 W. R., 39, p. 802. ^ lb., 39, pp. 821, 882. 

2 Thirteen officers and 150 * lb., 39, p. 831. 

men (TF. R., 39, p. 860). ^ lb., 40, pp. 860, 861. 



416 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

All this time Hooker with his 75,500 men, and the sound of Sedgwick's 
guns ringing in his ears, was held in check by Stuart with his 25,000. He 
allowed the day to pass without discovering the feebleness of his oppo- 
nent and appreciating the opportunity presented to him for crushing 
this fraction of Lee's army. Behind his intrenchments bristling with 
cannon and swarming with men, he waited supinely for Stuart to attack 
him or Sedgwick to attack Stuart. Reynolds begged to be allowed to 
attack the enemy's left flank, and failing to receive permission, sent 
Stone's brigade on a reconnaissance, hoping that it would bring on a 
general engagement. Stone got near enough to hear the voices of Stu- 
art's men, but prudently withdrew, not dreaming of the real purpose of 
the movement, of which Reynolds informed him afterward.' The 12 and 
13 Mass. with Hall's battery, and accompanied by General Robinson, 
made a reconnaissance to near Ely's Ford. They found the enemy in 
force, but then, having orders not to bring on an engagement, simply 
retraced their steps.^ Among the notable casualties of this day's de- 
sultory fighting was the death of Major-General Whipple. While stand- 
ing near Ricketts' battery, directing the construction of some earth- 
works, he was mortally wounded by a sharpshooter sitting in a tree, who 
had been annoying the Federal officers with his fire directed especially 
upon them. General Sickles had sent instructions to Whipple to have 
Berdan detach a portion of his command to dislodge him. Whipple was 
on his horse writing an order to this effect when he was hit. The bullet 
passed through his belt and stomach, and came out at the small of his 
back close to the spinal column. The sharpshooter proceeded to load, 
but he never fired again. A lieutenant of Berdan 's, carrying a loaded 
rifle, stalked across the Federal line of battle, crept through the line of 
skirmishers, and felt his way into the woods beyond till he caught sight 
of the Confederate marksman. Before the latter could finish reloading 
the lieutenant drew a bead on him and fired, bringing him down a corpse. 
On his return he exhibited as trophies an extra rifle, a foxskin cap, $1600 
in Confederate money, and $100 in greenbacks.* 

One of Knipe's regiments '(^—^|jj), guarding prisoners under Patrick, 
returned to its brigade. Another, the 4 Pa., recrossed the river en route 
to the front. 

The two-year men of the 5 N. Y. Volunteers, Duryee Zouaves 

^ Address, July 1, 1899, by H. S. Huide- and way to attack him successfully ; but it 

kooper; History of the 150th Regiment Pa. was ascertained that it could only be made 

Volunteers, by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas on him behind his defences, and with slen- 

Chamberlin, p. 95. der columns, which I believed he could de- 

^ History of the 12 Mass. Vol., by Lieu- stroy as fast as they were thrown on to his 

tenant-Colonel B. F. Cook, p. 93. works" (Hooker's testimony, Bep. of Com., 

"Between the 3d and 4th, reconnaissances IV, 133). 

were made on the right [in the right wing] ' New York Herald, May 7, 8 ; Historical 

from one end of the line to the other, to Sketch of the 118th Regiment Pa. Volun- 

feel the enemy's strength, and find a place teers, by H. T. Peek, p. 202. 



HOOKER INACTIVE 417 

(3. 2. V), were relieved to-day from duty with the army in order that 
the)' might return to the phxce where they had been mustered in, and 
arrive there in time to be mustered out on the expiration of their period 
of enlistment. They were honored with a complimentary order.^ 

To the music of the enemy's bullets, amid the rattling of their com- 
rades' rifles and the thundering of their cannon, officers and soldiers 
turned their backs on the field of battle, and marched to the rear. After 
crossing the pontoon bridge at United States Ford, they took up the 
other two-year men of the regiment, who were guarding the wagons, and 
proceeded briskly, about 200 strong, toward Stoneman's Switch. As 
they passed Banks' Ford they saw firing between Sedgwick's men and 
Lee's, and were harassed with fears that they would be again ordered to 
the front. But they reached the railroad without any such contretemps, 
and were safely conveyed North, receiving on the way and at their des- 
tination the ovations with which our people are wont to honor their mili- 
tary heroes. 

In contrast with this incident it is pleasant to consider that the 12.3 Pa. 
of Allabach's brigade (Colonel J. B. Clark) should, under existing 
orders, have been on its homeward march to-day. But it remained on 
the field of battle, and did not leave the army until the 8th, the day on 
which its term of enlistment expired.^ The 4 N. Y. (Colonel J. D. Mc- 
Gregor) was enlisted, for the greater part, to be mustered out on the 
1st of May. The whole regiment remained with the army through the 
campaign, and was not mustered out till the 25th.3 

This morning the New York Herald said in an editorial : 

The city yesterday was full of absurd rumors of defeat and disaster, which we 
hope will be completely dispelled by oflScial intelligence to-day of the greatest 
acliieveraent of the war; . . . considering the numbers of the rebel forces en- 

1 "Headquarters 2d Division, V Corps, regiment, and the General has no fears but 

"Camp near Chaneellorsville, Va., that it will be sacredly guarded and pre- 

"May 4, 1863. served. The officers and men who are to 

"General Order No. 99. leave this army will proceed to New York 

"I. The term of sendee of a portion of on the 5th. Colonel Winslow will turn in 

the 5th Regiment being about to expire, the to the proper department at Aquia Creek 

Major-General commanding desires the offi- all ordnance stores and all supplies of 

cers and men to know that he parts from property not needed for the men who re- 

them with very great regret, a regTet which main, 

he is contident is shared with the whole divi- ....... 

sion. The regiment has been distinguished "By command of General Sykes : 

in all the operations of his command, es- "G. Ryan, Captain, A. A. General." 

pecially at Gaines' Mill and the battle of 

Manassas Plains. Its ranks, thinned and Camp and Field Life of the 5 N. T. Volun- 

scarred by battle, are the best and proudest teer Infantry, Duryee Zouaves, by A. Dav- 

witness of the fact. The General hopes to enport, pp. 387, 388. 

see again the brave men who have served ^ W. R., 39, p. 549. 

under him. Many of their comrades still ^ New York in the War of the Rebellion, 

hnve to hold in trust the respect of the old by F. Phisterer, p. 377. 



418 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

gaged elsewhere, east and west, we believe it simply impossible that General Lee 
could muster an army capable of standing five hours outside of his works before 
the powerful army of General Hooker. 

A few hours later Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, 
entered a room at the Tribune office, holding in his hand the latest tele- 
gram from the front. His face was pallid, his step almost tottering, and 
his lips trembled. "My God!" he exclaimed, "it is horrible— horrible; 
and to think of it, 130,000 magnificent soldiers so cut to pieces by less 
than 60,000 half-starved ragamuffins!"' 

At daylight to-day Averell received Hooker's order relieving him 
from command. About 10 a.m. his division, now under Pleasonton, 
broke camp. It crossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, and 
camped 5 miles therefrom in the direction of Falmouth. 

The main train of the II Corps moved to-day to United States Ford." 
Instructions were issued by the chief quartermaster of the army looking 
to the safety of the depots and trains in case of a general failure or re- 
verse.^ At Aquia Landing everything movable was put on boats.^ 

Rear-Adniiral Lee wrote to Dix: 

... I respectfully and earnestly propose to you a joint expedition to take 
Fort Powhatan, Petersburg, and perhaps Richmond. I am ready to move at a 
moment's notice, and will cooperate with you in any and every way possible. 
My gunboats and a few companies will hold your posts at Suffolk and Yorktown. 

The opportunity for striking a great blow is such as rarely presents itself in 
the history of nations. I am confident you will improve it.^ 

This suggestion was not favorably considered by General Dix, and the 
operation was not undertaken. 

^ Personal Recollections of Abraham To Thompson, Quartermaster, Aquia, 

Lincoln and the Civil War, by J. R. Gil- 12 m. 

™°'"^' P'J^^i?" "Keep as much of the public property 

- W. R., .39, p. 549. jjjj^^j ^g y^^jj pjjjj ^jjj^jj further orders. Be 

3 I. galls to Haupt, 1, 12 m. prepared to act at short notice. See that 

your depot is kept constantly prepared [to 
"The [railroad] bridge need not be built move]." 
of course at present. You doubtless will 

see that your road stock is not molested by ^^ Rankin, Quartermaster, Falmouth, 12 m. 
any raid of the rebels." "Do not come up here yourself. Perhaps 

no one had better come just yet. Keep 
quiet; do not make any excitement. We 
"I do not wish any more supplies taken are in great trouble, but we shall fight [it] 
up [from Aquia to Falmouth] until further out. Do not communicate \vith Washing- 
notice. I hope you will ask for protection ton on the subject." 

at Aquia in case of necessity, though we * History of the 9 N. T. Cavalry, by N. 

trust to fight it out in excellent style yet." Cheney, p. 89. 

•■ TT. R., 26. pp. 693, 694. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

MAY 5 . . . HOOKER KECROSSES THE RAPPAHANNOCK 

AT midnight (4th-5th) all the corps commanders of the Army of the 
x\. Potomac, except Sedgwick and Slocum, assembled in a large tent 
at Hooker's headquarters in consultation. Hooker, Warren, and Butter- 
field were also present. Slocum was called, but, on account of the long 
distance from his post, did not arrive until after the meeting broke up. 
Hooker set forth the condition of affairs in the right wing, expressing 
apprehension of a want of steadiness on the part of some of the troops, 
exhibited, it seemed to him, by uncalled-for firing along parts of the line, 
and gave his hearers to understand that he was in favor of withdrawing 
the army to the north bank of the Rappahannock. He presented for 
consideration the question whether the army should advance or with- 
draw. Hooker and Butterfield then retired. Warren, thinking that 
some information might be wanted of him, remained. Meade and 
Howard spoke in favor of advancing.* Reynolds said that, as his corps 
was the only one that had not been engaged, he would not urge his 
opinion, but that he agreed with Meade. He asked Meade to vote for 
him, and then went to sleep. Couch expressed himself as incompetent 
from lack of knowledge to give an opinion. The knowledge which he felt 
himself lacking was whether in case of an advance Hooker would be in 
active command, and how he purposed to operate. Couch said that he 
favored an attack, provided he could choose the point of attack. Sickles 
modestly remarked that his profession had not been that of a soldier, 
and that therefore his opinion was perhaps entitled to but little consid- 
eration. He then presented reasons for retiring. He created a little stir 
as he went on to remark that he was astonished at the manner in which 
the commanding general had presented the subject, that he had not ex- 
pected that "the responsibilities" would be thrown on the corps com- 
manders. At this point the loyal Warren, perceiving that his chief was 
coming in for some criticism, withdrew. 

The question was raised and discussed whether a withdrawal could be 
safely effected. Before the assemblage dissolved. Hooker returned to 

1 "Howard voted to remain, without refer- and he wished to retrieve his reputation'' 
ence to the situation of the army, because, (Chancellorsville and GetU/shurg, by A. 
in his opinion, his corps had behaved badly, Doubleday, p. 68). 

419 



420 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

the tent and stated as his decided opinion that he could withdraw the 
army without loss of men or material. This statement and perhaps 
other circumstances satisfied Couch that Hooker would be in command, 
whichever way the army moved. So when the vote was taken Meade, 
Reynolds, and Howard voted for an advance, and Sickles and Couch for 
a withdrawal.' Hooker thereupon announced that he would take upon 
himself the responsibility of withdrawing. As the officers stepped out 
of the tent, Reynolds broke out: "What was the use of calling us to- 
gether at this time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow?"^ 
Thus Hooker, after stating to Sedgwick that he would advance in the 
morning, decided, against the advice of his corps commanders, to leave 
his lieutenant in the lurch. He directed General Warren to prepare a 
new and shorter line of defence in his rear to secure the army against 
any attempt of the enemy to interrupt its passage of the river, and 
ordered the corps commanders to cut roads where necessary, leading 
from their positions to United States Ford. He ordered Pleasonton 
"to cover all the fords, and prevent the enemy crossing until the army 
had got over. ' ' * General Hunt, chief of artillery, was instructed at 
daybreak to cross all the batteries not in line of battle to the north bank 
of the Rappahannock, under cover of the fog, and send them by way of 
Hartwood Church to their old camps. This duty Hunt delegated to 
Captain Best, chief of artillery of the XII Corps, directing him to select 
positions to protect the recrossing of the army. The V Corps was desig- 
nated as rear-guard. This corps was the best posted to cover the main 
roads to United States Ford ; its advanced position naturally suggested 
it as the one to retire last. It had, moreover, been the least engaged of 
all the corps, except the I, whose position on the extreme right was not 
suitable for the rear-guard. It had been the last to cross the Rappa- 
hannock at Kelley's Ford, and its commander had discharged the duty 
of bringing up the rear of the army on that occasion in a satisfactory 
manner. Finally, it comprised the regular division. These consider- 
ations may all have had weight in determining its selection as rear- 
guard. 

Hooker was still unwilling that the VI Corps should recross the Rap- 
pahannock. "My desire," he says, "was to have General Sedgwick re- 
tain a position on the south side of the river in order that I might leave 
a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of 

' "Whenever afterward Couch's action called the corjjs commanders together, not 

was challenged he replied : 'And I would as a council of war, but to ascertain how 

do it again under such a commander' " they felt in regard to making what I con- 

{History of the II Army Corps, by F. A. sidered a desperate mo\e against the eneniv 

Walker,' pp. 250, 251). in our front" {Rep. of Com., IV, 134). 

- Testifying before the Committee on the ' 76., 32. Pleasonton stated that he 

Conduct of the War, Hooker said : "Being started at midnight to execute this order, 

resolved on recrossing the river, ... I The hour was probably later. 



SEDGWICK RECROSSES THE RAPPAHANNOCK 421 

my force recross the river, march down to Banks' Ford, and turn the 
enemy's position in my front [at United States Ford] in so doing."^ 

Benham and Sedgwick had been classmates and friends at West 
Point. As they walked up and down upon the slope on which the men 
were lying at Scott's Ford, Benham cautioned Sedgwick not to recross 
the Rappahannock under any circumstances without his entire com- 
mand, nor without Hooker's express sanction." Acting upon this sug- 
gestion, Sedgwick wrote to Hooker : 

Second Dispatch 
I shall hold my position, as ordered, on south [side] of Rappahannoek. 

The messenger with his first dispatch (11:50 p.m., May 4)^ had to 
ride perhaps 3 miles to reach the place of telegraphing, and Sedgwick 
thought that the messenger with the second one would overtake him, 
but he did not. To Sedgwick's first dispatch Butterfield replied: 

1 a.m. Di-spateh this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and 
prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge this. 

About ten minutes later he received Sedgwick's second dispatch. In 
reply thereto Hooker wrote : 

i;^\> a.m. Yours received, saying you should liold position. Order to with- 
draw countermanded. Acknowledge both. 

Having received the dispatch of 1 a.m., Sedgwick wrote to Butter- 
field: 

2 a.m. General Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces imme- 
diately. 

He acted accordingly. Hooker's messenger with the dispatch coun- 
termanding the order to withdraw was delayed en ro^ite. To this dis- 
patch Sedgwick replied : 

2:30 a.m. Yours just received, countermanding order to withdraw. Almost 
my entire command has crossed over. 

The crossing being completed, this message was supplemented with 
the two following ones to Butterfield : 

5 a.m. The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung, and in process of being taken 
up. The troops are much exhausted. The dispatch countermanding my move- 
ment over the river was received after the troops had crossed. 

7 a.m. I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannoek last night, and am 
in camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up. 

• Rep. of Com., TV, 133. 
* Chancellorsmlle and Gettysburg, by A. Doubleday, p. 66. 
" P. 415 ante. 



422 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

The retreat was covered by the 8 Pa. Cavalry, two companies of 
which swam the river after the pontoons were removed.' 

Early this morning Hall's brigade withdrew from Fredericksburg to 
the north side of the Rappahannock. The 19 Mass. acted as rear-guard. 
Its left wing moved noiselessly to the river-bank and held the head of 
the pontoon bridge, while the right wing as silently fell back upon it. 
The enemy, discovering the movement, followed it up, but as he neared 
the defensive line, received a volley which turned him back. The Massa- 
chusetts regiment made a rush for the river, and gained the pontoon 
bridge. Two officers and half a dozen men with axes severed the shore 
lines which held it on the south side, then leaped into the boats and 
poled across. The bridge slowly drifted down with the current to 
the north shore, and the enemy did not attempt to follow it.^ The three 
bridges were dismantled and taken up between 3 and 7 p.m. 

In preparation for Hooker's withdrawal, Warren and Comstock pre- 
pared an inner line of intrenchment covering the bridges at United 
States Foi'd. Continuous "cover and abatis" were constructed from 
the Rappahannock at Scott 's Dam around to the mouth of Hunting Run 
on the Rapidan, a distance of 3 miles. This was the third line of de- 
fence that Hooker had caused to be prepared. It was not occupied 
to-day. The line which the army had been occupying since the 3d will 
be referred to hereafter as the Chandler line. 

Captain Best, pursuant to Hunt's directions of this morning, put 44 
guns in position on the north bank of the Rappahannock : ^ 10 in the 
bend below United States Ford, to sweep the front of the left of 
Hooker's line, and command all the open ground upon which the 
enemy could place guns to shell the bridges,* and 34 to command the 
ford so as to hold the enemy in check, should he attempt to follow the 
army on its withdrawal.'* The following instructions were issued : 

Circular : 

The Major-General commanding directs that every vehicle in your command 
on this side (south) of the river be sent to the north bank without unnecessary 
delay, under cover of the present fog; all extra animals of every kind to be sent 
over also. This, of course, does not include your necessary artillery and a very 
few ambulances. 

To Reynolds, 8:45 a.m. 

. . . send a most reliable [infantry] regiment (good shots), with a battery, to 
Richards' Ford, axemen with them, to fell trees, and make every possible obstacle 
to the passage of troops on our flank ; to move quickly. The regiment and battery 

^ The Charge at Chancellorsville, by Pen- and 18 of the XII Corps (W. R., 39, pp. 

noek Huey, pp. 73, 74. 676, 206, 303, 310, 350, 361, 674). 

^ History of the 19th Regiment Mass. * xirr, s^i- 

Vol. Infantry, by Committee, p. 208. '' ^irr, ttt, and others. 

= 8 of the I Corps, IS of the II Corps, 



HOOKER'S THIRD LINE OF DEFENCE 423 

must intrench themselves, and be instructed (confidentially) to fight to the death 
in case the enemy approach there. Let them have good supply of rations and 
ammunition by pack-train. I inclose a copy of dispatch to General Pleasonton, 
who will move to the right of Richards' Ford, as soon as he can, from Falmouth. 

[Inelosure] 

To Pleasonton, 8:45 a.m. 

. . . send a brigade of cavalry and a horse battery to guard our right, above 
Richards' Ford. Take intrenching tools with them. General Reynolds will be 
directed to send a regiment of infantry and a battery to Richards' Ford. Ob- 
struct all fords or possible crossings up to Rappahannock Station. Officers and 
men must be instructed to figlit to the death to guard our right. Put most reliable 
and true men on this duty. Will send copy of Reynolds' instructions. 

To Sedgwick, 2:30 p.m. 

. . . you are charged ^\nth the duty of guarding the river. General Gibbon "s 
command is temporarily placed at your disposal for this purpose. The probabili- 
ties now are that [all] the forces on the south bank will retire [across the river] 
to-niglit. You will make dispositions accordingly. . . . 

Pleasonton wrote to Butterfield at 10 : 10 a.m. : 

. . . Have sent [ordered] a brigade of five regiments under Colonel Davis, and 
Martin 's battery, above Richards ' Ford. . . . 

A. Pleasonton. 

The situation of the army was reported to President Lincoln by the 
followin.a: dispatch of 11 a.m. to-day, which was not received until 10 : 45 
a.m. on the 6th : ^ 

. . . The Cavalry [Corps], as yet learned about, have failed in executing their 
orders. Averell's division returned ; nothing done ; loss of 2 or 3 men. Buford's 
Regulars not heard from. General Sedgwick failed in the execution of his orders, 
and was compelled to retire, and crossed the river at Banks' Ford last night; his 
losses not known. 

The I, III, V, XI, XII [Corps], and two divisions of II Conis are now on 
south bank of Rappahannock, intrenched between Hunting Run and Scott's Dam. 
Trains and Artillery Reserve on north bank of Rappahannock. Position is strong, 
but circumstances, which in time will be fully explained, make it expedient, in 
the general's judgment, that he should retire from this position to the north bank 
of the Rappahannock for his defensible position. Among these is danger to his 
communication by possibility of enemy crossing river on our right flank and 
imperiling this army, with present departure of two years' [troops] and three 
months' [nine months'] troops constantly weakening him. The nature of the 
country in which we are prevents moving in such a way as to find or judge of 

1 Rep. of Com., IV, 226. 



424 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

position or movements of enemy. He [Hooker] may cross to-night, but hopes to 
be attacked in this position. 

Daniel Butterfield, 

Slajor-General, Chief of Staff. 

Owing to the censorship of the telegraph by the War Department, the 
news that reached the general public was meager, and the newspapers 
complained bitterly. One of them which supported the administration 
expressed itself thus : 

What does the government mean by this persistent suppression of telegrapliic 
war dispatches from "Washington ? The whole country is in an agony of expecta- 
tion to know the progress of the tremendous combat which is going on in Vir- 
ginia. Why should it not be allowed to know? We have too much respect for 
the members of the cabinet to suppose for a moment that it is done for the benefit 
of stock-jobbers, and yet the whole effect of it is to give them the opportunities 
they so much desire.^ 

As a contemporary record indicative of the state of the public mind 
at this time, the following extract from the diary of a son of General 
Dix is worthy of perusal : 

. . . It would seem that Hooker has beaten Lee, and that Lee has beaten Hooker ; 
that we have taken Fredericksburg, and that the rebels have taken it also ; that we 
have 4500 prisoners, and the rebels 5400; that Hooker has cut off Lee's retreat, 
and Lee has cut off Sedgwick's retreat, and Sedgwick has cut off everybody's 
retreat generally, but has retreated himself although his retreat was cut off ; that 
Longstreet has not left Suffolk at all, and again that he has never been there. In 
short, aU is utter confusion. Everything seems to be everywhere, and everybody 
all over, and there is no getting at any truth. = 

PI eason ton's orders brought him into conflict with Gibbon, to whom 
Sedgwick had practically delegated his authority for the defence of the 
river (Appendix 17). Pleasonton refused to receive orders from 
Gibbon. Regarding his own dispositions he wrote to Butterfield at 
2 : 30 p.m. : 

[I] Have two regiments of cavalry below Fredericksburg, watching river and 
Neck over ten miles down. Hear the rebels did have one pontoon train at Ham- 
ilton's Crossing.^ Have sent for another horse battery to be placed [below] ; 
one ]as now] at Richards' Ford. Will pounce on them if they try to cross in that 
way [by pontoon] to-night below. Would it not be well for the gunboats to push 

' New York Evening Post, May .5, 186.3; ^ Quoted in Memoirs of John Adams Dix, 

quoted from Rhodes, History of the U. S., compiled by his son Morgan Dix, II, 57. 

which see. Vol. IV, pp. 267 and 268 (foot- ^ xhere had been no pontoon train at 

notes), for details of the telegraph censor- Hamilton's Crossing, 
ship. 



APPREHENSION IN THE NORTH 425 

up the Rappahannock as far as they can? They can help a great deal. All 
quiet up to 12 m., at last accounts, up the river and to the rear toward Dumfries. 

A. Pleasonton, 
Brigadier-General Commandiug. 

Butterfield inquired of Magaw whether it would be possible for him 
to send any gunboats up the Rappahannock and received an unfavor- 
able reply, ending, however, with the statement: "If you will assume 
the responsibility, I will send everything under my command up the 
Rappahannock.'" This offer, it seems, was not accepted. 

Lee learned this morning that Sedgwick and Gibbon had withdrawn 
across the river ; and regarding Hooker, received the following commu- 
nication : 

Stuart to Taylor, 8:45 a.m. 

. . . the forced reconnaissance in our front, which I have ordered, discovered 
the enemy in force in earthworks, artillery and infantry. About thirteen pieces 
of artillery are said to bear on our center. About 200 spades and picks would be 
very acceptable toward burying the dead of the enemy and horses dead near the 
hospital [Chancellorsville?] and lines. Can they be had from Early's line? Our 
own dead are nearly all buried.^ 

Hooker to Lee 

I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending a burial party on 
the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead and care for the wounded officers 
and soldiers of my command. 

No answer was made to this dispatch to-day. Medical Director Let- 
terman was ordered this morning to remove all the wounded without 
delay, but to use only ambulances already on the south side of the 
river; the provost marshal at the river had orders to allow no ambu- 
lances to return when they had once passed to the north bank. Num- 
bers of the wounded would have been left behind, had not the medical 
director, after much solicitation, obtained permission late in the day to 
take ambulances from the north side of the river. With the transporta- 
tion thus secured, all the wounded were got across before the troops 
commenced crossing." 

The telegraph station was moved half a mile back toward the river 
to be reestablished, but the line was broken by the retreating troops. 

By General Lee's order, Jackson was moved to-day from the hospital 
at Wilderness Tavern to a house near Guiney's Station. Being asked 
what he thought of Hooker's plan of campaign, he replied : 

It was in the main a good conception, an excellent plan. But he should not 
have sent away his cavalry ; that was his great blunder. It was that which enabled 

^ Naval W. R., Series I, Vol. V. p. 264. ^ Medical Recollections of the Army of 

'WB 108, p. 702. "»e Potomac, by Jonathan Letterman, pp. 

137, 138. 



426 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

me to turn him without his being aware of it, and to take him in the rear. Had 
he kept his cavalry witli him, his plan would have been a very good one.' 

Lee wrote to President Davis from Guiney's Station: 

At the close of the battle of Chancellorsville on Sunday [3d] the enemy was 
reported advancing from Fredericksburg in our rear. General McLaws was sent 
back to arrest his progress, and repulsed him handsomely that afternoon at 
Tabernacle Church. Learning that his force consisted of two corps under Gen- 
eral Sedgwick, I determined to attack it. Leaving a sufficient force to hold 
General Hooker in cheek, who had not recrossed the Rappahannock, as was 
reported, but occupied a strong position in front of the U. S. Ford, I marched 
back yesterday with General Anderson, and uniting with McLaws and Early in 
the afternoon, succeeded, by the blessing of Heaven, in driving General Sedgwick 
over the river. We have reoceupied Fredericksburg, and no enemy remains south 
of the Rappahannock in its vicinity. - 

Leaving Early's division and Barksdale's brigade to hold the lines of 
Fredericksburg as before, and disregarding for the present the position 
of Banks' Ford, Lee ordered McLaws' and Anderson's divisions (in- 
cluding Wilcox's brigade) to march to the vicinity of Chancellorsville. 
The marching and fighting of the last four days had reduced the num- 
bers and sapped the strength of the troops, but did not prevent their 
responding with alacrity to this new call i;pon their martial spirit. ' ' As 
I sheltered myself," says the correspondent of the London Times, "in 
a little farm-house on the Plank Road, the brigades of Anderson's 
division came splashing through the mud in wild tumultuous spirits, 
singing, shouting, jesting, heedless of soaking rags, drenched to the 
skin, and burning again to mingle in the mad revelry of battle." '* Lee 
had resolved to attack Hooker on both flanks, directing Anderson and 
McLaws against his left on the Mineral Spring Road, and Stuart 
against his right on the Hunting Run. Before the lines could be 
formed for attack Stuart's troops had to be relieved by Anderson and 
McLaws opposite the Federal left. It was late and dark when the 
preparations for the assault were completed, and Lee was obliged to 
put off the formidable task till the morrow.'* He directed Colonel Alex- 
ander of the artillery to accompany Captain Johnston of the engineers 
to reconnoiter a position whence the Federal line of battle on the Min- 
eral Spring Road "could be reached." Alexander moved his whole 
battalion by the River Road to such a position, and in the course of the 
night had six gun-pits partially constructed. The Federal artillery 

^Stonewall Jackson and the American ^ Stoneu-all Jackson, hy hieutenant-Colo- 

Civil War, by Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. R. nel Henderson, II, 571. 

Henderson, II, 572. * The Crisis of the Confederacy, by Cecil 

= W. R., 39, pp. 794. 795. Battine. p. 91. 



CONCENTRATION AGAINST HOOKER 427 

across the river, without having observed the work of the Confederates, 
intrenched itself also during the night. 

Under cover of darkness and a drenching rain, the retreat of the 
Federals commenced about 7:15 p.m., the artillery leading. The 
bridges were covered with pine boughs to deaden the sound. About 
10 o'clock, hardly half of the artillery having crossed, the movement 
was interrupted by a sudden rise in the river so great as to submerge 
the ends of the bridges on the north side, and the velocity of the current 
threatened to sweep them away.i Some of the batteries that had moved 
toward the river were sent back to their positions. The infantry was 
still in the Chandler line, with pickets out (Map 39). 

^ Captain Candler says tliat the river rose 6 feet 8 inches in two hours 
(manuscript). 



CHAPTER XXVII 

EETUEN TO STAPFORD HEIGHTS. DEATH OF JACKSON 

MAY 6. When the order was given for the army to recross the 
river, General Hooker was almost the first man to cross, "leav- 
ing everything to his corps commanders."' At midnight (5th-6th) 
Meade sent word to Couch that the river was over the bridges, that 
Hooker was on the other side, and that communication with him was 
cut off. Couch immediately rode over to Hooker's late headquarters, 
and satisfied himself that he was in command of the army. He pro- 
ceeded with Sickles and Reynolds to Meade's headquarters to confer 
as to what should be done, and told Meade that the crossing was sus- 
pended. "We will stay where we are," he said, "and fight it out." 
He then went to his tent, and turned in, as he thought, for the night. 

Meade, it seems, was not satisfied with the situation in which Couch 
had thus placed him. At any rate, he directed Major Biddle of his 
staff to cross the river by way of United States Ford, find General 
Hooker, and ask for orders. The aide found the army commander fast 
asleep on the floor of a house. He awakened Butterfield, and reporting 
the situation, was told that the order for a retreat was imperative. On 
communicating this reply to Meade, Biddle was directed to transmit it 
to Reynolds. "Tell General Meade," said Reynolds, "that some one 
should be waked up to take command of this army." Who, if any one, 
was consequently waked up, history does not tell. At 2 a.m., however. 
Couch was roused to receive a sharp message from Hooker about re- 
crossing the army as he had directed. 

One of the bridges had been taken up, and used to piece out the other 
two, making the passage feasible. It was now resumed, and was con- 
tinued through the dark, rainy night. The batteries which were wait- 
ing at the river commenced again to recross. General Hunt sought 
General Hooker on the north side of the river, and proposed to him to 
postpone the movement for one day, as it was certain that the army 
could not all cross in a night. He expressed himself as doubtful whether 
the artillery could all go over before daylight.^ But Hooker refused to 
suspend the movement, and it proceeded, disturbed only by the rain, which 

' Private letter of Captain Candler, aide- 2 The Campaign of ChanceUorsviUe, by 

de-camp. May 7, 1863. "It was so differ- T. A. Dodge, p. 230. 
ent," says Candler, "from his former acts." 



HOOKER RECROSSES THE RAPPAHANNOCK 429 

flooded the trenches so that they had to be cut through to let the water out. 
The infantry commenced withdrawing from the intrenchments, leaving 
its pickets out. These were to veil the retreat of the army at all hazards. 
Under their protection the columns marched back by their several roads 
to the vicinity of the ford, except the infantry of the V Corps, which 
took position on the third line of defence, the Second and Third Di- 
xdsions in the trenches, the First Division in rear of them as support. 
The bulk of the infantry, near the ford, was ployed into masses to wait 
for their turns to cross (Map 39). Every effort was made to keep the 
ammunition dry, but it is doubtful whether at this time half of the 
muskets in the army could have been discharged. Sleep was out of the 
question. It has been remarked by writers on this campaign that a 
sudden onset by the enemy or a few shells dropped among the masses 
of troops assembled near the bridges would have precipitated a panic 
that would have resulted in the destruction of the army.' It may be 
answered that the V Corps, reenforced perhaps by other troops, would 
have taken care of the onset, and that the Army of the Potomac had 
been so inured to shell-fire that its only etTect in this case would have 
been to cause a deplojTuent of the masses into lines of battle. The 
army might, however, have been placed in a serious predicament, had 
the enemy been able to train a gim upon its bridges. As already stated, 
this danger had been anticipated and provided against by General 
Hunt. As Hunt had apprehended, it was daylight before the artillery 
had all crossed. About this time the infantry pickets commenced fall- 
ir ^ back, unobserved by the enemy. The artillery being all over, the 
masses of infantry, soon after daylight, commenced recrossing. Par- 
ties of Confederate skirmishers moved out to feel the Federal pickets, 
and finding them gone, pushed on after them. The Federal pickets halted 
occasionally to fire at them. In the meantime the masses of infantry 
had finished crossing; they were followed by the Third and Second 
Divisions, and these by the First Division of the V Corps. The First 
Division (GriiSn's) was selected to cross last because it was strong in 
numbers, composed of veterans who had fought on the Peninsula, while 
Sykes' division was numerically weak, and Humphreys' was made xip 
almost wholly of new regiments. The last brigade to cross was Barnes', 
Griffin's 1st brigade. It waited on the south bank the arrival of the 
pickets coming from the front under General Ayres, the field officer of 
the day. As the main column toiled up the north bank of tlie Eai^pa- 
hannock, many a backward look was taken at these last troops in con- 
tact with the enemy. Before they reached the bridges or the protection 
of Barnes' brigade they came under cover of the Federal artillery on 
the north side of the river. The pickets having crossed, Barnes ' brigade 

^Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, II, 432; The Campaign of Chancellorsville, 
by T. A. Dodge, pp. 231. 232. 



430 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

proceeded to follow them, with a rear-guard formed of detachments 
from the 18 Mass. and 118 Pa. 

A portion of the army sujiposed that it was making a flank march of 
great importance, but the general belief among officers and men was 
that they were retreating beaten. "The wonder of the private soldiers 
was great. How could they have been beaten with so little fighting! 
How had one half of the army been defeated while the other half had 
not fought? The muttered curses were prolonged and deep as they 
plodded back in the mud to their old camps." * Somewhere among the 
disgnmtled soldiery, having recrossed the river with the army, was 
the party of ladies that had experienced the bombardment of the Chan- 
cellor House.^ On account of the information which they possessed they 
could not be sent into the Confederate lines until after the campaign. 

Lee, having passed the night in complete ignorance of Hooker's move- 
ment, sent off this morning a report in which, after correcting a former 
misrepresentation, he makes another as serious as the one that he cor- 
rected. 

Near Chaneellorsville, via Fredericksburg, May 6, 1863. 
Hon. Secretary of War. 
Sir: 

General Hooker did not reeross the Rappahannock after his defeat on Sun- 
daj^ (May 3), but retreated to a strong position in front of the United States 
Ford, where he is now fortifying himself, with a view, I presume, of holding a 
position this side of the Rappahannock. I understand from prisoners that he 
is awaiting reenforcements, and that, among others, General Heintzelman [com- 
manding Department of Washington] is expected. I have received none of the 
troops ordered from south of the James River. ... I had hoped that Longstreet 
would have been here before tliis time. ... I hope every effort will be made to 
restore the railroads, else we shall have to abandon this country. 

Very respectfully, 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 

Lee says in his report of the campaign : 

Preparations M'ere made to assail the enemy's works at daylight on the 6th, but 
on advancing our skirmishers, it was found that under cover of the storm and 
darkness of the night he had retreated over the river.'' 

This statement is incorrect. The Federals had not completed their 
crossing at daylight. Their retreat was not performed under cover 
only of "the storm and darkness of the night." That some of them 
were not driven into the river was due mainly to the protection afforded 

' Recollections of a Private, by Goss, p. ]63. 

' Manuscript letter of Captain Murray F. Taylor, C. S. A. 

3 W. B., 39, p. 802. 



FAILURE OF PURSUIT 4^ 

by the Federal artillery on the north bank, as Lee himself testified, 
writing to Davis on the 7th : 

. . . The line of skirmishers was pressed forward until they came within range 
of the enemy's batteries, planted north of the Rajipahannock, which, from the 
configuration of the ground, completely commanded this side. His army, there- 
fore, escaped with the loss of a few additional prisoners/ 

It would seem from the statements of a prominent Southern writer 
that Lee was dissatisfied with some of his own officers for having failed 
to discover Hooker's retreat and to intercept or harass it. Jed. Hotch- 

kiss says: 

Just at dawn, on the morning of the 6th, as Lee was about to order an advance, 
General Pender came galloping to his field headquarters under a tent-fly at Fair- 
view cemetery, and informed him that his skirmishers had advanced and found 
Hooker gone. In surprise he exclaimed: "Why, General Pender! That is what 
you young men always do. You allow these people to get away. I tell you what 
to do, but you don't do it." - 

This interview must have taken place after "dawn." It was some 
time after daylight before the Confederate skirmishers discovered that 
the Federal army had withdrawn. 

Before the Committee ou the Conduct of the War Hooker represented 
that his recrossiug of the river was consequent upon Sedgwick's with- 
drawal, and with a view to resuming offensive operations below Fred- 
ericksburg. "As soon," he said, "as I heard that General Sedgwick 
had recrossed the river, seeing no object in maintaining my position 
where I was, and believing that it would be much more to my advantage 
to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin's Crossing, where 
I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army on the right was directed 
to recross the river. "^ Almost in the same breath he gave the testi- 
mony already cited to the effect that he had decided on withdrawing 
before he called his corps commanders together, or before Sedgwick 
conamenced to withdraw. 

Sedgwick's withdrawal deprived him of all hope of flanking Lee and 
driving him off the direct line of communication with Richmond. But- 
terfield said: 

He [Hooker] felt that he could remain perfectly well on the south side of the 
river, and possibly force the enemy to fall back; but as the enemy would fall 
back toward Richmond, they would constantly become stronger and go into their 
fortifications there, while we should grow weaker.* 

At dawn this morning Colonel Alexander put Eubank 's 4 Napoleons 
and 2 of Jordan's rifles in his unfinished gun-pits under Jordan, and 

1 Richmond Whig, May 8, 1863. ^ Rep. of Com., IV, 133, 134. 

' Confederate Military History, III, 392. * Ih., 77. 



432 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

proceeded with the construction of his works. The Federal artillery 
across the river was on the lookout for him. Winegar's and Pettit's 
batteries (j-ln' rn) ^^ *^^ main line of guns and Atwell's (.j^) in the 
flank position opened an annoying fire on the men working on the 
pits. One of their first shells went through the roof of the Hayden 
House, and some of the inmates left it with agonizing screams. About 
9 a.m. Alexander imdertook to drive off the Federal pieces with Moody's 
and Parker's batteries and a 24-pounder howitzer of Woolfolk's— 7 
guns in all. They took position in front of Winegar's and Pettit's 
batteries, and opened fire, assisted by the six guns in the pits. The 
Federal batteries continued their fire, and Thompson's (l-\ joined 
Atwell's („-5ii) in firing from a position on which Alexander's guns 
could not be brought to bear. After a duel of about three quarters of 
an hour between the 22 Federal and 13 Confederate pieces, the latter 
were silenced. In the meantime Alexander had perceived that the Fed- 
erals had all withdrawn across the river, and his works were therefore 
useless. 

At 6:30 a.m. the following instructions were issued, looking to the 
reunion of the wings of Hooker 's army : 

General headquarters to-night will be at the old camp near Falmouth. Corps 
commanders will send a staff officer for orders at 6 p.m., to report their locations 
for the night, as fixed on the old map of the camp of occupation. . . . 

Barnes' brigade was left at United States Ford to assist in taking up 
the bridges. About 9 a.m., the troops having crossed, the bridges were 
swung. So nervous were the engineers lest the enemy shoiild come 
upon them at their work, that they did not even wait to pull up anchors, 
but cut every cable, and cast loose,~glad enough to see their flotilla on 
the retreat after the army, and more gratified still at not being attacked 
during the operation. * The engineers and the men of Barnes' brigade 
assisting them were the last troops to cross the river. It was half-past 
four in the afternoon when the bridges were dismantled and loaded on 
the trucks, and the train started for Falmouth, escorted by Barnes' 
brigade. The storm was still raging. 

Captain Candler wrote home : 

... I hear the army moves at 12 m. [to-morrow]. If so, thank God. If not. 
Heaven only knows what will be the end. The army is in as good spirits as when 
we went out. It is perfectly marvelous. ... I have not had twelve hours' sleep 
in five days. 

Eegarding the danger of a passage of the Rappahannock by the 
enemy above Hooker's right, Pleasonton wrote to Butterfield at 7 a.m.: 

1 Hard Tarl- mid Coffee, by .T. 1). Billniffs. p. 383. 



THE LAST BRIDGES TAKEN UP 438 

Just heard from brigade on the right (^^) up to 6 p.m. last night. Were at 
Deep Run, and found that stream impassable. The Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cav- 
alry have pickets at Morrisville, Kelley's and Ellis' Fords. Scouts from the 
other side of the river report no enemy this side of the Rapidan. The brigade is 
1700 .strong, without the battei-y. 

Lee could not venture across the Kappahannock. Assuming that he 
could have gathered together the necessary bridge material, and that 
the Army of the Potomac was as inferior in prowess to the Army of 
Northern Virginia, or as demoralized by its recent reverse, as he now 
naturally believed it to be, he could not, for lack of supplies, have kept 
his army north of the Rappahannock long enough to strike or attempt 
to strike an effective blow. He must have appreciated, too, the risks 
that he would run of losing, or being severed from, his bridges over the 
high and turbulent river in his rear. "At Chancellorsville, " he is re- 
ported to have said, "we gained another victory; our people were wild 
with delight. I, on the contrary, was more depressed than after Fred- 
ericksburg; our loss was severe, and again we had gained not an inch 
of groimd, and the enemy could not be pursued." ^ 

A detachment was left at Chancellorsville to guard the battle-field, 
while the wounded were removed, and the captured property collected. 
The rest of the army returned to the lines of Fredericksburg. 

Lincoln telegraphed to Hooker, 12 :25 p.m. : 

We have through General Dix the contents of Richmond papers of the 5th. . . . 
The substance is, General Lee's dispatch of the 3d (Sunday) claiming that he 
had beaten you, and that you were then retreating across the Rappahannock, dis- 
tinctly stating that two of Longstreet's divisions' fought you on Saturday, and 
that General Paxton was killed, Stonewall Jackson severely wounded, and Gen- 
erals Heth and A. P. Hill slightly wounded. The Richmond papers also stated, 
upon what authority not mentioned, that our cavalry have been at Ashland, 
Hanover Court-House, and other points, destroying several locomotives, and a 
good deal of other property, and all the railroad bridges to vrithin 5 miles of 
Richmond. 

12:30 p.m. 

Just as I had telegraphed you contents of Richmond papers, showing that our 
cavalry has not failed. I received General Butterfield's, of 11 a.m. yesterday. 
This, with the great rain of yesterday and last night, securing your right flank, 
I think, puts a new face upon your case, but you must be the judge. 

Lincoln wrote this dispatch imder the impression that Hooker was 
still on the south side of the Rappahannock. By referring to Butter- 
field's dispatch, it will be seen that it was Hooker's line of communica- 
tion, not his right flank, that was thought to be imperiled. 

» Address of Colonel Chapman Biddle, Hist. Soc. of Pa., March «, 18S0. 
- Anderson's and MeLaws'. 



434 THE CAiMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Hooker, probably on receipt of this message, issued the following 
circular : 

Corps Commanders: 

The major-general commanding directs that you have your command well in 
hand, arms inspected, ammunition dry, and everything in readiness for action 
by to-morrow p.m. 

To Noah Brooks, who was at the White House, Lincoln stated that, 
while still without any positive information as to the result of the 
fighting at Chancellorsville, he was certain in his own mind that 
"Hooker had been licked." He was only then wondering whether 
Hooker would be able to recover himself and renew the fight. Later in 
the day he got positive information. "I shall never," says Noah 
Brooks, "forget that picture of despair. He held a telegram in his 
hand, and as he closed the door and came toward us, I mechanically 
noticed that his face, usually sallow, was ashen in hue. The paper on 
the wall behind him was of the tint known as 'French gray,' and even 
in that moment of sorrow and dread expectation I vaguely took in the 
thought that the complexion of the anguished President's visage was 
almost exactly like that of the wall. He gave me the telegram, and, in 
a voice trembling with emotion, said, 'Read it— news from the army.' " * 

It read as follows : 

Headcjuarters Army of the Potomac, May 6, 1863, 1 p.m.- 
His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States: 

I have just returned from above, and find your two dispatches to General 

Hooker, and one from him to me, directing me to telegraph you that the army has 

reerossed the river; that the bridges are up, and that all are under orders to 

return to camp. Your dispatches were sent to him, and by this time he has 

probably received them. „ t^ 

^ Danl. Butterfield, 

Major-General, Chief of Staff. 

"The appearance of the President," says Noah Brooks, "as I read 
aloud these fateful words, was piteous. Never, as long as I knew him, 
did he seem to be so broken up, so dispirited, and so ghostlike. Clasp- 
ing his hands behind his back, he walked up and down the room, saying, 
' My God, my God, what will the country say ! What will the country 
say I' He seemed incapable of uttering any other words than these, and 
after a little time he hurriedly left the room. ..." 

The New York Herald said in an editorial : 

Terrible will be the responsibility of President Lincoln and his cabinet and 
his chiefs of the war office should their ruinous policy of underrating the enemy 

^ Washington in Lincoln's Time, by Noah Conduct of the War gives the hour of send- 
Brooks, p. 57. ing as 1 : 15 and the hour of receipt as 

''The Report of the Committee on the 1:35 (IV, 227). 



DISAPPOINTMENT AND :\rORTIFICATION 435 

and trusting to luck result in another disastrous campaign of the Army of the 
Potomac. AVe shrink from the contemplation of the fearful consequences which 
in this event may befall the administration and the country. 

Before the day was out a correspondeut wrote to the New York 
Times: 

The news that Hooker and his army had reerossed the Rappahannock flashed 
through Washington about 5 o'clock this afternoon. The impression produced by 
it was profound. Men's minds were cast down from the congratulatory cheer- 
fulness with which all had for three days discussed the events which succeeded 
the brilliant passages of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. ... It made men 
silent and thoughtful beyond anything I have ever seen in ^\"a.shington. 

The wildest rumors were set on foot ; but it was known that the Presi- 
dent and General Halleek had gone to the front, taking a special steamer 
at the navy yard at four o 'clock that afternoon. It was commonly be- 
lieved that Hooker was or would be put under arrest; that Halleek 
would be ])laced in command of the Army of the Potomac ; that Stanton 
had resigned ; that Lee had cut Hooker to pieces, and was approaching 
A^'ashington by way of Dumfries; that McClellan was coming on a 
special train from New York, and that Sigel, Butler, Fremont, and sev- 
eral other shelved generals had been sent for.' Many men who were 
earnest in support of the war gave up all idea that the South could be 
conquered. But the general feeling of the country, as well as of the 
army, was one of disappointment and mortification rather than of dis- 
couragement or despair. The general gloom and sickness at heart that 
followed the first and second Bull Kun, the defeat of McClellan before 
Richmond, and the battle of Fredericksburg, did not manifest them- 
selves in anything like the same degree.- 

The following messages went over the wires : 

Governor Morgan. New YorJf, to President Lincoln, 3 p.m. 
Nothing will so cheer the hearts of all good men as the immediate reenforee- 
ment of General Hooker by troops from around Washington, Fort Jlonroe, and 
Suffolk. 

Ilooker to Lincoln. i:30 p.m. 

Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of 
11 a.m.-'' and 12:30. The army had previously reerossed the river, and was on 
its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this 
advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the 
prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my 
troops have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place nearer 
at hand. Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of 
the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing. 

' Washington in Lincoln's Time, by Noah Brooks, pp. 58, 59. 
2 Rhodes' History of the U. S.. IV. 266. ^ >jot found. 



436 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Seward, Secretary of State, to Morgan, Governor of New York 

General Hooker has had, has now, and will have, everything he asks for by 
telegraph, which is always in full connection with the War Department. He 
knows best what he wants, and when and where, and directs everything according 
to his own plans. He reports confidentially that only three corps of his army, all 
told, have been engaged. You need not be told that this is less than half of the 
army in his command and actually with him. Further accumulation of troops, 
not called for by him, would exhaust his supplies and endanger his plans. Be 
patient. 

Lee to Hooker 

I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, requesting permission 
to send a burial party to attend to your dead and wounded on the battle-field of 
Chancellorsville. I regret that their position is such, being immediately within 
our lines, that the necessities of war forbid my compliance with your request, 
which under other circumstances it would give me pleasure to grant. I will 
accord to your dead and wounded the same attention which I bestow upon my 
own ; but if there is anything which your medical director here requires which 
we cannot provide, he shall have my permission to receive from you such medical 
supplies as you may think proper to furnish. Consideration for your wounded 
prompts me to add that, from what I learn, their comfort would be greatly pro- 
moted by additional medical attendance and medical supplies. 

Stanton to Hooker, 8:30 p.m} 

The President and General-in-Chief left here this afternoon at 4 o'clock to see 
you. They are probably at Aquia by this time. 

May 7. About 10 o 'clock this morning a special train consisting of a 
locomotive and a single box car arrived at Falmouth, bringing from 
Aquia Creek the President and Major-General Halleck. They were im- 
mediately conducted to a carriage, and, with a solitary cavalryman on 
either side, escorted to the headquarters of General Hooker. The 
President, after he had conferred with Hooker, returned to Washing- 
ton, writing him the following letter probably en route: 

The recent movement of your army is ended without efi:eeting its object, except, 
perhaps, some important breakings of the enemy's communications. What next? 
If possible, I would be very glad of another movement early enough to give us 
some benefit from the fact of the enemy's communication being broken; but 
neither for this rea.son or [sic] any other do I wish anything done in desperation 
or rashness. An early movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effects 
of the recent one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already 
in your mind a plan wholly or partially formed 1 If you have, prosecute it with- 
out interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incom- 
petent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for the army. 

1 Hep. of Com., IV, 228. 



LINCOLN REVISITS THE ARMY 437 

The President left Halleck with the army, to remain until he knew 
"everything." The President's letter elicited the following reply: 

... I do not deem it expedient to suspend operations on this line, fi"om the 
reverse we have experienced in endeavoring to extricate the army from its present 
position. If in the first efi:ort we failed, it was not for want of strength or con- 
duct of the small number of troops actually engaged, but from a cause which 
could not be foreseen, and could not be provided against.' After its occurrence, 
the chances of success were so much lessened that I felt another plan might be 
adopted in place of that we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its 
results. At all events, a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other 
case it was certain to follow the absence of success. I may add that this consid- 
eration almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return to its old 
camp. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only 
decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn the feeling of the troops. 
They should not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no fault of theirs (if I 
may except one corps) that our last efforts were not crowned with glorious vic- 
tory. I suppose details are not wanted of me at this time. I have decided in my 
own mind the plan to be adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to 
have one made. It has tliis to recommend it: It will be one in which the opera- 
tions of all the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, wiU be within my personal 
supervision. 

The following circular was issued at 12 :15 p.m. : 

Corps commanders will have three days' rations issiied and ready to cook at 
short notice ; lost knapsacks replaced, and supplies on hand to fill them ; arms and 
equipments in order ; a full supply of ammunition ; everything prepared for at 
once resuming active operations. 

Captain Candler wrote home : 

I am of the opinion that we will move within twenty-four hours. The report 
now is that Johnny Reb retreated at the same time we came back, and that the 
pontoons are to be thrown across at Fredericksburg to-morrow morning. . . . 
it will be found out that the enemy was retiring at the same time we were. . . . 
It is my opinion that already they have commenced their retrograde march on 
Gordonsville, and that the troops seen in our front are only a rear-guard. We 
shaU undoubtedly attack again in twenty-four hours. 

Lee wrote : 

To Critcher 

. take position on the right of the infantry, beginning at Moss Neck Mill, 
and picketing as before down the Rappahannock. Keep a good lookout and 
report any movement of the enemy that may be discovered.^ 

1 The rout of the XI Corps. - W. R., 108. p. 705. 



438 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

To Longstreet 

. . . My letter of the 1st instant' to which you refer was intended to apprise 
you of my intended movement [Jackson's flank march] and to express the wish 
rather than the expectation that one of your divisions could cooperate in it. I 
did not intend to express the opinion that you could reach me in time, as I did 
not think it practicable. The emergency that made your presence so desirable 
has passed for the present. . . . The only immediate service that your troops 
could render would be to protect our communications from the enemy's cavalry, 
and assist in punishing them for the damage they have done. 

Longstreet wrote to the Secretary of War : 

His Excellency the President expressed the desire last night [May 6] that I 
should join General Lee at Fredericksburg at once. 

I regard the opening and securing the communication of General Lee's army 
with this city [as] of the first importance, and fear that this may not be accom- 
plished if I leave it unfinished. There are some indications, too, that the enemy 
may bring one or two other columns against this city with the hope of getting pos- 
session by a sudden dash. I think it more important that these things should be 
considered, and that we should have our forces so in hand as to meet any such 
contingency. I propose, therefore, to remain here until I can so arrange and 
dispose of my forces as to free General Lee 's army of the force which now threat- 
ens his communications." 

For the reassurance of the Federal armies and the Northern public 
the following bulletin was sent from the War Department to Generals 
Grant, Rosecrans, Dix, Pope, Burnside, and Curtis, and to the govern- 
ors of all the Northern states : 

The President and General-in-Chief have just returned from the Army of the 
Potomac. Tlie principal operation of General Hooker failed, but there has been 
no serious disaster to the organization and efficiency of the army. It is now occu- 
pying its former position on the Rappahannock, having recrossed the river with- 
out any loss in the movement. Not more than one third of General Hooker's force 
was engaged. General Stoneman's operations have been a brilliant success. A 
part of his force advanced to within 2 miles of Richmond, and the enemy's com- 
munications have been cut in every direction. The Army of the Potomac will 
speedily resume offensive operations. 

The melancholy correspondence relating to the Federal dead and 
wounded proceeded as follows : 

Hooker to Lee, 8 p.m. 
... If agreeable to you, I would like to send medical supplies and attendance 
to my wounded, and, at such times as the state of the stream will permit, send 
ambulances for them via the fords designated in your communications, viz., 

1 Not found. J. B. .Jr. = W. R., 20, p. 10.50. 



REASSURANCE 439 

United States and Banks' Fords. . . . Upon an intimation from you as to any 
deficiency in your immediate necessities of medical supplies of your own, by 
reason of their use for my wounded or other causes, I shall with pleasure replace 
them. 

Lee to Hooker 

The reasons that prevented me from complying with your request with refer- 
ence to your wounded no longer existing, I have the honor to inform you that you 
can extend to them such attention as they may require. All persons whom it may 
be necessary to send within my lines for this purpose will remain until the 
wounded are finally disposed of. The burial of your dead has already been 
provided for. 

At daylight this morning Dr. McGuire, Jackson's medical director, 
was aroused and informed that the general was suffering great pain. 
An examination disclosed pneumonia of the right lung. This complica- 
tion was due to Jackson's persisting, in opposition to Dr. McGuire 's 
urgent dissuasion, in treating a cold which he had by the application of 
wet blankets.^ 

Toward evening he became better, and hopes were again entertained 
of his recovery. Mrs. Jackson arrived with her infant child, and con- 
tributed her tender and faithful nursing to the skilful and no less faith- 
ful attendance that he was receiving from the doctor. 

May 8. The hopes that Jackson would recover were of short dura- 
tion. On the 8th his wounds were found to be doing well, and the pain 
in his side had disappeared, but he breathed with difficulty, and com- 
plained of a feeling of exhaustion. On the 9th his breathing was less 
difficult, but he grew steadily weaker. About daylight on the 10th Mrs. 
Jackson informed him that his recovery was very doubtful. He con- 
tinued to lose strength with increasing rapidity. About half-past one 
he was told that he had but two hours to live. "Very good, it is all 
right," he answered feebly, but firmly. After lying for some time un- 
conscious, he came to himself, crying out : ' ' Order A. P. Hill to prepare 
for action! Pass the infantry to the front! Tell Major Hawks—" 
leaving the sentence unfinished. Once more he was silgnt; but soon 
afterward said very quietly and clearly, with an expression as if of 
relief: "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the 
trees." It was his last utterance. General Stonewall Jackson was dead. 

1 Memoirs of the Confederate War, by H. von Boreke, II, 259; General Pendleton, 
in Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton, D.D., by his daughter, p. 269. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

OPEKATIONS OF INDEPENDENT CAVALEi' 

Mosby 

THE movement which Stuart suggested to Mosby on the 26th of 
April, with a view to interrupting the railroad communication 
in rear of Stoneman's camp, culminated on the 3d of May in a dash at 
a brigade of Major-General Stahel's cavalry division at Warrenton 
Junction. About daylight Mosby started with a following of from 75 
to 100 men from the vicinity of Warrenton, intending to strike at 
Hooker's trains and depots, between Aquia and United States Ford. 
But arriving within a couple of miles of the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, and learning that a force of Federal cavalry was encamped 
on it, he changed his plan and adopted this force as his objective. He 
succeeded in surprising the outpost of the 1 W. Va. Cavalry. A large 
part of the regiment was caught in a building and compelled to surren- 
der. The attackers were then in turn attacked by the 5 N. Y. Cavalry. 
The Northern sabers soon drove the Southern pistols from the field, and 
compelled the release of most of the prisoners.^ Another Federal regi- 
ment (1 Vt.) was at hand, but not engaged. It was this affair that gave 
rise to-day in Hooker's army to the rumor that Fitzhugh Lee had 
crossed the Upper Rappahannock.' 

Mosby himself comments on it as follows : 

"These [Federal] troops had just been sent up [from Fairfax Court- 
House] to replace Stoneman's. I committed a great blunder in allowing 
myself to be diverted by their presence from the purpose of my expe- 
dition. They were perfectly harmless where they were, and could not 
help Hooker in the battle then raging. I should at least have endeav- 
ored to avoid a fight by marching around them. If I had succeeded in 
destroying them all, it would hardly have been the equivalent of the 

' One of the Federal commanders says all Brigadier-General Abercrombie (Federal) 

but 2 (W. R., 39, p. 1106). Mosby says he puts the attacking force at "about 125 men" 

kept 8 (*., 40, p. 861). He gives the (*., pp. 1105, 1106). Major Chamberlain, 

strength of his command as "not over 100 commanding the 1 W. Va., says his men 

men." The Federal General Stahel says it were attacked "by about 1000 rebel cavalry" 

consisted of Mosby's "band of guerillas, {ib., p. 1106). See also ib., pp. 1104 and 

together with a portion of the Black Horse 1105, and Historic Records of the 5 N. Y., 

cavali-y and a portion of a North Caro- by L. N. Boudrj'e, pp. 55, 56. 

lina regiment [2d]" {ib., 39, p. 1104). ' = P. 380 ante. 

440 



MOSBY ERRS IN JUDGMENT 441 

damage I might have done to Hooker by appearing at United States 
Ford during the agony of the fight. There all of his wagons were parked. 
It would be difficult to calculate the demoralizing effect of the news on 
his army that the enemy was in the rear, and their trains and rations 
were burning up.'" 

Stoneman 

On the 29th of April, having followed the army across the Rappa- 
hannock, Stoneman camped, as already stated, at Madden (Map 10). 

Aj)iil 30. At daylight this morning he prepared to resume his march 
with as few encumbrances as possible. All the pack-mules and led horses 
were started toward Germanna Ford to follow in rear of the army. No 
supplies were retained except three days' subsistence and three days' 
short forage (ten povmds to the ration), and forty carbine and twenty 
pistol cartridges per man, all of which were to be carried on the horses 
of the men and officers. Not a wheel of any description accompanied 
the expedition, outside of the artillery." Stoneman wanted to reach 
Verdiersville by the interval between Mountain Run and Clark's Moun- 
tain, and selected Raccoon Ford as his point of crossing. But satisfied 
that he would find this point guarded, he ordered Buford to cross at 
Mitchell's Ford, about 6 miles below, and open up Raccoon Ford. At 
9 a.m. he received Averell's note of the 29th informing him that Stuart 
was ignorant of his ( Stoneman 's) whereabouts.^ 

Buford reached Mitchell's Ford about 11 a.m. and found it impracti- 
cable. His leading squadron under Lieutenant Mason swam across, and 
marched up the right bank. About 12 m. the remainder of the brigade 
crossed at Morton's Ford, and detached a squadron to accompany 
Mason's as advance-guard. 

The two squadrons under Mason scoured the country to Somerville 
Ford. The remainder of the brigade marched to Raccoon Ford, and 
finding it practicable, was joined by the main body under Stoneman. 
The rear of the column got over about 10 p.m., when the whole command 
went into bivouac. Stoneman heard that Stuart with Fitzhugh Lee's 
brigade crossed this morning at Somerville Ford, and that he proceeded 
toward Fredericksburg.^ He had allowed no fires to be made, as his 
camp was in plain view of the Confederate signal station on Clark's 
Mountain, and issued orders for the command to be in the saddle at 
2 'clock in the morning, and in the meantime to stand to horse without 
unsaddling. A dense fog settled down in the valley; it became very 

> Moshi/'s War Reminiscences, pp. 130- " P. 202 ante. 

]^32 * Stuart erossed. as previously stated, 

' For further details of the lo^stics of about midnight (29th-30th) at Raccoon 
"Stonenian's Raid" the reader is referred Ford (R. E. Lee's report, W. R., 39, p. 
to the report of Stoneman's chief quarter- 797; Stuart's report, ib., p. 1046; Cam- 
master, Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Sawtelle, paigns of Stuart's Cavalry, by H. B. Mc- 
U. S. Army (W. R., 39, pp. 1067 et seq.). Clellan. p. 227). 



442 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

cold. The mud was deep, and froze so that it bore a horse. All clothing 
being wet, the men suffered greatly. Many sank exhausted at their 
horses' heads, and, with reins fastened to wrist, slept for hours despite 
their discomfort.* 

May 1. Stoneman intended to take up the march at 2 o'clock this 
morning. But at that hour the country was covered with the usual 
morning fog, and as he had no guide he delayed his start until daylight,- 
when he marched to Verdiersville. He did not find Stuart there, but 
struck his trail on the Turnpike, and saw therefrom that he had gone 
toward Fredericksburg. He sent Gregg's division ahead toward Louisa 
Court-House, on the Virginia Central Railroad (Map 1, sheet A). In 
the course of the day Major Falls of General Gregg's staff, who had 
been out foraging for a guide, came galloping along the column with an 
"intelligent contraband" astride his horse behind him. At midnight 
Gregg was still on the march, probably in the vicinity of the North 
Anna. The remainder of Stoneman 's command, consisting of Buford's 
brigade and corps headquarters, followed in the same genei-al direc- 
tion, and camped on the south side of the North Fork of the North 
Anna. For the first time in three days and nights the horses of this 
portion of the command were unsaddled and the men allowed to make 
fires. For Gregg's division there was to be no unsaddling, and no 
sleep, except what the men might succeed in getting in their saddles. 

W. H. F. Lee, who had been opposing Averell at Rapidan Station, 
received an order from R. E. Lee to burn the bridge and fall back on 
Gordonsville. The Federals had started to burn the bridge, but de- 
sisted on seeing that the enemy had anticipated them. Averell with- 
drew under the erroneous impression that the bridge was destroyed;^ 
saturated by the recent rains, it had proved refractory to all the fire 
that was brought to bear iipon it. Though the effort to burn it was not 
abandoned till retreat made it necessary, the structure was then left 
standing and serviceable.* 

May 2. Gregg's division, detached yesterday from Stoneman 's com- 
mand, arrived within three fourths of a mile of Louisa Court-House at 
3 a.m. Its four pieces of artillery were placed in a commanding posi- 
tion and the 2d brigade detailed as support. The 1st brigade was then 
ordered forward in three columns of attack, the central column to take 
the town, the other two to strike the railroad one mile to right and left 
of it. No enemy being found, the pioneer corps went to work destroy- 
ing the railroad, which it effectually did for a stretch of 5 miles. The 

1 Annals of the 6 Pa. Cavalry, Gracey, report of Captain Harrison, 5 U. S. Cav- 

pp. 138, 139; The Battles of Chancellors- airy, the march was resumed at 4 a.m. 

ville and Gettysburg, by Captain A. H. (ib., 39, p. 1092). 

Nelson, p. 23. 3 jf,^ 39^ p jQjg 

= Stoneman's and Buford's reports, W. * History of the 9 Va. Cav., by R. and T. 

B., 39, pp. 1060, 1089. According to the Beale, p. 63. 



STONEMAN AT LOUISA COURT-HOUSE 443 

water-tank was also destroyed, and some commissary stores were seized 
at the depot. About 10 a.m. Stoneman arrived at Louisa Court-House 
with the remainder of his corps, and pushed out a squadron of the 
1 Me. under Captain Tucker toward Gordonsville, to ascertain the 
whereabouts of the enemy. "When W. H. F. Lee about 11 a.m. reached 
Gordonsville, he heard it rumored that ' ' a large body of the enemy was 
at Trevilian's Station and Louisa Court-House." He at once detached 
the 9 Va. Cavalry in the direction of those places. It had hardly started 
when its pickets were driven in by the squadron of the 1 Me. The latter 
was then in turn forced back by the 9 Va. Both sides were subsequently 
reenforced and the contest resumed, with the net result that each of the 
opposing commanders gained the information which he desired. "W. 
H. F. Lee learned that there was "no large body of the enemy" at 
Trevilian's Station, but that Stoneman, with his whole corps, was at 
Louisa Court-House; and Stoneman learned that W. H. F. Lee was at 
Gordonsville with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. A train which 
started from Gordonsville for Charlottesville had to turn back on ac- 
count of the presence of a force of Federal cavalry at Cobham Station. 
At 4 o 'clock this afternoon there were three trains at Gordonsville that 
could not leave by any of the railroads.' 

Stoneman put an operator in the telegraph office at Louisa Court- 
House, who received messages from Biclunond giving information of 
the success of Hooker's operations up to that time. For nearly an hour 
Confederate messages continued to arrive. When the discovery was 
made in Eichmond that the "Yankees" held the line, a few forcible 
remarks came over the wires, and communication ceased. - 

Stoneman 's present duty, under his orders from Hooker, was to make 
all haste for Hanover Junction. But no such thought, it seems, entered 
his mind. He detached Captain Lord with 265 officers and men of the 
1 U. S. Cavalry to destroy the track and buildings of the Virginia Cen- 
tral Railroad as far as Frederickshall, a distance of 12 miles, and, if 
possible, Carr's bridge over the North Anna, about 6 miles north of 
Frederickshall, on the main road from Spottsylvania to Goochland on 
the James. From Louisa Court-House the main column proceeded to 
Yaneeyville, where the South Anna was crossed on a bridge. From this 
point Captain Merritt was detached with a squadron of the 1 Md., about 
50 strong, including pioneers, to destroy the bridges and the fords as 
far as possible down the South Anna. Stoneman went on to Thomp- 
son's Cross-Roads, where he arrived at 10 p.m.; his rear-guard, con- 
sisting of the 1 Me., came up with him here about midnight. This 
regiment of Gregg's was again to pass the night without unsaddling 
and without sleep except what it might get in the saddle. At mid- 

1 Stahel to Heintzelman, W. B., 40, p. 433. 
= Annals of the 6 Pa. Cavalry, by S. L. Gracey, pp. 140. 142. 



444 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

night Lord's and Merritt's detachments were still out. W. H. F. Lee, 
being joined by Rhett with 1400 men from Richmond, settled down to 
the defence of Gordonsville. His force now numbered about 2400 men 
and 6 guns. 

May 3. At Thompson's Cross-Roads Stoneman captured the bag- 
gage-wagon of a surveying party under a Captain Blackford, in which he 
found a set of section maps of this part of Virginia, which were to prove 
very useful to him. The maps that he had brought with him had been 
prepared by the U. S. Topographical Engineer Corps, and were based 
upon surveys made years before the war. 

In the course of the forenoon he caught sounds of the artillery firing 
at Chancellorsville, 35 miles off as the crow flies, and was more or less 
disquieted by it.' Respecting his intentions he says in his official report : 

At this point the James and South Anna Rivers are less than 12 miles apart, 
and here I determined to make the most of my 3500 men in carrying out my pre- 
viously conceived plan of operations. I called together all my regimental com- 
manders, showed and explained to them the maps, and gave them an idea of what 
I wished done. I gave them to understand that we had dropped in that region 
of country like a shell, and that I intended to burst it in every direction, expect- 
ing each piece or fragment would do as much harm and create nearly as much 
terror as would result from sending the whole shell, and thus magnify our small 
force into overwhelming numbers, and the results of this plan satisfied my most 
sanguine expectations. . . . 

According to instructions thus issued, parties went out as follows : 

1. Colonel Wyndham, with the 1 N. J. and 1 Md., about 400 men, to 
strike the James River at Columbia (the jimction of the James and 
Rivanna Rivers), destroy, if possible, the canal-aqueduct over the Ri- 
vanna, and proceed along the canal in the direction of Richmond, doing 
all the damage possible. If thought expedient, a detachment was to be 
sent across the James River to make a dash on the railroad bridge over 
the Appomattox. 

2. Colonel Kilpatkick, with the 2 N. Y., about 400 men, to push on 
to the railroad bridges over the Chickahominy, destroy them and the 
telegraph, and operate in the direction of Richmond, about 4 miles from 
the Chickahominy bridges, doing as much damage as possible. 

3. Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, with the 12 111. Cavalry, about 300 
men, to penetrate to the Richmond and Potomac Railroad, and, if possi- 
ble, to the Virginia Central, and destroy communications. 

4. Bkig.adier-Genekal Gregg, with the 1 Me. and 10 N. Y. and 2 pieces 
of artillery, to destroy the bridges, including, if possible, the two rail- 
road bridges, on the South Anna. 

1 My authority for this statement is Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Austin, 
Stoneman's commissarv officer. ,J. B. Jr. 



STONEMAN'S BURSTING SHELL 445 

The bulk of Buford's regnlar brigade and the 6th Lancei-s remained 
in camp as a reserve and provost guard. 

The raiding parties were all off by 3 a.m. They were instructed to 
endeavor to strike the railroad and telegraph at 3 p.m. of this day, in 
order that, all striking at the same time, they should find some at least 
of their objectives unguarded. 

The first three commanders, Wyndham, Kilpatrick, and Davis, were 
directed, if they crossed the Virginia Central Eailroad, to push on to 
Williamsburg on the Peninsula as a place of refuge. Gregg was or- 
dered to return to the reserve. It will be observed that none of these 
parties (6, including Lord and Merritt) was directed upon Hanover 
Junction, "somewhere in the vicinity" of which Hooker expected the 
main blow to be struck.* Gregg's column was directed to the railroad 
crossing of the South Anna about 5 miles south of the Junction, and the 
other three columns upon or toward Kichmond. Stoneman was ap- 
parently less intent upon checking a retreat of Lee's army than he was 
upon entering Richmond, which Hooker did not expect him to do.^ 

Elzey wrote to Lee: 

One regiment has been sent to [railroad] bridge on North Anna, one to Han- 
over Junction, and a force to [railroad] bridge over South Anna. General Petti- 
grew 's brigade arrived to-day from Petersburg. General Lee from Gordonsville 
reports enemy moving toward Columbia on James River. They have left the 
[Virginia Central] railroad. General Lee is moving after them. I shall detail 
Pettigrew's force here to-day. 

Captain Lord, sent out by Stoneman yesterday, and Colonel Wynd- 
ham, sent out this morning, returned to-day. Lord destroyed Carr's 
bridge over the North Anna, and disabled the Virginia Central Railroad 
for a distance of 15 miles. Wyndham cut the James River Canal at 
Columbia, burned five bridges, and destroyed a large quantity of sup- 
plies. For want of proper implements, he did not succeed in materially 
injuring the stone aqueduct across the Rivanna. Hearing that W. H. 
F. Lee was after him with cavalry and artillery, he did not attempt to 
reach the Appomattox or to proceed as ordered in the direction of 
Richmond, but took up the march to return to Thompson's Cross- 
Roads. W. H. F. Lee marched all night in pursuit of him. 

Kilpatrick, making a forced march for Hungary Station, went into 
camp at daylight about 15 miles from his objective, and remained in 
camp, concealed, all day and about half of the night. At midnight he 
was again on the march, hut not far from his late camp. Davis de- 
stroyed one bridge on the South Anna. He struck the Richmond and 
Potomac Railroad at Ashland, catching an ambulance-train from Fred- 
ericksburg that contained 250 sick and wounded. He received their 
' Williams to Stoneman, April 12. = TF. B., 39, p. 1065. 



446 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

version of the fight at Chancellorsville, paroled them, and let them go. 
He destroyed a railroad trestle bridge, and went on to the Virginia 
Central Railroad at Hanover Station, arriving about 8 p.m. Here also 
he destroyed a trestle bridge. Proceeding to Hanover Court-House 
and thence to within 7 miles of Richmond, he halted and camped for 
the night. 

Merritt, sent out yesterday, left intact the bridge at Yanceyville and 
one a few miles below it. The latter, it seems, was afterward destroyed 
b}- some one else. The second bridge below Yance>'\'ille he destroyed. 
Overtaken by Gregg, he proceeded with him down the river, destroying 
a ford at Paine 's Mill, then a bridge known as the Factory Bridge, and, 
a few miles further down, the Ground Squirrel Bridge. Late in the 
afternoon Gregg halted his column at Rocky Mills, 15 miles from Rich- 
mond. Here his horses were fed and groomed, and the more fortunate 
of his men got something to eat. On a report that the railroad bridge 
across the South Anna was guarded only by a small cavalry picket, a 
detachment of 200 men, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith 
of the 1 Me., was sent about an hour before sunset, with a negro guide, 
to destroy it. Captain Merritt joined this party with his squadron. 
An erratic ride through the woods with no roads, seemingly in no par- 
ticular direction (the guide knowing little about the country), and for 
the greater part at a trot, brought the column to the bridge. There it 
was discovered that the enemy had sent a force of infantry and artil- 
lery for its protection. The bridge was not destroyed, but a portion of 
the railroad track was torn up and some storehouses were burned. At 
midnight the column was on its return march to Rocky Mills. Another 
night for the 1 Me. without unsaddling. Two thirds or more of the men 
allowed themselves to go to sleep and their horses to wander at will. 
The column was immensely strung out. The utmost efforts of the offi- 
cers and of the men who were not asleep no more than sufficed to keep 
the rest of the men in the straggling column of files. Twenty wide- 
awake determined Confederate soldiers could have captured the whole 
200.1 

The people of Richmond were seized with apprehension. A "Rebel 
War Clerk" wrote in his diary: 

There has been some commotion in the city this afternoon and evening, but no 
painful alarm,— caused by intelligence that the enemy's cavalry had cut the road 
at Trevilian's Depot, had reached Ashland, and destroyed the depot. Subse- 
quent rumors brought them within 8 miles of the city, and we have no force of 
any consequence here. ... I think they will disappear down the Pamunkey, and 
of course will cut the Central and York roads and the wires. Thus communica- 
tion with Lee is interrupted. Tlie Fredericksburg train of course failed to come in 
to-day at 6 p.m., and it is rumored there were 700 of our wounded in it. 

1 History of the First Maine Cavalry, by E. P. Tobie, p. 139. 



APPREHENSION IN RICHMOND 447 

The Philadelphia eorrespondeut of the New York Thues wrote: 
The latest news from Clianeellorsville is that Stoneman lias cut the raih-oad. 

That Stoneman had cut Lee from Richmond, at least for a time, must 
have been known this evening both to Lee and to Hooker.' 

There were anxious moments now for Stoneman, waiting for the scat- 
tered fragments of his "bursting shell" to do their work and come 
together again. Apjirehending an attack upon his feeble reserve at 
Thompson's Cross-Eoads, he sent Lieutenant Mason with a squadron 
of the 5 U. S. to guard the bridge at Yancey\-ille, and prepare to de- 
stroy it, should that become necessary. AVith a view, in this ease, to 
passing the river by a ford, he detached Captain Drummond with 200 
picked men and 4 officers of the 5 U. S. to examine all the fords of the 
South Anna as far down as Allen Creek. The captain was directed to 
proceed, if possible, from the mouth of that stream to Goochland Court- 
House on the James Eiver, and clear the place of any hostile force that 
might be found in it. He found the upper ford practicable and the 
others impracticable. An hour or two after midnight he went into 
camp below Allen Creek. Captain Harrison with the remainder of the 
5 L^. S., numbering 119 officers and men, was sent to Shannon's Cross- 
Eoads with orders to scout the country in the directions of Gordons- 
ville, Fluvanna," and Columbia. 

L^neasy as Stoneman may liave been as to the result of the pending 
operations, he was not influenced, it seems, by a single thought of what 
he should have been doing. Breaking up his command and sending it 
off on separate expeditious would have been very well if his sole duty 
had been to make raids. But his principal duty was to check the 
enemy's retreat, and if this failed, to fall upon his flanks and harass or 
delay him.^ The operation that has gone into history as Stoneman 's 
Eaid was to have been a part of a grand tactical and strategic manoeu- 
ver. Without Averell, Stoneman 's force numbered only about 4000 
sabers, but outnumbered the cavalry opposed to it about 2 to 1. The 
latter advantage was thrown away in order to spread alarm through 
the enemy's country. 

The measures taken for the protection of Lee's communications ap- 
pear in the following dispatches : 

„ Ti -n T Richmond, May 3, 1863. 

General R. E. Lee. ■' 

General: 

One regiment has been sent to bridge on North Anna, one to Hanover Junc- 
tion, and a force to bridge over South Anna. General Pettigrew's brigade arrived 
to-day from Petersburg. . . . Arnold Elzey, 

Major-General. 

' For Butterfield's erroneous or misleading testimony on this point, see Bep. of Com., IV, 77. 
- About 13 miles northwest of Columbia. Not shown on map. 
^ Williams to Stoneman, April 12, pp. 142-144, ante. 



448 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

War Department, C. S. A., Richmond, May 3, 1863, 12 midnight. 
General Hampton, Lynchburg, Va. : 

I do not think Farmville or Lynchburg threatened. The enemy have, I learn, 
turned down the river on the north side, either for a daring dash on this city, or, 
more probably, to escape by the Peninsula to Yorktown or around Port Royal. 
Move with your forces, as you concentrate, toward Gordonsville. 

J. A. Seddon, 

Secretary of War. 

May 4. Apprehending the approach of hostile cavalry, Stoneman 
moved back to Shannon's Cross-Roads, about 6 miles in his rear. There 
he had an encounter with the brigade of W. H. F. Lee, set free by the 
recall of Averell's command. The raiding column under Davis (o s'c) 
started at 8 o'clock this morning from its camp, about 7 miles from 
Richmond, for Williamsburg. At Tunstall Station it was met by a train 
of cars filled with infantry and a battery of 3 guns run out from White 
House. The Confederates took position in a line of intrenchments and 
repelled the Federal assault. Davis withdrew, and determined to cross 
the Pamunkey and Mattapony Rivers and make for Gloucester Point.* 

Kilpatrick with his regiment (rve) reached Hungary, on the Rich- 
mond and Potomac Railroad, at daylight, and destroyed the depot, tele- 
graph wires, and railroad, for several miles, charged a battery, and 
drove it to within 2 or 3 miles of Richmond. He was now with his sin- 
gle regiment within the line of fortifications of the enemy's capital. A 
Confederate officer rode up to him with the question, "What regi- 
ment?" and was answered, "The Second New York, and you, sir, are 
my prisoner." This officer proved to be an aide to General John H. 
Winder. "You 're a mighty daring sort of fellows," he remarked, "but 
you will certainly be captured before sundown. " " That may be, ' ' said 
Kilpatrick, "but we intend to do a deal of mischief first." 

Kilpatrick appropriated the specially fine horse which the prisoner 
was riding, secured the 11 men by whom he was escorted, and made off 
with his booty and captives. He forded the Chickahominy above 
Meadow Bridge, burned that bridge, by which the Virginia Central 
Railroad crossed the Chickahominy, and ran a train of cars into the 
river. Having now crossed the railroad, he was debarred by Stone- 
man's orders as well as by circumstances from returning to the cav- 
alry corps. Instead, however, of proceeding toward Williamsburg, he 
decided, as Davis had done, to cross the Pamunkey and Mattapony 
Rivers, and make for Gloucester Point. Picking up an intelligent negro 
who knew the roads, he made him act as guide, and in less than two 
hours reached Hanovertown. There he performed the tedious oper- 
ation of crossing the Pamunkey on a ferry-boat that would not carry 

^W.R., 39, p. 1087. 



MAKING FOR GLOUCESTER 449 

more than 20 horses with their riders. The last load being safely 
landed, he destroyed the ferry just in time to cheek a force of pursuing 
cavalry, burned a train of 30 wagons loaded with bacon, took 13 pris- 
oners, and camped for the night about 5 miles beyoud the Pamunkey. 
The two railroads connecting Hanover Junction with Richmond were 
now both cut, each in two places. 

Captain Harrison, with his 119 officers and men of the 5 U. S., ar- 
rived at Shannon's Cross-Koads about half-past 2 o'clock a.m. and 
established pickets. He had hardly done so when he was attacked by 
a regiment of Virginia Cavalry, about 800 strong, under W. H. F. Lee, 
and driven back upon Lieutenant Mason at Yanceyville, where he made 
arrangements to hold the bridge. Word was sent to Stoneman of the 
proximity of the enemy, and Buford's command and the lancers (6 Pa.) 
came up at a trot, accompanied by Stoneman, but not in time to strike 
the enemy. Captain Harrison, in this affair, lost 2 officers and 30 men 
captured, and 4 men wounded, one having seven saber-cuts. W. H. F. 
Lee returned to Gordonsville. Captain Drummond with his 200 men, 
also of the 5 U. S., took up the march about daylight for Goochland 
Court-House. Halting in the vicinity of that place, he had it examined, 
and found it unoccupied and almost deserted. He then returned to 
Thompson's Cross-Roads, but not to his regiment, which was now with 
the reserve at Yanceyville.' 

About 2 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith with his 200 men, returning 
from his attempt to destroy a bridge, arrived at Rockville, and found 
that the remainder of Gregg's command had gone. Without stopping 
to rest, he pushed on in search of it. Men who had thus far kept awake 
gave up in despair. Arguments, orders, curses, and even blows, could 
not keep them awake. About 3 :30 a.m. the detachment found the com- 
mand about 3 miles from Rockville, standing "to horse," and expecting 
every moment to receive orders to move. Oblivious to this circum- 
stance, the exhausted troopers threw themselves upon the ground to 
rest, and got about an hour's sleep.^ Half a dozen of them did not get 
this much, for as soon as they arrived they were sent off by General 
Gregg to carry dispatches to General Stoneman at Thompson's Cross- 
Roads. They reached Stoneman, and delivered the dispatches, just as 
he was starting out from the Cross-Roads for Yanceyville. W. H. F. 
Lee wrote to Elzey, magnifying Stoneman 's 11 regiments of cavalry 
to 28.^ 

This was the sixth day since the cavalry corps crossed the Rappa- 
hannock, the last, according to Stoneman 's understanding, that he had 
to wait to hear from Hooker. He had not received any communication 

1 This detachment did not rejoin the resiment until noon of the Otli. 

2 History of the First Maine Cavalry, by E. P. Tobie, p. 140. 
•" W. R., 39, p. 1097. 



450 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

from him, and since the 2d had heard nothing as to the situation of the 
army, except vague rumors of its defeat and capture; the rations for 
man and beast which he had carried with him were exhausted, and 
foraging was becoming more and more difficult. So in a council of war 
which he called this evening it was decided that the portion of his corps 
that he now had with him should return to the army by the route that it 
had come by. 

May 5. To deceive the enemy, a detachment of 646 men of the regu- 
lar brigade on picked horses was sent under Buford to threaten any 
force that might be in the vicinity of Gordonsville, and induce W. H. F. 
Lee and Hampton to believe that Stoneman was to march that way. 
The outlying detachments were left to find their way to the main body 
as best they could. Buford was to rejoin it at Orange Springs on the 
following day. The main body started this evening in a thunder-shower, 
with the 1st Maine regiment as advance-guard. It had as guide a negro, 
who, to gain his freedom, engaged to pilot the column by a route out of 
reach and observation of the enemy, who occupied the main roads. ^ 

The shower settled into a steady rain ; the night was very cold. The 
men, who during the day had been inclined to complain of the heat, now 
shivered in their saddles. After crossing the South Anna at Yancey- 
ville the bridge at that point was desti'oyed. Proceeding northward, 
the column crossed the railroad at Tolersville. It was so dark that a 
trooper could hardly see his file-leader unless he rode a white horse; 
the way lay through swamps, thickets, woods, cow-paths, by-paths— 
every sort of communication except a highway. The dismal ride was 
made more dismal by an occasional shot from a guerilla, and the dole- 
ful note of a whippoorwill that followed the column all night.- 

Captain Drummond, with his 200 men of the 5 Cavalry, and another 
outlying detachment of about 100 men, under Captain Rodenbough, 
started separately from Thompson's Cross-Eoads to find and rejoin 
the main body. Rodenbough took up the march at 8 p.m., crossed the 
South Anna by the bridge at the Cross-Roads, and then set fire to it. 
Where Drummond crossed the river is not known.^ 

Davis (v'^) crossed the Pamunkey at Putney's Ferry and the Matta- 
pony at Walkerton without meeting with serious opposition. Between 
the two ferries a portion of his command under Major Bronson became 
separated from the rest. 

Kilpatrick (~^ was on the march at 1 a.m. At Aylett's on the 
Mattapony he captured 2 officers and 33 men, burned 45 wagons and a 
depot containing more than 60,000 barrels of corn and wheat, and quan- 

^ Manuscript narrative by Brigadier-Gen- ^ History of the First Maine Cavalry, by 

eral E. V. Sumner, U. S. Army, retired— E. P. Tobie, p. 141. 

lieutenant and aide-de-camp on General ' The author has Ijeeii unable to learn 

Stoneman's staff. the route followed by this column. 



DAVIS PERPLEXED 451 

titles of clothing and commissary stores. Crossing the Mattapony, he 
destroyed the ferry just in time again to check the enemy's cavah-y. 
Late in the evening he destroyed a third wagon-train and a depot a few 
miles above and west of Tappahannock on the Rappahannock. Through 
the night he continued his march southward, aiming at King and Queen 
Court-House, and pursued by cavalry which he supposed to be a por- 
tion of Stuart's. 

At Aylett's Lieutenant Estes of the 1 Me., serving on Kilpatrick's 
staff, was detached with 10 men to dash across country northward, 
and communicate, if possible, with Hooker. He struck the Rappa- 
hannock at Tappahannock, and found the river too much swollen to 
cross, but surprised, captured, and paroled a lieutenant and 15 men. 
The county militia, about 400 strong, assembled under a General Mule, 
and took the field against him. Summoned to surrender, he refused, 
mounted, and spurred rapidly with his escort down the river. En route 
he caught a Confederate major, 2 captains, and 3 privates, going to 
join their regiments, and paroled them. General Mule with about 300 
of his men followed closely, and soon had the little party in a cul-de-sac 
between the swollen river and the Dragon Swamp. They again refused 
to surrender, abandoned their horses, destroyed their arms, and took 
to the swamp. Here the militia gave up the pursuit, but the planters 
turned out, and went after them with bloodhounds. At midnight they 
were probably in full cry on a hot trail. 

The perplexity of President Davis and others at having to reconcile 
Lee's report of a "great victory" with rumors created by Stoneman's 
cavalry occasioned to-day the following communications: 

Seddon to Lee 

. . . The enemy's cavalry in detachments, varying in numbers from 500 to 
2000, reported by General W. H. P. Lee to be twenty-seven regiments [say 8100 
men], have been making raids from Louisa Court-House to Cohimbia; in Gooch- 
land [County], to Ashland, Hungary Station, Hanover Court-House; [and] the 
line of the [Virginia] Central Railroad to the Chickahominy. They have been 
hovering around the city with two or three regiments, apparently menacing 
attack, probably covering escape of all down the Peninsula. We have a force to 
protect the bridges over the Annas and to defend the city, but want cavalry to 
punish the marauders. Hood's division is expected here this evening. The rail- 
road communication shall be opened at the earliest practicable moment. 

To W. H. F. Lee, Gordonsville 

The general detachments of the Yankee cavalry that have been prowling in 
Goochland and around this city, with the exception of about 500 who escaped 
down the Peninsula, are from concurring reports believed to have returned 
toward Louisa Court-House or somewhere thereabouts, perhaps toward the 
Rapidan. 



452 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Longstreet to Elzey 

... I shall remain here [at Petersburg] for the present, to try and prevent 
this place falling into the hands of the enemy. Some of my troops marched 34 
miles the night before last, and all marched all night and nearly all day and night 
last night, so they must be somewhat scattered. I will hurry them up as much as 
possible. Hood is not yet at Ivor.' 

Send out citizens in all directions, to try and have all roads blocked by which 
the enemy may effect his retreat. Felling trees thickly, particularly in the 
streams, may prevent the escape of the enemy. 

To Seddon 
I leave at 7 o 'clock this evening for Richmond.^ 

W. H. F. Lee at Gordonsville heard by telegram from Richmond 
' ' that the enemy was everywhere. ' ' ^ 

May 6. Stoneman halted for breakfast and rest from 4 to 7 a.m., 
then resumed the march with great caution. He received no intelli- 
gence from the Army of the Potomac. Every few miles he ordered a 
halt, and had the country in front and on the flanks thoroughly pa- 
trolled. He reached Orange Springs between 9 and 10 a.m. and there 
found Buford awaiting him. Buford came near being cut off. When 
the head of his column reached the North Anna, which was about day- 
light, the water was rising rapidly, and before the rear had crossed the 
river, it was swimming. The rear-guard found it impassable, and 
crossed on rafts. Eodenbough and Drummond were given up as lost, 
but rejoined the command safely, the former about 10 a.m., the latter 
about 12 m. 

Stoneman now first heard through negroes that the army, having 
been repulsed, had withdrawn to the north bank of the Rappahannock, 
but he did not know how much of such reports to believe. Starting at 
noon, he made another all-night march. It rained harder, the darkness 
was blacker, and the roads were muddier, than the night before. There 
was the same mournful refrain of a whippoorwill, and an occasional 
shot as if from the same guerilla. At the halts the men and horses 
were generally sound asleep. Intense quiet would prevail imtil some 
luckless fellow would lose his balance and fall to the ground, when the 
rattling of his saber and accoutrements would wake those about him 
and subject him to a shower of unfeeling epithets, or some innocent 
snorer would evoke an outcry of "Put a nose-bag on him," "Buck and 
gag him," etc. The advance got out of the woods and swamps at Ver- 
diersville on the Orange Plank Road, and shivered there an hour or 
two, waiting for the rear of the column to close up. When the march 

' Piekett was in rear of Hood. = W. B., 26, p. 1045. 

=> lb.. 39, p. 1098. 



STONEMAN'S RETURN MARCH 453 

was resumed, it was comparatively easy, pleasant, and rapid. The men 
had no longer to give constant attention to their horses. Many of them 
took advantage of their freedom from care to go to sleep. A number 
were led otf the road by Confederate scouts, and taken prisoners. An 
attempt was made thus to mislead and capture the train, but was frus- 
trated by the quartermaster in charge of it. The column passed within 
sight of the enemy's camp-fires and within sound of his drums, but was 
not attacked.' 

Kilpatrick at sundown came upon a body of cavalry in the vicinity of 
King and Queen Court-House, and advanced to attack it, when he dis- 
covered that it was the stray portion of the 12 111. under Bronson. The 
two commands probably bivouacked there together.^ 

Lieutenant Estes and his 10 men in the Dragon Swamp were run 
down and captured. Eefusing to be paroled, they were put under guard 
and marched off for Richmond. 

The first report received in the Federal lines from any part of Stone- 
man 's force was the following dispatch : 

Yorktown, May 6. 
Major-General Dix: 

Colonel Davis, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, with the advance of his regi- 
ment, has arrived at Gloucester Point, having accomplished fully the orders of 
General Stoneman. I have sent a cavalry scout up the Richmond road to get 
information of any of our cavalry which may be coming down. General Stone- 
man seems not to have been aware that the enemy have all along had troops on 

this Peninsula, ... „ 

E. D. Ketes, 

Ma.ior-Geneval. ' 

The perplexity of the enemy occasioned the following communica- 
tions : 

Lee to Seddon 

. . . Unless some of the cavalry in North Carolina and the south is sent here, 
it will be impossible to arrest these raids, and they will roam through this entire 
section of country with little or no molest-ation. 

Longstreet to Seddon 

. . . General Hampton ordered to unite his force with that of Captain Minor 
and with the main force to hover on the enemy's [Stoneman 's] rear with the 
small, select parties, to block all roads that the enemy can take in retiring, and 
use every means of detaining the enemy until we may be able to set out a force 
that may destroy the enemy's column. General W. H. F. Lee and General Petti- 
grew are ordered to keep out their scouts, and endeavor to intercept the passage 
back of the enemy's cavalry, and to have all of his roads blocked by felling trees 
in his way. 

1 History of the First Maine Cavalry, by E. P. Tobie, p. 142. 
2 W. R.. 39, p. 1084. =• 76., 26, p. 701. 



454 THE CAMPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Seddon to Lee 

. . . General Longstreet reached here last night. His forces in part were then 
in Petersburg, resting from long march. A train with escort and provisions was 
sent [to you] yesterday. All possible effort shall be made to keep open the rail- 
road and supply you. 

It would appear from the last two sentences that railroad communi- 
cation between Fredericksburg and Richmond was reestablished yes- 
terday, the 5th, having been interrupted during part of the 3d, the 4th, 
and part of the 5th, say two days. That this line was open at any rate 
on the 6th is shown by the following message telegraphed to-day by 
Colonel Bradley T. Johnson at Hanover Junction to General Elzey at 
Richmond : 

Train has taken my forage to Fredericksburg. Please send me forage for 70 
horses on next train. 

May 7. As Stoneman's cavalry left the Orange Plank Road, heading 
for Raccoon Ford, the 2 U. S. Cavalry was detached to Germanna Ford, 
to guard that crossing against any enemy that might threaten the col- 
umn. There the first reliable information was obtained to the effect 
that the Army of the Potomac had recrossed the Rappahannock. Stone- 
man's advance crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford about 2 a.m., and 
the rear about daylight. 

Lieutenant E. V. Sumner, Jr., aide-de-camp of General Stoneman with 
10 of the best men and horses of the regular brigade, was detached to 
find the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, and deliver 
to him a written report from General Stoneman. Skirting the left bank 
of the Rapidan, and keeping ofif the road as much as possible, he reached 
Germanna Ford without seeing any one. He entered the ford with his 
party, intending to cross, and hoping to find the Army of the Potomac 
on the right side and victorious, when, sitting on his horse in the stream 
and scanning the landscape about him with the hawk-like glance that a 
soldier acquires in reconnoitering, he caught sight of a small white 
object that looked like a handkerchief, waving at him from a window in 
a house that he had passed. Taking a couple of men and riding back, 
he found, where he had been looking, a lady, who, though a Virginian, 
was in sympathy with the North. She warned him not to go any fur- 
ther in the direction that he had taken, stating that the Confederates 
had an outpost just beyond the ford. He promptly withdrew from the 
ford, and, on a little reflection, decided to heed this warning and take 
a longer but safer route. He accordingly took up the march with his 
escort in the direction of Kelley's Ford. Coming suddenly upon an 
outpost of the enemy, he rushed past it, firing into it. In a few moments 
a mounted party was in hot pursuit, and it was a race between him and 
the enemy for the ford, perhaps 8 miles off. He succeeded, by turning 



LIEUTENANT SUMNER'S RIDE 455 

on the foremost of his pursuers, in dismounting several of them, and 
just before dark reached his goal with all his men. But on this day it 
was not a ford. The Rappahannock was swimming, full to the banks, 
and about 200 yards wide. Giving his men the choice between following 
him and being captured, he plunged into the stream and started across 
alone. His men, with the exception of two or three who hid in the bushes 
and afterward joined Stoneman, were soon in the enemy's hands. His 
pursuers, on reaching the water's edge, commenced firing at him. Being 
deep in the water by the side of his swimming horse, he made a difficult 
target, and the Confederate fire was distracted by that of a strong Fed- 
eral picket on the opposite side of the river. Neither horse nor rider 
was hit. Wet and chilled as he was, and urged to rest and recuperate, 
he started at once on the last stretch of his journey, a distance of about 
22 miles. Reacliing the headquarters camp, he guided his horse into 
the maze of tents and headed him toward that of the commanding gen- 
eral. The animal kept the direction, and did not stop until his nose 
rubbed against the front pole of the general's fly. The rider was un- 
conscious. It was 11 o'clock at night. The apparition of this equestrian 
statue caused sufficient excitement to bring out the adjutant-general, 
who, inspecting it, exclaimed: "Why, this is Lieutenant Sumner of 
Stoneman 's staff." There was no reply. He was gently lifted from 
his horse, carried into an adjoining tent, stripped and rubbed, under the 
direction of a surgeon, rolled in warm blankets, and left to rest, which 
he did by sleeping until noon of the following day. In the meantime 
papers found in his boot were delivered to General Hooker.* 

Stoneman 's main column on the north side of the Rapidan took a 
good rest. The horses were unsaddled and fed what little forage there 
was. The men were permitted to build fires and cook what meager ra- 
tions they had. About 10 a.m. the march was resumed, and the whole 
command went on to Kelley's Ford, where it arrived about 9 p.m. The 
night being too dark to attempt a passage, the troops rested until morn- 
ing near the ford. Here it was learned that the army was back in its 
old camps about Falmouth. 

About as Stoneman started out from Raccoon Ford, Kilpatriek with 
his regiment, after a 50-mile march, arrived at Gloucester Point. Since 
leaving Stoneman he and Davis had marched about 200 miles in less 
than five days. 

The following dispatch went to Washington : 

Yorktown, Va., May 7, 1863. 
Eon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

Colonel Kilpatriek, with the Harris Light Cavalry and Twelfth Illinois Cav- 
alry, have just arrived at Gloucester Point, having accomplished the object of 
their mission fully and most gallantly. . . . Rufus King, 

Brigadier-General •- 
1 Manuscript of General Sumner. - TT. R.. 26, p. 706. 



456 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

This morning General Dix and General Keyes moved up the Pamunkey 
River with about 5000 infantry, 2 batteries of artillery, and a battalion 
of 100 cavalry, to West Point, and established a post there. The cav- 
alry under Major Hall was pushed on at once to White House, where it 
destroyed the railroad bridge across the Pamunkey. On its way back 
it met the Confederate column escorting Lieutenant Estes and his men 
to prison. A short, sharp action, and the escort and the prisoners 
changed places. Lieutenant Estes and his men escorted their late escort 
to Gloucester Point. 

Lee sent off the following communications: 

To Seddon 
... It is probably Stoneman, on his way to Rappahanuock. General Stuart 
with Fitz Lee's brigade will endeavor to strike them. 

To President Davis 
I hardly think it necessary to state to your Excellency that unless we can 
increase the cavalry attached to this army we shall constantly be subject to 
aggressive expeditions of the enemy similar to those experienced in the last ten 
days. ... If I could get two divisions of cavalry, I should feel as if we ought to 
resist the three of the enemy. . . . 

May 8. As soon as it was light enough to see, Stoneman 's cavalry 
proceeded to cross the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford. The only craft 
available was a flat-bottomed boat, or scow. This was used to transport 
the ammunition-chests of the artillery. The pieces and caissons were 
drawn over the bottom of the river, the horses swimming. One piece after 
another was pulled out by its eight horses as they gained their footing 
on the north bank— its muzzle running like a water-main. The troopers 
and cannoneers swam their horses sitting in the saddle.' The emaci- 
ated animals could hardly stem the swift current. There was but one 
exit for them on the north side wide enough for two to land and ascend 
the bank together. Every one felt that the enemy was not far off and 
might come up yelling and shooting at any moment. This feeling grew 
stronger as the remnant still to cross grew less. Stoneman remained 
nevertheless on the south banlf until almost the entire command had left 
it, when he took to the boat, and went over among the last. The only 
losses were one man and five or six horses. The crossing was completed 
about dark, when the march was continued to Bealeton Station. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Aiistin, Stoneman 's commissary, who crossed the 
Rappahannock with the head of the column, rode on to Falmouth. The 
informal report which he rendered of Stoneman 's operation was re- 
ceived rather coldly. Hooker was apparently not pleased. Butterfield 
intimated that Stoneman had not done what he set out to do. He re- 
marked: "From your account, I don't see but that you are ready to 

1 There were not more than twenty yards to swim (W. R., 39, p. 1063). 



THE CAVALRY CORPS REUNITED 457 

start out ou another expedition riglit away." Austin, somewhat nettled, 
retorted : "Perhaps, sir, your long experience with infantry lias unfitted 
you to form a fair estimate of the work of cavalry," or words to that 
effect. 

Long-street wrote to Seddon : 

All our reports represent the enemy's main cavalry force returning to the 
Rappahannock by tlie same or nearly the same route as that they came [byl. I 
fear that no effort has been made by our forces or citizens to obstruct his routes. 

The Cavalry Corps remained over the 9th at Bealeton, receiving sup- 
plies from Alexandria. On the 10th, leaving a squadron to picket the 
railroad from Rappahannock Station to Cedar Kun, it marched to Deep 
Run ; and on the 11th, leaving the Reserve Brigade, Buf ord 's Regulars, 
to guard the Rappahannock from the railroad to Falmouth, it returned 
to its old camp with the Army of the Potomac.^ 

The projected movement of Stuart with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade 
against Stoueman was not made. It seems that the Confederates had 
no suspicion of the faithful and efficient guidance that was furnished 
the Federal cavalry by negroes, and no exact information as to its move- 
ments. Stoueman 's passage of the river was not known to them for 
several days after it was effected. As late as the 11th Lee wrote to 
Stuart: "Hood is at Frederickshall. ... I hope between you two you 
may scatter Stoueman." 

Kilpatrick remained at Gloucester Point, resting and recuperating, 
until the 30th of May. He then marched with his own regiment and the 
8 111. through Gloucester Court-House and the Dragon Swamp to Sa- 
luda and thence to Urbana on the Rappahannock, taking some pris- 
oners and destroying a considerable amount of property. He crossed 
at Urbana with his command on transports sent to meet him, and pro- 
ceeded to Falmouth, where he reported to Hooker on the 3d of June. 

COMMENTS 

Stoueman must be held responsible for Averell's not rejoining him 
from the vicinity of Rapidan Station. His order of April 30 admits of 
the interpretation by which xVverell accounts for his continued sepa- 
ration from him ; and Averell could not refuse or fail to obey an order 
from Stoueman, though it contravened a prior order of Hooker's. He 
was bound to obey the last order that he received ; and he carried out 
Stoneman's orders as he understood them. But it must be said that a 
general of cavalry, taking Stoneman's orders in connection with Hook- 
er's of April 12, should not have misunderstood them as Averell did. 
Averell contented himself between April 29 and May 2 with advancing 
» w. B.. 30, p. 1063. 



458 THE CAJMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

from Kelley 's Ford to Rapidan Station, a distance of 28 miles, without 
inflicting any appreciable injury upon liis opponent, whom he outnum- 
bered more than three to one. On this matter Hooker expressed him- 
self to the Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, as follows : 

... It is no excuse or justification of his course that he received instructions 
from General Stoneman in conflict with my own, and it was his duty to know that 
neither of them afforded an excuse for his culpable indifference and inactivity. 
If he disregarded all instructions it was his duty to do something. If the enemy 
did not come to him, lie should have gone to the enemy. ... It is unnecessary 
for me to add that this army will never be able to accomplish its mission under 
. commanders who not only disregard their instructions, but at the same time dis- 
play so little zeal and devotion in the performance of their duties. I could excuse 
General Averell in his disobedience if I could anywhere discover in his operations 
a desire to find and engage the enemy. I have no disposition to prefer charges 
against him, and in detaching him from this army my object has been to prevent 
an active and powerful column from being paralyzed in its future operations by 
his presence.^ 

Neither Stoneman nor Averell seems to have caught the spirit of the 
orders he received. Hooker is but just when he remarks before the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War: "It is charitable to suppose 
that Generals Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and 
determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views 
and inclinations. ' ' ^ 

Instead of being scattered to raid, Stoneman 's troopers should have 
been used in a body to beat the road to Fredericksburg for the retreat- 
ing Confederate army. Possibly Stoneman 's tactics are attributable 
to his physical condition. Throughout this campaign he was a sufferer 
from hemorrhoids, the cavalryman's complaint. He could not sit in a 
saddle without pain, and so was physically unfit to be in active service. 
It is not improbable that this circumstance determined his adoption of 
a plan that would exempt him for a day or two from riding. 

The damage done by the Federal cavalry to the railroads was easily 
repaired. Traffic was not interrupted for more than two days. Stores 
were destroyed in considerable quantity, but their loss did not seriously 
affect the Confederate commissariat. The question may be asked: 
What would have been the strategic effect, had Lee's army been de- 
feated, of the damage done by Stoneman to the Confederate communi- 
cations? If the pursuit had been prompt and vigorous, and Stoneman 
had got his scattered regiments to operate against the front and flanks 
of the retreating army,— neither of which suppositions seems, in the 
light of events, altogether plausible,— it would have been a serious em- 
barrassment, but not necessarily a fatal cheek, to the enemy. Stoneman 

1 W. R., 39, pp. 1072, 1073. » Rep. of Com., IV, 140. 



COMMENTS 459 

claims in his report that "all the road bridges across the South Anna 
and several across the North Anna were completely destroyed, placing 
a ditch fordable only in a very few places between the enemy and Rich- 
mond." Admitting that this was the case, it is not improbable that 
these "very few places" would have been found and utilized, and that 
Lee would have got away from Hooker as he got away from McClellan 
after Antietam, and was to get away from Meade after Gettysburg. 

Nearly all the transportation of Lee's army was collected at Guiney's 
Station, 18 miles from Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and 
might have been destroyed by one third of Stoneman's force. The 
destruction of the few days' supplies that Lee had on hand, together 
with that of his transportation, would have proved a heavy, if not a 
decisive, blow to him. The absence of the Federal cavalry from the 
front and flanks of the army was, or should have been, severely felt by 
Hooker, while Lee's plans were not disarranged by its presence in his 
rear.^ 

Stoneman's cavalry had indeed a share in deterring the enemy from 
following the defeated Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock, 
but it might better have prevented that army from being defeated. It 
gained from its operations hardihood, instruction, and morale, but 
these acquisitions, together with the damage which it inflicted upon the 
enemy, directly and indirectly, materially and morally, were hardly an 
offset to the loss which it sustained in horse-flesh. About 1000 of Stone- 
man's horses were abandoned. Most of these were replaced by brood- 
mares and work-horses— not suitable for cavalry— and mules. A num- 
ber of men, who could not be remounted, were left behind to fall into the 
enemy's hands. On the 13th of May Stoueman reported the portion of 
the force brought back with him that was then tit for duty in the field 
as about 2000— less than 50 per cent, of the total. On the 27th of May 
Pleasonton, who had succeeded Stoneman in command of the Cavalry 
Corps, reported the number of serviceable cavalry horses present in 
the corps as 4677. The trimonthly return for May 31 gives the number 
of enlisted cavalrymen present for duty as 9626. Thus about 50 per 
cent, of the force was dismounted.- 

• Chancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and Allan, p. 108. 
2 See also Ingalls to Meigs, W. R., 40, p. 547. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

OPEKATIONS OF INDEPENDENT CAVALRY (CONTINUED) 

Jones and Imboden 

ON the 20tli of April Imboden marched from Shenandoah Mountain 
(Map 1, sheet B) with about 1825 men, and on the 21st was reen- 
forced at Hightown to about 3365, of whom about 700 were mounted. 
His column was accompanied by a wagon-train carrying 13 days' ra- 
tions of flour and 30 days' of salt. He relied upon the country for meat. 
W. E. Jones marched from Lacy Spring on the 21st. Such men and 
horses as were unfit for a hard campaign he left near Harrisburg to 
hold the Valley. These troops were to keep up communication with 
Fitzhugh Lee at Sperryville. The force which Jones took with him 
consisted mainly of cavalry, but comprised some infantry and artillery, 
a pack-train, and a wagon-train. It numbered about 3500 men. Ac- 
cording to the original plan, approved by General Lee, these two col- 
umns were to strike the railroad at the same time, Imboden 's at Grafton 
and Jones' at Oakland. But they were hardly in motion when Jones 
received a letter from Imboden informing him that when Jones reached 
Oakland Imboden would be at Beverly. It was too late to rearrange 
matters, and the movement proceeded on this new plan.* Jones had 
intended by the original plan, and perhaps still hoped, to accomplish 
such destruction on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that for six 
months at least no troops might pass over it.^ That the Federals were 
not taken unawares appears from the following dispatch of 3 :30 p.m., 
the 21st, from Schenck to Halleck : 

Many circumstances now tend to indicate that the rebels are preparing to 
make some movement in force in Western Virginia. General Milroy telegraphed 
to me yesterdaj' that, except some small scattering parties, the enemy had fallen 
back with all troops as far as Harrisburg. In a dispatch to-day he says : 

"From information received, which I deem reliable, the baggage of [Stone- 
wall] Jackson's army and some artillery and ordnance stores arrived at Staunton 
some ten days since. ' ' 

On the 23d Imboden reached Huttonsville, having marched 70 miles 
in four days, most of the time in a drenching rain, which made the 

' Tr. R.. 39, p. 119. 

- History of the Laurel Brigade, by W. N. MeDonald, p. 117. 

460 



IMBODEN TAKES BEVEKLY 461 

roads very difficult.^ Jones marched on Moorefield, which the Federals 
had left unoccupied. He intended to cross the south branch of the Poto- 
mac at that point, but before he reached it the stream was so swollen 
by the downiiour that he abandoned the idea. He reached Moorefield 
on the 23d. The unfavorable weather and bad condition of the roads 
made these first three days exceedingly arduous. - 

AiJiil 24. Imboden reached and attacked Beverly, garrisoned by 
about 900 men with 2 pieces of artillery under Colonel Latham. From 
a point 25 miles north of Beverly, he wrote to General Samuel Jones : 

Had three hours' fight [with] the enemy on the heights in rear of Beverly 
to-day. Drove him from the town ; cut his retreat on Buckhannon ; hurried 
[harried?] him till dark toward Philippi. Renew the pursuit in the morning. 
Casualties small on both sides. Enemy set fire to the town in his retreat, and 
burned a large part of it. Enemy's loss of stores considerable. Our captures 
of wagons and mules valuable.^ 

Eoberts at Buckhannon reported the affair to Halleck, stating: 

. . . Colonel Latham [commanding at Beverly] has retreated on the road to 
Philippi. The enemy interposed cavalry and artillery in the road to this place, 
and prevented his falling back [on this place] . Reenforcements should be thrown 
into Grafton without delay, or the enemy will reach the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road, and do great damage. The roads in this region are impassable. 

He received the following answer sent at 8 p.m. : 

Collect your forces, defend the railroad, and drive the enemy back. You are 
strong enough to do it if you try. Do not call for reenforcements from here. You 
have no need of them, and we have none to give you, if you had. I do not under- 
stand how tlie roads there are impassable to you when by your account they are 
passable enough to the enemy. If you can not drive the enemy out, we will seek 
some one who can. 

Roberts replied at 9 :4:0 p.m. : 

... I have collected my forces from Sutton [Suttonville] and Bulltown into 
this place, to repel the enemy. Colonel Latham, with half of my command, has 
allowed himself to be surprised, and has been compelled to retreat in the direction 
of Philippi, where he can not reach me. The enemy has five regiments of cavalrj-. 
I have but four companies [of cavalry]. The roads the enemy has passed over 
are mountain roads. Those I must move over are in the valley, and I have never 
seen any in so impassable a condition. I shall fail in nothing that is possible. 

General Jones, to increase his mobility, sent back from ]\Ioorefield to 
the Valley his infantry, artillery, and wagon-train, thus reducing his 
column to cavalry, mounted infantry, and a pack-train. 

1 W. E., 39, pp. 90-106. = Ih.. 39. p. 116. ^ jf, ^ 39^ p. 97. 



462 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

After making a detour he reached Petersburg, where the river was 
found to be still dangerously high. Men with weak horses were not 
forced to attemjDt the ford, and a few here turned back. A number of 
citizens of the neighborhood who were familiar with the crossing, hav- 
ing provided themselves with long poles, boldly rode out into the river, 
and took stations at regular intervals along the ford. They constantly 
warned the troopers to keep their horses' heads up-stream, and when a 
horse would start do'mi, would tap him on the neck with a pole, and 
thus help keep him in the ford. One man and two horses were drowned.^ 
Descending the river from Petersburg, Jones camped nearly opposite 
Moorefield. 

April 25. Imboden spent the day in resting and reconnoitering and 
trying to open communication with W. E. Jones, who according to the 
plan should have been at Oakland. Neither Imboden nor Jones had 
heard from the other. Roberts, at Buckhannon, sent the following dis- 
patches to Kelley at Harper's Ferry, the first one at 3 p.m. : 



The troops that reach Grafton should force a march to Philippi, where Colonel 
Latham attempted to retreat [from Beverly]. I don't know whether he suc- 
ceeded or not, but a rapid movement on Philippi may save him. 



Just heard from Colonel Latham. He was near Philippi. Had a running 
fight of eight hours. Proposes to join me, if possible, to-morrow night. 

After leaving Petersburg, Jones' route lay through Greenland Gap. 
Contrary to his expectations, he learned that this point was occupied. 
The Federal force consisted of portions of two companies (G, 23 111., 
Captain Martin Wallace; and A, 14 W. Va., Captain Jacob Smith), 
numbering together 86 men.^ The position could have been turned, but 
the consequent delay might have endangered the success of the general 
plan. Accordingly, Jones decided to force it. The Federals took shelter 
in a log church and two log houses, and repulsed the repeated assaults 
of the raiders, who numbered, according to Captain Wallace, 3100 men,^ 
and according to a Confederate writer and participant in the affair, 
3500.* The defenders would not yield until the assailants had suc- 
ceeded in setting fire to the church, in which the main force of the de- 
fence was stationed. By this action the Confederates were detained 
four hours, and prevented from making important captures at their 
next objective point. The fight gave them 4 wagons and 1 ambulance, 

1 History of the Laurel Brigade, by "W. ^ lb., 39, p. 110. 

N. McDonald, pp. 118-120; IF. R., 39, p. * Forty Tears of Active Service, by C. 

116- T. O'Ferral, p. 58. 

2 W. R., 39, pp. 108, 109. 



CHECK AT GREENLAND GAP 463 

encumbered them with 75 or 80 prisoners, and cost them 42 men in 
killed and wounded. * Fortunately for them, they had delayed the as- 
sault until near dark. This saved them from a much heavier loss. 

The stubborn resistance of the Federals greatly enraged the Confed- 
erates. Some insisted that the prisoners should be killed, but General 
Jones, like the officer and gentleman that he was, replied : ' ' They fought 
lilve brave men and did their duty. They shall receive honorable treat- 
ment. "- 

Proceeding on a night march, he detached Colonel Harman with the 
12 Va. Cavalry, Brown's Maryland battalion of cavalry, and McNeill's 
company of Partisan Bangers, to burn the bridge of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad at Oakland, in the southwestern corner of Maryland, and 
march thence by way of Kingwood and Morgantown to rejoin the main 
column ; and a squadron of the 11 Va. Cavalry under Captain McDonald 
to Altamont, 12 miles east of Oakland, to burn some small bridges there 
and follow Colonel Harman. With the remainder of his force he went 
on toward Rowlesburg. At 12 p.m. he was still on the march. It was a 
freezing cold night. Many men, wet to the skin, suffered severely. 
These operations occasioned the following correspondence: 

Schenck to Halleck, April 25, 12 to. 
The rebel Jones appears to have left the Valley to go in the direction of Moore- 
field, perhaps to cooperate with Imboden and [W. L.] Jackson, ■'' but more likely 
to threaten the railroad at New Creek, or some point this side. Elliott's brigade 
has been sent from Winchester, toward Moorefield, to reeonnoiter. I must draw 
troops westward from "Winchester and Harper's Perry. Will you have General 
Stahel, with his cavalry, look out toward the Blue Ridge and the Valley, while 
my forces are thus partially drawn off? * . . . 

April 26. Imboden camped between Philippi and Buckliannon, about 
12 miles from each place, and sent all his cavalry to seize and hold the 
bridge across Buckhannon River near its mouth, intending to cross 
there. He had not yet heard from W. E. Jones. In a conference which 
he held with his colonels, it was judged by all that Jones had failed to 
reach, or interrupt, communications on the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road; that Imboden 's command was exposed to attack, and its safety 
required that it should fall back to a position where escape would be 
possible, if it were overpowered. It was accordingly decided to move 
back on the morrow. Latham, falling back from Beverly, joined Rob- 

1 Jones reported that for laek of trans- = History of the Laurel Brigade, by Cap- 

portation he destroyed 90 Enfield rifles. tain W. N. McDonald, pp. 121-123. 

According to Wallace's report the defen- ' Included in Imboden's command, 

ders threw these arms into the flames to * This movement of Stahel's was made 

save them from the enemy [W. B., 39, pp. on the 27th. 
no, 114, 117). 



464 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

erts at Bucldiannon. Roberts ordered the commanders at Big Birch, 
Suttonville, and Bulltown to send all wagons and supplies that could 
be removed by way of Weston to Clarksburg, and with the troops to 
join him by forced marches at Buckhannon. 

Jones arrived at the Cheat Eiver, near Rowlesburg, about 2 p.m. 
With three regiments of cavalry, dismounted, say 1000 men, he attacked 
the railroad at Rowlesburg, defended by about 250 men, and was re- 
pulsed. It was near sundown. His command, after thirty-six hours of 
forced marching, was without forage. He had difficulty in procuring 
food for his men. Rumors reached him of Federal columns advancing 
from different directions. The countrj^ people were unfriendly and fre- 
quently in the mountain passes fired into his column. His detachments 
were beyond recall. He had not heard from Imboden, and could not 
abandon him. To renew his attack on the railroad he regarded as hope- 
less. He therefore deemed it best to pass on, leaving the railroad 
bridge and trestlework unharmed, and the garrison at Rowlesburg in 
his rear. After a few hours of night marching he found a scanty sup- 
ply of forage and went into camp, 6 miles east of Evansville. Harman 
reached Oakland at 11 a.m., surprised, captured, and paroled a com- 
pany of infantry stationed there, destroyed two railroad bridges, and 
proceeded toward Kingwood. Halting at the Cheat River, he burned 
the bridge, and bivouacked for the night. McDonald was behind him, 
destroying the railroad. 

April 27. Imboden marched back to-day to Roaring Run, withdraw- 
ing his cavalry from the Buckhannon Bridge. The road was so bad 
that it took from 5 a.m. until 2 p.m. to make 2 miles, and the command 
did not reach camp until after dark. Roberts was joined at Buckhan- 
non by the detachments already mentioned, which gave him an effective 
force of 2800 men.i 

Jones moved to Evansville, where corn was secured for the horses 
and meat for the men. Fearing that news would travel rapidly along 
the railroad, he threw a force into Independence, and had it destroy 
the bridge at that place. In the hope of establishing communication 
with Imboden, he wrote to him: 

... I have come here to feed men and horses, and wait for news and junction 
with Harman, when I will make my way to you. ily movements, as a matter of 
course, will be controlled by circumstances. . . .- 

The whole command crossed the railroad about dark, and proceeded 
northward to look up Harman. About midnight, finding forage, and 
having heard of Harman, it went into camp near Independence. 

' 2500 hifanti-y, 200 eavalry, 100 artillei-y (4 pieces) (TF. M., 39, p. 91). 
= 7b., 39, p. 105. 



OCCUPATION OF MORGANTOWN 465 

Harman marched to ]\Iorgantown. Several hundred citizens, who 
had armed themselves and collected here, prepared to offer resistance, 
when summoned, surrendered unconditionally, depositing their arms in 
the court-house, and retired to their homes.' A portion of Harman 's 
force remained in this place, with the Confederate flag flying over it, 
for about two hours. While no resistance was made, no sympathy was 
shown him by the inhabitants. The best efforts of his gallant followers 
to propitiate the ladies were of no avail. When induced to sing or play 
they gave the "Star-Spangled Banner," or "Hooker is Our Leader," 
or the Union version of "Maryland, My Maryland," or some other 
expression of decidedly Union sentiment. 

On receipt of the news from Morgantown the court-house bell at 
Uniontown, Pa.,- was rimg, and intense excitement prevailed. The 
specie of its bank was removed to Pittsburg. The latter place itself 
was somewhat disturbed. Wheeling was filled with excitement. The 
mills were stopped, and picked citizens proceeded to form a home 
guard. A large amount of its specie was shipped also to Pittsburg. 

From Morgantown Harman proceeded toward Independence, and 
camped about 7 miles from that place. 

Jones' movements so scared the telegraph operator at Grafton that 
he destroyed his instruments and left. A Colonel Wilkinson cooperated 
with the enemy by having a bridge burned near Bridgeport and the 
track torn up, to prevent the enemy from coming to him by rail.^ 

At 11 :30 p.m. Schenck telegraphed him: 

. . You are evidently in a causeless panic. . . . Your burning of the bridge 
at Bridgeport is disgraceful. 

I sincerely hope Mulligan is, as you suppose, at Grafton, where you ought to 
have been. . . .* 

Colonel Mulligan, falling back from Philippi, where he had gone to 
cover Latham's retreat, reached Grafton with two regiments of infan- 
try and a battery of artillery.^ 

Roberts received from Wilkinson a telegram that Grafton was cap- 
tured, and that he was preparing to evacuate Clarksburg in two hours. 
He replied that he would reach Clarksburg the following day at noon, 
and directed him "to hold on, if possible, but if compelled to retreat, to 
run the railroad stock and supplies to Parkersburg, destroy such as 
could not be secured, and to fall back to Parkersburg or Weston."*' 

At 4 p.m. Roberts, with the troops at Buckhannon, took up the march 
for Clarksburg. 

April 28. Imboden marched to within 4 miles of Buckhannon, hav- 

1 W. B., 39, pp. 126, 134. ' lb., 40, p. 298. 

2 North of the map. "■ lb., 39, pp. 91, 112. 

3 W. E., 40, p. 296. " lb., 39, pp. 91, 92. 



466 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ing heard that the enemy had abandoned that place. Roberts with his 
command reached Clarksburg. 

Harman took up the march at 2 a.m. for Independence. W. E. Jones, 
proceeding northward, met Harman at daylight and learned from him 
that the expeditions to Oakland and Altamont had been successful. 
With his whole command, except the squadron under McDonald, he pro- 
ceeded to Morgantown, crossed the Monongahela at that point, and 
rested. In the course of the day he was joined by McDonald. Judging 
that he had gone as far north as was safe, he decided to turn southward 
and look up Imboden. He resumed his march at dark, but went into 
camp a short distance outside of Fairmont. 

How these operations were viewed and met by the Federals is indi- 
cated in part by the following dispatches of this day : 

Halleck to Schenck 

You should concentrate your forces on the rear of Jones' raid, so as to cut oS 
his return. . . . This raid is unquestionably made to divert our attention from 
tlie Rappahannock and Suffolk.' If Roberts [at Clarksburg] and Kelley [at 
New Creek] ^ will act promptly, they can cut Jones completely off. It is believed 
that his entire force is not over 3000. 

Schenck to Halleck. 2:30 p.m., received 4:40 p.m. 

1 have Mulligan at Grafton. . . . The whole rebel force that has been on the 
line of the railroad I do not believe exceeds 1500, but aU cavalry. ... I hope to 
intercept enemy's retreat. It is difficult, though, to catch cavalry with infan- 
try. . . . They have got up unnecessary panic at "Wheeling, Pittsburg, and Park- 
ersburg. 

J. W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, tele- 
graphed to-day from Baltimore to the comijany : 

. . . But one train of empty cars was stopped, which we have recovered. One 
bridge only was destroyed west of Oakland, which we are reconstructing. We 
have strong working forces at all points, and expect to reopen through to-morrow. 
No passenger or freight trains have been disturbed upon our entire line. 

April 29. Imboden marched to Buckhannon, 4 miles, and spent the 
rest of the day resting and gathering supplies. His horses were break- 
ing down in great numbers. Some were dying from overwork and lack 
of nourishment. Grain was very scarce and had to be procured in 
small quantities, sometimes less than a bushel at a house. He em- 
ployed a considerable portion of his cavalry in collecting cattle and 
sending them to the rear, paying for everything at the rates that were 
current before he arrived in the country. This gave general satisfac- 

' The raid was not made with such intention. 

' In general control of the troops on the railroad. 



BRIDGE DESTROYED AT FAIRMONT 467 

tion, Confederate money being freely accepted.' He received his first 
information from W. E. Jones in the form of the latter 's dispatch of 
the 27th. He also heard that the enemy was massing his troops at 
Janelew, a village about midway between Buckhannon and Clarksburg, 
and fortifying his position. 

Jones attacked Fairmont, which was defended by 400 men, carried 
the place, and destroyed the bridge, an iron structure which it had 
taken two years to build. The result of his day's work was the de- 
struction of 4 railroad bridges, and the capture of 1 piece of artillery, 
300 small arms, 260 men, and many horses. 

At 9:20 a.m. Roberts at Clarksburg telegraphed to Schenck at Bal- 
timore: 

Arrived myself last night [from Buckhannon] , men and horses, all exhausted 
by three days' and nights' forced march. Can do nothing with them for twenty- 
four hours or more. . . . Jones is now at Fairmont, probably 2000 strong. . . . 
"We must keep this [place] and the supplies liere. ... If General Cox [at Cin- 
cinnati] can send 4000 or 5000 men to Parkersburg, it should be done, and the 
enemy captured or defeated. . . . 

Schenck telegraphed to Halleck at 11:.30: "Bridge at Fairmont is 
safe," and on receipt, at 1:10 p.m., of the dispatch of 9:20 a.m. from 
Roberts: "I do not credit the report of Jones and his 2000 at Fair- 
mont." But at 11 p.m. he added that he had just received the follow- 
ing dispatch from Roberts at Clarksburg : 

Fairmont is taken, and the bridge at that place burned, and the piers blown up. 

In the meantime Halleck telegraphed: 

To Schenck, 3:05 p.m. 

The enemy's raid is variously estimated at from 1500 to 4000. Ton have 
45,000 under your command. If you can not concentrate enough to meet the 
enemy, it does not argue well for your military dispositions. 

According to his consolidated morning report Schenck 's command 
numbered on the 30th of April 34,297 present for duty." 

Burnside, under orders from Halleck, collected all the troops that 
could be spared from his department, and shipped them up the Ohio 
to Parkersburg to cooperate with Schenck 's forces. He also arranged 
with the naval authorities for sending a couple of gunboats up the river. 

Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania telegraphed to Stanton : 

It is reported to me that the rebels have taken Morgantown in force. Please 
say if you have any information, and if force wiU be sent on, if true. We have 
no force in the state, and you could send troops before we could organize any.' 

1 W. B., 39, p. 102. = lb., 40, pp. 321, 322. 

' The Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1863, by S. L. French. 



468 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Lincoln telegraphed the same day to Curtin : 

I do not think the people of Pennsylvania should be uneasy about invasion. 
Doubtless a small force of the enemy is flourishing about in the northern part of 
Virginia on the "scewhorn" principle, on purpose to divert us in another quar- 
ter. I believe it is nothing more. We think we have adequate force close after 
them.^ 

A dispatch of similar import was sent by Stanton.- 

April 30. Imboden spent the day at Buckhannon, collecting corn and 
cattle. W. E. Jones marched on Clarksburg. This place contained, 
according to Schenck, "about 4500 troops of all arms," and according 
to Roberts, who commanded the troops, "2600 effective men, with 10 
pieces of artillery. "^ Learning of its occupation and not feeling 
strong enough to attack it, Jones turned on Bridgeport, and there cap- 
tured 46 men and a few horses, and destroyed a bridge, making, with 
the one destroyed by Wilkinson, two bridges destroyed at Bridgeport. 
He camped about dark a short distance out of that place on the road 
to Philippi. 

May 1. Imboden spent another day at Buckhannon foraging and 
constructing a raft on which to cross the river. He sent a regiment of 
cavalry to Weston, which found that place evacuated and stores col- 
lected there destroyed, but confirmed the report that the enemy was at 
Janelew. Fearing that Jones had been cut off, and meaning to look him 
up, he issued orders to move early in the morning toward Philippi. 

Jones reached Philippi about noon. He now further lightened his 
column by sending off his led horses to the Shenandoah Valley. He had 
received no "certain intelligence" of Imboden, but understanding, 
probably from the people of the country, that he was at Buckhannon, 
he proceeded on a night march toward that place. 

While Jones was turning the position of Clarksburg the Federals 
continued to think that he was marching on it. At 2:30 p.m. Halleck 
received the following dispatches : 

Prom Cipher Correspondent at Parkersburg 
. . . Enemy captured company cavalry 4 miles east of Clarksburg, and are 
now represented as surrounding the town. Attack momentarily expected. 

Kelley to Schenck, 1:30 p.m. 
General Kenly [from Harper's Ferry] has just arrived at Grafton; [he] will 
push right on to Clarksburg by rail as far as he can with safety, then debark and 
march by turnpike. I will order him to attack aud raise the siege [of Clarks- 
burg] at once. . . . Everything looks well now. The enemy have completely sur- 
rounded Roberts, but had not attempted to attack him up to last advices. 

1 The Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1863, bv S. L. French. 
2 W. R., 40, p. 300. 3 jj,^ 40, pp.' 348, 376. 



GOVERNOR CURTIN ANXIOUS 469 

While this imaginary siege was being raised Mulligan was to march 
from Grafton to Philippi and cut off the retreat of the besiegers in that 
direction. But he was not to move until Kelley heard "something defi- 
nite" from Roberts/ and Roberts, for lack of cavalry, could get no in- 
formation of a definite character. Kelley telegraphed to Roberts: 

. . . What is j'our latest news of tlie enemy? Don't let him escape you if it 
can possibly be prevented. Communicate fully with me. 

He received the following reply: 

. . . Jones' force passed my left through Bridgeport to-day. It is . . . evi- 
dently trying to form a junction with Imboden's. . . . They intend, after joining 
their forces, to attack this place. . . . 

. . . General Kenly has just reached Bridgeport with his command, and will 
join me before morning. 

... I have no cavalry that can do any service. The forces of Milroy should 
be thrown in toward Franklin, to cut off Jones' retreat. Scammon's forces [at 
Charleston, W. Va.] should be drawn round toward Summerville and Lewisburg, 
to prevent retreat in that direction. 

As a consequence of this call for cavalry the 12 Pa. was ordered by 
Milroy to take the cars westward from Martinsburg at 6 p.m. 
Schenck telegraphed to Curtin, Governor of Pennsylvania : 

All I want is some cooperation from the direction of Pennsylvania and the 
Ohio River, to beat and capture the enemy, if he does not escape by Clarksburg 
at once. 

The enemy was escaping, not by Clarksburg, but by Bridgeport. 
There was some cooperation coming from the Ohio, but none from 
Pennsylvania. At 4 :25 p.m. Governor Curtin telegraphed to President 
Lincoln that he was in hourly receipt of dispatches from the western 
part of his state, that the people of West Virginia were calling for aid 
from the Pennsylvania militia, and that he should like to have the 
President 's opinion as to the propriety of his complying with such re- 
quests. Receiving no reply, he telegraphed later: 

... I have dispatches stating that the Union forces have been repulsed and 
are falling back into Pennsylvania. If it is your pleasure that I should call out 
the militia, immediate arrangements should be made for their transportation and 
subsistence. . . . 

The President replied : 

The whole disposable force at Baltimore and elsewhere in reach have already 
been sent after the enemy that alarms you. 

The worst thing the enemy could do for himself would be to weaken himself 

^ Preceding dispatch. 



470 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

before [in front of] Hooker, and therefore it is safe to believe that he is not doing 
it, and the best he could do for himself would be to get us so scared as to bring 
part of Hooker's force away, and that is just what he is trying to do. 

It is evident from these and previous communications that both Lin- 
cohi and Stanton had misjudged the purpose of Lee's raiding columns. 
There was no thought of a diversion in Lee's immediate front, of draw- 
ing troops away from the Army of the Potomac. Lee did think that 
the raids would draw Milroy from the Shenandoah Valley, but this he 
considered as a means of opening that country to Confederate foraging, 
and not as a weakening of Hooker. The great object of the raiders was 
not to draw Federal forces after them, but to destroy the railroad and 
collect supplies and recruits.' 

Among the wild rumors that perplexed the Federal authorities to- 
day was one that the Confederate force was estimated at 20,000, and 
was under the command of Stonewall Jackson.- 

May 2. A few miles from Buckhannon, Jones, coming from Phil- 
ippi, received the first certain intelligence of General Imboden, and on 
arriving found him ready to move to Weston. Both officers had lost so 
many men that they hardly had more between them than each one had 
at the beginning.^ That they had not struck the railroad simulta- 
neously as had been planned was attributed by Jones to the fact that 
Imboden encumbered his column with wagons. Jones says in his re- 
port:* 

Knowing the difficulty of moving wagons over mountain roads in early spring, 
I stipulated with General Imboden that no such impediment should clog his move- 
ments after leaving Huttonsville. I was surprised to find a train of 70 wagons at 
Buckhannon. Had our original plan [Jones'] been carried out, I feel confident 
northwestern Virginia could have been cleared to the Ohio. 

No such consummation could now be hoped for. The whole com- 
mand, under Jones as senior officer, took up the march for Weston; 
Imboden marching directly on that point, and Jones by the road to 
Clarksburg and by-roads, flanking Imboden on the right. Imboden 
covered about one half, and Jones about one third, of the distance to 
Weston, and camped for the night. 

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was now free from the enemy and 
in working order, except at the bridge destroyed by Wilkinson near 
Bridgeport. 

^ Lee to Jones, April 26, ante. given to all his men who desired it permis- 

- Curtin to Stanton, W. R., 40, p. 347. sion to go home. 

' Imboden reports a loss of 200 men by * W. R., 39, p. 119. 
desertion {W. R., 39, p. 102). Jones had 



JUNCTION OF JONES AND IMBODEN 471 

Schenck telegraphed to Scammon at Charleston, W. Va. : 
. . . ["W. E.] Jones retreating rapidly by way of Philippi. 

Roberts and Kelley [Kenly] will pursue south from Clarksburg. You should 
send whatever force you can to Summerville. . . . 

And Lincoln to Curtin : 

... I really do not see the justification for incurring the trouble and expense 
of calling out the militia. . . . Our forces are exactly between the enemy and 
Pennsylvania. 

Did Lincoln know that the Federal forces were doing their best to 
gain the enemy's rear, and thus put the enemy between themselves and 
Pennsylvania? 

May 3. Imboden reached Weston and went into camp. Jones 
camped en route to that point. 

Roberts, who was to pursue from Clarksburg, telegraphed to 
Schenck : 

No additional information of the enemy. . . . The Twelfth Pennsylvania Cav- 
alry, 320 strong, reaches me to-day, broken down. 

No means of transportation gotten here yet. It will be several days before I 
can do anything but protect railroad. 

The transportation had all been removed from Clarksburg by Wil- 
kinson before Roberts arrived there. Roberts had sent for it and was 
waiting for its return. 

May 4. W. E. Jones rejoined Imboden at Weston. Here the forces 
rested until the 6th of May, by which time the campaign of Chancellors- 
ville was decided. Their subsequent operations may be described in a 
few words. Imboden moved southward through Bulltown, Sutton- 
ville, and Big Birch— all of which places he found evacuated— to Sum- 
merville, where he arrived on the 13th of May. Jones took his com- 
mand northward, and struck the railroad at West Union and Cairo. 
He destroyed two bridges at the former place, and three at the latter. 
From Cairo he moved to Oil Town, where he arrived on the 9th, and 
burned a quantity of oil estimated at 150,000 barrels. Turning south- 
ward, he proceeded by way of Glenville and Suttonville to Summer- 
ville. He arrived there with a portion of his command and united with 
Imboden on the 13th. The remainder of his command joined him on the 
14th, after which Jones and Imboden marched together eastward for 
some distance, and separated to go to their respective camps. 

Their joint operation can not be said to have been a success. They 
did more damage to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad than Stoneman 



472 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

did to the railroads in Virginia, but the military effect of it was even 
less than Stoneman's brief interruption of Lee's communication with 
Richmond. They were greatly disappointed in the number of recruits 
obtained. The Secessionists were rather incensed than pleased by the 
treatment that they received from their raiding visitors. The prop- 
erty seized was taken from these people perhaps more than from 
Unionists, for the reason that the latter were active in hiding their 
property, while the Secessionists, trusting to the consideration of their 
friends, took no such ijrecaution. The raiders had little regard for 
persons whose only aid was their sympathy. A rich Secessionist, who 
rode into Fairmont on a fine horse, told General Jones how much he 
was doing to help the Southern cause. The general interrupted him by 
a requisition for his horse. In answer to his protestations on the score 
of his loyalty, he was told that he ought cheerfully to give his horse for 
the cause that he loved so well. 

The best that General Lee could say of Jones' and Imboden's oper- 
ations may be gathered from his indorsements of June 15 on their re- 
ports : 

The expedition under General Jones appears to have been conducted with 
commendable skill and vigor, and was pi-oductive of beneficial i-esults. The in- 
jury inflicted on the enemy was serious, and he will doubtless be induced to keep 
troops to guard the railroad who might be otherwise employed against us. Gen- 
eral Jones displayed sagacity and boldness in his plans, and was well supported 
by the courage and fortitude of his officers and men.^ 

Although the expedition under General Imboden failed to accomplish all tlie 
results intended, it nevertheless rendered valuable service in the collection of 
stores and in making the enemy uneasy for his communications with the west. 
The men and officers deserve much credit for the fortitude and endurance exhib- 
ited under the hardships and difficulties of the march, which interfered so seri- 
ously with the success of the enterprise.^ 

The Federal defence depended upon anticipating the enemy at his 
points of attack or at points commanding his line of retreat. For lack 
of cavalry it could not undertake to follow or harass him. What cav- 
alry it had might perhaps have been used to better advantage than it 
was in observing and reporting the enemy's movements. At any rate, 
the failure of the defence to intercept either of the enemy's columns 
was the natural consequence of its imperfect information. The defence 
of Greenland Gap stands out as the finest thing of the whole operation, 
and seems really deserving of the much-abused characterization of 
heroic. 

' W. R., 39, p. 121. White's Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, Laurel 

'lb., 39, p. 105. For some interesting- Brigade, Hampton Division. A. N. V., by 

details of the operation, the reader is re- F. M. Myers, late Captain Company A, 35 

ferred to The Comanches, a History of Ya. Cavah-y. 



CHAPTER XXX 

LOSSES IN THE OPPOSING AEMIES. COMMENTS 

THE losses in killed, wounded, and missing which the campaign 
entailed upon the Army of the Potomac are given in the follow- 
ing table : 

AGGREGATE PBES- KILLED AND KILLED, WOUNDED, 

ORGANIZATION ENT FOR DUTY WOUNDED AND MISSING 

EQUIPPED NUMBER PER CENT. NUMBER PER CENT. 

General headquarters, cavalry 

escort " . 60 

I Corps 16,908 245 1 299 2 

II Corps 16,893 1,193 7 1,925 11 

III Corps 18,721 3,023 16 4,119 22 

V Corps 15,824 541 3 700 4 

VI Corps 23,667 3,145 13 4,610 19 

XI Corps 12,977 1,618 12 2,412 19 

XII Corps 13,450 1,703 13 2,824 21 

General Artillery Reserve . . 1,610 

^ , ^ ( Active force . 9,060 ' 81 1 389 4 

Cavalry Corps J j^^p^^ ^^^,^.^ 2,481= 

Provost Guard 2,217 

Army of the Potomac . . . 133,868 11.549 9 17,278= 13 

The percentages express the ratios of casualties to Present for Dnty 
Equipped. The casualties among non-combatants were insignificant 
in number. There were no losses reported in the General Artillery 
Reserve or Provost Guard of the army. Two men were reported 
wounded on signal duty.* The VI and XII Corps reported 3 killed and 
wounded, and 1 captured or missing, in their respective provost 
guards.^ Berry's old division had 2 men wounded in the ambulance 
detachment." 

The portion of the II Corps that fought under Couch at Chancellors- 

1 Pleasonton, 1020; Averell, 3520: Stone- Hooker's staff and 8 in the Engineer Bri- 

man, 4320 (inehiding horse artillery in gade. These casualties, not included in the 

each case), and 200 artillerymen, who, with table, make the grand aggregate 17,287 

10 pieces of horse artillery, were in batten' (TF. i?., 39, pp. 173, 216, 192). 

at Banks' Ford. * Ih., 39. p. 223. 

- Guarding camps and communications = 76.. 39. pp. 183. 189. 

north of Rappahannock. " Ih., 39, p. 451. 

^ One casualty was reported in General 



474 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

ville lost in killed and wounded 10 per cent, and in killed, wounded, and 
missing, 16 per cent. 

It will be observed that the loss, in proportion to strength, sustained 
by the XI Corjjs, on which fell the first heavy blow— intended to be the 
decisive blow— of the campaign, was exceeded by that of the III and 
XII Corps and equaled by that of the VI Corps, and that the largest 
loss in proportion to strength was sustained by the III Corps. 

Averell lost at Rapidan Station fio of 1 per cent, in killed and 
woimded, and 1 per cent, in killed, wounded, and missing. Pleasonton 
lost in the march to Chancellorsville and subsequent operations 7 per 
cent, in killed and wounded, and 20 per cent, in killed, wounded, and 
missing. Stoneman lost in his immediate command, or raiding column, 
%o of 1 per cent, in killed and wounded, and 3 per cent, in killed, 
wounded, and missing. 

The foregoing figures are compiled for the greater part from the 
monthly return for April, and the returns of casualties for the cam- 
paign.i 

The Confederate records do not give the casualties as fully as the 
Federal. They contain a report of killed and wounded by the medical 
director, which, however, does not include the losses of the General 
Artillery Reserve, of the horse artillery, or of W. H. F. Lee's brigade 
of cavalry.^ These omissions may be repaired, at least in part, by ref- 
erence to the reports of Generals Pendleton and other commanders.^ 
Where the losses in killed and wounded are reported by the organiza- 
tion commanders their numbers are generally larger than in the report 
of the surgeon-general. There is no official statement of the losses of 
the Army of Northern Virginia in missing. Many of the commanders 
failed to report such losses. McLaws of the I Corps gives the number 
for his division.* Anderson of the I, and Rodes and Early of the II, 
Corps give the numbers for their infantry.*^ Pendleton gives the num- 
ber for the General Artillery Reserve." These statements and reports 
of other commanders furnish a basis for estimating the number for the 
army.' The Century Company gives this as 1708.* General E. P. 
Alexander gives it as 2196." The official records show 2528 missing, 
reported or accounted for as such.i" Doubleday gives his estimate as 
2753." Immediately after the campaign Colonel Hofmann, the Federal 
commissary-general of prisoners, commenced making arrangements 
for the transportation and accommodation of about 3000 prisoners. i" 

1 W. B., 40, p. 320, and 39, pp. 172-192. '' lb., 39, pp. 822, 1048, 1051, 1098. 

= lb., 39, pp. 806-809. » B. and L., Ill, 238. 

' lb., 39, pp. 816, 1050, 1098, 1076 (17th » Memoirs of a Confederate, p. 361. 

line from bottom). i» This is the result of the author's own 

* lb., 39, p. 829. examination of the published documents. 

^76., 39, pp. 854 (see also 864), 947, " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, p. 71. 

949, 1002. 8 lb., 39, p. 816. " W. B., 118, pp. 552, 557, 560, 563. 



ARMY OP NORTHERN VIRGINIA 475 

Captain Candler, writing home on the 7th of May, gives the number of 
prisoners as from 3000 to 4000.^ In a bombastic order published to his 
army at the close of the campaign, which will be presented later, Hooker 
claims 5000. The Confederate missing, including those who escaped 
capture, may safely be estimated as 3000. 

The casualties of the Army of Northern Virginia may now be tabu- 
lated as follows. The killed and wounded are generally those reported 
by the medical director. The killed, wounded, and missing are partly 
reported by commanders and partly computed by the author. 



ORGANIZATION 



AGGREGATE 
EFFECTIVE 



KILLED AND 


KILLED, WOUNDED, 


WOUNDED 


AND MISSING 


JUMBEB PER CENT. 


NUMBER 


PER CENT. 


1,189 14 


1.445 


17 


1,395 16 


1,775 


20 


52 7 


106 


15 


2,636 14 


3,326 


19 


2,616 23 


2.940 


26 


2,228 22 


2,937 


29 


846 10 


1,346 


16 


l.STO--^ 27 


2,078 


30 



1 Div., Anderson 8.370 

2 " McLaws 8,665 

Corps Artillery 720 

I Corps 17,755 

1 Div., A. P. Hill 11,751 

2 ' ^ Rodes 10,063 

3 " Early 8,596 

4 " Colston 6,989 

Corps ArtiUery 800 69 9 80 10 

II Corps 38,199 7,629 ' 18 9,381 25 

General Artillery Reserve . . 480 3 1 3 1 

Cavalry 2,500 25 1 111 4 

Army of Northern Virginia . 60,892 10,293 ^ 17 12,821 ' 22 

With respect to non-combatants the Confederates report 1 killed in 
the signal corps attached to Jackson's headquarters, and 2 wounded 
in the pioneer corps of Colston's division. In artillery the Federals 
reported a loss of 14 pieces^ and the Confederates a loss of 8.^ But 
the Confederates claim only 13 « and the Federals only 7 '' as captured. 
The Federals lost 17 colors, the Confederates 15.* The closeness of 
the fighting is attested further by the casualties among the general 
officers. The Federals lost Berry killed and Whipple mortally wounded. 
The Confederates lost Paxton killed, and Jackson, who died of pneu- 
monia superinduced upon the effects of his wounds. The other wounded 
generals were, on the side of the Federals, Mott and Devens, and on the 

1 Manuscript. tenant-Colonel Baldwin, Chief of Ordnance, 

= Includina' 2 artillerymen. Loss reported Army of Northern Virginia, reported a loss 

as "inconsiderable" (TF. E., 39, p. 1044). of 10 pieces [ib., 40, p. 79.5). 

3 Not includin,? 5 casualties at headquar- ^ Lee's report, ib., 40, p. 804. 

ters II Corps. ' Hooker's Order No. 49, ib., 40, p. 171. 

* Hunt's report, TF. B., 39, p. 253. * lb., 39, pp. 804, 171, and ib., 40, p. 

5 Pendleton's report, ib., 39, p. 816. Lieu- 594. 



476 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

side of the Confederates, A. P. Hill, Heth, McGowan, Hoke, and Nich- 
olls. The general officers numbered in the Army of the Potomac 70 
and in the Army of Northern Virginia 40. Hence the Federals lost in 
killed or wounded 1 general in 18, or, counting Hooker, who was not 
reported, 1 in 14; and the Confederates 1 in 6. The Federals lost one 
general captured (General Hays).^ General Sedgwick reports the 
capture of a general officer, but does not mention his name.^ The re- 
port must be a mistake. There is no Confederate general identified as 
captured at Fredericksburg. 

An important tactical lesson that may be learned from this campaign 
is the advantage of rapid or timely deployment, of being properly 
formed for attack before undertaking it, and the error of piecemeal or 
dribbling assaults. Sedgwick's failure at Salem Church was due to his 
attacking before his forces had come up arid deployed. His leading 
division gained some advantage, but, not being supported, was driven 
back with heavy loss. Stuart's attack of Berry's lines was on the same 
order. What would have been the effect of Jackson's attack if it had 
been made as Sedgwick's was at Salem Church? Perhaps not so com- 
plete a failure, but certainly not the stunning blow that Jackson's was. 

Referring to his situation on the 3d and 4th, Hooker said in a private 
letter : 

With Lee in my front and Jackson on my flank, I was unwilling to attempt to 
force my way through Lee, especially as the roads through the forests would 
only enable me to present my columns with narrow fronts, which the enemy 
would cut down as fast as they were exposed. I knew that I could do this, and 
I gave the enemy credit for being able to do as much as I could, but no more. 
Had Sedgwick come up on Lee's rear, the latter would have found himself be- 
tween two armies, and would doubtless have followed Jackson's flank movement, 
which I desired, as that would throw the enemy ofE the short road to Richmond 
and our troops on it.^ 

Hooker could not have cut down the heads of the enemy's columns 
because the enemy would not have presented them to him. The forests 
did not prevent the Confederates as they did the Federals from deploy- 
ing off the roads and marching in line. The Confederates moved 
through the Wilderness in every direction and in every kind of forma- 
tion. They were better woodsmen than the Federals, and better ac- 
quainted with the terrain, or better supplied with guides. They were 
hardier, tougher men. They cared less if they tore their clothes or 
scratched their hands and faces. Not but that the Federal soldiers 
would follow their officers, and when so led did follow them, through 

' This officer was erroneously reported as ^ 76., 39, p. 561. 

wounded (TF. B., 39, pp. 177, 376, and i6., ^General Hooker to Colonel Samuel 

118, pp. 570, 571, 618). Ross, B. and L., III. 223. 



COMMENTS 477 

the thickets. The Confederate movements were better connected and 
better covered than the Federal. 

Hooker was asked by the Committee on the Conduct of the AVar what 
he thought would have been the result had Sedgwick carried out his 
orders vigorously. He replied: "My impression was that Lee would 
have been compelled to move out on the same road that Jackson had 
moved on, and pass over to my right." ^ Such a statement does not 
sound like the remark in Van Alen's dispatch of the 2d to Sedgwick: 
"You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by 
General Lee, and between you and the major-general commanding, he 
expects to use him up." With such apparent indecision on Hooker's 
part, it is hard to conjecture what he would have done had Sedgwick 
succeeded in striking Lee in rear. General Warren was asked by the 
Committee: "What would have been the effect of an attack by General 
Sedgwick in conjunction with the main army on the enemy's 
lines . . . ■?" He discreetly answered: "I think we ought to have de- 
stroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal upon how hard 
the other [Hooker's] part of the army fought. ... If he [Sedgwick] 
had got over there, and the other part had fought as they ought to have 
done, I think we should have pretty nearly destroyed General Lee's 
army. I do not believe that if General Sedgwick had done all that he 
could, and there had not been harder fighting at the other end of the 
line, we would have succeeded. ' ' - 

Hooker contented himself with holding his line as a bridge-head. 
True, if he had moved to join Sedgwick both he and Sedgwick might 
have been caught between the fords and driven against, if not into, the 
river. But if Hooker, with the mass of the army, could not safely 
undertake to join Sedgwick when Sedgwick was moving to join him, it 
was hardly to be expected that Sedgwick, with a single corps, would 
succeed in joining Hooker. If Hooker was not to move, Sedgwick's 
movement should have been directed up the north bank of the Rappa- 
hannock and over United States Ford, instead of across country from 
Fredericksburg, or the I Corps (Reynolds') should have been left with 
Sedgwick, who would then have had about 40,000 men instead of about 
25,000. The I Corps, be it remembered, was taken from Sedgwick, and 
yet was not actively engaged at Chancellorsville. 

Hooker's irresolution in this campaign was only partially due to the 
injury which he received at the Chancellor House. It was exhibited, 
as has been shown, long before he sustained that injury, and would in 
all probability have lasted through the campaign had he not been in- 
jured at all.^ 

^ Bep. of Com., IV, 145. had crossed the Rappahannoek with the 

- lb 47 48. ' ' Ai-my of the Potomac in the campaign of 

3 A couple of mouths later, when Hooker Gettysburg, he was asked by General 



478 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Before the campaign it appeared from reports and returns that the 
best corps in the Army of the Potomac was the XI and the poorest the 
11.^ After the campaign it appeared from performance on the march and 
in action that the best, if there was any best, was the II and the poorest 
the XI. Military efficiency can not be reliably estimated without reckon- 
ing with the tactical judgment and ability of the commanding general. 

On the 6th of May Lieutenant Ropes wrote home: "Everywhere we 
hear of the shameful cowardice of the XI Corps"; and on the 10th 
Major Rusling wrote: "The army all did well except the Eleventh 
Corps. That broke and ran discreditably. 'I fights mit Sigel' is played 
out. Tell S. that his Dutchmen can't begin to stand up against the fury 
and rush of Americans, even if they are Rebels!" 

For the rout of the XI Corps no one was ever officially held to ac- 
count. General Schurz in concluding his report of the battle said: 
"Being charged with such an enormous responsibility as the failure of 
a campaign involves, it would seem to me that every commander in this 
corps has a right to a fair investigation of his conduct and of the cir- 
cumstances surrounding him and his command on that occasion. I 
would therefore most respectfully and most urgently ask permission to 
publish this report."^ 

To this request, it seems, no attention was paid. While the report 
was in Hooker's hands, Schurz wrote through regular channels to the 
Secretary of War asking permission to publish it, and, as an alterna- 
tive, that a court of inquiry be convened to investigate the circum- 
stances surrounding his command on the 2d of May, and the causes of 
its defeat.^ Howard forwarded this communication without remark. 
Hooker indorsed it: "I hope to be able to transmit all the reports of 
the recent battles, and meanwhile I cannot approve of the publication 
of an isolated report." Schurz was consequently informed by the 
Adjutant-General of the Army that it was contrary to orders to iiublish 
the reports of battles except through the proper official channels. He 
thereupon requested that his report be published when it should reach 
the War Department through "the proper channel," and repeated his 
request for a court of inquiry, should his report not be published. His 
letter was indorsed by Howard on the 30th of May as follows : 

With reference to the court of inquiry asked for, I recommend that the request 
be granted. I do not know of any charges against General Schurz from an official 

Doubleday: "Hooker, what was the matter there is to it" (Manuscript letter of Major 

with you at Chancellorsville ? Some say E. P. Halstead, U. S. Volunteers, April 19, 

you were injured by a shell, and others that 1903). See also History of the Army of 

you were drunk; now tell us what it was." the Potomac, by J. H. Stine, p. 368. 

Hooker answered frankly and good-na- ^ See figures of efficiency of the several 

turedly: "Doubleday, I was not hurt by a corps, Appendix 3. 

shell, and I was not drunk. For once I ^W. R., 39, p. 658. 

lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all ^ Ih., 39, pp. 658, 659. 



COMMENTS 479 

quarter, but I do not shrink from a thorough investigation of all the circum- 
stances connected with the disaster of May 3. 

It was forwarded by Hooker without remark, and returned by Hal- 
leek on the 4th of June indorsed : ' ' Publication of partial reports not 
approved till the General commanding- has time to make his report." 
General Hooker never made his report, and General Schurz never had 
his court of inquiry. 

General Howard forwarded to Hooker on the 21st of May a List of 
German Troops in the Eleventh Army Corps, from which it would 
appear that the Germans in the corps numbered but 5282, or about half 
the corps present for duty.^ But the list does not indicate how the 
count was taken nor what was understood or meant by "German 
Troops." A veteran of the XI Corps writes on this point as follows: 
"There were 15 of these so-called foreign regiments in the corps, 11 
of which were exclusively German, and numbered about 4500 men ; the 
other four regiments were of mixed nationalities, and numbered some 
2500 men. . . . Probably % of the command were foreign-born. "- 
There can hardly be a reasonable doubt that the corps was composed 
mainly of men of German parentage, but it is preposterous to ascribe 
its debandade on the 2d of May to that fact. Such a disaster would 
have happened to any body of troops situated as the XI Corps was 
when Jackson struck it. But other men might have comported them- 
selves with more dignity, or less ignominy, even while running for their 
lives. On this point General Francis A. Walker, who fought through 
the Civil War, says : 

I never saw an American so frightened as to lose his senses, though I have 
seen thousands of the natives of Columbia leave one battle-field or another in the 
most dastardly manner. But if an American is mean enough to abandon the 
line, it is always done coolly and collectedly. Indeed, he will exhibit a degree of 
engineering skill in getting out of a fight under cover which would do credit to 
a member of the topographical staff.^ 

It should be observed that the XI Corps was commanded by an Ameri- 
can ; that the compatriots of the Old Dessauer, of Frederick the Great, 
of von Bliicher and von Moltke, who belonged to the corps, were more 
or less the product of American influences. They were American Ger- 
mans, or, as they are more commonly and properly called, German- 
Americans. Their courage can hardly be impugned without reflecting 
to some extent upon the people among whom they had lived as citizens, 
and many of them been born and bred. 

1 W. R., 39, p. 660. 

2 Captain Hartwell Osbom, Papers of Illinois Commandery, Military Order 

Loyal Legion, IV, 174. 

3 History of file Second Army Corps, by F. A. Walker, p. 229, foot-note. 



480 THE CAJVIPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

They were not typical Americans, but neither were they tyjiical Ger- 
mans. An appreciable proportion of our German population comes to 
our country to escape from military service, and for this reason is not 
representative of the military population of Germany. This consider- 
ation is necessary to understanding how a people who lead the world 
in the art and science of war, who have produced a host of commanders 
of the highest order, and have a long and glorious military history, 
should have furnished our country some of its poorest soldiers. 
Whether a man who abandons his colors preserves or loses his self- 
control, he is equally lost to the firing line. His deportment is of mili- 
tary moment only in so far as it influences other men. To that extent 
the American's deliberation is ordinarily to be preferred to the Ger- 
man-American's precijaitation, but the sight of entire regiments of 
Americans marching off the field under the command of their officers 
might be hardly less demoralizing to onlooking troops than a panic in 
a foreign contingent. 

Let us consider the reasons which Hooker has given for his repassage 
of the Rappahannock: 

The rout of the XI Corps. 

This occurred on the 2d. fie was stronger in men and in position 
after the 2d than he was before. At no time during the campaign was 
he better situated for gaining a decisive victory than he was on the 3d. 

His army hod none of its trains of supplies ivith it. 

There were ample supplies along the north bank of the river ready to 
be hauled to the troops. 

Major J. F. Huntington, the gallant commander of the batteries at 
Hazel Grove on the evening of May 2, says in a paper read before the 
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts : 

I think (if we can imagine Grant allowing his army to be placed where 
Hooker's was at noon on that day (Sunday) )that he would have made his sol- 
diers fry their boots, if there was nothing else to eat, before he would have re- 
erossed the river. 

The army had at least five days' supplies in its trains; ^ its depots 
were not 15 miles away ; and there was an abundance of transportation 
on its lines of communication." Ingalls says in his report to the quar- 
termaster-general : 

1 Ingalls says six or eight (W. R.. 40, p. with, marked B. This report and its ae- 

545). companying papers now in your office will 

^ Ingalls says : "To show what was our give you full and valuable information" 

custom on the eve of battle with regard to (TF. R., 27, p. 103). The inclosure refeiTed 

our trains, I take the Uberty to inclose a to has disappeared from the files of the 

copy of my report of our arrangements War Department. J. B. Jr. 
during the Chancellorsville campaign, here- 



COMMENTS 481 

... no diflBculty was experienced by our department in bringing forward 
all [the subsistence] that was required. At no time did I feel that there could be 
any failure to supply the army on either side of the Rappahannock.' 

Lieutenant-Colonel Woods, chief commissary of subsistence of the 
III Corps, says : 

. . . many commands were obliged to throw away the rations they had re- 
ceived; and during the eight days there were upon an average thirteen days' 
rations issued. This extraordinary demand was, of course, not anticipated, and 
the labors of the commissaries were proportionately increased ; but during all the 
time, the troops, so far as I have been able to ascertain, were fully supplied with 
food." 

Lieutenant-Colonel ToUes, chief quartermaster of the VI Corps, says: 

As fast as supplies were exhausted, they were replenished from the depots at 
l''alniinilh, sii flint wlien tlie movement was completed, the quartermaster's de- 
partment was as well prepared for a march as at the beginning." 

A heavy rain and consequent rise of the Rappahannock threatened 
to sever his communications. 

This rain did not set in until about 4 p.m. on the 5th; Hooker's de- 
cision was formed and announced to the army before there was any 
sign of rain. ' ' The order to retire was given 12 hours before any rain, 
and during a cloudless sky. ' ' * 

The nature of the country prevented his forcing the enemy's lines in 
his front. 

That might have been an excuse for not undertaking offensive oper- 
ations, but could not justify his withdrawing across the river. 

He wanted to get his army together and adopt a plan ^vhich would 
alloiv of his directing the movements of the several corps himself. 

His errors were largely due to his interfering with his corps com- 
manders, and not allowing them to do what their own judgment dic- 
tated. Had he not interfered with Slocum on the 30th, Banks' Ford 
would probably have been opened on that day. It is questionable 
whether on the 1st his right wing could have beaten Jackson's force, 
but had he not, against the judgment of his corps commanders, com- 
pelled it to return to Chancellorsville, it would at least have taken up 
and held a better position than the one to which he withdrew it. But 
Hooker's desire to have his troops under his own eye was due not so 
much to distrust of his corps commanders as to his realization of a 
serious mental defect of his own. He had not the imagination neees- 

1 TF. B., 40, p. 546. - Ih.. 39, p. 399. " j^ ^ 40^ p. 554. 

* Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, by William Swinton, p. 307. 



482 THE CAJVIPAIGN OP CHANCELLORSVILLE 

sary to keep before his mind the changing positions of troops out of his 
sight. His mental vision was practically limited by his physical vision, 
and he had apparently no training or faculty for making war on a map. 

In an advance from United States Ford failure ivould involve disas- 
ter, while in an advance from Franklin's Crossing it would not. 

How Hooker deduced or conceived this idea is a mystery. It would 
seem that no one has presented satisfactory grounds for it, and it may 
be dismissed as unreasonable. 

Butterfield gave as one of the reasons for recrossing the Rappahan- 
nock that the terms of enlistment of the 38 New York regiments had 
expired or were about to expire.^ Hooker did not attempt to justify 
his withdrawal on that ground, nor on the other ground advanced by 
Butterfield, that in case of a successful offensive by the Army of the 
Potomac the Confederates would fall back on Richmond, and grow 
stronger as they did so. In the course of the conference held at Hook- 
er's headquarters on the 7th, Hooker said to Halleck in the presence of 
the President that notwithstanding the losses of the battle of Chancel- 
lorsville and the discharge of troops whose services were about to ex- 
pire, he would have left about 100,000 men, which was all he could 
employ to advantage." 

No greater mistake was made during the campaign than Hooker's 
final one of recrossing the Rappahannock. Lee was about to play into 
his hands by attacking him on his own ground ; the condition on which 
his plan of operation was based was at last to be realized, when he 
weakly retired from the contest. Had he been in defensive position on 
the south side of the river on the morning of the 6th, he would in all 
probability have gained a victory that would have made the campaign 
of Gettysburg impossible, and might have anticipated the surrender of 
Appomattox. 

Lee made a brilliant use of interior lines. On the 2d of May he at- 
tacked the larger Federal fraction under Hooker ; on the 4th, the smaller 
one under Sedgwick. He would on the 2d as well as on the 4th have 
turned first upon the smaller, which was in each case the nearer one, 
but for the strength of the Federal position of Stafford Heights, which 
made it impossible to inflict a crushing blow upon it. On the 4th of 
May Hooker had fallen back from his commanding position, dispirited 
by the events of the last two days, and Sedgwick was away from the 
cover of Stafford Heights, and, what was more important, in possession 
of the Confederate position at Fredericksl)urg, and of Banks' Ford, by 
which Hooker might reenforce or join him. Lee was under the impres- 
sion, too, that Sedgwick was stronger than he really was. To dislodge 

^ Rep. of Com., TV, 77; letter to Lincoln, May 5, 11 a.m. 
2 Halleck to Stanton, TF. B., 40, p. 505. 



COMMENTS 483 

Sedgwick was now of immediate and paramount importance. "In all 
history," says a British military writer, "there is not recorded a cam- 
paign which exemplifies more fully the preponderance of skilful direc- 
tion over superior numbers than this week's fighting in the forest of 
Virginia." ^ Longstreet comments on Lee's conduct of the campaign as 
follows : 

Chancellorsville is usually accepted as General Lee's most brilliant achieve- 
ment, and considered as an independent affair, it was certainly grand. As I had 
no part in its active conduct, it is only apropos to this writing to consider the 
plan of battle as projected some four months previous, i.e., to stand behind our 
intrenched lines and await the return of my troops from Suffolk. 

Under that plan General Lee would have had time to strengthen and improve 
his trenches, while Hooker was intrenching at Chancellorsville. 

He [Lee] had interior lines for defence, while his adversary was divided by 
two crossings of the river, which made Lee's 60,000 for defence about equal to 
the 113,000 under General Hooker. By the time that the divisions of Pickett and 
Hood could have joined General Lee, General Hooker would have found that he 
must march to attack or make a retreat without battle. It seems probable that 
under the original plan the battle would have given fruits worthy of a general 
engagement. The Confederates would then have had opportunity, and have been 
in condition, to so follow Hooker as to have compelled his retirement to Wash- 
ington, and that advantage might have drawn Grant from Vicksburg; whereas 
General Lee was actually so crippled by his victory that he was a full month 
restoring his army to condition to take the field. 

To these strictures it may be replied that neither Lee nor Longstreet 
expected such inaction on the part of the enemy as Hooker manifested 
in this campaign. What might have been the result if, with Lee on the 
passive defensive and Longstreet marching to join him. Hooker had 
struck out vigorously on interior lines against these separate fractions? 
The strategy which Lee put in practice would seem to have been more 
in accordance with the fundamental principles of war, and a safer prec- 
edent for commanders situated as he was, than that which his illustrious 
lieutenant would have had him adopt. 

In the art of writing and interpreting orders and dispatches the Con- 
federates showed themselves superior to the Federals. The Confeder- 
ate documents were generally shorter and more to the point than those 
of the Federals. A number of the latter were misunderstood. Suffice 
it to refer here only to Hooker's oi'ders to Sedgwick for his demon- 
stration and pursuit, and for his retention of a position south of the 
Rappahannock, to his order to Butterfield relative to Gibbon's passage 
of that river at Banks' Ford, and to Stoneman's order to Averell re- 
specting the latter 's movements. It may be noted, on the other hand, 
that Lee's important order of 3 a.m. on the 3d to Stuart required expla- 

^ The Crisis of the Confederaci/, by Cecil Battine, Captain 15th Hussars, p. 95. 



484 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

nation. With this exception, however, there does not seem to have been 
an instance of a Confederate written order that admitted of misunder- 
standing. The Confederate orders that appear to have been misunder- 
stood were generally verbal; for instance, Lee's of the 2d to Early, and 
Stuart's of the 3d to Archer and McGowan. How many failures and 
disappointments in garrison and in the field may be avoided by the 
observance of the simple lesson to be drawn from this fact ! Field or- 
ders as now understood were unknown in either army. Had they been 
generally used, the work of historians of the war would be immeasur- 
ably easier than it is. 

The orders in which certain commanders reviewed their operations 
for the inspiration or encouragement of their troops may now receive 
attention : 

Headqrs. Army of Northern Virginia, May 7, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 59 : 

With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the army his 
sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men during the arduous 
operations in which they have just been engaged. Under trying vicissitudes of 
heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a 
tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, 15 miles distant, 
and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to 
seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you 
to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to return 
our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal deliverance He 
has wrought. It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on 
Sunday next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due unto His name. 

Let us not forget, in our rejoicing, the brave soldiers who have fallen in de- 
fence of their country ; and while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate 
their noble example. 

The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one to whose 
bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success. 

The following letter from the President of the Confederate States is communi- 
cated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of their success : 

" [General Lee:] 

' ' I have received your dispatch, and reverently unite with you in giving praise 
to God for the success with which He has crowned our arms. 

"In the name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself and the 
troops under your command for this addition to the unprecedented series of great 
victories which your army has achieved. 

"The universal rejoicing produced by this happy result will be mingled with 
a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed 
and the wounded." 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 



CONGRATULATORY ORDERS 485 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Falmouth, May 6, 18C3. 
General Orders, No. 49 : 

The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratuhitious ou its 
achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was 
expected, the reasons are well known to the array. It is sufficient to say they 
were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or 
resource. 

In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering 
a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its 
confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents. In fighting at 
a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, our cause, 
and our country. 

Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will 
give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command. It will also 
be the guardian of its own history and its own fame. 

By our celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the 
rivers were undisputed, and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel ventured to foUow. 

The events of the last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and 
soldier of this army. We have added new luster to its former renown. We have 
made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in liis intrenchments ; 
and whenever we have fouglit, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have 
received. 

We have taken from the enemy 5000 prisoners [and] fifteen colors; captured 
and brought off seven pieces of artillery ; placed hors de combat 18,000 of his 
chosen troops ; destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores ; deranged 
his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital; 
and filled his country with fear and consternation. 

We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions ; 
and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest 
cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle. 

By command of Major-General Hookee : 

S. Williams, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. ^ 

Headqrs. Eleventh Army Corps, May 10, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 9 : 

As your commanding General, I cannot fail to notice a feeling of depression 
on the part of a portion of this corps. Some obloquy has been cast upon us on 
account of the affair of Saturday, May 2. 

I believe that such a disaster might have happened to any other corps of this 
Army, and do not distrust my command. Every officer who failed to do his duty 
by not keeping his men together, and not rallying them when broken, is conscious 
of it, and must profit by the past. 

I confidently believe that every honorable officer and every brave man ear- 
nestly desires an opportunity to advance against the enemy, and demonstrate to 

1 W. R., 39, p. 171. 



486 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

the army and to the country that we are not wanting in principle or patriotism. 
Tour energy, sustained and directed under the Divine blessing, shall yet place 
the Eleventh Corps ahead of them all. 

0. 0. Howard, 

Major-General Commanding. ^ 

On the 13th Hooker wrote to the President : 

Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion of my Orders, No. 49? If so, 
do not answer me. Jackson is dead, and Mr. Lee beats McCleUan in his untruth- 
ful bulletins. 

Wlat reply, if any, the President vouchsafed to this inquiry and 
remark is not known, but at 1 p.m. he telegraphed to Hooker: "If it 
will not interfere with the service, nor personally incommode you, 
please come up and see me this evening." Hooker replied at 3 p.m.: 
' ' Will see you at 8 o 'clock this evening. ' ' 

It is presumable that the interview took place, and that Hooker went 
away from it enlightened as to Lincoln's opinion of the order in ques- 
tion, and his views on other matters of greater importance. 

The navy was not required to act the important part which had been 
projected for it, but it responded with characteristic zeal and efiBciency 
to the calls made upon it for assistance ; and the good will entertained 
toward it by the Army of the Potomac was repeatedly demonstrated. 
On the 15th of May Lieutenant-Commander Magaw wrote to Commo- 
dore Harwood: "I beg to call your attention to the uniform courtesy 
and kindness which my division of the Potomac Flotilla has received at 
the hands of the Army officers and others, heads of their respective de- 
partments at their posts. ' ' After particularizing the incidents referred 
to, he said: "I respectfully suggest that some acknowledgment be made 
to the above-mentioned gentlemen either by yourself or the department. 
Everything that we have ever asked for has been done with cheerfulness 
and with remarkable promptitude." In forwarding this letter on the 
19th to the Secretary of the Navy, Commodore Harwood remarked: 
"Truly appreciating the importance of a cordial understanding between 
the two services, I take pleasure in forwarding to the department this 
evidence of the satisfactory relation between the Army of the Potomac 
and the flotilla." On the 8th of June he wrote to Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Magaw: "You will please give to the military officers named 
in your letter my warm thanks for their courtesy to those under my 
command, and my assurance that it will afford me great pleasure to 
reciprocate in every way in my power their good feeling. ' ' ^ 

When Halleck returned to Washington, the President, the Secretary 

1 TF. R., 39, p. 631. 
2 Naval W. B., Series I, Vol. V, pp. 271, 272. 



COMMENTS 487 

of War, and himself held a conference, and concluded "that both the 
check at Chancellorsville and the retreat were inexcusable, and that 
Hooker must not be intrusted with the conduct of another battle. Hal- 
leck had brought a message from Hooker to the effect that, as he had 
never sought the command, he could resign it without embarrassment, 
and would be only too happy to do so, if he could have the command of 
his old division, and so keep in active service." ^ But as he was ap- 
pointed by political selection, so on political grounds he was temporarily 
retained with a view to relieving without disgracing him. In the mean- 
time the command was offered to Couch, who declined it. "Neither 
his health, always delicate, nor his retiring disposition qualified him for 
such a post of responsibility." ' But unwilling to make another cam- 
paign under Hooker, he asked to be relieved from duty with the Army 
of the Potomac, and his request was complied with. 

On the 29th of May General Ingalls, in compliance with a request of 
the Quartermaster-General of the Army, forwarded a report of the 
operations of the quartermaster's department, inclosing reports of 
corps quartermasters. These documents throw much light on the logis- 
tics of this campaign. The principal conclusions to which they seem to 
have led may be summarized as follows : 

1. The troops were overloaded. Many carried both overcoat and 
blanket. It was intended that either should be taken without the other. 
Forty rounds of ammunition were deemed sufficient for the soldier to 
carry on his i^erson in the future. 

2. The knapsack tvas an unnecessary incumbrance, and should he 
replaced hy the blanket roll. About 25 per cent, of the knapsacks were 
lost— thrown away on the march or in action; or laid aside to go into 
action, and not recovered. In parts of the army the loss in knapsacks 
was considerably greater. In the V Corps it was about 30 per cent., and 
in the XI and XII about 50 per cent. The loss in blankets, shelter tents, 
haversacks, etc., was correspondingly great. General Rodes says in his 
report : " ... the enemy abandoned such a large number of knapsacks 
in retreating to his works that when this division began its homeward 
march in the rain it was thoroughly equipped with oilcloths and shelter 
tents of the best quality."^ 

3'. The pack-miile system could not be relied on for long marches ivith 
heavy ivagons. Pack-mules should be made auxiliary to wagons for 
short distances over rough country, where roads are few or bad— the 
wagons to be moved as far to the front as is safe or practicable, the 
pack-mules then to be packed with ammunition and necessary forage, 
and pushed on after the troops to follow them everywhere. 

1 B. and L., Ill, 241. 

2 General Hancock, by F. A. Walker, pp. 92, 93. 

' W. B., 39, p. 945. 



488 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

4. The pack-trains should he organized independently of the ivagon- 
trains. In this campaign the mules for the pack-trains were detached 
from the ammunition and supply trains, reducing the teams of the latter 
to 4 mules. The pack-mules and packers were green and inexperienced. 
About two thirds of the pack-mules were rendered unserviceable by 
careless or unskilful packing, causing sore backs. 

5. In the cavalry the horses were overloaded. Each trooper carried 
on his horse about 3 days' subsistence and short forage, 40 rounds of 
carbine, and 20 rounds of pistol ammunition. The load of the horse, 
without the trooper, must have weighed about 110 pounds, and with 
trooper— equipped as he was with carbine, saber, and pistol— at least 
270 pounds. 

6. The system of cavalry remount ivas defective. It was remedied 
after the campaign of Gettysburg by the formation of a branch of the 
War Department called the Cavalry Bureau, which was given charge 
of "the organization and equipment of the cavalry forces of the Army, 
and of the provision for the mounts and remoimts of the same. ' ' 

Hooker's measures for resuming the offensive were not carried into 
effect. The armies did not move until Lee initiated the campaign of 
Gettysburg. The pickets on the opposite banli^s of the river, while not 
so intimate as before the campaign, conversed with each other, bandy- 
ing jokes like old acquaintances, as many of them were. To the taunt: 
"Where is Joe Hooker now?" the grim reply was : "Gone to the funeral 
of Stonewall Jackson." 

The interval of two months between the battles of Chancellorsville 
and Gettysburg was for the South— notwithstanding the irreparable 
loss it sustained in the death of Jackson— the brightest period of the 
Civil War. But its brightness was that of a false and treacherous light. 
The overeonfidence born of the victory of Chancellorsville carried the 
Army of Northern Virginia against the impregnable front of the Fed- 
eral lines at Gettysburg ; and it was the victory of Gettysburg that sus- 
tained the Army of the Potomac in its desperate wrestling in the Wil- 
derness, and in gaining the point of vantage from which it finally 
started on the arduous, decisive, and fateful race to Appomattox. 



APPENDIX 1 

composition and disposition op the potomac flotilla ' 

1 Division, under Lieutenant-Commandek Magaw 
Steamers: 

In Rappahannock River {Anacostia and Dragon) 2 

Off Aquia Creek (Freeborn) 1 

At Piney Point" (dispatch-boat Ella) 1 

Sailing-vessels (mortar schooners) : 

Off Aquia Creek (r. A. Ward) 1 

At Alexandria, Va. (Dan Smith, Adolph Hugcl) 2 

2 Division, under Lieutenant-Commander McCrea 
Steamers: 

Store-ship, not available for other use 1 

Convoy of General Hooker's supplies (^fZia)ice, Jacob Beii) 2 

Other ser\'iceable steamer (Eureka) 1 

Sailing-vessels (mortar schooners) : 

Including 1 tender at Piney Point and 1 guard-vessel 5 

Undergoing Repairs at the Navy Yard 

Steamers (Satellite, Currituck, Resolute) 3 

"With Acting Rear- Admiral Lee 
Steamers: 

Disabled ( Teaser, CeBur de Lion ) 2 

Serviceable (Yankee, Primrose) 2 

Total 23 



APPENDIX 2 

Special Orders, No. 77 : 

9. There being now 2000 pack-saddles for issue at Aquia Creek, they will be 
distributed as follows, and corps commanders will at once cause requisitions 
to be made for the number apportioned to them, viz. : First Corps, 329 ; Third 
Corps, 361 ; Fifth Corps, 328 ; Sixth Corps, 450 ; Eleventh Corps, 275 ; Twelfth 
Corps, 257. 

Of these pack-saddles, two will be distributed to each regiment to carry the 

^ Naval W. R., Series I, Vol. V, p. 260. 
2 Marked on map Piney Ft. 

4S0 



490 APPENDICES 

shelter tents, with which ofBeers will be provided, and extra rations for officers. 
The remainder will be devoted to the transportation of ammunition, the average 
amount of which, to be carried in each pack-saddle, will be two and a half boxes ;' 
the stronger and larger animals to carry three boxes, and the lighter ones two 
boxes. 

Waterproof pouches will be used to protect the ammunition in rainy weather." 
Drill for a few hours each day in packing and unpacking will be instituted, 
without delay, to familiarize the men and animals to the use of the pack-saddles. 

The animals for the ammunition-pack, if there are none extra on hand, will be 
taken from the ammunition-wagons, in which case the wagons and harness will 
be turned in to the quartermaster's department. 



APPENDIX 3 

On the basis of the inspection reports the following order was issued with a 
view to promoting emulation and efficiency throughout the army : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Falmouth, Va., March 3, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 18 : 

V. The inspection reports of the following regiments and batteries give evi- 
dences of the necessity of strong exertions on the part of every officer and 
member of the command to bring them up to a proper state of discipline and 
efficiency. No further leave of absence or furloughs will be granted to these 
commands, and all officers absent therefrom must be recalled and their leaves 
revoked : 

Regiments— 12. 21, 23, 26. 34, 35, 42, 59. 60. 78, 88, 104. 105,' 107. 149 New 
York ; 29, 68, 69, 124, 125, 132, 136, 155 Pennsylvania ; 27 Indiana ; 32 Massachu- 
setts Volunteers. 

Batteries— B, 1 New York, Pettit's; 10 New York, Bruen's; 11 New York, 
[von] Puttkammer's: C, 1 New York, Barnes'; B, 1 Maryland, Snow's; A, 1 New 
Jersey, Hexamer's; C, 1 Pennsylvania, McCarthy's; D, 1 Pennsylvania, Hall's;* 
12 Ohio, Johnson's; 3 Pennsylvania, Hampton's; and C, 1 New York Battalion, 
Langner's.^ 

VI. The following regiments and battalions appearing from the inspection 
reports to have earned high commendation from inspecting officers, it is left to 
the discretion of the corps commander, having regard to the efficiency of the 
command, to increase the leaves of absence and furloughs to these commands 
for the 15 days following the receipt of this order to 3 instead of 2 enlisted 

1 A box held 1000. of active operations with Company C, 1 

2 The metallic-case cartridge had not yet Pa., Captain McCarthy. 

come into general use. A few of the kind ^ This organization appears in the state- 
known as the Bumside cartridge were in ment of the organization of the Army of 
service, but the common cartridge was cased the Potomac for January 31 ( W. R., 40, 
in paper and was not waterproof. p. 16), but not m that for May 1-6 (ib., 

3 Consolidated with the 104 N. Y., March 39, pp. 1.56-170). It was presumably de- 
20, 1863 (TF. B., 39. p. 278). tached. 

■* Consolidated before the commencement 



APPENDICES 491 

men for every 100 present for duty and 3 officers instead of 2, as provided in 
General Orders, No. 3, January 30, 1863, from headquarters Army of the Poto- 
mac, viz. : 

Regiments— 1, 2, and 20 Massachusetts; 10 and 19 Maine; 5 and 10^ New 
York; 5 New Jersey; 111 Pennsylvania; 3 Wisconsin; and 1 Minnesota Vol- 
unteers. 

Battcrics~5 Maine, Leiypien's; A, 1 Ehode Island, Arnolel's; B, 1 Rhode 
Island, Hazard's; K, 4 United States, Seeley's; D, 1 New York, Osborn's; E, 1 
Rhode Island, Randolph's; D, 5 United States, Eazlett's; C, 1 Massachusetts, 
Martin's; A, 1 ]\Iassachusetts, McCartney's; 3 New York, Ham's: 2 New York, 
Blinne's: K, 1 United States, Grahayn's; 5 New York, Taft's; B, 1 Connecticut, 
Brooker's. 

By referring all the regiments and batteries to their respective corps, balanc- 
ing the proficient against the deficient, calculating for each corps the ratio of the 
result to the total number of regiments and batteries in the corps, and reducing 
the scale of comparison thus obtained to positive numbers, we get the order of 
instruction and discipline indicated in the following table : 

FIGURE OF 
CORP.S INSTRUCTION AND 

DISCIPLINE 

1. XI Corps (Sigel) 105 

2. V " (Meade) 96 

3. Ill " (Sickles) 94 

4. VI " (Sedgwick) 93 

5. XII " (Slocum) 61 

6. I " (Reynolds) 14 

7. II " (Couch) 1 

This showing, be it observed, rests upon inspections, not of corps, but of regi- 
ments and batteries. They were poor criterions of tactical efficiency, especially 
of the larger units (corps and divisions). Regarding the XI Corps, an officer 
wrote in a private letter under date of March 1, 1863 : 

Sigel's corps is, or seems to be, composed wholly of Germans. They are dis- 
gracefully undisciplined. . . . Sigel's and Slocum 's [corps] are very near each 
other, but there is little communication between them. Sigel is pretty generally 
regarded as a humbug by the Army of the Potomac. His men are marauders, 
and are not believed in as fighters. 



APPENDIX 4 

February 7 

XII. The flag designating the headquarters of army corps will be as follows : 
A blue swallowtail flag, with wliite Maltese cross in center of field ; the numerical 
designation of the corps in red figures in the center of the cross. 

The chief quartermaster will furnish the flags, on proper requisition, to com- 
manders of army corps. 

Marcli 21 

For the purpose of ready recognition of corps and divisions in tliis army, and 
to prevent injustice by reports of straggling and misconduct through mistake as 

1 See note 5, p. 490. 



492 



APPENDICES 



to its organization, the chief quartermaster will furnish without delay the fol- 
lowing badges, to be worn by the olificers and enlisted men of all the regiments 
of the various corps mentioned. They will be securely fastened upon the center 
of the top of the cap. 

Inspecting officers will at all inspections see that these badges are worn as 
designated : 



First Corps, a sphere . . 
Second Corps, trefoil . 
Third Corps, lozenge . . 
Fifth Corps, Maltese cross 
Sixth Corjis, cross . . 



Eleventh Corps, crescent . 
Twelfth Corps, star . . . 



First Division, red; 

Second, white ; 

Third, blue. 

First Division, red ; 

Second, white; 

Third, blue. 

First Division, red; 

Second, white; 

Third, blue. 

First Division, red ; 

Second, white ; 

Third, blue. 

First Division, red ; 

Second, white ; 

Third, blue. 

(Light Division, green.) 

First Division, red ; 

Second, white ; 

Third, blue. 

First Division, red ; 

Second, white; 

Third, blue. 



The sizes and colors will be according to pattern.^ 




As printed, the badges are one-half size. 



APPENDICES 493 



APPENDIX 5 

The following table shows the ratio of sick in the several army corps on the 
28th of .March : ^ 

CORPS SICK PER 1000 

1. VI Corps (Sedgwick) 46 

2. XII " (Slocum) 53 

3. V " (Meade) 61 

4. XI " (Sigel) 69 

5. Ill " (Sickles) 76 

6. II " (Couch) 85 

7. I " (Reynolds) 90 

Letterman says in a letter to Hooker dated April 4, from which the foregoing 
data are taken : - 

The paper marked A ^ shows the whole number of sick in this army to be on the 
2Sth of March ultimo 10,777. The corps exhibiting the greatest ratio of sick are 
those in which there is the greatest number of new regiments. Thus, the First 
Corps, having a ratio of 90.02 per 1000, has, according to the data in this office, 
eighteen new and twenty-one old regiments. 

The Sixth Corps, with a ratio of 46.16 per 1000, ha.s only four new regiments 
and thirty old regiments. The ratio of sick for the whole army is 67.64 per 1000. 

Numerous reports made to this office refer to the general improvement in the 
health, tone, and vigor of those who are not reported sick ; an improvement which 
figures will not exhibit, but which is apparent to officers whose attention is 
directed to the health of the men.* 

The foregoing table of healtli exhibits roughly the length of service, or experi- 
ence, of the several corps. As an approximate figure of experience let us take 
the number of well men per 1000 as shown in this table. "We have now for each 
corps a numerical expression, or factor, (1) of desertion, (2) of instruction and 
discipline, (3) of sickness, and (4) of experience. By multiplying the factor 
of instruction and discipline by that of experience, and dividing the result by the 
product of the factors of sickness and desertion, we get what may be called a 
figure of efficiency. Doing this for each corps will enable us to arrange the sev- 
eral corps in an order of efficiency as follows : 

FIGURE OF 
CORPS EFFICIENCV 

1. XI Corps (Sigel) 32.94 

2. V " (Meade) 16.23 

3 VI " (Sedgwick) 15.70 

4. Ill " (Sickles) 9.60 

:") XII " (Slocum) 9.01 

6 1 " (Reynolds) 1-32 

7. II " (Couch) 0.12 

^ W. E., 40, p. 240. tee on the Conduct of the TVar that the 

= This letter is pubUshed without date in ratio of sickness was decreased from about 

W. R., 40, p. 239, and without list in Let- 10 per cent, to below 5 per cent. (Rep. of 

tei-man's Medical Recollections, pp. 109- Com., IV, 74). According to Lettemian, 

-^j^l the ratio of sickness at the end of April was 

3 Omitted. under 4^2 per cent. (Medical Recollections, 

*Butterfield testified before the Commit- p. 112). 



494 APPENDICES 



APPENDIX 6 

Under date of January 30, Hooker wrote to Halleck : 

By General Orders, No. 61, War Department, 1862, leaves of absence cannot 
be granted in the field, except to prevent death or permanent disability. This 
rule never has been strictly regarded in this army . . . and I have thought 
proper to issue the inclosed order. I believe by it much desertion will be stopped, 
and a more contented feeling pervade the army. . . . 

I. No leaves will exceed fifteen days. 

II. Leaves to commanders of corps, divisions, and cavalry brigades will only 
be granted upon appi'oval at these headquarters. One brigade commander only 
in a corps to be on leave at one time. 

III. Not more than one field officer of a regiment to be absent on leave at one 
time, where the fuU complement of field ofScers are present. . . . 

IV. Not more than two line officers to be given leave from any regiment at the 
same time ; not more than one from any battery or detachment. 

V. Leaves [are] not to exceed ten days, except to residents of the following 
states, when it [sic] may be given for fifteen days; viz.: Maine, New Hampshire, 
and Vermont; Ohio, Michigan, and the States west of these last named. 

VI. Furloughs to enlisted men must in no case exceed two for every 100 men 
present for duty in the regiment, battery, or detachment. . . . 

VII. In case of the failure of any officer or soldier to return before their [sic] 
leave expires, leaves will not be granted to others from the same commands until 
their return. . . . 

VIII. A return from each regiment, battery, and detachment will be forwarded 
to these headquarters within eight days from the date of this order, showing the 
number of officers and men absent from duty from any cause whatever. . . . 

Halleck replied February 30 : 

... In no ease will commanders of grand divisions, army corps, etc., be al- 
lowed to grant leaves. The number of applications sent to the War Department, 
approved by such officers, shows a recklessness and carelessness exceedingly rep- 
rehensible, for if one third so approved were granted, the efficiency of the army 
would be completely destroyed. All leaves to officers to visit Washington without 
the consent of the War Department are deemed null and void, and hereafter all 
general officers who come here on leave not properly granted will be dismissed. 
The mere passage through the city, when that is the shortest or only line of 
travel, is not considered visiting, but any officer w'ho remains here twenty-four 
hours without authority will be arrested. 

In the face of these instructions Hooker, on the 7tli, issued an order authoriz- 
ing corps commanders to grant leaves and furloughs. 

Things were going on swimmingly under this order when the following corre- 
spondence took place : 

Halleck to Hooker, February 27, 3 p.m. 

The authority given to you to grant leaves of absence cannot be delegated by 
you to commanders of corps. Leaves not signed by your orders are null. 

Hooker to Kelton, Assistant Adjutant-General, March 3 

. . . the authority to exercise this power, under well-defined restrictions, was 
conferred upon corps commanders, and I have never heard of its having been 



APPENDICES 495 

abused by them. If officers holding these high positions cannot be intrusted witli 
this duty, it seems to me that they should be replaced by others who can. 

The delay incident to applications for leave will be appreciated when you are 
informed that my camp is nearly 100 miles in circumference, and, if acted on 
immediately on their receipt at these headquarters, would, in the majority of 
eases, delay the departure of the applicant eight-and-forty hours. . . . 

Halleck to Hooker, March 5 

. . . As many officers presented themselves here in Washington with leaves 
from commanders of army corps, I applied to the Secretary to ascertain if such 
authority had been granted. He replied that he had conferred that authority 
only on you, and that it would not be given to commanders of army corps. . . . 
Last reports show that 9692 officers are now absent from their commands. It is 
the determination of the War Department to diminish this number by retaining 
to itself the power to grant leaves and by refusing them except in the most 
urgent cases. 

The War Records contain no reply to this dispatch, nor any order of Hooker's 
revoking his permission to corps commanders to grant leaves of absence. It would 
seem that he was sustained by the President. 



APPENDIX 7 

On the 31st of January Lee wrote to General H. B. Kershaw in regard to a 
proposed formation of a "battalion of honor" : 

. . . The proper selection of the men and officers for such a battalion would 
be exceedingly difficult, and even were it organized, it would be more difficult 
still to fill properly vacancies which might occur in its ranks. The fact is, Gen- 
eral, we have now an army of brave men. The formation of a battalion of honor 
would I'eward a few and leave many equally brave and equally faithful un- 
noticed, and perhaps with the feeling that an improper distinction had been 
made between themselves and their comrades. 

Again, a battalion of honor would be a distinct order created among lis, and 
such orders have generally been considered inconsistent with the spirit of our 
institutions. The Congress of the Confederate States, appreciating the diffi- 
culties of properly rewarding meritorious conduct in the army, and of inciting a 
spirit of emulation of deeds of gallantry, proposes the plan embodied in General 
Orders, No. 93, Act No. 27, of the Adjutant and Inspector General, at Richmond. 
By this act the President is authorized to bestow medals on such officers as shall 
be conspicuous for courage and good conduct on the field of battle ; also to confer 
a badge of distinction upon one private or non-commissioned officer of each com- 
pany after every signal victory he shall have assisted to achieve. This soldier to 
be indicated by a majority of the votes of his company. If the award fall upon 
a deceased soldier, the badge will be given to his widow, or to such relative as 
the President may adjudge entitled to receive it. This plan meets the difficulty 
in question in some measure.' 

Hooker wrote to Army Headquarters, Washington, on the 2d of February : 

General Orders, No. 19, February 22. 1862, provide for the inscription, upon 
the coloi-s of all regiments and batteries in the service of the United States, [of] 

1 For an instance of this plan carried out. see General Orders, No. 131, Adjutant and 
Inspector General's Office, Richmond, Va., October 3, 1863 {W. R., 39, p. 1052). 



496 APPENDICES 

the names of the battles in which they have borne a meritorious part. Most, if 
not all, the regiments and batteries now in the service with this army are en- 
titled to distinction. Boards have been organized, and have reported upon the 
claims for these honorable inscriptions. There are no records at the [these] 
headqiiarters of these proceedings, but I am reliably informed that the recom- 
mendations of the boards have been forwarded to the headquarters of this army, 
although they are not now here. . . . 

If these records are on file at the headquarters of the Army or of the "War 
Department, I trust they may receive prompt and immediate action. . . . 

Following is Kelton 's reply : 

. . . The only report transmitted to these headquarters was from the board 
instituted in the Fifth Corps. It was approved by the general-in-chief and sub- 
mitted to the Secretary of War December 23, 1862.' 

It does not appear that any further action was taken on Hooker's letter of the 
2d of February, but, of their own accord, regiments and batteries put the names 
of battles in which they were engaged on their colors, which led to great abuse. - 

In the Confederate armj' a regular method had been instituted by the following 
order from the "War Department, July 23, 1862 : 

1. It will be the duty of the commanding generals of separate armies to cause 
to be entered, in some conspicuous place on the standards of regiments, bat- 
talions, and separately organized squadrons of their commands, the names of the 
several battles in which their regiments, battalions, and separate squadrons have 
been actually engaged.^ 



APPENDIX 8 

Couch to Williams* February 21 

I telegraphed you last evening that the pickets had reported that sixteen pieces 
of artillery and eleven pontoons were seen passing through Fredericksburg down 
the river. The infoi-mation did not get to me until twenty-four hours or more 
after the movement was observed — as stupid a thing as ever occurred in military 
history. It is but a specimen of how military duties are done by a great many 
officers in my corps. Higher officers spend their time in reading newspapers or 
books, playing cards or the politician, drinking whisky, and grumbling. Of 
course this charge does not include all by a long way, for it contains some of the 
finest officers that ever drew sword, from major-general down. 

Upon a personal investigation, I find that the movement of pontoons and artil- 
lery was seen by so many that nobody reported the fact. The general officer of 
the day was Colonel Frank, one of our most sterling officers. 

'^ Rep. of Com., IV, 191. ' The present regulations of the U. S. 

^ General Meade, when subsequently in Anny, issued in 1908, contain no provision 

command of the Army of the Potomac, for keeping the memories of battles fresh in 

sought to remedy this abuse by the appoint- the soldiers' minds. 

ment of boards whose investigations and * Adjutant-General, Army of the Po- 

conclusions are embodied in General Orders, tomae. 
No. 10, Headquarters Army of the Poto- 
mae, 1865. 



APPENDICES 497 

Williams to Couch, February 21 

In reply to your communication just received, Major-General Hooker directs 
me to say that it is a most extraordinarj' report. The general can not think you 
expect him to bring your oiScers to a sense of their duty. He trusts that you 
will have no delay in bringing the officer who neglected his duty to trial and 
punishment. It is of the utmost importance to him to know if the enemy have 
any pontoons ^ and, if so, how many and where they are. He desires that you 
should communicate to him without delay all reliable information you can obtain 
upon this point. 

Couch to Williams, February 22 

. . . The men I questioned yesterday were not positive that pontoons were 
seen, but thought they were.^ As for the artillery, one man counted thirty-two 
6-horse carriages that he supposed were artillery, but could not see the guns. In 
my letter I did not intend for the major-general commanding to understand that 
I wished to throw off the responsibility of disciplining ray command, but rather 
for him to be informed as to the difficulties in the way of duty— as, for instance, 
this most imwarrantable neglect of duty occurred under the best picket officer I 
have, and as good a one as I ever knew, and, too, at a time when we were en- 
deavoring to perfect our picket system, and thought we were successful. 

Among the measures taken in the opposing armies for their protection against 
spies was the issuing of the following orders : 

Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 13, 1863. 
Brig. Gen. M. B. Patrick, 
Provost-Marshal-General : 

The commanding general directs that all trading establishments, peddlers, 
etc., within the lines of this army, except regularly authorized and appointed 
sutlers, be broken up, and the parties, with their goods, be sent outside our lines 
to the rear by to-morrow night ; that notice be served upon them ( and copies to 
department provost-marshals) that if found within our lines after twenty-four 
hours, their goods, wares, and horses will be confiscated,— one half to the hospi- 
tals of the corps within which they may be arrested or found, the balance to the 
general hospitals at Aquia, Belle Plain, and Windmill Point. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

S. WiUiams, 
Assistant Adjutant -General. 

Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia, February 16, 1863. 

I. The presence of citizens in the camps or within the lines of the army, unless 
authorized, is forbidden. Persons coming into the lines on special business must 
make it known to the provost-marshal. Citizens properly vouched for will be 
allowed to visit within the lines of the army with passports signed by division 
commanders. Loyal citizens who reside within the lines will obtain permanent 
passports from the division commanders near them. 

II. Corps commanders will take steps to enroll all citizens within the army 
who are not exempt from military duty, and assign them to such regions as they 
may select. They will cause the immediate arrest of all unauthorized persons 
wandering aboutthe various camps and depots. If they can give a satisfactory 
account of themselves these persons will be liberated and sent out of the lines. . . . 

1 There is no reference to these pontoons of them elsewhere. They were undoubt- 
in the Confederate records; nor is there, so edly an optical illusion or a fiction of the 
far as the author can learn, any mention imagination. 



498 APPENDICES 

On the 7th of March Hooker wrote to Lee : 

As, in two instances of late, communications have been sent under flags of 
truce to subordinate officers of my command, I respectfully state that 1 have 
directed that, until further orders, no communication coming from your lines 
be received unless the same be addressed to myself, and under existing circum- 
stances [as long as the armies are in their present position] delivered in front of 
Fredericksburg. 



APPENDIX 9 

Lee to Davis, February 16 

The concentration of a large force of the enemy at Aquia Creek, with other 
indications, renders it probable that a general movement is in progress. I learn 
from Baltimore that all transports of every description are ordered from there 
to Aquia, and deserters report that their army is going to Tennessee or North 
Carolina ; I think more probably the latter. 

Seddon to Lee, February 17 

An officer of the Signal Corps . . . reports as certain that about 20,000 men 
have been landed and are encamped at Newport News. ... In addition to these 
troops at Newport News 8000 or 10,000 were reported ... to have been sent to 
Suffolk. ... I am inclined to think the enemy's movements too serious for a 
feint or a diversion, and that Hooker really designs withdrawing from the Rap- 
pahannock and changing his whole plan. . . . 

From the foregoing numbers Lee concluded that two corps must have gone 
from the Army of the Potomac. 

Lee to Seddon, February 17 

Reports . . . state that a third corps of General Hooker's army was embarking 
on the 15th instant, and circumstances they give indicate a continuance of the 
movement. 

To Davis, February 18 

... it appears that the Federal Army under General Hooker is abandoning 
its present position between the Rappahannock and the Potomac. The greater 
portion which has so far left has descended the Potomac. . . . Accurate informa- 
tion ought to be obtained of the enemy 's movements and intentions in Hampton 
Roads, and it should be ascertained whether he is preparing to reembark his 
troops for the more southern port, or place them in camp, or advance them to 
Suffolk or into North Carolina. 

To his daughter Agnes, February 21 
General Hooker is obliged to do something: I do not know what it will be.' 

' Memoirs of R. E. Lee, by A. L. Long, p. 244. 



APPENDICES 499 



APPENDIX 10 

Lee to Seddon, March 27 

. . . The troops of this portion of the army have for some time been confined 
to reduced rations, consisting of 18 ounces of flour, 4 ounces of bacon of indiffer- 
ent quality, with occasional supplies of rice, sugar, or molasses. The men are 
cheerful, and I receive but few complaints; still I do not think it is enough to 
continue them in health and vigor, and I fear they will be unable to endure the 
hardships of the approaching campaign. Symptoms of scurvy are appearing 
among them, and to supply the place of vegetables each regiment is directed to 
send a daily detail to gather sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, lambs' quarters, 
and poke sprouts, but for so large an army the supply obtained is very small. . . . 

Lee to his troops, April 5 

The commanding general again calls the attention of officers and soldiers of 
the army to the importance of aiding the farmers of the country in raising their 
crops by abstaining from destruction of fences and avoiding injury to fields of 
growing grain. The failure of the crops in districts occupied by the army will 
detract from our si:pplies, and render a large population heretofore contributing 
to our support dependent upon other portions of the country. The fortitude of 
citizens in districts which have suffered from our presence and the inroads of 
the enemy appeal [s] to the sympathy of their defenders. 

The women who have devoted themselves to the care of our sick and wounded 
claim protection. The contracted limits of cultivated country render it more 
difficult to procure subsistence, and self-preservation requires that protection and 
every aid be given to the production of the necessities of life. 



APPENDIX 11 

ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINLi 

NtTMBER OF 

I Corps PIECES 

1 Division ( Anderson) ^ 

Ilardaway's battalion 

1. Grandy's battery 4 

2. Lewis' battery- 4 

3. Maurin's battery^ 4 

4. Moore's battery 4 

16 

2 Division (McLaws) 

Cabell's battalion* 

1. Carlton's battery 4 

2. Fraser's batterj' 4 

3. McCarthy's battery 4 

4. Manly 's battery 4 

^6 

Carried forward, 32 

^ Commanded also by Gamett. ' Commanded by Penick. 

' This battery was in depot at Guiney's Station throughout the campaign. 

* Commanded also by Hamilton. 



500 APPENDICES 



ARTILLERY OP THE ARMY OP NORTHERN VIRGINIA — Continued 

NUMBER OF 
PIECES 

Brought forward, 32 
Artillery Reserve (Corps Artillery)' 
Alexander's battalion - 

1. Eubank 's battery' 4 

2. Jordan's battery 4 

3. Moody's battery 4 

4. Parker's battery 4 

5. Rhett's battery 4 

6. Woolf oik's battery 4 



Walton's battalion (Washington Artillery) 

7. Squires' battery (1 company) 2 

8. Richardson's battery* (2 company) 4 

9. Miller's battery (3 company) 2 

10. Eshleman's battery* (4 company) 4 



24 



12^ 



20 



20 



II Corps (Jackson) 

1 Division (A. P. Hill) 

Walker's battalion ^ 

1. Branson's battery 4 

2. Crenshaw's battery" 4 

3. Davidson's battery 4 

4. McGraw's battery 4 

5. Marye's battery 4 

2 Division (Rodes) 

Garter's battalion 

1. Reese's battery 4 

2. Carter's battery 6 

3. Fry's battery 4 

4. Page's battery 6 

3 Division (Early) 

Andrews' battalion 

1. Brown's battery 4 

2. Carpenter 's battery 4 

3. Dement 's battery 4 

4. Eaine's battery 4 

16 

Carried forward, 124 

' There seems to have been no chief of ' Commanded by C. B. Taylor, 

artillery present with this portion of the * One piece of Richardson's battery and 

corps, and no commander for its artillery 1 of Eshleman's were absent throughout tlie 

reserve, except Pendleton, chief of artillery campaign, probably in depot at Chesterfield 

of the army. During the active operations (Map 1, sheet A). 

Alexander's battalion was detached from ^ Commanded also by Pegram. 

the reseiTe. " Commanded by Chamberlayne. 

- Commanded also by Huger. 



APPENDICES 501 

ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VlRGiyilA.— Continued 

NUMBER OF 
PIECES 

Brought forward, 12-1 
4 Division (Colston) 
Jones' battalion 

1. Carrington's battery 4 

2. Garber 's battery ' 4 

3. Tanner's battery" 4 

4. Thompson's battery 4 

16 
Artillery Reserve (CrutcMeld)^ 
Brown's battalion* 

1. Brooke's battery 4 

2. Dance's battery 4 

3. Graham's battery 4 

4. Hupp's battery 4 

5. Smith's battery 4 

6. Watson's battery 4 

24 
Mcintosh's battalio7i 

7. Hurt's battery 4 

8. Johnson's battery 4 

9. Lusk's battery 4 

10. "Wooding's battery 4 

16 
General Artillery Reserve (Pendleton) 
Cutis' battalion 

1. Patterson's battery 4 

2. Ross' battery 4 

3. Wingfield's battery 4 

12 
Nelson's battalion 

4. Kirkpatrick 's battery 4 

5. Massie's battery 4 

6. Milledge's battery 4 

12 

Cavalry Division (Horse Artillery) (Beckham) 

1. Moorman's battery 4 

2. Breathed 's battery 4 

3. McGregor's battery 4 

4. Hart's battery 4 

Total 220 = 

* Commanded also by Fultz. * Commanded also by Watson and by 

^ The name is also sriven in the War Dance. 

Records as Latimer, but see W. R., 40. ^ Includins: Maurin's battery (3. 1. I), 1 

p. 729. piece of Richardson's (8. I), and 1 of 

'Commanded also by Walker and by J. Eshleman's (10. I), total 6 pieces, absent 

T. Brown. The artillery "on the field" was tlirong-hont the campaisn. 
at that time commanded by Alexander (W. 
K., 39, pp. 822, 824, 938)." 



502 



APPENDICES 



ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 



1 Division (Wadsworth) 

1. Edgell's battery 

2. Reynolds' battery . 

3. Stewart's battery . 

2 Division (Robinson) 

1. Hall's battery . . 

2. Leppien 's battery ' 

3. Thompson's battery 

4. Ransom's battery . 

3 Division (Doubleday) 

1. Cooper's battery 

2. Ricketts' battery . 

3. Amsden's battery . 



/ Corps (Reynolds) 



number of 
pieces 



IN. 

1 N. 
4 U, 



B, Me. light (2d) 
E, Me. light (5th) 

C, 4 Pa. . . . 



C, 5 U. S 6 

B, 1 Pa 4 

P, 1 Pa 4 

G, 1 Pa 4 



1 Division (Hancock) 

1. Pettit's battery . 

2. Tliomas' battery 

2 Division (Gibbon) 

1. Arnold's battery 

2. Hazard 's battery ° 

3 Division (French) 

1. Ames' battery . 

2. Adams' battery . 
Artillery Reserve (Kirby) 

1. Kirby 's battery . 

2. Gushing 's battery 



11 Corps (Couch) 



IN. 
4 U. 



1 R. I. 
IR. I. 



1 N. 
1 R. 



I, 1 U. S 6 

A, 4 U. S 6 



B, 1 N. J. . 

E, 1 R. I. . 

F, K, 3 U. S. 



7/7 Corps (Sickles) 

1 Division (Birney) 

1. Clark's battery' . . . 

2. Randolph 's battery ■* . . 

3. Livingston's battery' 

2 Division (Berry) 

1. Osbom's battery® . . . 

2. Smith 's battery '' . . . 

3. Dimick's battery . . . 

4. Seeley's battery . . . 

3 Division (Whipple) 

1. Bruen's battery* . . . 

2. von Puttkammer's battery 

3. Huntington's batteiy . . 



B, 1 N. Y. 
4 N. Y. 
H, 1 U. S. 
K, 4 U. S. 



10 N. Y 6 

11 N. Y 6 

H, 1 Ohio 6 



51 



48 



60 

159 



^ Commanded also by Lieutenant Kirby 
and by Lieutenant Stevens. 

^ Commanded by Lieutenant Brown. 
' Commanded by Lieutenant Sims. 
* Commanded by Lieutenant Jastram. 
" Commanded by Lieutenant Tumbull. 



Carried forward, 

Formed by the consolidation of two de- 
pleted batteries. 

" Commanded by Lieutenant Winslow. 

' Commanded by Lieutenant McLean. 

* Commanded by Lieutenant Lewis. 

" Commanded also by Lieutenant Burton. 



APPENDICES 503 

ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC — Continued 

NUMBER OF 
PIECES 

Brought forward, 159 
V Corps (Meade) 



1 Division (Griffin) 

1. ]\Iartin's battery 

2. Phillips' battery 



3. Waterman's battery . . . C, 1 R. 1 6 



4. Hazlett's battery 

2 Division (Sykes) 

1. Gibbs' battery . 

2. Weed's battery^ 

3 Division (Humphreys) 

1. Barnes' battery . 

2. Randol's battery - 



C, Mass 6 

E. Mass 6 



D, 5 U. S 6 

L, 1 Ohio 6 

I, 5 U. S 4 



C, 1 N. Y 4 

E, G, 1 U. S 4 



VI Corps (Sedgwick) 

1 Division (Brooks) 

1. McCartney's battery ... A, Mass 6 

2. Hexanier's battery^ ... A, N. J 6 

3. Rigby's battery A, 1 Md 6 

4. Williston's battery . . . D, 2 U. S 6 

2 Division (Howe) 

1. Cowan's battery . . . . 1 N. Y 6 

2. Martin's battery . . . . F, 5 U. S 6 

3 Division (Newton) 

1. McCarthy's battery* . . . C, D, 1 Pa 6 

2. Butler's battery .... 6, 2 U. S 6 

4 Division (Burnham) 

Harn's battery 3 N. Y 6 



42 



54 



X7 Corps (Howard) 

1 Division (Devens) 

Dieckmann's battery .... 13 N. Y 6 

2 Division (von Steinwehr) 

Wiedrich's battery .... I, 1 N. Y 6 

3 Division (Schurz) 

Dilger's battery I. 1 Ohio 6 

Artillery Reserve (Sehirmer) 

1. Jahu's battery 2 N. Y 6 

2. De Beck's battery .... K, 1 Ohio 6 

3. Hill's battery C, 1 W. Va 6 

36 

Carried forward. 291 

^ Commanded by Lieutenant Watson. ' Commanded by Lieutenant Parsons. 

2 Formed by the consolidation of two de- " Formed by the consolidation of two de- 

pleted batteries. pleted batteries. 



504 



APPENDICES 



ARTILLERY OF THE AR.\n' OF THE POTO^IAC— Confinuecl 



Brought forward, 



NUMBER OP 
PIECES 

291 



1 Division (Williams) 

1. Fitzhugh's battery^ 

2. Winegar's battery^ 

3. Best's battery^ . . 

2 Division (Geary) 

1. Knap's battery* . 

2. Hampton 's battery ^ 



A'77 Corps (Slocum) 



K, 1 N. Y 4 

M, 1 N. Y 6 

F, 4U. S 6 



Pa. 
Pa. 



General Artillery Reserve (Graliam)' 



1. Brooker's battery . 

2. Pratt's batterj' . . 

3. Taft's battery . . 

4. Hart's battery . . 

5. von Bliieher's battery 

6. Voegelee's battery 

7. Kusserow's battery' 

8. Graham's battery^ 

9. Meinell's battery . 

10. Miller's battery . . 

11. Kinzie's battery 



B, 1 Conn 4 

M, 1 Conn 4 

5 N. Y 4 

15 N. Y 6 

29 N. Y 4 

30 N. Y 6 

32 N. Y 6 

K, 1 U. S 6 

C, 3 U. S 6 

G, 4U. S 6 

K, 5 U. S 4 



Cavalry Corps (Stoneman) 

1 Division (Pleasonton) 

Martin's battery 6 N. Y 6 

2 Division (Averelli 

Tidball's batterj- A, 2 U. S 6 

Abtillery Reserve (Horse Artillery) (Robertson) 

1. Robertson's battery" . . . B. L, 2 U. S 6 

2. Pennington's battery 1" . . M, 2 U. S 6 

3. Elder's batterv E, 4 U. S 4 



Provost Guard (Patrick) 

1. Snow's batterj- B, Md. ) 

2. Johnson's battery .... 12 Ohioy 

Total 



10 



28 



56 



28 



10 
413 



^ Commanded by Lieutenant Bailey. 
° Commanded also by Lieutenant Wood- 
bury. 

' Commanded by Lieutenant Crosby. 
* Commanded by Lieutenant Atwell. 
° Commanded also bv Lieutenant Flem- 



« Later Tyler. 

' Commanded by Lieutenant Gaston. 

' Commanded by Lieutenant Thomas, Jr. 

" Commanded by Lieutenant Vincent. 
Formed by the consolidation of two de- 
pleted batteries. 

1° Commanded bv Lieutenant Clarke. 



APPENDICES 



505 



APPENDIX 12 

TABLES OP DAILY LOSSES 


These tables, while based upon the ofiScial records of the war, are in 
a measure conjectural. 

Army of the Potomac ^ 

ORGANIZATION Before May 22 May 2 May i After May 3' 

I Corps 55 109 97 38 

II " 3 68 1,835 19 

III " 4 311 3,767 37 

V " 232 2 458 8 

VI " 15 5 3,490 1,100 

XI " 2,411 1 

XII " 49 306 2,466 3 

rStoneman, including I ... 49 26 121 
Cav. -l Averell S 

[Pleasonton J33 136 1 

Army of tlie Potomac 463 3,374 12,113 1,328 

Army of Northern Virginia* 

ORGANIZATION Before May 2 May i! May 3 After May 3 

1 Division, I Corps 66 5 1,291 83 

2 " I " 18 38 1,719 

Corps Artillery _0 J) 106 _0 

I Corps 84 43 3,116 83 

1 Division, II Corps 174 2,766 

2 " II " 12 709 2,213 3 

3 " II •■ 1,346 

4 " II •• 230 1,825 23 

Corps ArtiUerj- _0 80 

II Corps 12 1,113 6,884 1,372 

General Artillery Reserve 3 

Cavalry Division _94 17 

Army of Northern Virginia . 190 1,173 10.003 1,455 



APPENDIX 13 

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH ACCORDING TO REPORTS 

"Where the figures in the reports appear to include enlisted men only, the 
ofScers have been added on the basis of 1 to every 20 men. The mark + indicates 
that the number which it follows is less, and the mark — that it is greater, than 



1 Without counting 1 on Hooker's 
and 8 in Engineer Brigade. 

2 With few exceptions, May 1. 



staff ^ With few exceptions, May 4. 

* Not inchiding 5 casualties at headquar- 
ters n Corps. 



506 APPENDICES 

the true number. The mark ± indicates that the number which it follows is 
greater or less than the true number. 

Federal 

ORGANIZATION April 27 April 28 April 29 April 30 May 1 May 2 May 3 May 4 

I Corps 17,000 ± " 

4. O.— 1. 3. II 372 

105 Pa.— 1. 1. Ill 357 

114 Pa.— 1. 1. Ill 420 

141 Pa.— 1. 1. Ill 484 441 

72 N. y.— 2. 2. Ill 440 

120 N. y.-2. 2. Ill 481 

5 N. J.-2. 2. Ill 320 

8N. J.— 2. 2. Ill 271 

ifl 3,500 

12 N. H.-2. 3. Ill 558 

4 U. S.— 1. 2. V 220 

10 U. 8.-2. 2. V 108 

17 U. S.-2. 2. V 331 

^, 3,684 I 

3.V 1.711 

rv 1,973 

3N. J.-l. 1. VI 349 

r%i 1,500 

121 N.Y.-2. l.VI 453 

VI 6,000 

XI 4,200 ± 

irVr 1,470± 

17 Conn.— 2. 1. XI 517 

25 O.— 2. 1. XI 349 

55 0.-2. 1. XI 471 

^xi 1>575 ± 

ir 4,143± 

XII Corps 9,610 ± 

xVl 5,700 5,000 

5 Conn.— 1. 1. XII 481 

66 0.— 1.2. XII 362 

78 N. ¥.- 3. 2. XII 322 

137 N. Y.— 3. 2. XII 563 

149 N. y.— 3. 2.XII 503 

Confederate 

22 Va.-1. 1. 11 107 

40 Va.— 1. 1. II 217 2 

1 S. Ca.— 3. 1. II 315 

13 S. Ca.— 3. 1. 11 315 

33 N. Ca.— 4. 1. II 504 504 - 

45 Ga.— 6. 1. II 375 350 

49 Ga.— 6. 1. II 398 280 

tV 1,400 

1 Tenn.— 5. 1. II 262 

;, 8,551 

„-J„ 1,895 



2-\f 1,622 1,594 

y^n 1.795 



1,730 

Infantry only. - After about an hour's fighting-. 



APPENDICES 



507 



ORGANIZATION 
A 

6 Ala.— 1. 2. II . . . 
12 Ala.— 1. 2. II . . 
12 N. Ca.-3. 2. II 
23 N. Ca.-3. 2. II 

-t 

4 Va.— 1. 4. II 

27 Va.-l. 4. II . .. 
48 Va.— 2. 4. II . . . 

A 

23 Va.-3. 4. II . . . 

1 La.-3. 4. II . . . . 

2 La.-3. 4. II ... . 



Confederate {continued) 

Ai)ril -n April -JS April 29 April JO May 1 
1,509 



6,000 + 



131 ± 



May 3 
473 



3.-)5 
185 



325 ± 
70 



APPENDIX 14 

Williams to Stoneman, April 22 



... it is expected that you are again prepared for a forward movement, so 
far as regards your stores. The commanding general, therefore, directs that you 
proceed across the river to-morrow morning, if the fords are practicable. The 
general does not look for one moment's delay in your advance from any cause that 
human effort can obviate, and directs me to add that his army is awaiting your 
movements. 

2 

The major-general commanding is of the opinion that you are encamped in 
the immediate vicinity of your depot of supplies, and that you will spare no 
labor to put your command in a state of the utmost efficiency, while you hold it 
in readiness to move at the earliest practicable moment. He also directs that j'ou 
improve the opportunity to keep yourself advised of the condition of the water 
on the fords ; also of the force of the enemy to guard the fords, and also mature 
your plans for an advance when the signal is given. Determine at what ford 
you will cross, at what hour, and the lines you will advance on to accomplish 
your mission. The line of the enemy's pickets, being extended, must be a weak 
one, and if attacked at break of day, will easily be broken. If you desire, \ngor- 
ous demonstrations can be made by the infantry and artillery' at Kelley's Ford 
at any hour, which, as before, will tend to draw the enemy in that direction. If 
necessary, a .still larger force can be sent to that point ; but as it will require the 
best part of two days for them to reach there from this camp, it may not be in 
season. If the detachment you dispatched [dispatch] to look into Culpeper and 
Gordonsville should find the'm held by an infantry force too numerous to engage, 
let them pass around those places. After you break through the enemy's ad- 
vanced lines, you will find no force in the direction of Richmond, that city itself 
being without a sufficient force to keep out your own command, should you 
advance on it. This, however, is not expected. Major-General Keyes has a 
command at Gloucester Point and also at Fort Magruder. Wise is in his front 

1 After battle. Loss in killed, wounded, and missing- (since April 20). 670. 

Stragglers, etc., 1130. 

2 After battle. Loss in killed, wounded, and missing (May 2 and 3), about 13.5. 



508 APPENDICES 

with a small force. After crossing the Rapidan the major-general suggests that 
you subdivide your command, and let them take different routes, and have some 
point of meeting on your line of general operations. These detachments can 
dash off to the right and left, and inflict a vast deal of mischief, and at the same 
time bewilder the enemy as to the course and intentions of the main body} It 
seems to him that these should move without artillery, and if necessary to strike 
a railroad or effect a surprise, make long marches at night. You have sent so 
many animals to the rear, the general hopes that you will be able to pack ammu- 
nition for your batteries and leave your wagons behind. All vehicles will only 
embarrass your operations. In his opinion two pieces of artillery to a division 
should be all that you attempt to move with. Of this you must be the judge. 
You have officers and men in your command who have been over much of this 
country in which you are operating ; make use of them. The experiences of your 
march up the river will doubtless satisfy you of what can be accomplished by 
celerity. Remember that you are turning the rivers, which the enemy, to follow 
you, must swim, should they become swollen. Cross them, however, as low down 
as possible, as that will shorten your marches. Let the officers and men selected 
to destroy bridges, etc., be efficient, and let their work be done thoroughly. 

Should you be out of forage and food, you will find them at the farm-houses 
between the rivers flowing into the Potomac, as that country north of York River, 
low down, has hitherto completely escaped drainage by the army. I am in- 
structed to inform you that the general regrets that up to this time you have 
made no mention of Colonel Davis' disaster the third day out from here.^ He 
requests that you will keep him fully and correctly advised of all your operations. 
He also requires that you will inform him, without delay, of the probable hour 
you wUl be able to resume your march. In marching you must require your men 
to keep together as much as in an Indian country. Send any officer to the rear 
who does not keep his command in hand. You will lose every man and horse 
who separates from his command. 



APPENDIX 15 

Butterfield to Hooker 
Sedgwick asks if column to move on Telegraph road simultaneously with ad- 
vance on Bowling Green road is to be portion of his present command. One 
portion of your letter directs him to move his whole force on Bowling Green 
road. I presumed that contingency of moving forces on the two roads was the 
division of the forces of the enemy. Am I right ? ^ 

To Sedgwick 

. . . the general commanding has gone to Chancellorsville. Sickles' (Third) 
Corps was ordered to move to that point before he wrote your letter of instruc- 
tions. From this I judge it [the column to move on Telegraph Road] was to be 
a portion of your present command. I will send your letter to him by an orderly 
with a copy of this reply and may get telegraphic answer. 

' The italics are mine. J. B. Jr. nmns, one on the Telegraph Road and one 

- Loss of a number of officers and men on the Bowlins: Green Road, whether the 

captured and drowned in reerossing the enemy retreated in two eohinms or in one. 

Rappahannock on the 15th. Those instructions also indicated that both 

3 The instructions furnished Sedgwick by of the pursuing columns were to consist of 

Hooker's adjutant-general on the 27th sug- portions of Sedg^ck's command. 

gested that the pursuit be made in two col- 



APPENDICES 509 



APPENDIX 16 

FEDERAL ARTILLERY BETWEEN CHANCELLORSVILLE AND UNITED STATES FORD 
AFTER 12 M. MAY 3 

In Position 

Randal— Three batteries of Griffin's division (\-y^)] the two batteries of Hum- 
phreys' division— io^aJ 5 batteries, numbering 26 pieces. 

Weed— Amsden's battery of Doubleday's division; Ames' of French's division; 
Kirby's of the corps artillery of the II Corps; Seeley's of Berry's (now 
Carr's) division, except one section; Lewis' and von Puttkammer's of 
Whipple's division; both batteries of Sykes' division; Bailey's of Williams' 
division; a section of Waterman's battery of Griffin's division— fofai 9 bat- 
teries and one section, numbering 48 pieces. 

Wainivright—T-wo groups: Stewart's battery of Wadsworth's division, and 
Hall's and Ransom's of Robinson's division, 18 pieces; Wiedrich's battery of 
von Steinwehr's division minus 2 pieces lost, and Atwell's of Geary's division, 
10 pieces— total 5 batteries, numbering 28 pieces. 

Grand total in position: 20 batteries, numbering 102 pieces;' or, including 4 
pieces of Waterman's battery, about midway between Randol's and Weed's 
masses, 106 pieces. 

In Reserve 
Though given by corps, the batteries were not thus grouped. 

/ Corps— Edgell's and Reynolds' batteries of Wadsworth's division; Leppien's 
and Thompson's of Robinson's division ; Cooper's and Ricketts" of Doubleday's 
division- total 6 batteries, numbering 29 pieces. 

II Corps— Pettit's and Thomas' of Hancock's division; Arnold's of Gibbon's 
division; Cushing's of the corps artillery of the II Corps— total 4 batteries, 
numbei'ing 24 pieces. 

III Corps— The 3 batteries of Birney's division minus 1 piece of Jastram's lost; 
Winslow's, McLean's, and Dimick's batteries, and a section of Seeley's battery, 
of Berry's division; Huntington's battery of Whipple's division minus 3 
pieces lost— total 7 batteries and one section, numbering 40 pieces. 

1 Hunt includes in Weed's mass Martin's and Ricketts' (3. I). Weed gives the num- 

battery (F), 5 IT. S., representing it as of ber of guns in his mass as 56, but he does 

4 o-uns. This was a 6-gim battei-y belonging not specify the batteries, nor is he clear as 

to^Howe's division of the VI Corps, with to the time to which he refers. He prob- 

which it remained throughout the campaign ably counted gims which were held in re- 

{W. R.. 39, pp. 250, 613, 614). He ignores ser^'e {ib., p. 512). Hunt gives the number 

Watson's battery (2. V). which is entitled of guns under Wainwright as 32, but he 

to the place he gives to Martin's {ib.. pp. includes Re\molds' 6-gun battery (1. I), 

513 544). His report is based on what he which was not put in line until the 4th, 

found at 10 p.m. By this time Seeley's and allows Atwell's battery (2. XII) only 

and von Puttkammer's batteries (included 4 pieces. It had 6 in position {ib., pp. 

above) were replaced by Edgell's (1. I) 251, 259. 771). 



510 APPENDICES 

XI Corps— Dilger's battery of Schurz's division minus 1 piece lost; the 3 bat- 
teries of the corps artillery of tlie XI Coy])s— total 4 batteries, numbering 23 
pieces. 

XII Corps— Winegar's and Crosby's batteries of Williams' division and Hamp- 
ton's of Geary's division — total 3 batteries, numbering 18 pieces. 

Cavalry Brigade — Martin's battery of 6 pieces. 

Grand total in reserve: 25 batteries, numbering 140 pieces. 



APPENDIX 17 

Pleasonton to Gibbon 

1 

Your note of this date [May 5] is received. • I am not authorized to detach 
any part of the cavalry to other commands w-ithout orders from headquarters 
Army of the Potomac, but I am positively ordered to obtain all the cavalry I can 
to carry out my instructions. 

General: ' ^' " 

I am here [near Phillips House] acting under the direct orders of Major- 
General Hooker, and am in communication with him. I will do all I can to assist 
you, but my own plans cannot be interfered with. I have a regiment of cavalry 
at Falmouth guarding the river, but I cannot say at what moment circumstances 
may induce me to withdraw it to some more important point. My line now 
extends from Rappahaunock Station to below Fredericksbiirg some 10 or 12 
miles, besides to the rear as far as Dumfries. Up to this time the reports are 
quiet from the right and rear. If the rebels have a pontoon train, they will try 
to use it below to-night. I will do my best to keep you informed of events. 

[Indorsement addressed to Butterfield] 

For the information of General Williams [Hooker's adjutant-general] I should 
like to be informed whether I am in command of the forces in this vicinity for 
the defence of the river. One thing is certain, if I am, two persons cannot com- 
mand the troops. 

John Gibbon, 

Brigadier-General. 

Gibbon to Butterfield, 3:20 p.m. 

General Pleasonton claims to be here [at Phillips House] under the direct 
orders of General Hooker, with certain plans to carry out. Please inform me 
whether I am responsible for the defence of this part of the river, and whether I 
have command of all the troops in the vicinity. 

Williams, Adjutant-General, to Gibbon, 4:10 p.m. 

Your note of this date with reference to General Pleasonton 's command re- 
ceived. I know nothing of the instructions General Pleasonton has received, but 
will at once refer the subject to the major-general commanding for his decision 
thereon. 

' Not found. J. B. Jr. 



APPENDICES 511 

To Butterfield, 4:45 p.m. 

There appears to be some conflict of jurisdiction between Generals Gibbon and 
Pleasonton. The former thinks he has under his instructions command of all the 
troops in this vicinity, and the latter considers that his orders give him exclusive 
control, so far as the cavalry is concerned. Please let me know the decision of 
the commanding general in the matter. 

An examination of the records of the Army of the Potomac fails to discover 
any answer to this request. The question may have been settled without corre- 
spondence.' 

' Statement of Mr. J. W. Kirkley, Army Board of Publication. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



Abraham Lincoln, by Nicolay and Hay 

Abraham Lincoln, by W. H. Ward 

Across the Continent with the 5 Cavalry, by G. F. 
Price 

Annals of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, by S. L. 
Gracey 

Ap/tletone* Cyclop(Edia of American Biography 

A uiobiography of Oliver Otis Howard 

Battle of Eelley's Ford, by J. B. Cooke 

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. The Century 
Company 

Battles in Culpeper County, Virginia, by D. A. 
Grimsley 

Berdan's V . S. Sharpshooters, by C. A. Stevens 

Biographical Memorial of General Daniel Butterfield, 
A, edited by Julia L. Butterfield 

Camp and Field Life of the 5 N. T. Volunteer In- 
fantry, Duryee Zouaves, by Alfred Davenport 

Camp Fires of the Twenty-third [N. Y.], by Pound 
Sterling 

Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, by H. B. McClellan 

Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, by William 
Swinton 

Census of 1860, Miscellaneous Statistics 

Chancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and Allan 

Chancellorsville, by J. W. de Peyster 

Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, by Abner Boubleday 

Charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry at Chan- 
cellorsville, by Pennock Huey 

Confederate Military History 

E. M. Stanton, by F. A. Fowler 

Following the Greek Cross, by T. W. Hyde 

Forty Years of Active Service, by C. T. O'Ferral 

Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, by R. G. 
de Trobriand 

From Manassas to Appomattox, by James Long- 
street 

General Hancock, by F. A. Walker 

General Lee, by Fitzhugh Lee 

Geyieral Meade, by I. R. Pennypacker 

Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle. 2d Series 

Hard Tack and Cojee, by J. D. Billings 

Historic Records of the 5 N. T. Cavalry, by L. N. 
Boudrye 

Historical Sketch of the Hundred and Eighteenth 
Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, by H. T. Peck 

Histories of the .Several Regiments and Battalions 
from North Carolina in the Great War, 1861-1S6S, 
by W. Clark 

History and Roster of Maryland Volunteers, by Com- 

History of a Cavalry Company (A, 4 Pa.), by Wil- 
liam Hyndman 
History of Battery B, First New Jersey Artillery, by 

Michael Hanifen 
History of Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Ar- 
tillery, by J. H. Rhodes 
History of Battery E, First Rhode Island Light Ar- 
tillery, by George Lewis 
History of McGowan's Brigade, by J. P. J. Caldwell 
History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, by S. P. Bates 
History of the Army of the Potomac, by J. H. Stine 
History of the Bucktails, by O. K. Thomson and W. 

R. Ranch 
History of the Civil War in America, by the Comte 
de Paris 



History of the Corn Exchange Regiment [118 Pa.], 
by the Survivors' Association 

History of the Fifth Regiment New Hampshire Vol- 
unteers, by William Child 

History of the First Maine Cavalry, 1861-1865, by 
E. P. Tobie 

History of the First Regiment Delaware Volunteers, 
by W. P. Seville 

History of the First Reqiment Pennsylvania Reserve 
Cavalry, by W. P. Lloyd 

History of the First- Tenth- Twenty-ninth Maine 
Regiment, by J. M. Gould 

History of the Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Penn- 
sylvania Volunteers, by Thomas Chamberlin 

History of the Laurel Brigade, by W. N. McDonald 

History of the Nineteenth Regiment Massachusetts 
Volunteer Infantry, by Committee 

History of the Ninety-third Regiment New York Vol- 
unteer Infantry, by D. H. King, A. J. Gibbs, and 
J. H. Northupp 

History of the Ninth Massachusetts Volunteer In- 
fantry, by D. G. Macnamara 

History of the Ninth New York Cavalry, by N. 
Cheney 

History of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry, by R. and T. 
Beale 

History of the Philadelphia Brigade, by 0. H. Banes 

History of the Second Army Corps, by F. A. Walker 

History of the Second Regiment of N. E. Volunteer 
Infantry, by M. A. Haynes 

History of the Sixth New York Cavalry, by Commit- 
tee 

History of the Tenth Regiment of Cavalry, New York 
State Volunteers, by N. D. Preston 

History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, by 
Committee 

History of the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers, by 
B. F. Cook 

History of the Twentieth Massachusetts, by G. A, 
Bruce 

History of the Twenty-eighth Regiment New York 
State Volunteers, by C. W. Boyce 

History of the Twenty-second Massachusetts In- 
fantry, by J. L. Parker 

History of the Twenty-seventh Indiana Volunteer 
Infantry, by a Member of Company C 

History of the Twenty-seventh Regiment N. Y. Vol- 
unteers, by O. B. Fairchild 

History of the United States from the Compromise 
Mf 1S50, bv James Ford Rhodes 

History of the V . S. Secret Service, by L. C. Baker 

John Watts de Peyster, by Frank Allaben 

Johnny Reb and Billy Yank, by Alexander Hunter 

Lee's Last Campaign, with an Accurate History of 
Stonewall Jackson's Last Wound, by J. C. Gorman 

Life and Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. Jack- 
son, by R. L. Dabney 

Life and Letters of R. E. Lee, Soldier and Man, by 
J. W. Jones 

Life of General G. G. Meade, by R. M. Bache 

Life of Stonewall Jackson, by a Virginian 

Liiu-o(n tn the Telegraph Office, by D. H. Bates 

Maine in the War for the Union, by W. E. S. Whit- 
man and 0. H. True 

Major-General Hiram 0. Berry, by E. K. Gould 

Marginalia, by "Personne" 



514 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac, 

by Jonathan Letterman 
Memoir and Memorials of Brigadier-General E. F. 

Paxton, by his son J. G. Paxton 
Memoirs of Henry YiUard 
Memoirs of John Adams Dix, compiled by his son 

Morgan Dix 
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, by A. L. Long 
Memoirs of the Confederate War, by H. von Borcke 
Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton. DJ)., by his 

daughter Susan P. Lee 
Memorial of Lieutenant Franklin Butler Crosby, 4 

V. S. Artillery 
Men and Things J Saw in Civil War Days, by J. F. 

Rusling 
Military Memoirs of a Confederate, by E. P. Alex- 
ander 
Military Miscellanies, by J. B. Fry 
Mosby's Men, by J. H. Alexander 
Mosby's Rangers, by J. J. Williamson 



at the 



nd Session, Thirty-eighth Con- 



Mosby's Wa 



Re 



nd StuarVs Cavalry 



by J. S. Mosby 
% the War of the Rebellion, by F. Phis- 



Campaigns 
New York 

terer 
Obituary of J. W. de Peyster, by "Anchor" 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies 
in the War of the Rebellion, by Prof. E. K. Raw- 
son, U. S. Navy 
Ohio in the War, by Whitelaw Reid 
Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massa- 
chusetts 
Papers of the Southern Historical Society 
Partisan Life with Colonel J. S. Mosby, by Major 

John Scott 
Personal Recollectiot^s of Abraham Lincoln and the 

Civil War, by J. R. Gilmore 
Poems of American Patriotism, chosen by J. Bran- 

der Matthews 
Recollections of a Private, by W. L. Goss 
Recollections of Half a Century, by A. K. McClure 
Reminiscences of a Mosby Guerilla, by J. W. Mun- 

6on 
Reminiscences of Carl Schurz 
Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt 
Reminiscences of Service in the First Rhode Island 

Cavalry, by G. N. Bliss 
Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of 



Sto 



and Spurs, by Frederic Denison 
I and his Men, by Committee 
mil Jackson and the American Cr 

R. Henderson 
r of our Soldiers, collected from 



the Boston 



Journal 

The Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1S63, by 
S. L. French 

The Army of the United States, edited by T. P. 
Rodenbough and W. L. Haskin 

The Battles of Chancellor sville and Gettysburg, by 
A. H. Nelson 

The Campaign of Chancellor sville, by T. A. Dodge 

The Comanches, a History of White's Battalion, 
Virginia Cavalry. Laurel Brigade, Hampton Divi- 
sion, A. N. v., by F. M. Myers 

The Crisis of the Confederacy, by Cecil Battine 

The Fifth Army Corps, by W. H. Powell 

The Richmond Howitzers in the War. by a Member 
of the Company 

The Signal Corps in the War of the Rebellion, by 
J. "W. Brown 

The Three Years' Service of the Thirty-third Massa- 
chusetts Infantry Regiment, by A. B. Underwood 

The Volunteer's Manual, by W. Simmers 
Bachschmied 

The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Offi. 
cial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 
by Lieutenant-Colonel R. N. Scott and others 

Three Years in the Army, by C. E. Davis, Jr. 

Three Years in the Army of the Potomac, by H. N 
Blake 

Three Years in the Federal Cavalry, by Willard Gla 

Trials and Triumphs, by Hartwell Osborn 

Two Days of War, by H. E. Tremain 

War Papers of the Military Order of the Loyal Le- 
gion of the U. S., Commanderies of: Illinois. 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Wis- 
consin 

War Talks in Kansas 

War Talks of Confederate Veterans, by G. S. Ber- 
nard 

Washington in Lincoln's Time, by Noah. Brooks 

Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion, by W. de 
Love 



INDEX 



INDEX 

Besides the abbreviations given on page xiv and others in common use for the 
states of the Union, the following forms are here used : 



adj.= adjutant: adm.— admiral; adv.— advocate; 
art'y = artillery ; assist. = assistant ; bat'y = bat- 
tery ; = Confederate; c.= corps; capt.=; captain; 
cav.i= cavalry ; ch.:= church; C. H.^ Court-House ; 
Ch'ville = Cliancellorsville; com.= commanding; 
com'r = commander ; comm'y = commissary ; corp'l 
= corporal; dep't — department ; eng.= engineer ; 
F = Federal; f d = ford; Fred'b'g = Fredericks- 
burg; gen. = general; H.= House; headq.^ head- 
quarters; hosp.— hospital; inf. = infantry; insp.= 



inspector; lieut.^ lieutenant ; maj.= major; med. 
= medical; mil. =: military ; n.= footnote ; north'n 
= northern; northw'n ^ northwestern ; off.— offi- 
cer ; ordn.= ordnance; q.m.= quartermaster ; 
Rapp'k = Rappahannock ; reg't = regiment; r. r. 
z= railroad; sec— secretary; sta.= station; surg.= 
surgeon; tav.= tavern; tel.= telegraph ; tranEp.= 
transportation; west'n = western ; wil'ness = wil- 
derness 



Abercrombie, Brig.-gen. J. J. F, 
cited 440 n. _. 

Acts of Congress: C, 85, 87, 127, 
F 23 n., 35 n., 48 ^ ^, 

Adams, Capt. G. W. C, com. bat y 

Adam",'capt. K. H. T. C, signal 
Adl'ms,"^Sergeant C. E. C, cited 

Adjutant-general, army oi North'n 
Va. See Taylor. Ma,. ^-^-.^ 

Adjutant-general, army of foio- 
mac. See Williams, Bng.gen. 

Adjutant-general. U. S. army. See 

Thomas. Brig.-gen. Lorenzo 
Agents of C government, 3 
Aides, army of North'n Va 14 
Aides, army of Potomac, 11 
Albright. Col. Charles F (3. 3 II), 

com^bdg., 302, 303 314,353 
Alexander, E. P. , C, bng.-gen., 
xiii; col. com. arty (I), 133 n 
500; at Zion Ch., 215; Maj; I, 
245, 248, 252; May 2, 273, 274, 
319; May 3. 341, 348 n 397, 
399, 401: May 4. 415; Mag 5, 
426: May 6. 431, 432; 501 n. 
Alexander, Lieut.-col^ oAo 
writes to Averell, 227, ~-S 
Alexandria, 29 „.„,„„ ttn 
Allabach.. Col. P. H. F (2. 3. V), 

com brig.. 26, 256, 371 
Allen. Col. T. S. (5 Wise.), 391 
Alsop. H., combat at, 225-ZJ7 
Ambulance corps, 21 
Ambulances; C. 120, 232 274; 
F 128, 174, 175. 178, 183, 219; 
May 1, 244. 262; May S. 302; 
May 3. 373, 400; May 4. 412; 
May B. 422, 425 
Ames. Lieut. Nelson F, com. bat y 

(3 II), 502, 509 
Ames, Sergeant J. P. F, 79, 80 
Ammunition, supply and transp. 
of 48, 120, 142, 174, 176, 186, 231, 
•53'> 274 289, 310, 313; May 3, 
Zbl'. 367. 375-377, 402: May 4. 
414; May 7. 437; kinds of, 22, 
23, 490 n. ; on Stoneman s raid, 
441 , 

Amsden, Capt. F. P. F, com. bat y 

(3. I), 502, 266, 509 
Amusements, 33 ,,,.,00 

Anaroslia F. steamer, 154, 489 
Anderson,, Adna F, eng. of r. r. 
construction, 12 



Anderson, Maj. -gen. R. H. C 
(1. I), com. div., 19. 132. 208 n., 
209; retires from Ch'ville, 213, 
214; at Zion Ch., 214. 215, 220, 
222, 233; 218 n. : May 1. 242, 
248, 262, 265; May 2, 273, 281, 
299; Mag 3, 367, 378, 405; 
Mag 4, 406, 407. 410, 413; 
May 5. 426; orders for, 209, 
281: writes to Mahone, 115 

Andrews. Lieut.col. R. S. C. com. 
arfv (3. II), 133, 500, 268 n., 
387, 408 

Aquia Creek Sta., r. r. to, 29; 
depot at, ib. 

Archer, Brig.-gen. J. J. C 
(5. 1. II), 133; Mag 2. 282, 284, 
292, 298, 299, 316; May S, 340, 
346, 347, 348. 354, 367 

Armament. See Artillery. Cavalry. 
Infantry. Partisan Rangers 

Armv corps C, 21: 

I 19 : on Stafford Heights, 
32: 56. 135; art'y of. 499, 500; 
strength of, 132, 134. Losses, 
475. 505 . 

II. 19: on Stafford Heights, 
32- 56; order for marching, 120; 
moves up Rapp'k, 207: May 1. 
238, 262; May 2. 273, 280, 281, 
289. 298: May 3. 340, 346: May 
4. 406, 416; art'y of, 500. 501; 
strength of, 133, 134. Losses, 
475, 505 

See Divisions C 

Armv corps F, 21: flags, 47, 491; 
badges, 47, 48. 491. 492: 

I. 18, 21: desertions from. 36; 
reviewed, 130: hosp. of, 132; 
strength of reg'ts. 138 n.; trains 
of. see Trains F: instructions 
for 178; in motion, 190; 231, 
233; May 1. 265; May 2, 271, 
303, 306, 307, 308; May 3. 342; 
instruction of, 491; sick, 493; 
efficiency, ib. : art'y of, 502 ; 
strength of, 136, 506. Losses, 
473, 505 

II. 18: desertions from, 36; 
39: reported embarked, 53; 111; 
reviewed, 129: hosp. of, 132; 
strength of reg'ts. 138 n..; or- 
dered to march, 173, 174: trains 
of. see Trains F; at U. S. F'd, 
186, 203, 219: at Chandlers. 
224- May 1, 240: May 2. 314; 
instruction of, 491: sick, 493; 
efficiency, ib.; art'y of, 502; 
strength of, 136, 225, 260. 
Losses, 473, 474, 505 

517 



III, 18; desertions from, 36; 
39; in skirmish at Hartwood Ch., 
62 : visited by President, 129 ; 
hosp. of, 132: strength of reg'ts, 
138 n.: 173; trains of, see 
Trains F; instructions for, 178; 
reviewed, 179; under Sedgwick, 
184; in motion, 190; 200, 212, 
216: ordered to U. S. F'd, 229; 
on to Ch'ville. 231; May 1, 260; 
May 2, 293, 394, 301, 303; May 
3. 350; instruction of, 491; sick, 
493: efficiency, ib.; art'y of, 502; 
strength of. 136. Losses, 473, 
474, 505 

V, 11, 18: desertions from, 36; 
39; reviewed, 129; hosp. of, 132; 
strength of reg'ts, 138 n. ; or- 
dered to march, 173; 174, 175; 
trains of, see Trains F: orders 
for, 190; at Kelley's F'd, 190, 
195: cav. for, 187, 194; on to 
Rapidan, 195, 197: at Rapi- 
dan, 199 n. ; at Ch'ville, 219, 
322, 223; May 1. 240, 241, 243; 
May 5. 430; May 6. 429; in- 
struction of, 491; sick, 493: effi- 
ciency, ib. : art'y of, 503 ; strength 
of, 136, 225, 260. Losses, 473, 
505 

VI, 18: desertions from, 36; 
39; reviewed, 129; hosp. of, 132; 
strength of reg'ts, 138 n. ; trains 
of. see Trains F; instructions 
for, 178, 190. 191: in motion, 
190; 231; May 1, 265: Mag 2. 
329-335: May 3. 382-401; Mag 
4. 413, 414, 415; May 0, 421; 
Mag 6. 431: instruction of, 491; 
sick, 493 ; efficiency, ib. ; art'y of. 
503; strength of, 136. Losses, 
473, 474, 505 

IX, 8, 18; transferred, 53, 55 
n.; 54, 114; strength of, 55 n 

XI, 18; desertions, 36, o^ , 
command of, 43, 83: 111; vis 
ited bv President, 130; hosp. of 
133; strength of reg'ts, 138 n. 
ordered to march, 173. 174. 175 
trains of, see Trains F: instruc 
tions for, 184; at Kelley's F'd 
187, 188, 195, 203: on to Rapi 
dan, ib.. 197: at Rapidan, 198 
218; at Dowdall's Tav., 221, 222 
223, 227: May 1. 239, 240, 243 
249; May 2. 276. 283, 286, 296 
302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308 
309, 310, 311, 325; May 3. 343 
German troops in, 478-480, 491 
instruction of, 491; sick, 493 



518 



INDEX 



efficiency, ib.; art'v of, 503, 510; 
strength of, 136, 225, 386. 
Losses, 473, 474, 505 

XII, 18; desertions, 36, 39; 
reviewed bv Hooker. 108; visited 
by President, 130; hosp. of, 132; 
strength of reg'ts, 138 n. ; or- 
dered to march, 173; 174, 175; 
trains of, see Trains F; instruc- 
tions for, 184, 185; crosses 
Rapp'k, 194, 202 : r-.iv. attached 
to, ib.; on to Rapid^ui, 195, 197; 
at Rapidan, 198; on to Ch'ville, 
218; at Ch'ville, 221-323, 227; 
May 1, 240, 241, 243, 248, 250, 
251, 260; May 2, 283, 286; May 

3. 405; instruction of. 491; sick, 
493; efficiency, ib.: art'v of, 504; 
strength of, 136, 225, 506. 
Losses, 473, 505 

See Divinons T 

Army of C. S., 15-17 

Array of Northern Va., command 
of, 3; staff of, 14; composition 
of, 15 et seq., 20. 21, 499-501; 
organization of, 26, 27, 45; on 
heights of Fred'b'g, 29; lines of 
communication of, ib.. 122, 123; 
gen. state of, 49 ; reported 
strength of, 112; art'y ordered 
up, 119; estimated strength of, 
158 n., 267; strength of reg'ts, 
138 n.; returns to heights of 
Fred'b'g, 433; strength of, 132- 
134. Losses, 475, 505 

Army of Potomac, command of, 3. 

4, "7, 8; staff of, see Hooker, 
Joseph : composition of, 15 et 
seq., 21; art'y of, 502-504; or- 

tanization of, 18, 27, 45. 46; on 
tafford Heights, 29, 31, 32; 
quarters, 32-34, 48: pa.v, 36; 
desertion, 36; absentees, 36; 
cooks, 48; health, 35, 48, 49, 
162. 493; inspection of, 46; dis- 
cipline. 46. 47. 491; informa- 
tion, 47, 496, 497; clothing, 49; 
efficiency, 493 ; abolition of grand 
div's, 39, 40; com'ded by Grant, 
40; stripping for the march, 126; 
visited by President, 128-132 ; 
hosp's of, 132 ; estimated strength 
of, 158, 162, 180; strength 
of reg'ts, 138 n. ; commences 
gen. movement. 173; orders 
from hendq. of, 48. 53. 71. 72, 
119, 120, 168 n., 169 n., 432; 
gen. state of, 49: plans for, see 
Hooker, Joseph ; camp rumors in, 
111. 112; ignorant of plan, 201, 
430; strength of, 136, 137. 
Losses, 473. 505 

Army of U. S.. 15-17, 23 

Arnold. Capt. W. A. F, com. bat'y 
(2. II). 502. 183. 184 n., 247, 
260. 271. 372, 491, 509 

Artillery 0, 19. 21, 119; arma- 
ment. 22; 23; on the march. 120; 
designation of batteries. 27 ; 
range of. 28; organization of, 
45; at Ch'ville, 273, 278, 279, 
341, 346, 367, 368; at Fred'b'g. 
268. 387; at Salem Ch., 398. 
399, 401; at U. S. F'd, 405. 406, 

431, 432; at Scott's (Banks') 
F'd, 414, 415; strength of, 133, 
134, 499-501. Losses, 475 

Gen. reserve, 209, 215, 223, 
225; strength of, 134. 501. 
Losses. 475. 505 
Artillery F. 18. 19, 21; armament 
of, 22, 23; command of. 26; des- 
ignation of batteries, xii n., 27; 
range of, 28; organization of, 39, 
45, 46; at Ch'ville, 368, 370. 
444; at Fred'b'g, 286. 386, 387, 
392, 400; at Salem Ch., 400, 
401; at Scott's (Banks') F'd. 
414. 415; at U. S. F'd. 432. 429. 

432, 509. 510; strength of, 136, 
137 n., 50-2-504. Losses, 347, 
368. 475 

Gen. reserve. 19, 22; use of. 
46; reviewed. 129; 176, 178; be- 
low Fred'b'g, 206; at Banks' 



F'd, 231; in right wing, 225 n., 
240, 365, 338; strength of, 136, 
504 

Artiller.v, modern, 27 

Assistant Sec. of Navy F. See 
Fox, G. Y. 

Assistant Sec. of War F, 112, 
122 n. 

Atwell, Lieut. C. A. F, com. bat'y 
(2. XII), 504 n., 248, 274, 284, 
342, 432, 509 

Austin, Lieut. -col. A. S. F, comm'y 
off., 444 n., 456, 457 

Averell, Brig.-gen. W. W. F, com. 
outpost. 60; in skirmish at Hart- 
wood Ch., 61, 63, 65, 67; chal- 
lenged to cav. combat, 73 ; in bat- 
tle of Kelley's F'd, 89-105; inter- 
view with Lincoln, 131; (2. C) 
com. div., 136; 148, 163 n., 189; 
crosses Rapp'k, 196, 197, 202; 
advances to Rapidan Sta., 237, 
338; May 1, 267 n., 268, 442; 
May 2, 271, 322, 327, 328; May 
3, 350, 359; May 4, 418; orders 
for, 146, 201, 227. 458. Letters, 
etc., to: Candler, 322; Lee, Fitz- 
hugh, 101 

Ayres, Brig.-gen. R. B. F (1. 2. V), 
246, 302, 429 

B 

Bailey, Col. B. P. F (1.3.111), 

com. brig., in skirmish at Hart- 
wood Ch., 63. 69 
Bailey, Lieut. E. L. F, com. bat'y 

(1. XII), 504 n., 343, 368, 370, 

509 
Baker, Col, E. D. F, 11 
Baldwin, Lieut.-col. G. B. C, chief 

of ordn., 14, 232 
Balloons, 20, 275 n. 
Ball's Bluff, affair at, 11 
Baltimore and Ohio R. B., headq. 

on, 30; operations against, 123- 

125, 460-472 
Banks' Ford, signal sta. at, 180; 

defence of. 184, 266, 267. 400, 

410 n., 413 n., 414, 415; un- 
covering of, 185, 186, 200, 217, 

220, 230 n., 241 
Barker, Capt. E. J. F, 80 
Barksdale, Brig.-gen. William O 

(4.2.1), 132, 330, 332, 387, 

392, 393, 394, 408, 426 
Barlow, Brig.-gen. F. C. F 

(2. 2. XI), 285, 286, 289, 294, 

296, 299, 305, 308, 312, 320, 

327, 342, 346 
Barnes, Brig.-gen. James F 

(1. 1. V). 199, 220, 222, 303, 

429, 430, 432 
Barnes, Capt. Almont F, com. bat'y 

(3. V), 503, 490 
Barstow, Maj. S.' F. F, assist, adj.- 

gen., letters, etc., to: corps 

com'rs, 437; Sedgwick, 383 
Bartlett, Brig.-gen. J. J. F 

(2. 1. VI), 392, 396, 399, 401 n. 
Barton, Capt. Randolph C, cited, 

275, 317 n. 
Barton, Capt. R. J. C, .xiii 
Batchelder. Lieut.-col. R. N. F, 

cited 224 n. 
Bates, Attorney-gen. Edward F, 

127 
Bates, D. H., 20 n. 
Battalion of honor, 495 
Battles: Kellev's Ford, 86, 89- 

105; Chancellorsville, 346-373; 

Fredericksburg, 382-394; Salem 

Church, 397-401 
Beauregard, Gen. G. T. C. 117 
Beaver, Col. J. A. (148 Pa.), 366 
Beckham, Maj. R. P. C, com. art'y 

(C), 133, 157; May 1, 245, 252, 

253, 256, 257, 260 
Belle Plain, depot at, 29 
Benham, Brig.-gen. H, W. F, com. 

eng. brig., 178, 188 n., 400 n. ; 

191, 192, 204; May 1, 266. 267; 

May 3. 395; May 4. 410, 412; 

Mail 5. 421; instructions for, 

305, 229, 411. 412 



Berdan. Col. Hiram F (3. 3. Ill), 
com. sharpshooters, 27, 278, 280, 
350, 356 

Berry, Maj. -gen. H. G. F (2. Ill), 
com. div., 136; May 1, 249, 250, 
201; May 2. 293, 294, 306, 312, 
313, 314, 315, 320, 334, 326- 
328; May 3. 344, 350, 351, 357 

Best, Capt. C. L. F, com. art'v 
(XII), May 1, 256, 260; May 2, 
384, 302, 304, 309, 312, 318 n., 
326, 328; May 3. 343, 348, 356, 
358, 362; May 5, 420, 422; his 
bat'y, see Crosby. Lieut. F. B. 

Best, Col. E. F. (23 Ga.), 281, 
283, 284, 299 

Betts, Lieut.-col. J. A. (5 Conn.), 
com. reg't, 351 n. 

Biddle, Maj. J. C. F, aide, 428 

Bingham, Capt. H. H. F, judge- 
adv., 376 

Birney, Brig.-gen. D. B. F (1. Ill), 
com. div., 136; May 1, 249, 255 
n., 260; May 2, 275, 280, 281, 
283, 293, 294, 301, 304, 306, 
311, 312, 325; May 3, 342, 345, 
361, 376 

Black Horse Cavalry, 60 n., 47, 
157, 165, 440 n. 

Blackford, Capt. W. W. C, eng. 
off., 444 

Blaisdell, Col. William (11 Mass.), 
278 

Blockade, 3 

Blume, Lieut. P. J. T. F, com. 
bat'y (XI), 491. See John, Capt. 



He 

Boston Commandery, Loyal Le- 
gion. U. S.. xiii 
Boswell. Capt. J. K. 0, eng., 262, 

263, 316-318, 333 
Bowman, Col. S. M. F (2. 3. Ill), 

com. brig., 357 
Branding cavalry horses, 350 n. 
Bread riot, 121, 122 
Breathed, Capt. James C, com. 

bat'y (C), 501, 245. 292, 295 
Breckinridge, Capt. James C, 92 
Bridge trains. See Pontoon trains 
Bridges over: canal. 387, 388; N. 

Anna. 443, 451, 459; S. Anna, 

443, 446, 450, 459; Chickahom- 

iny, 444. See also Pontoon 

bridges 
Briscoe, Lieut. J. C. F, aide, 249 n. 
Brockenbrough, Col. J. M. C. com. 

brig., 133 n., 340. 349. 352. 353 
Brockman, Col. B. T. (13S. Ca.), 

273, 274 
Bronson, Maj. Stephen (12 111. 

cav.), 450, 453 
Brooke, Capt. .1. V. C, com. bat'y 

(II), 501, 280, 283, 294. 299 
Brooke. Col. J. R. F (4. 1. II), 

com. brig.. 295 n.. 366. 370 
Brooker, Lieut. A. F. F, com. bat'y 

(A), 176, 491, 504 
Brooke's Station, depot at, 29, 311 
Brooks, Brig.-gen. W. T. H. F 

(1. VI), com. div.. 136, 191, 192, 

204, 212, 229, 255 n., 330, 333, 

334; May 3, 382, 385, 392, 393, 

394, 396, 398, 399; May 4, 408, 

414 
Brooks, Noah, 127, 128, 130, 434 
Brown, Capt. W. D. 0, com. bat'y 

(3. II). 500 
Brown, Col. H. A. (3. 4. II), 

com. brig., 133 n. 
Brown. Col. H. W. F (1.1. VI), 

com. brig., 396 
Brown, Col. J. T. C, com. art'y 

(II), 501. 293 
Brown, John, 13 
Brown, Lieut. T. F. F, com. bat'v 

(2. II), 502 n. See Haiard, 

Capt. J. a. 
Brown, Lieut.-col. H. A. (1 N. Ca.), 

291 n. 
Brown, Maj. Ridgely C (1 Md. 

battalion cav.). 463 
Browne, Capt. George, Jr. F, 90, 

91 n. 
Browne. Col. W. H. F (2. 3. VI). 

com. brig., 335 



INDEX 



51'9 



Browne. Lieut. George, Jr. T. co;n. 
bat'j- (1. C), 310 n. 

Browne. Lieut. S. A. F. 93, 94 

Bruce. G. A., author, 7 n. 

Bruen, Capt. J. T. F, his battery, 
503. 490. See Lewis. Lieut. 
Samuel 

Brunson, Capt. E. B. C, com. bat'y 
(1. II), 274, 341, 500 

Buford. Brig.-gen. John F (re- 
serve cav. brig.), 136, 147, 148, 
151, 163, 201, 441, 445, 449, 
450. 452, 457 

Bullard, Lieut. Willard F, aide. 
249 n. 

Burbank, Col. Sidney P (2. 2. V), 
com. brig., 246 

Buruham, Col. Hiram F (4. VI). 
com. light div., 17, 136, 330, 
334, 384, 390, 391, 414 

Burnside, Major-gen. A. E. F, 
com. army of Potomac. 3 ; re- 
lieved from command, 4, 7 n. ; 
transfers command to Hooker, 
7-9 ; 26 ; former command, 8 n. ; 
on leave, 53: com. dep't, 57; 
165; at Fred'b'g, 388 n.; 438, 
467 

Burt, Maj. J. B. F, aide. 250 

Burton. Lieut. J. E. F, com. bat'y 
(3. Ill), 502 n. See Hunlinff- 
ton. Capt. J. F. 

Buschbeck, Col. Adolphus F 
(1.2. XI), com. brig., 146-148. 
151. 164. 175; May 1, 261; May 
2. 386, 303-305, 308, 312, 313; 
May 3. 343 

Butler. Lieut. J. H. F, com. bat'y 
(3. VI), 414 n., 503 

Butterfleld, Ma.i.-gen. Daniel F, 
chief of staff, 10, 11; mil. 
record, 11; suggests badges. 48; 
receives President, 128; 131; 
visits Washington. 141; directs 
extension of tel. line, 180, 181; 
requests Heintzelraan to extend 
patrols. 234; May I. 238, 244. 
250. 267; May I. 335; May 3. 
382, 396, 397, 403; May 5. 419, 
425, 510, 511; May 6. 428. 431, 
432; May 8, 456, 457; testimony 
before com., 106, 166, 167. 431. 
447 n.. 493 n. Letters, etc., to: 
Averell, 65, 328; Comstock, 231; 
Couch, 64, 304; Cram, 65 n. : 
engineer off.. 335; Gibbon. 239, 
331, 334 n., 335, 383, 401, 409; 
Haupt. 229, 334 n.; Heintzel- 
man, 70: Hooker, 223, 238. 239. 
ib..Mayl. 247. 253. 254. May 2, 
329, 331, May 3. 363, 370, 383, 
389, 391. 395-398. 401. May 4, 
409. 508; Howard. 104; Hunt. 
395; Ingalls, 393, 404; Keyes, 
332; Lincoln, 403. 404. 423. 
424. 434; Magaw. 51. 160; 
Meade. 173, 204; Peck. 267; 
Pleasonton. 65 n.. 68. 423 ; Rey- 
nolds. 104. 231, 330, 432, 433; 
Sedgwick, 190, 191, 211, 312, 
229/230 n.. 231 n., 333, 334 n., 
335, 383, 386, 388, 389, 393, 
398 n.. 399 n.. 421. 423. 508; 
Sickles. 229. 230 n.; Slocum, 65, 
66, 104. 200, 204; Stoneman. 
68[ 152, 183; Warren, 316 



Cabell, Col. H. C. C, com. arty 

(2. II), 132. 499 
Caldwell, Brig.-gen. J. C. F 

(1. 1. II), 364-366 
Caldwell, J. F. J., quoted. 371. 372 
Candler. Capt. W. L. F. aide, 

11. 164, 301, 303, 342, 345 n., 

4''7 n. ; letters home, 223, 271, 

363 n , 428, 433, 437. Letters, 

etc. to; Averell, 368, 269; c. 

com'rs, 258; Comstock. 186; 

Couch. 254; Howard, 258; 

Meade. 186; Pleasonton. 187; 

Slocum 258: Stoneman. 188. 189 
Candy. Col. Charles F (1.3. XII), 

com! brig., 356, 363 



Carbines. See Cavalry 
Cardwell, Col. D. M. C, xiii 
Carlton, dipt. H. H. 0, com. bafy 

(2. I). 268, 387, 393. 499 
Carpenter. Capt. J. C. 0. com. 

bafv (3. II), 500 
Carpenter, Capt. J. E. F, cited 

313 n. 
Carr, Brig.-gen. J. B. F (1.2. Ill), 

349 n., 350. 351. 354-356. 361 
Carrie Martin F. steamer, 137, 128 
Carrington, Capt. J. McD. 0, com. 

bat'y (4. II), 501 
Carroll, Col. S. S. F (1. 3. II), 
com. brig., 184, 219, 272, 303, 
343. 353 
Carter, Capt. W. P. 0, com. bat'y 

(2. II). 405 n., 500 
Carter, Lieut.-col. T. H. 0, com. 
arfy (2. II). 133, 292, 368 n., 
500 
Carter, Lieut.-col. W. R. (3 Va. 

cav.), 210, 218, 381 
Castle, Capt. D. E. F, signal off., 

343, 249, 280, 287 
Cavalry: C, 21. 23, 24; arma- 
ment, 35. 94; training of, 208 n. ; 
operations of, 53 ; skirmish at 
Hartwood Ch., 59-68; battle of 
Kelley's F'd. 90-104 ; Jones and 
Imboden expedition. 133-125. See 
Divisions C. cor. F, 21, 23, 85, 
86; consolidated, 29; training of, 
208 n.; reviewed, 128; carbine. 
46; in double rank. 99 n.; skir- 
mish at Hartwood Ch.. 59-73; 
battle of Kelley's F'd. 89-105; 
strength of. 136, 137. See Cav- 
alry corps 
Cavalry corps F, command of, 39, 
136; strength of, 136; prepares 
for active service, 142; headq. 
lantern of, ib. ; marches to Mor- 
risville, 145 ; attempts passage of 
Rapp'k, 147; moves to Bealeton, 
i7).; 157; reported at Warrenton 
Springs, 180; at Kelley's F'd, 
196, 201; in Stoneman's raid. 
189. 190, 441-457; 397. 425. 
426; art'y of. 504. Losses. 473. 
505 
Cavalry div. C. See Divisions C 
(Cavalry in Franco-German war. 

208 n. 
Chamberlain, Maj. B. F. F (1 W. 

Va. cav.), cited 440 n. 
Chamberlain, Maj. S. E. F. 92. 93 
Chamberlaine, Capt. W. W. C. xiii 
Chamberlavne, Lieut. J. H. C, 

com. bat'y (l.II), 500 
Chambliss, Col. J. R.. Jr. (13 Va. 

cav.). 202 
Chancellorsville, map of, xi ; na- 
ture of. 178; strategic value of. 
185. 186. 200. 209, 316; civil- 
ians at. 216, 371; fighting at, 
April 30. 222 ; advance from. 
May 2. 340 et seq.: position at, 
273; fortification of. see Fortifi- 
cation : fighting at. May 2, 295- 
304, 335-337; ib.. May 3, 346- 
372 
Charleston, expedition against. 53, 

128, 130 
Chew, Col. R. P. C, xiii 
Chief commissary, army of North'n 

Va. See Cole. Lieut.-col. R. O. 
Chief commissary, army of Poto- 
mac. See Clarice. Col. H. F. 
Chief engineer, army of North'n 
Va See Smith. Lieut.-col. W. P. 
Chief engineer, C. S. A. See Oil- 

mer. Col. J. F. 
Chief of artillerv, army of North n 
Va. See Pendleton, Brig.-gen. 
W. N. 
Chief of artillery, army of Poto- 
mac. See Hunt. Brig.-gen. H. J. 
Chief of construction and transp.. 
mil. r. r's. See Haupt. Herman 
Chief of Engineer Bureau C. See 

Gilmer. Col. .J. F. 
Chief of mil. tel. c. F. See Eelcert. 

T. T. 
Chief of ordnince. army of North n 



Va. See Italdwin, Lieut.-col. 
G. B. 

Chief of secret service, army of 
Potomac. See Sharpe, Col. O. II. 

Chief of staft'. armv of North'n 
Va.. see Chilton, Col. R. U.: 
army of Potomac, see Butterfield, 
Maj. -yen. Daniel 

Chief of topographical engineers, 
army of Potomac. See Warren. 
Brig.-gen. G. K. 

Chief ordnance offlcer, anny of 
Potomac. See Flagler, Lieut. 
D. W. 

Chief quartermaster, army of 
North'n Vo. See Corley, Lieut.- 
col. J. L. 

Chief quartermaster, army of Poto- 
mac. See Ingalls, Col. Rufus 

Chief signal officer, army of Poto- 
mac. See Gushing, Capt. S. T. 

Chief signal offlcer C. See iVor- 
ris. Maj. ]yilliam 

Chiefs of artillery : C, 45 ; F, 33 

Chilton, Col. R. H. 0, army of 
North'n Va., chief of staff, 14, 

Christie, Col. D. H. (33 N. Ca.), 

358, 364 
Civil 'War, ix, xi, xii, 3, 4. 15-17, 

115 
Clark, Capt. A. J. F, com. bat'y 

(1. III). 502 
Clark. Col. J. B. (123 Pa.). 417 
Clarke, Col. H. F. F, chief comm'y. 



11 
Clarke, Lieut. Robert F, com. bat'y 

(C), 504 n. 
Clothing, 33, 121 
Coburn, Abner, governor of Me., 

179 
Cole, Lieut.-col. R. G. C, chief 

comm'v, 14 
Colgrove, Col. Silas (27 Ind.), 313 
Collins, Capt. C. R. C. 114 
Colors, lost and taken, 475; in- 
scriptions on, 495, 496 
Colquitt, Brig.-gen. A. H. C 
(4. 2. II). com. brig., 133; May 
2, 274, 275, 291, 298, 301, 308, 
316; May 3, 354, 357, 360, 362, 
367 
Colston, Brig.-gen. R. E. C (4. II). 
com. div., 136, 191 n. ; May 1, 
238, 345, 251 n. ; May 2. 274, 
295 n., 308. 314. 322; May 3. 
340. 347. 353 n.. 354, 378, 404, 
405 
Colston, Capt. P. M. C, xiii 
(bolt's revolvers. See Cavalry, Par- 
tisan Rangers 
Commander-in-chief: 0, see Davis, 
.Jefferson; F, see Lincoln, Abra- 
ham 
Commissariat: C, 33, 122, 127, 
158, 458, 466. 467. 499; F. 35, 
48, 49. 142. 184, 231, 331, 404, 
480. 481: on Stoneman's raid. 
441; supply boats, 268, 418, 489 
See Trains 
Commissary-gen. C. See Northrop, 

Col. L. B. 
Communication, lines of, 29 
Comstock, Capt. C. B. F, com. 
eng's, 21, 107, 112, 140; in- 
structions for. 186. 215. 221; 
at Kelley's F'd, 187. 190; at 
Falmouth, 223; May 2, 300, 314: 
May 5. 422. Letters, etc., to: 
Butterfleld. 110; Hooker. 112 
Comte de Paris, quoted 374 
Confederate government, agents of, 

3 
Confederate States, recognition of, 

3, 4, 17 
Confederate troops. See Artillery, 
Cavalru. etc. 
Conscription: C, 13, 15. 17; F, 

see Draft 
Construction train, 163 n. 
Contrabands. See Slaves 
Cooper, Capt. J. H. F, com. bat'y 

(3. I), 502, 5fl9 
Cooper, Gen. Samuel C. adj. and 
insp.-gen., 114, 158, 163, 184, 



520 



INDEX 



206, 2H n. Letters, etc., to: 
Lee, 267, 268; Longstreet, 233 
Corley, Lieut. -col. J. L. C, chief 

a.m., 14 
Corps, Army. See Army corps 
Couch. Maj.gen. D. N. F. com. right 
grand div., 18 ; com. lie, 39, 136 ; 
early career, 42, 43 : interview 
with Lincoln, 130; 161 n., 165, 
173; interviews with Hooker, 
181, 259, 366, 367: 186, 200, 
215; Mat/ 1. 247, 251, 353, 254, 
255 n., 259; Man S. 359, 360, 
362, 366, 367, 369, 370; May 6, 
419, 420; May 6. 438; orders 
for, 203, 204, 216, 219, 221; 
ih.. May 1, 247, 258, May S.366, 
367; writes Williams, S., 496, 
497. See Army corps T. II 

Cowan, Oapt. Andrew F, com. bat*y 
(2. VI), 503 

Coi, Brig. gen. J. D. F. com. dis- 
trict of W. Va., 30, 467 

Cram, Capt. G. C. F, in skirmish 
at Hartwood Ch„ 64, 65 n. 

Creighton, Col. W. R. F, com. 
brig., 65 

Crenshaw, Capt. W. G. C, his bat'y 
(1. II), 348 n., 500 

Critcher, Col. John (15 Va. cav.). 
208 

Crosby, Lieut. P. B. F, com. bat'y 
(1. XII), 504 n., 248, 253 n., 
343 n., 358, 359, 510 

Cross, Col. E. E. (5 N. H.), 184, 
203, 234 

Cruisers C, 3 

Crutchfleld, Col. Stapleton C, com. 
art'y (II). 501, 133, 209, 308, 
312-314, 319 

Culpeper C. H., alarmed. 177 

Cummins. Lieut. -col. F. M. F, 63 

Curtin, Governor A. G. (Pa.), 467, 
469. Letters, etc., to : Lincoln, 
469; Stanton, 470 n. 

Curtis, Maj.-gen. S. R. F, 438 

Cushing, Capt. S. T. F. chief sig- 
nal otf., 11; instructions for, 
180: 181, 398 n. 

Cushing, Lieut. A, H. F. com. 
bat'y (II), 502, 372, 509 

Cutts, Lieut.-col. A. S. C, com 
art'y (A), 501 



Dance, Capt. VI. 3. C, com. bat'y 
(II), 501, 273, 279 

Davidson, Capt. Greenlee C, com. 
bat'y (1. II), 348 n., 500 

Davidson, "Yankee," 81 

Davis, Col. B. F. F (1 1 C) 
com. brig., 145-148, 151, 152 n., 
153, 163, 189, 322, 423, 508 

Davis. G. B., judge-adv.-gen., xiii 

Davis, G. W., judge-adv.-gen., xiii 

Davis, Jefferson C, President, 54, 
88, 124, 127, 157, 180, 206, 451; 
letter to Lee, 211 

Davis, Lieut.-col. Hasbronck (12 
111. cav.), com. reg't, 444-447 
450 

Davis, Lieut.-col. N. H. F, assist. 
insp..gen,, 46, 367 

De Beck, Capt. W. L. F, com. bat'y 
(XI), 347, 503 

Dement, Capt. W. F. 0, com. bat'y 
(3. II), 500 

Department of — N. Ca. C. 57- N 
Ca. F, 56, 57, 116 n.; North'w'n 
Va. C, 30. 123 ; Richmond C, 56, 
57, 150; S. Ca. C, 117 n.: S. Ca 
Ga., and Fla. C. 14 ; South'n Va. 
C, 57, 150; The Ohio F 57- 
The West F, 117 n.; Va. and N 
Ca. C. 56: Va. C, 14: Va. F, 31, 
53, 56, 116 n.; Washington, 9; 
West'n Va., 30. See also Middle 

de Peyster, J. W., cited, 194 n 

241; quoted 276 
Depots, 29 

de Russy, Capt. G. A. F, 22 n. 
Desertion: C, 25, 112, 238, 251, 

267, 470 n.; F, 36, 46, 49, 199 



Dessauer, Capt. F. A. F, aide, 297 

Details C, 17, 18 

Devens, Brig.-gen. Charles F, com. 
div., 136; 189 n., 222 n., 285- 
288, 291, 296, 297, 302, 304, 
405 

Devereux, J. H. F, superintendent 
of O. and A, R. R., 12 

Devin, Col. T. C. F (2. 1. 0), com. 
brig., 145, 155, 162, 187; 
crosses Rapp'k, 194; on to Rapi- 
dan, 198; at Rapidan, 199. 200; 
on^ to Ch'ville, 214, 215; at 
Ch'ville, 216; on reconnaissance, 
216, 220, 222; May 1, 240, 259; 
May 2, 299, 305, 312 

Diary found by Pleasonton, 197 n., 
198 n. 

Dickinson, Lieut.-col. Joseph F, as- 
sist, adj. -gen., 11, 238, 297, 371 

Dictator, 10 

Dieckmann, Capt. Julius F. com. 
bat'y (1. XI), 503, 261, 325 

Dilger, Capt. Hubert F, com. bat'y 
(3. XI), 503, 288,303-305,310, 
312, 325, 343, 510 

Dimick, Lieut. J. E. F, com. bat'y 
(2. Ill), 502, 312 n., 315, 318, 
343, 349, 351, 358, 509 

District of West Virginia, 30 

Divisions C, 27, 134: 

I c. : 1, strength of, 132; 135; 
strength of reg'ts, 138 n. ; May 1, 
246, 253, 262, 265; May 2, 273, 
378, 410; May 5. 426; arfv of, 
499 ; losses, 475, 505 ; 2, strength 
of, 132, 135; strength of reg'ts, 
138 n.; May 1, 265; May 8,273, 
274; May S. 846, 368. 378, 
397, 398, 405; May 4. 413, 414- 
May 5. 426; art'v of, 499; losses, 
475, 505 ; 3, to Salem Ch., 32 ; to 
Richmond, 54; in front of Suf- 
folk, 56 n., 112, 115, 150, 210: 
May 1. 238, 251, 267; Ma\i 3 
401; May 4. 407; May 5. 451, 
454; May 11, 457; 4. to Rich- 
mond, 53; in front of Suffolk, 
56 n., 112, 150, 210; May 1, 
238, 267; May 3, 401; May 4 
407 n. ; May S, 454 

II c. : i, strength of, 133; 
strength of reg'ts, 138 n. ; May 1, 
245, 251, 253; Stay 2. 274, 313, 
314; May 3, 347, 378; May 4, 
407, 413; art'y of, 500; losses, 
475, 505; 2, strength of, 133, 
267, 506; strength of reg'ts, 
138 n.: May 1, 245, 251, 252, 
265; May 2, 274, 291, 308, 312, 
314; May 3, 340, 346, 378; 
art'y of, 500: losses, 475, 505; 

3, strength of, 133; strength of 
reg'ts, 138 n. ; moves up Rapp'k, 
181; 207; May 1. 238. 251; 
May 2, 314; May 4, 410, 426; 
art'y of, 500; losses, 475, 505; 

4, strength of, 133, 507; strength 
of reg'ts, 138 n. : May 1, 245, 
251; May 2. 274, 291, 308; 
May 3, 340, 347. 378, 404; art'y 
of. 501; losses. 475 

Cav., 19, 82. 134. 197, 451; 
art'y of, 501 ; losses, 475, 505 
Divisions F, 27; badges, 47, 48, 
491, 492: 

I c: 1, 192, 205, 300, 308, 
315, 330, 343, 347, 502; 2, 300, 
307, 308, 315, 330, 323, 324, 
328, 329, 342, 343. 502; 3, 27, 
163, 300, 307, 308, 315, 320, 
323, 324, 328, 329, 342, 502 

II c. : 1, 183, 200, 224; 
May 1. 247, 256, 259; May 2, 
271; May 3. 343, 365, 367-370, 
372, 376; 502; 2, 27, 184. 215, 
238, 331; May 3, 383-387, 392, 
393; 397; May 4, 407-409, 413; 
502; 3, 183, 200, 224, 250, 260, 
352. 353, 364, 372, 393; 502 

III c: 1, 260, 261, 293, 294, 
306, 311, 312, 335, 342, 345, 
346; 502,509; 2,249,250,261; 
May 2, 293. 294, 312-315, 326, 
344, 350, 502; 3, 249, 250, 261, 



281, 293, 306, 312, 313, 342, 
345, 502, 506 

V c. : 1, 190, 199, 200, 214. 

215, 219, 243, 271; 429, 502, 
509; 2, 27, 129, 190, 200, 214- 

216, 219; May 1, 243, 245, 246 
256, 259; May 2, 271; May 3 
343, 509; May 6. 429; 503; 
3, 27, 190. 203, 215, 216, 219, 
220, 224. 227; May 1, 243, 259; 
May 2, 271; May 3. 343, 347; 
May 6, 429; 503, 506, 509 

VI c. : 1, 191, 192, 197, 205, 
333, 334; May 3. 385, 392, 393, 
394, 396, 398, 399; May 4 408 
414; 503; 2, 333, 334; May 3, 
382, 384, 385, 389, 391, 392- 
394, 396, 397, 399, 400; May 4 
408. 413, 414, 415; 503, 509 n ■' 
3, 329, 333, 334, 382, 384, 385, 
390, 392, 396, 397, 400, 408, 
414, 503; 4, 27, 265, 333, 334, 
384, 390, 391. 414, 503 

IX c. : 1, 57; 2, id.; 3, ib. 

XI c. : 1, 188, 221; May 1, 
249; May 2, 285-287, 296, 300, 
302 ; May 3. 343, 405 ; 503, 506 ; 

2, 249, 296, 300, 343; 503; 

3, 188, 222, 249, 285, 296, 300, 
303. 308, 312, 343, 405, 503 

XII c. : 1, 248, 260, 293, 304, 
306, 312, 313, 326, 344, 504, 
506; 2, 218, 248; May 2, 271 

282, 313; May 3. 344, 356, 358, 
362. 365, 405; 504 

Cav. c: 1, 145, 271, 504: 
2, in skirmish at Hartwood 
Ch., 65 ; in battle of Kellev's F'd 
90-105; 145. 146, 148, 163 
189, 227, 228, 322, 326. 350; 
recrosses Rapp'k, 418; art'y of, 
504; 3, in Stoneman's raid, 145- 
148, 152, 163, 189, 442; art'y 
of. 504 

Stahel's (dep't of Wash.) See 
Stahel, Brig.-gen. Julius 

Dix, Maj.-gen. J. A. F, com. dep't 
of Va.. 31, 53, 108, 150, 418, 
438. Letters to: Halleck, 161, 
336; Hooker, 234 

Dix, Morgan, quoted 424 

Dodge, T. A„ cited 209 n. 

Doles, Brig.-gen. George C( 2. 2. II), 
193, 291, 396, 354, 357, 358, 
367 

Doubleday, Maj.-gen. Abner F, 
com. div., 37, 136, 389 n., 163, 
303. 375, 376, 413, 419 n. ; 
questions Hooker, 477 n., 478 n 

DouU. Maj. Alexander F, insp. of 
art'y, 176, 397 n. 

Draft, 15, 55 n. 

Dragon F, steamer, 154, 489 

Drill, 33, 49. 103; in packing, 490 

Drill regulations, 46 

Drummond, Capt. Thomas (5 U 
S. cav.), 447. 449. 450, 453 

Duffie, Col. A. N. F (1. 2. C), 
com. brig., 90, 97, 104 

Dumfries, depot at, 29 

Du Pont, Rear-adm. S. F. F. 53 
130 



Early, Maj.-gen. J. A. C (3. II), 
com. div,, 19, 181, 207, 231 
233; May 1. 251. 268: May 2. 
330, 332. 336: May 3. 393, •i02; 
May 4, 409. 410: May 5. 426 

"Eastern Shore." operations on, 50 

Easton, Lieut. F. A. F, cited, 194 
n., 226 n. 

Eckert, Maj. T. T. F, chief of mil. 



tel. 



Edgell, Capt. F. M. F, com. bat'y 
(1. I), 502, 509 

Edwards, Col. O. E. C (3. 1. II), 
com. brig., 352 

Effective strength, 135, 137, 138, 
505, 506 

Electric telegraph. See Tel. com- 
munication, electric 



INDEX 



521 



Elliott, Brig.-gen. W. L. F, 463 

Elliott, Capt. G. M. F, crdn. off., 
376 

Ekey, Maj.gen. Arnold C. com. 
dep't, 56, 57, 150, 454. Letters. 
etc., to: Lee, 445, 447; Long- 
street, 122 

Engineer brigade F, command of, 
21, 178; instructions for, 132; 
216; crosses Rapp'k, 219; 15 
N. Y. eng's, 187, 192; eng. bat- 
talion, 21, 244 

Engineers: C, 14, 20. 21; F, 14, 
19, 21, 432. See also Eng. brig. 

Eshleman, Capt. B. F. C, com. 
bafy (I), 500, 501 n. 

Estes, Lieut. L. G. (1 Me. cav.), 
aide, 451, 453 

Eubank, Capt. J. L. C, his bal'y 
(I), 348 n., 431, 500 

Ewell, Lieut. -gen. E. S. C, 198 



Falls, Maj. R. J. F, assist, insp.- 

gen., 443 
Falmouth, headq. at. 29, 432 ; 

depot at, ib. 
Farnum, Col. J. E. (70 N. Y.), 

cited 307 
Federal troops. See Artillery, Cav- 

airy. etc. 
"Fighting Joe Hooker," how name 

originated. 6 
Firearms, 27 
Fisher, Capt. H. B. F, signal off.. 

181, 243 
Fitzhugh, Capt. R. H. F, com. 

bafv (1. XII), 504 
Flagler, Lieut. D. W. F, chief 

ordn. off., 11, 376 
Fleming, Lieut. J. P. F, com. bat'y 

(2. XII), 504 n. 
Flint. Capt. H. C. F. 88 
Flower, F. A., 20 n. 
Forage, dearth of, 35 ; transp. of, 

174, 176, 184; on Stoneman's 

raid, 142, 145, 163 n., 441; 

289, 402, 404; on Jones and Im- 

boden raid, 466 
Ford, Miss Antonia C. 81, 82, 85 
Foreign troops, 90. 176 
Fort Lafayette. Gen. Stone con- 
fined in. 11 
Fort Monroe, the Gibraltar of 

Chesapeake. 30; 31. 151 
Fortification. 112. 113; at Banks' 

F'd, 176. 184. 415; at Ch'ville. 

216. 222. 258. 259, 261, 271, 

272. 286. 304, 312. 314. 328. 

344. 347, 348; at U. S. F'd. 430. 

422-426 
Foster. Maj. -gen. J. G. F. 108 
Fo.x. G. V. F, assist, sec. of navy. 

telegraphs to Hooker. 130 
Francine, Col. L. R. (7 N. J.), 

Franklin. Col. Emlen F(l. 3. Ill), 

com. brig., 353, 356, 365 
Eraser, "Capt. J. C. C, com. bat'y 

(2. I), 268 n., 387, 393, 394, 499 
Fredericksburg, map of. xi; Burn- 
side's repulse at. 4. 14. 207; head 

of navigation. 30, 32: site of, 33; 

first battle of. 111. 385 n., 388 n., 

389; second battle of, 334-394 
Freeborn F, steamer. 489 
French. E. B. F, second auditor of 

treasury, 179 
French, Maj. -gen. S. G. C, com. 

dep't of South'n Va., 57, 150, 

211, 359 
French, Maj.-gen. W. H. F(3.II), 

com. div., 136. 250. 260, 351- 

364 
Friend. Lieut.-col. C. W. F, staff 

(1. XI). 288 
Fry. Capt. C. W. C. com. bat'y 

(2. II). 405 n., 500 
Fultz, Lieut. A. H. C. com. bat'y 

(4. II). 501 
Funk. Col. J. H. S. (5 Va.), 354; 

(1.4. II) com. brig., ib., 361, 

365 
Furloughs. 49. 494 



a 

Garber. Capt. A. W. C, com. bat'y 

(4. II), 501 
Garnett, Col. T. S. (2. 4. II), 

com. brig.. 133 n., 353, 354 
Garnett, Lieut.-col. J. J. C, com. 

art'v (1. I), 132 n., 499 n. 
Garrett, J. W., r. r. president. 466 
Gaston. Lieut. George F, com. bat'y 

(A). 206. 504 n. 
Geary, Brig.-gen. J. W. F (2. XII), 

com. div., 136, 218; May 2, 271, 

282, 284, 293. 313; May S, 344, 

356, 358, 362, 365, 367, 369, 

376, 405 
General in-chief F. See Halleck, 

Maj.-gen. H. W. 
General situation. 3. 4 
German troops, 62, 90, 478. 479 
Germanna Ford, affair at, 195, 196 
Gettysburg, campaign of. 117, 488 
Gibbon, Brig.-gen. John F (2. II), 

com. div., 136, 184, 215, 233, 

230; May 1. 238. 239, 267; 

May 2. 320. 325. 331. 333, 335; 

May 3. 382-388 n., 393-394, 

397, 401; May 4, 407-409, 413; 

May 5, 434, 510. 511 
Gibbon, H. A. C. deserter, 112 
Gibbs. Capt. F. C. F. com. bat'y 

(2. V). 503 
Gill. Gen. John C. xiii 
Gilmer. Col. J. F. C. chief of eng. 

bureau, letter to Lee. 113 
Gloucester, strategic value of, 31 
Gordon. Brig.-gen. J. B. C (1.3. II), 

133, 387, 393. 410. 413 
Gordonsville, on Lee's line of re- 
treat, 29, 143, 144, 167, 177, 

189, 193, 207, 208, 211. 225. 

257. 282, 331, 442-444, 447, 

450 
Governor of — Me., 179; N. J., 

179; N. Y., see Morgan, E. D.; 

Pa., see Curlin, A. G.; Va.. 83 n. 
Gragg. Capt. I. P. F, mentioned 

Graham, Brig.-gen. C. K. F 

(1. 1. Ill), 26; May 1, 249. 258. 

260; May 2, 271, 281, 283, 325; 

May S. 345, 347, 354, 358, 361 
Graham, Capt. Archibald C, com. 

bat'y (II). 501 
Graham. Capt. W. M. F. com. 

arfy reserve. 136, 267 n.; his 
bat'y, 491, 504. See Thomaa, 

Lieut. Lorenzo. Jr. 
Grand divisions F, composition of, 

18. 19: abolition of, 39, 40, 44; 

Franklin's, 55 
Grandy, Capt. C. R. C, com. bat'y 

(1. I), 204, 245, 273, 300. 499 
Grant, Col. L. A. F (1.2. VI), 

com. brig., 389, 414 
Grant, U. S. F, lieut.-gen., 40; 

maj.-gen.. 438 
Graves, Lieut. C.H. F, ordn. off., 376 
Gray, Col. George F, cited 70; 

quoted 71 
Greeley, Horace, excited. 418 
Greene, Brig.-gen. G.S.F (3.2. XII), 

26, 358, 363 
Greenhalgh, J. B. F. aide. 350 
Greenland Gap. affair at, 462, 463, 

4 72 
Gregg, Brig.-gen. D. McM. F, com. 

cav. of grand div.. 18 ; com. out- 
post, 60; (3. C) com. div., 136; 

146, 147. 152. 163 n.. 189; 

May 1, 442; May 2, 442. 443; 

May 3. 444. 445, 449; orders for, 

201, 202 
Griffin, Brig.-gen. Charles F(l.V), 

com. div.. 136. 215. 216. 219. 

222; May 1. 243. 260; May 2. 

271; May 3. 343: May 6, 429; 

orders for, 190. 332 
Griffin, Col. T. M. (18 Miss.). 391 
Guild. Surgeon L. C, med. direc- 
tor, 14 
Guiney's Sta.. depot at, 29 
(5unboats on Rapp'k, 54, 268, 424, 

425 
Guns. See Artillery 



H 

Hall, Capt. J. A. F, com. bat'y 
(2. I), 502, 347, 416, 509 

Hall, Capt. J. S. F, signal off., dis- 
patch to Cushing, 228 

Hall. Capt. Michael F, com. bat'y, 
490 

Hall, Col. J. M. C (1. 2. II), com. 
brig., 133 n., 356-358, 364, 365, 
432 

Halleck, Maj.-gen. H. W. F. rela- 
tions with Hooker, 9, 31; refers 
Sigel's application to Sec. of War, 
41; plans of, 106. 160. 161; 
visits army. 168, 436, 437; 176, 
467, 468 ; indorses request for 
investigation, 479. Letters, etc., 
to: Burnsidc, 106; Dix, 53, 160, 
161, 336; Hooker, 7, 106, 108. 
149. 494. 495; Roberts, 461; 
Schenck, 466, 467; Stanton, 158 n. 

Halstead, Maj. E. P. F, quoted, 
477 n.. 478 n. 

Hamilton, Col. D. H. C (3. 1. II), 
com. brig., 352, 372 n. 

Hamilton. Maj. S. P. C, com. art'y, 
132 n., 499 n. 

Hamilton's Crossing, depot at, 29 

Hampton, Brig.-gen. Wade C, 49, 
53, 66 n., 123, 134, 210 n., 448, 
453 

Hampton. Capt. R. B. F, com. 
bat'y (3. XII), 504, 274, 343, 
355, 490, 510 

Hancock, Maj.-gen. W. S. F 
(1. II), com. div., 136; May 1, 
247, 256, 259; May 2, 271. 284. 
301, 311. 320; May 3, 343, 365. 
367-370. 376 

Hanover Junction, on Lee's line of 
retreat, 29, 143 

Hardaway, Maj. R. A. C, com. 
art'y (l.I), 132, 279, 367, 405, 
406. 410, 412-415, 499 

Hardie, Brig. gen. J. A. F, judge- 
adv.-gen., 11 

Harlow, Lieut.-col. F. P.(7Mas5.), 
com. reg't. 390 

Barman. Col. A. W. (12 Va. cav.), 
463-466 

Ham, Lieut. W. A. F, com. bat'y 
(4. VI), 491, 503 

Harrison, Capt. J. E. (5 U. S. 
cav.), 443 n., 447, 449 

Hart, Capt. J. F. C. com. bat'y 
(C), 501 

Hart, Capt. Patrick F, com. bat'y 
(A), 206 n., 266, 267 

Hart, Capt. William F, 90. 91 

Hart, Lieut.-col. O. H. F, adj.- 
gen., 305, 313, 324 

Harwood, Com'dore A. A. F, direct- 
ing movements of Potomac flotilla, 
30; 160 

Haskell, Col. J. C. C, xiii 

Haupt, Brig.-gen. Herman F, chief 
of construction and transp., mil. 
r. r's, 12 : confers with Hooker, 
109, 110; preparations of, 110, 
395: instructions for, 239, 418 n. 
Letters, etc., to: Anderson, 110; 
Hooker, 12; Welles. 50 
Hawley, Col. William (3 Wise), 

252 
Hayman, Col. S. B. F (3. 1. III), 
com. brig., 280, 283, 325, 349, 

350, 361 

Havs, Brig.-gen. H. T. C(4. 3. II), 
133, 251, 313, 333, 387, 392, 
397, 410. 414 

Havs. Brig.-gen. William F. com. 
art'y reserve, 23 n.; (2.3. II) 
com. brig.. 307. 312. 314. 315. 

351. 352. 356 

Havwood. Surg. Nathan F, quoted 

35' n. 
Hazard, Capt. J. G. F, his bat'y 

(2. II), 502, 491. See Brown, 
Lieut. T. F. 
Hazlett. Lieut. P. E. F. com. bat'y 

(1. V), 491, 503 
Health of troops: C. 49, 158; F, 

35. 48, 49. 162. 458. 493 
Heintzelman, Maj.-gen. S. P. F, 



INDEX 



com. dep't, 9, 83, 142, 150, 278. 

430, 443 n. Letters to: Butter- 
field, 65, 69; Halleck, 9 
Henry, Dr. A. G.. 127, 128 
Hess, Lieut. F. W. F, quoted, 60, 

91 
Heth, Brig.-gen. Henr.vC(l. l.II). 

133; May 1. 252, 256; May S, 

292, 314. 316: (l.II) com. div.. 

May S, 322, 323; May 3, 347, 

378; May 4, 407. 413 
Hexamer, Capt. William F, his 

bat'v, 503. 490. See Parsons, 

Lieut. A. N. 
Hill, Capt. Wallace F, com. bat'y 

(XI), 503, 325, 343 
Hill, Maj.-gen. A. P. C (l.II), 

com. div., 19; 198 n.; May 1. 

245, 251; May 2. 274, 313-316, 

318, 321, 323; May 3. 339 
Hill. Maj.-gen. D. H. C (2. II), 

com. div., 19; com. dep't, 57, 

133 n„ 191, 211, 251, 267, 

319 n. 
Hinrichs. Lieut. Oscar C, eng., 

quoted 292 
Hoke, Brig.-gen. R. P. C (2. 3. II). 

133, 387, 410, 414 
Holt, Lieut.col. W. C. (10 Ga.), 

com. reg't, 372 
Hood, Maj.-gen. J. B. C (3. I), 

com. div., 54, 112, 115, 150, 

251, 267, 401, 407 n., 451, 457 
Hooker, Joseph F, brig.-gen., 5; 

maj.-gen. com. army of Potomac, 

4, 7—9 : early career. 4—7 : com- 
ments on Ch'ville. 6 n. ; relations 
with Halleck, 9. 31. 494. 495; 
staff of. 10, 11; comments on 
Lincoln, 10; com. div., 19; in- 
dorses Sigel's letter, 4 1 ; assigns 
Howard, 42 ; classmate. 43 ; in- 
troduces pack-mules, 44 ; regu- 
lates courts-martial, 46 : inter- 
views Averell, 73 ; orders him 
against Fitzhugh Lee, 89; com- 
ments on Averell. 104, 105, 165; 
confers with Haupt, 109. 110; 
visits Washington, 107, 108; re- 
views XII c, 108; at President's 
review, 129. 130; Lincoln's com- 
ment on, 130; interview with 
Lincoln, ih.; 136 n. ; his secrecy, 
106, 140, 141, 149. 161, 168, 
181; his distrustfulness. 162; 
his boastfulness, 108, 130, 236, 
259; reported movement of, 163, 
164, 183; demonstrations of, 
163, 165; commences gen. move- 
ment, 173; at review of III c. 
179; stratagem, 174-176, 203; 
reported designs of, 177. 180, 
183. 218 n.; imparts plan to 
Couch, 181: moves to Morris- 
ville, 184; at Kellev's F'd. 187; 
establishes Howard's line. 221; 
at Ch'ville. 223; order No. 47, 
ih.. 225, 230, 231. 236; his 
blasphemy, 237; May 1. 237. 
240-242, 244, 246, 247, 249, 
254, 255, 259, 266, 267; May 2, 
272, 276, 277 n., 278, 283, 306, 
307, 314; May 3. 343, 345, 353, 
359, 362-364, 366, 369, 370, 
403, 447; May 4, 411, 412, 415; 
May 5. 419, 420, 422, 423; May 
6, 428, 436; May 7, 436, 455; 
made no report, 479 ; testimony 
before com., 50, 138, 139. 166, 
185 n.. 235. 241, 321, 412, 420, 
421, 431, 458, 477; conjectures 
of, 54-56, 112, 150, 158 n.. 167, 
177, 184. 186, 200, 210-212, 
218 n., 228, 230, 235, 236; ib.. 
May 1, 249, 251, 263, 266, May 
2. 272, 277, 278, 280, 285. 290. 
May 3. 370, 381, 396; plans of, 
107-110, 139-141, 143. 144, 
153-155, 157, 161-163. 166, 
167, 185, 191, 200, 212, 216, 222, 
223, 230; ih.. May 1. 241, 242. 
244. 254. 255. 258, 259, May 2, 
272, 278, 290, 321, 338 n.. May 

5, 364 n., 403, May 4. 411. 412, 
May S, 420. 421. May 6. 431. 



May 7, 437; his irresolution, 
221, 235. 250, 254, 255, 259, 
364, 366, 380, 477, 478 n., 482. 
Lettei*s, etc., to: Butterfield, 239, 
241 n., 244, 250, 251, 266, 271, 
363; c. com'rs, 120; Dix. 211, 
234; Halleck, 36, 149, 495; Kel- 
ton, 56, 89 n., 126, 494, 495; 
Lee, 425, 438, 439, 498; Lin- 
coln, 150-152, 157, 158, 161, 
162, 180, 381, 413, 435, 437; 
Magaw, 154; Peck, 211: Pleas- 
onton, 86; Koss, 141, 476; Sedg- 
wick, 411; Slocum, 184. 229; 
Stanton, 41, 42, 65, 111, 149, 
162; Stoneman, 68, 69, 72, 147, 
150, 167; Svkes, 250; Thomas. 
Lorenzo, 458; Williams, S., 191. 
See also Butterfield. Williams, S., 
Candler, and Tan Alen 

"Hooker is our Leader." 175 

Horses, 23, 24, 163 n., 459, 466 

Hospital stores, transp. of, 184, 
262 

Ho.spitals: F, 132, 262, 311, 328, 
373. 393. 412; C. 319. 340 

Hotchkiss, Capt. Jedediah C. eng., 
maps by, xi ; 323. 341 

Howard, Maj.-gen. O. O. F, com, 
II c, 18; com. 2 div., II c, 41; 
offended, ib. ; commission of, ib.; 
assigned to XI c, 42, 136; early 
career, 42; age, 43; 164, 173, 
176 n., 188 n., 207, 210, 221 n., 
222; May 1, 249, 250, 257, 258, 
263; May 2, 279, 280, 283, 285- 
287, 289, 290, 294, 296, 297, 
299, 304; May 5. 419, 420; in- 
dorses request for investigation. 
478, 479; orders for, 258, 276, 
277, 285 

Howe, Brig.-gen. A. P. F (2. VI), 
com. div., 136, 334, 384, 385, 
388, 389, 391, 392-394, 396, 
397, 400; May 4, 408, 413-415; 
509 n. 

Huev, Maj. Pennock (8 Pa. cnv.), 
com. reg't, 194 n., 213 n., 284. 
299, 306, 309 

Huger, Maj. Frank C, com. art'y 
(I), 500 n. 

Humphreys, Brig.-gen. A. A. F, 
com. div., 136; crosses Rapp'k, 
203; crosses Rapidan, 219, 220; 
May 1, 239, 259, 260; Zlay 2, 
271, 272; May 3. 343, 347, 359; 
May 6, 429; orders for, 190, 
203, 215, 220, 224; *., May 1, 
239, 243 

Hunt, Brig.-gen. H. J. F, chief of 
art'y, 11, 26, 45, 369, 370; to 
approve transfers of batteries, 
39; nt Banks' F'd, 176, 266, 
267, 388; below Fred'b'g, 206; 
at Ch'ville, 318 n., 403; at U. S. 
F'd, 430, 429, 509 n. Dis- 
patches to: Butterfield, 397; 
Hooker, 266 

Hunter, Maj.-gen. D. F, 108 

Huntington, Capt. J. F. F, com. 
art'y (3. Ill), 502, 309, 345, 
347, 480, 509 

Hupp, Capt. Abraham C. com. 
bat'v (II). 501, 273, 279 

Hurt, Lieut. W. B. C, com. bat'y 
(II), 501, 405 n. 

Hvde, Maj. T. W. F, aide, quoted 
396 n. 



Imboden, Brig.-gen. J. D. C, com. 
dep't of Northw'n Va., 30: plan 
of, 123, 125, 153: April 20-May 
14, 460-472. Letter to Lee, 123 

Infantry: C, armament, 26; range 
of fire. 28; number of. 133; qual- 
ity of. 377; at Fred'b'g. 387; 
F, armament, 26; range of fire. 
28 

Infantry in Franco-German war, 
208 n. 

Information, service of: C, 53: 
F, 47, 162, 181, 398, 443. See 
.■iir/nal sta's 

Ingalls. Col. Rufus F, chief q.m.. 



11, 23. 145, 244, 265, 404. 

Letters, etc., to: Butterfield, 359, 

381, 393, 394; Haupt, 418 n. ; 

Meigs. 459 n.. 480, 480 n., 481; 

Postmaster, Washington, 149 ; 

Rankin, 418; Rucker, 268; 

Thompson, 418 n. 
Inspector-gen. 's dep't F, 46, 490, 

491 
Instruction. See Military instruc- 
tion 
Intrenchment. See Fortification 
"Irish brigade" F (2. 1. II). See 

Meayher 
Iverson, Brig.-gen. Alfred C (3. 2. 

II). 133, 273. 291. 358 



Jackson. Col. H. W. F, quoted, 
392, 393 

Jackson, Col. W. L. (19Va. cav.), 
463 

Jackson, Lieut. -gen. Stonewall 
(T. J.) C, com. II c, 19, 163; 
early career, 43, 44: order for 
marching, 119, 120; his baggage 
reported at Staunton, 460 ; 198 n., 
200; prepares for action, 206; 
proposes attacking Sedgwick, 
208; 209, 211; reported at Rapi- 
dan Sta., 228; to oppose Hooker, 
232; May 1. 238, 242, 343, 245, 
246, 248, 251-253, 257, 262, 
264, 265, 470; May 2. 272-275, 
280-282, 289. 291, 293, 295, 
296, 298, 300, 301. 304. 306, 
308, 315-318, 321; May 3, 340, 
340 n., 341, 373; May 5, 425, 
436: May 7, 439. Dispatches 
to: Lee, 290; Stuart, 246 

Jackson, Mrs. T. J., 439 

Jahn. Capt. Hermann F, com. bat'y 
(XI), 503, 347. See Blume, 
Lieut. F. J. T. 

James River, 30 

James River Canal, 30 

Jastram, Lieut. P. S. F. com. 
bat'y (1. III). 244, 260, 261, 
275, 299, 304, 312, 347, 362 n., 
368, 502 n.: 509. See Ran- 
dolph. Capt. O. E. 

Johns, Col. T. D. (7 Mass.), 390 

Johnson, Capt. A. C. F. com. bat'y 
(provost guard), 490, 504 

Johnson, Capt. MarmadukeC, com. 
bat'y (II), 501 

Johnson, Col. B. T. C, telegraphs 
to Elzey, 454 

Johnston, Capt. S. R. C, eng., 14, 
426 

Johnston, Col. A. S. C, 13 

Johnston, Gen. J. E. C, 117 

Johnstone, Lieut. -col. Robert F, 
82 

Jones, Brig.-gen. J. R. 0(2. 4. II) 
133, 301 

Jones, Brig.-gen. W. E. C, in Val 
lev, 29. 30. 49, 123-125, 134, 
143, 153, 157; April 20-13 
460, 461; April 24-May 14 
461—472. Letters to: Imboden, 
157, 464; Lee, 124 

Jones, H. P. C, col., xiii; lieut, 
col., com. art'y (4. II), 133 
501, 356, 360, 365, 367 

Jones, Lieut. -col. E. S. F, in skir^ 
mish at Hartwood Ch., 61 

Jones, Maj.-gen. Samuel C, com 
dep't, 30, 124. Letter to Jones 
W. E., 154 

Jones and Imboden expedition, 
122-125, 460-472 

Jordan, Capt. T. C. C, com. bat'y 
(I). 500; 244, 245, 273, 279 
346, 348 n., 368, 405 n., 431 

Judge-advocate-gen., array of PotO' 
mac. See Bardie, Brig.-gen. J. A 



Kane, Brig.-gen. T. L.F(2. 2. XII), 
26, 362 

Kearney, Brig.-gen. Philip F, de- 
vised "Kearney's patch," 47, 48 



INDEX 



523 



Keen, Lieut. C. W. F, signal off.. 

280 
Keenan, Mnj. Peter T, 198, 200 
Kelley, Brig.-gen. B. F. F, com. 

defences of Upper Potomac, 30, 

462, 466, 469. Dispatches to: 

Roberts. 469; Schenck, 468 
Kelle.v's P'd, battle of, 86. 89-105 
Kellog, H. M. F, cited 277 n. 
Kelton, Col. J. C. F, assist, adj.- 

gen.. 56, 89 n., 126, 494, 495. 

Writes to Hooker, 496 
Kenly, Brig.gen. J. R. F (1. 1. 

VIII), 468, 469 
Kerr, Col. J. K. F, com. cav., 18 
Kershaw, Brig.-gen. J. B. C 

(1.2.1), 132, 242, 247, 273, 

279, 397, 410, 415, 495 
Ke.ves, Maj.-gen. E. D. F, dis- 
patches to: Dix, 453; Halleck, 

112 
Kilpatriek, Col. H. J. F (1. 3. C), 

com. brig., 444, 445, 448, 450, 

451, 453, 457 
Kinzie, Lieut. D. H. F, com. bat'y 

(A), 267, 504 
Kirbv, Lieut. Edmund F. com. 

art'y (II), 136, 360. 370, 371 n. ; 

his battery, 502, 372, 509 
Kirkley, J. W., Army Board, .\iii, 

134 
Kirkpatrick, Capt. T. J. C. com. 

bafv (A), 501 
Knap. Capt. J. M. F, his bat'y 

(2. XII), 504 
Knipe. Brig.-gen. J. F.F( 1.1. XII). 

at Rapidan, 198. 316, 326, 

351, 356 n., 357, 358, 416 
Krupp, 22 n, 
Kusserow, Capt. Charles F, com. 

bat'y (A), 504 



Lacv, B. F. C, chaplain, 264 

Lane, Brig.gen. J. H. C (4. 1. II), 

133. 292; May 2, 314, 315, 322, 

326; Ma// 3, 346, 348, 349, 351, 

352, 353 

Langner, Capt. Robert F, his bat'y, 

490 
Langston, Capt. J. G. (8 N. J.), 

quoted 349 n. 
Latham, Col. G. B. F, 461-464 
Latimer, Capt. J. W. C. his bat'y 

(4. II), 501 
Lawrence, Maj. W. H. F, aide, 11 
Leaves of absence, 49, 494, 495 
Lebroke, Corp'l J. H. F. 370 
Le Due, Lieut. -col. W. E. F, chief 

q.m., 277 n. 
Lee. Acting rear-adm. S. P. F, 
com. squadron, 31, 268, 418, 489 
Lee. Brig.-gen. Fitzhugh C (1. C), 
skirmish at Hartwood Ch., 55, 
59-72, 117; challenges Averell 
and command, 73 ; at Culpeper 
C. H., 76, 77, 78, 83; moves to 
Sperrvville, 124, 146; 131, 133, 
143, 153, 160; in reserve. 195; 
at Raccoon F'd, 210; 217; at 
Alsop's, 226; May 1, 242, 245, 
246, 249, 257, 263, 264; Mail!. 
282, 289, 326; May 3. 340; May 
7. 456; 457. Letters to Averell, 
73, 101 
Lee. Brig.-gen. W. H. F. C (2. C). 
below Fred'b'g, 54; moving up, 
124; 133, 145, 147, 148, 151, 
154, 157, 160; moves to Brandy 
Sta., 181; moves toward Kelley's 
F'd, 195; detached, 210; at 
Rapidan Sta., 227, 228. 245, 
257, 268, 442; at Gordonsville, 
443-445, 447, 449, 451-453 
Lee. Col. J. C. F (55 Ohio), 287, 

296 
Lee, Gen. R. E. C, com. army of 
North'n Va., 3, 12, 14; early 
career, 12, 13; staff of, 14; com. 
troops in Va. and N. Ca., 31; 
orders Longstreet to return, 114; 
revokes order, ih,; prepares for 
march, 126, 127; announces 
Thanksgiving Day, 127; coufi- 



ileiice in his troops, 116, 206, 
208; appeals to them, 499; ap- 
prised of Hooker's crossing, ib., 
207; of his moving toward Rapi- 
dan, 208; orders up art'y, 209; 
211 n., 217, 218 n., 226; orders 
.Jackson against enemy, 232; 
May I, 238, 242, 246, 251, 256, 
257, 262; May 2. 272-274, 279, 
281, 299, 300, 301, 323. 328. 
332, 333; May 3, 367, 372, 397. 
402, 404; May 4, 406. 407. 410. 
413, 414; May 5. 426; May 6, 
430-432; his tactics, 375, 482, 
483; conjectures of, 53-57, 114- 
119, 123, 153. 157-160, 163, 
165, 180, 181, 193, 207, 209. 210, 
232, 498; ib., May 1. 257. 263, 
264, May 2. 278, May 3. 378, 
379. 402, May 4. 400; plans of. 
108, 113, 116,117,124,165,181, 
182, 209, 232, 470; ib.. May 1, 
262-264. May 2. 276, 278, May 
3. 341, 342, 402, May 4, 413. 
May 5, 426; comments on Jones 
and Imboden, 472. Letters, etc., 
to : Agnes, daughter, 498 ; An- 
derson, 208 n., 209, 218 n. ; 
Cooper, 114, 158, 163,164,206- 
208 n.; Critcher, 208, 233, 437; 
Davis, 54, 88, 124, 157, 180, 
206-208 n., 210, 278, 379, 426. 
431. 498: Early, 402; Hooker, 
436; Imboden, 124; Jackson. 
163, 373; Jones. W. E., 123. 
124, 153, 158; Kershaw, 495; 
Longstreet, 57, 58, 114, 116, 
118, 180, 438; McLaws. 208 n., 
209. 402, 415; Mosby, 84; Pen- 
dleton, 119; Seddon, 18, 26, 33, 
53-55, 117, 124, 158, 430, 453. 
498. 499; Stuart, 105, 113, 159, 
160, 165, 257, 341, 342, 375, 
457; Trimble, 113 

Left wing F, 178; in motion, 190; 
203-206, 211, 212, 228-232; 
May 1. 265-268; May 2, 333- 
335; May 3, 382-401; May 4. 
413-415; May 6, 431. Strength 
of. 386, 387, 400, 413 

Leigh, Lieut. T. J. F, aide, 340 

Leppien, Capt. G. F. F. com. bat'y 
(2. I), 502, 355, 368, 371 n.. 
490, 509 

Letcher, Governor John, Va., 82 n. 

Letterman, Surg. Jonathan F, 
med. director, 11, 132, 175, 425. 
Letters to Hooker, 48, 162 

Lewis. Capt. J. W. 0. his bat'y. 
See Pfuick. Lieut. Nathan 

Lewis, Lieut. Samuel F, com. bat'y 
(3. Ill), 281 n., 284. 293, 313, 
343 n., 347, 354, 362 n., 368, 
502 n., 509. See Bruen, Capt. 
J. T. 

Lincoln, Abraham F, President, 
proclaims emancipation, 3 ; ap- 
points Hooker brig.-gen., 5 ; to 
command army of Potomac, 4, 
7; wants mil. success, 10; visits 
war dep't, 20 ; approves appoint- 
ment of Howard, 42 ; offers am- 
nesty, 46 ; relinquishes right to 
review sentences, 46 ; remarks on 
captured horses, 82 ; visits army, 
127-132, 168, 436; proclaims 
Thanksgiving Day, 233; ap- 
points c. com'rs, 39 n.; his hu- 
manity, 46; his strategy, 138. 
139, 152; commissions Kirbv. 
371 n.; 381, 403; his despair, 
434; 470, 471. Letters, etc., to: 
Butterfleld, 403; Curtiu, 468, 
469, 450, 471; Hooker, 10, 41, 
141, 152. 179, 412, 433, 436 

Lincoln, Mrs. Abraham, 127, 129- 
132 

Lincoln, "Tad." 127 

"Little Sorrel," honse, 319 n. 

Livermore, Col. T. L. F, xiii 

Livermore, Col. W. R., -xiii 

Livingston, Capt. La R. L. F. 
com. bat'y (1. Ill), 502 

Locke, Capt. F. T. F, adj. -gen., 
dispatches to Humphreys, 215. 380 



Long, Col. A. L. C, mil. sec, 14 

Longstreet, Lieut. -gen. James C, 
com. I c, 19, 132, 16:j ; early 
career, 43, 44; com. dep't. 50; 
his lines about Ch'ville, 150; his 
div's at Fred'b'g, 135; his ab- 
sence felt, 207, 210, 211. 278, 
430; May 1, 238, 267; May 3, 
401 n.; May S, 454; conjectures 
of, 57, 58: in front of Suffolk, 
56, 111, 150; criticizes Lee, 483. 
Letters, etc., to: Lee, 57, 115, 
116, 117, 118; Seddon, 118 n., 
438, 453, 457 

Lord, Capt. R. S. C. (1 U. S. 
cav.). com. reg't, 443, 444, 445 

Losses, 137; at battle of Kellev's 
F'd, 102; in fight at Alsop's, 
227; about Ch'ville, 265, 328, 
378: in Seeley's bnt'v, 368; of 
27 Conn., 372; at Fred'b'g, 392, 
394; at Greenland Gap, 462, 
463 ; in course of campaign, 473- 
476, 482, 506 

Lowe, Professor T. S. C. F, aero- 
naut, dispatch to Butterfleld, 300 

Lowell, S. v., quoted 7 

Loyal Legion. U. S., Boston, xiii 

Lusk, Capt. J, A. M. C, com. bat'v 
(II), 501 

M 

McAllister, Col. Robert (UN. J.), 

350 
McCabe, Capt. W. G. 0. xiii 
McCallum, Col. D. C. F, 12 
McCarthy, Capt. E. S. C. com. 

bat'v (2.1), 273, 278, 399, 410, 

414, 499 
McCarthy, Capt. Jeremiah F, com. 

bat'y (3. VI), 503, 385,401,490 
McCartney, Capt. W, H. F. com. 

bat'y (1. VI), 503, 401, 491 
McClellan, Gen. G. B. F. 9, 11, 

12, 14, 459 
McCrea, Lieut.-com'r E. P. F. com. 

2 div., Potomac flotilla, 30, 489 
McDonald. Capt. E. H. (11 Va. 

cav.), 463, 464, 466 
McGowan, Brig.-gen. S. C (3. 1. II), 

133, 282, 292; May 3, 340, 346, 

348-350, 352, 353 
McGraw, Capt. .Toseph C, com. 

bat'y (1. II). 500, 248, 274, 

348 n., 368 
McGregor, Capt. W. M. C. com. 

bat'v (C), 501 
McGregor, Col. J. D. (4 N. Y.), 

417 
McGuire, Surg. Hunter C, med. 

director, 275, 319. 340 n., 

341 n., 439 
Mcintosh, Col. D. G. 0, xiii 
Mcintosh, Col. J. B. C, com. art'y 

(II), 501, 90, 91 n., 97, 308 
McKim, Maj. W. D. C, aide, 354 
McLaughlin, Col. N. B. (IMass.), 

cited 307 
McLaws, Maj.-gen. Lafavette C 

(2.1), com. div., 19, 208 n., 

218 n. ; to join Anderson, 232, 

233; May 1. 246, 247, 253, 256, 

265: Mat! 2. 273, 274, 299; May 

3, 346, 368, 378, 397, 398, 405: 

May 4. 407-410. 413, 414; May 

5, 426; orders for, 209, 232, 

279 
McLean, Brig.-gen. N. C. F 

(2. 1. XI), 261, 285. 286, 312 
McLean, Lieut. W. T. F, com. 

bat'v (2. Ill), 343 n., 502 n., 

509. See Umith. Capt. J. E. 
McMahon, Lieut.-col. M. T. F, 

assist, adj. -gen.. 385 
McNeill, Capt. J. H. C, partisan 

ranger, 463 
McQuade, Col. James F (2. 1. V). 

222 
McVicar, Lieut.-col. Duncan (0 

N. Y. cav.), com. reg't, 220, 225 
Macy, Lieut.-col. G.N. (20 Mass.). 

com. reg't. 165 
Magaw. Lieut.-com'r Samuel F. 

com. div., Potomac flotilla, 30, 



524 



INDEX 



423, 489. Letters to: Butter- 
field, 425 : Harwood, 154 
Mahone, Brig.-gen. William C 

(1.1. 1), 109. 114,132, 197,203, 

204, 212, 315; May 1, 242-244, 

247; May 2, 283, 299; May 3, 

346, 397 
Manassas Gap R. R., 122 
Manl.v, Capt. B. C. C, com. bat'y 

(2.1), 273, 278, 399, 401, 415, 

499 
Maps, how prepared, xi 
Marshall, Major Charles C, aide, 

14; col., quoted 372 
Martin. Capt. A. P. F, com. bat'y 

(1. V), 503 
Martin, Lieut. J. W. F, com. bat'y 

(1. C), 504, 231, 239, 285, 310, 

312, 347, 423, 510 
Martin, Lieut. Leonard F, com. 

bat'y (2. VI), 503, 401, 409, 

491, 509 n. 
Marye, Capt. E. A. C, com. bat'y 

(1. II), 500, 341, 405 n. 
Marve's Hill, 384, 391, 391 n., 

392 n. 
Mason, Capt. A. P. C, assist, adj. 

and insp.-gen., 14 
Mason, Lieut. J. W. F, 441, 447, 

449 
Massie, Capt. J. L. C, com. bat'y 

(A), 501 
Maurin, Capt. Victor C, bis bat'y 

(1. I), 499, 501 n. 
Meade, Maj.gen. 6. G. F, com. 

grand div., 18; com. V c, 39, 

136; early career, 42, 43; 173; 

cav. for, 187; on to Rapidan, 

190. 194; at Rapidan, 199; on 

to Ch'vilk, 214; at Ch'ville, 216, 

220, 222; 241 n. ; May 2, 273, 
302; May 3. 359, 364, 366. 367, 
369; May S. 419, 420; May 6, 
428; after Gettysburg, 459; in- 
structions for, 173, 186, 204, 

221, 258, 259. Dispatch to 
Humphreys, 220. See A.rmy 
corps, y 

Meagher, Brig.-gen. T. F. F 

(2. 1. II), 184, 219, 244, 271, 

272, 356, 365, 370 
Medical director, army of North'n 

Va. See Guild, Surg. L. 
Medical director, army of Poto- 
mac. See Letterman, Surg. 

Jonathan 
Meigs, Brig.-gen. M. 0. F, q.m.- 

gen., 23, 459 n. 
Meinell, Lieut. Henry F, com. 

bat'v (A), 267, 504 
Mercer, Col. J. T. (21 Ga.), 354 
Merriam, Lieut. -col. Waldo (16 

Mass.), com, reg't, cited 307 
Merrill. Lieut -col. C. B. (17 Me.), 

com. reg't, 361 
Merritt, Capt. Wesley (2 U. S. 

cav.), 443-445 
Michler, Gen. N. F, maps by, li 
Middle department F, 30 
Miles, Col. N. A. (61 N. Y.). 280, 

284, 365, 366 
Military instruction; F, 15, 49, 

102; 'C, 15, 102 
Military schools, 16 
Military secretary, army of North'n 

Va., i4 
Military spirit, 15, 116, 176 n., 

430, 432, 476, 477 
Military telegraph corps. See V, 

S. mil. tel. corps 
Militia, 16, 451, 469, 471 
Milledge. C!apt. John, Jr. C, com. 

bat'v (II), 501 
Miller, Capt. M. B. C, com. bat'y 

(I), 500 
Miller, Lieut. M. P. F, com. bat'y 

(A), 504 
Milrov. Brig.-gen. R. H. F 

(2. VIII), com. div.,30, 123, 124, 

153, 460, 469 
Minor, Capt. J. W. C. 453 
Moodv, Capt. G. V. 0, com. bat'y 

(I), 500, 289, 432 
Moore, Capt. Alexander F, aide, 

11, 104 



Moore. Capt. J. D. C, com. bat'y 
(1. I), 273, 304, 387, 399, 499 

Moorman, Capt. M. N. C, com. 
bat'y (C), 501, 292, 293, 309, 
312 n. 

Morgan, E. D., governor of N. Y., 
telegraphs to Lincoln, 435; 436 

Morgan, Lieut. -col. C. H. F, chief 
of art'y, 359, 369 

Morris, Col. O. M. (66 N. Y.), 
com. picket line. 370 

Morris, Maj. Robert, Jr. (6 Pa. 
cav.), com. reg't, 136 

Morrison, Capt. J. G. C, 319 n. 

Mortar schooners F, 489 

Mosby, J. S. C, early career, 75 ; 
raises followers, ib. ; operates 
against Washington. 75, 76; at- 
tacks Wyndham, 76 ; his gueril- 
las, 76, 77, 87 n. ; at Thomp- 
son's Corner, 77; at Aldie, 78; 
captures Gen. Stoughton, 78-83; 
at Dranesville, 83, 84; at Hern- 
don Sta., 84; appointed capt., 
84, 87; at Chantilly, 86; ap- 
pointed maj., 87, 88; at Miskell's 
Farm, 87, 88; 157, 165, 183; 
on O. and A. R. R.. 440. Let- 
ters to: citizens of Fauquier Co., 
77; Stuart, 85 

Moss, Capt. W. A. C, 92 

Mott, Brig.-gen. Gershom F 
(3. 2. Ill), 258, 261, 272, 324, 
343, 349-351, 356 

Muhlenberg, Lieut. E. D. F, com. 
bat'y (2. XII), 284, 320, 342, 

Mule, Gen. [1] C, 451 

Mulligan, Col. J. A. F(5. 1. VIII), 

com. brig., 465, 466. 469 
Munford, Col. T. T. C, xiii, 23 n., 

226, 281, 308 
Murray, Lieut. -col. E. C, assist. 

adj. and insp.-gen., 14 
Music in Camp, 37 
Myers, Lieut. -col. F. F, deputy 

chief q.m., 11 

N 

Naval operations, 30, 54 

Negroes. See Sialics 

Neill, Brig.-gen. T. H. F(3. 2. VI), 
389, 409, 414 

Nelson, Lieut. -col. W. 0, com. art'y 
(A), 501, 268 n. 

Newspapers, exchange of, 115 

Newton, John F, brig.-gen., com. 
VI c, 18; maj. -gen. (3. VI), com. 
div., 136, 329, 334, 384, 385, 
388, 389, 390, 392, 396, 397, 
399, 400; May 4, 408, 414 

New York brigades, 26 

New York Herald, quoted, 434, 
435 

Nicholls, Brig.-gen. T. P. (4. 4. 
II), 133, 291, 292 

Nine-months men F, 108, 168, 169, 
423, 482 

Norfolk, naval base. 31 

Norris, Maj. William C, chief sig- 
nal off., 180. Telegram to Long- 
street, 180 

North Anna River, line of defence, 
29 

Northrop, Col. L. B. C, comm'y- 
gen., 33, 34 



O'Connor, Lieut. D. L. F, cited 
79 n. ; quoted 82 n. 

O'Donohue, Lieut. William (4 U, 
S. art'y), 362, 371 

O'Neal, Col. E. A. (1. 2. II), 
com. brig., 133, 356 

Orange and Alexandria R. R., 52, 
122, 147. 166 n., 177, 180; ob- 
jective of Stoneman's cav., 143, 
146, 442, 443 

Orders: JE", assuming command, 
8; transferring command, 8, 
379; reorganizing army, 7, 39; 
for gen. movement, 119, 120, 
126, 240, 289, 434, 437; for 



turning movement. 173, 184, 
185, 186, 190; for passage of 
river, 146, 147, 178, 187-189, 
191, 204, 219, 383; for cav., 
142-144, 228; for retreat, 250, 
258, 370, 422, 423, 432; for 
demonstration, 148, 178; for di- 
version, 277, 278, 290. 325, 333, 
335, 363, 383; for deployment, 
315, 334; congratulatory, 104, 
223, 485, 486; C, for gen. 
movement, 127, 232 ; for thanks- 
giving, 127 n.; for attack. 341, 
342, 346, 402, 415; for feeling 
enemy. 404; congratulatory, 82, 
83, 103, 104, 484 

Orders and dispatches, quality of, 
483, 484 

Ordnance troops: 0, 21; F, 19, 
21 

Organizations. See Army corps, 
Cavalry corps, Divisions, En- 
gineer brigade 

O'Rorke, Col. P. H. F (3. 2. V), 
com. brig., 26, 247, 256 

Osborn. Capt. Hartwell F, quoted, 
289, 479 

Osborn, Capt. T. W. F. chief of 
arfv(3. Ill), quoted, 310, 311; 
his bat'y, 503, 491. See Wins- 
low, Lieut. G. B. 

Outposts: F, harried by enemy, 
24, 53, 75-80, 83, 84, 86; in- 
spection of, 46 ; protection of, 
52, 85, 86, 89 et seq.; attacked, 
55, 59-73; formation of, 59, 72, 
117, 189; information from, 71, 
119, 496, 497; reduced, 132, 
155; 208; Howard's, 232, 259, 
264, 285, 289 n, : of right wing, 
240, 249, 250, 263, 427, 429; 
C, 208 

Owen, Brig.-gen. J. T. F(2. 2. II), 
26, 400. 410 n., 413 n. 

Owen, Col. T. H. (3 Va. cav.), 210, 
217, 218, 220, 344, 247, 256, 
274 



Pack, soldier's. See Soldier's pack 
Pack-mules, 44, 45, 145, 158, 487; 

at review, 179; reported to Lee, 

180; ford Rapidan, 198; sent 

back by Stoneman, 441 
Pack-saddles, 489, 490 
Pack-trains, 120, 142, 145, 174; 

at review, 179; 227, 310, 313, 

320, 460, 461, 488 
Page, Capt. R. C. M. C, com. bat'y 

(2. II), 500, 341, 348 n. 
Paine, Capt. W. H. F, aide, 241, 

303, 343 
Park, Capt. R. E. C, xiii; cited 

208 n. 
Parker, Capt. W. W. 0, com. 

bat'y (I), 500, 245 n., 248 n., 

268 n., 289, 387, 410, 414, 432 
Parkersburg, correspondence from, 

468 
Parsons. Lieut. A. N. F, com. 

bat'y (1. VI), 503 n. See Hex- 

amer, Capt. William 
Partisan Rangers, 25.26.77,85,87 
Patrick, Brig.-gen. M. R. F, pro- 
vost-marshal-gen., 11, 136, 238, 

239, 247, 266, 351 n., 435, 497 
Patterson, Capt. G. M. C, com. 

bat'v (A), 501, 268 n., 387 
Paxton, Brig.-gen. E. P. C(l. 4. II), 

47, 133, 289, 291, 292, 298, 301, 

308, 316, 354 
Pavne, Lieut. A. D. C, com. Black 

Horse Cav., 147 
Peale, T. R., examiner of patents, 

179 
Peck, Maj. -gen. J. J. F, com. at 

Suffolk, 150; 161. Letters, etc., 

to: Hooker, 161, 211; Lincoln, 

150; Stoneman, 167 
Pegram, Maj. W. R. C, com. art'y 

(1. II), 500 n., 133 n., 273, 

341 n., 368 
Pelham, Maj. John C, death of, 97 
Pender. Brig.-gen. W. D. C 

(2.1. II), 133, 292, 314, 316, 



INDEX 



525 



318, 322. 323; May 3, 349-353, 

358; May 6. 431 
Pendleton, Brig.-gen. W. N. 0, 

chief of art'v. 14, 22. 133, 223, 

268. 330; orders for, 209, 232 
Pendleton, Maj. A. S. C, assist. 

adj. -gen., 323, 340 
Penick Lieut. Nathan C, com. 

bafy (1. I). 273, 387, 399, 401, 

410, 414, 493 
Pennington, Lieut. A. C. M., Jr. 

F, his bat'y, 504 
Pennsylvania brigades. 26 
Perrin, Col. Abner C (3. 1. II), 

com. brig., quoted 346 
Perrv, Brig.-gen. E. A. C (3.1.1), 

132, 245, 253, 256, 284, 299, 

313, 346, 405, 410, 414 
Personnel, 15. 22, 476 
Pettigrew, Brig.-gen. J. J. C, 397, 

445, 453 
Pettit, Capt. R. D. r, com. bafy 

(1. II), 502, 183, 250, 271, 284, 

343 n., 362, 368, 370, 432, 490, 

509 
Peyton, Maj. H. E. C, assist, adj. 

and insp.-gen., 14 
Phelps, Col. W., Jr. F (1.1. I), 

com. brig., 26 
Phillips, Capt. C. A. F, com. bafy 

(1. VI), 503 
Pickens, Col. S. B. (12 Ala.), 357 
Pickets. See Outposts 
Pickett, Maj. -gen. G. E. C (4. I), 

com. div., 19. 32, 53, 112, 150, 

267, 401, 407 n. 
Pierce, Capt. E. C. F, signal off., 



See Engineers 
Pitzer, Lieut. A. L. C, aide, 393 
Plank Road, 177 
Pleasonton, Brig.-gen. Alfred F, 
com. grand div., 18; com. out- 
post, 60; in skirmish at Hart- 
wood Ch., 64-69, 72, 73: (1. C) 
com. div., 136; 67. 85, 112, 
122; on march to Rapidan. 194- 
199; 217 n., 218 n. ; at Ch'ville, 
220; May 1, 239, 255 n.. 267 n.; 
May 2. 271, 272; 284, 294, 299- 
301. 312; May 3, 347, 367, 379, 
380; May 4, 412; May 5. 423- 
425, 510, 511; May 6, 432, 433; 
instructions for, 186, 240, 420 
Poland, Capt. J. S. F, chief of 
staff. 295 n., 307, 324, 349-351 
Pontoon bridges at; Fitzhugh's 
Crossing, 200, 205, 206, 229; 
tb.. May 1. 240. May 2.271, 329, 
330,335,387; Franklin's Crossing, 
200, 205, 206, 229; ib.. May 1, 
240, May 2, 271, 329-331, 335, 
May 3, 383, 387, 396; Pred'b'g, 
386. 409, 422, 437; Lacy H., 
383, 384, 386, 422; Kellev's F'd, 
187, 201-204; Scott's (Banks') 
F'd, 331, 395-397, 400, 402, 
411, 412, 415, 421, 434: U. S. 
F'd, 219, 396, 402, 413, 427, 
428. 432 
Pontoon trains: C, 161, 229, 409, 
424; F, 174, 178, 192, 203- 
205. 215; 219, 223. 233, 497; 
May 1, 240; May 2, 329; May 3, 
383, 386, 396; Man 6. 432 
Pope. Maj. -gen. John F, 12, 26, 

438 
Population, 16, 17 
Posev, Brig.-gen. Carnot C(2. l.I), 
109". 114, 132. 204, 209, 213, 
214; May 1, 243, 248, 252. 256, 
265; May 2. 273, 281, 283, 299; 
Mau 3, 346, 405; May 4, 410, 
414 
Postmaster at Washington, to au- 
thor, 149 n. 
Potomac flotilla, 30. 154. 160, 489 
Potomac River, commanded, 30; 

navigable to Washington, ih. 
Potter, Lieut. W. E. F, ordn. off., 

376 
Powers, Col. C. J. F (2. 3. II), 

com. brig., 250 n. 
Pratt, Capt. F. A. F, com. bafy 
(A), 504 



Present for duly, defined, 135 

Present for duty equipped, de- 
lined, 135; 136, 137, 138 

President: C. see Daris, Jejter- 
son; F, see Lincoln, Abraham 

Press, control of, 234 

Price, Maj. R. C. C. adj. gen., dis- 
patches to: Chambliss, 202; 
Mosby, 165 

Prize money. See Partisan ijan- 

Proclamation of Emancipation, 3, 

4; dissatisfaction from, 35, 36 
Provisional army, 15 
Provost guard F, 19; strength of, 

136; arfy of, 206. Losses, 473 
Provost-marshal-general, army of 

Potomac. See Patrick, Brig.-ffen. 

M. K. 
Prussian artillery, 22 n. 
Prussian infantry, 26 
Prussian minister, 179 



Quartermaster-gen. F. See Meifft, 

Briq.-yen. M. C. 
Quarters, winter, 32-34 
Quinn, Capt. S. J. C, xiii 



Railroad construction corps. See 
Anderson, Adna 

Raine, Capt. C. I. C, com. bafy 
(3. II), 500 

Ramseur, Brig.-gen. S. D. C 
(5. 2. II), 133; May 1, 248, 
256; May 2, 273, 291, 298, 301, 
308; May 3, 354, 357, 358, 361, 
362 

Randol, Capt. A. M. F. com. bafy 
(3. V). 260, 503, 509 

Randolph, Capt. G. E. F, chief of 
arfy, 359; his bafy, 502, 491. 
See Jastram, Lieut. P. S. 

Range of firearms, 28 

Rank, 21 

Rankin, Capt. W. G.F,q. m., 418 n. 

Ransom, Brig.-gen. R., Jr. C, 56, 
268, 397 

Ransom, Capt. D. R. F. com. 
bafy (2. I), 502, 355, 509 

Rappahannock Bridge, attempt to 
destroy, 52 

Rappahannock River, navigable to 
Fred'b'g, 30; topography of, 108, 
109, 173, 204, 206 n.; rises, 
151, 157, 163 n., 427. Passage 
of. at Kelley's F'd. 147, 188 et 
seq.; below Fred'b'g, 192 <•( 
seq.; at Fred'b'g, 386; at U. S. 
F'd, 219. Repassage of, at 
Fred'b'g, 422; at Scott's F'd, 
421, 422; at U. S. F'd. 427- 
431, 480-482; at Kelley's F'd, 
148, 456 

Ration: C, 112, 158; F, 35, 48, 
49 

Rations: C, 232; F, 120, 126; 
on Stoneman's raid, 142, 144, 
145, 190; on march to Ch'ville, 
175, 184, 231; at Ch'ville, 404, 
441 
Rawson, Professor E. K., U. S. 

Navy, xiii 
Razderichin, Capt. Valerian F 
aide, 335, 383 
Reese, Capt. W. J. C, com. bafy 

(2. II), 500 
Regular army. See U. S. Army 
Reid. Maj. G. W. (145 N. Y.), 

Reno, Capt. M. A. F (Reserve 

brig ), com. brig., 90. 100, 101 
Revere, Brig.-gen. J. W.F(2. 2. Ill), 

26, 355 
Reynolds, Capt. J. A. F, com. 

bafy (1. I), 502. 509 
Reynolds, Maj. -gen. J. P. F, com. 

I'c, 18, 39, 136; birthplace, 42; 

previous service, 43; 192, 233; 

May 2, 271. 300, 303, 306, 315, 

324, 328, 329; May 3, 342, 355, 



304; May 4, 416; May 5. 420, 
422; May 6, 428: conjectures of, 
229. Letters, etc., to; Butter- 
field, 231 n., 329; Hooker, 
230 n., 231 n.; Sedgwick, 231 n., 
238. See Army corys F. / 
Rhett, Capt. A. B. C, com. bafy 

(I), 500, 245, 268 n„ 348 n. 
Rhett, Col. T. S. C, 122, 211, 444 
Rice, Acting major Owen (153 

Pa.), 288 
Richardson, Capt. J. B. C. com. 
bafy (I), 500, 268 n., 387 n., 
501 n. 
Richard.son, Col. Charles C, xiii 
Richardson, Col. J. B. C, xiii 
Richmond, Lewis C, assist, adj.* 

gen.. 8 
Richmond, objective of Stoneman's 
cav., 444 ; apprehensive, 446— 

448, 451, 452 

Richmond, Fred'b'g, and Potomac 
R. E., 29, 332; objective of 
Stoneman's cav., 143, 144, 444- 

449, 451, 454 

Richmond Enquirer, correspon- 
dence of, 155 
Biehmond Whig, correspondence 

of, 155 
Ricketts, Lieut. R. B. F. com. 

bafv (3. I), 502, 416, 509 
Rifles. See Artillery. Infantry 
Rigbv, Capt. J. H. F, com. bafy 

(1. VI), 414 
Right wing F, in motion, 174 et 

seq.; command of, 181, 184, 
221; at Mt. Holly Ch.. 187; at 
Kellev's F'd, 188, 190; on to 
Rapidan, 194-199, 202 n.; on to 
Ch'ville. 219; at Ch'ville, 224. 
225; 227, 230; May 1. 238- 
263; May 2, 271-328: May 3, 
339-373; May 4, 416, 417; May 
5. 427; May 6, 428-432. 
Strength of, 185, 224, 225; May 
1, 240, 265; May 2, 328; May 3, 
378; May 4, 416 

River road, 178 

Roberts, Brig.-gen. B. S. F, com. 
district of W. Va., 30, 464-466, 
468, 469. Letters, etc., to: Hal- 
leck, 461; Kelley, 462, 469; 
Schenck, 467; Wilkinson. 465 

Robertson. Capt. J. M. F, com. 
arfy (C). 136, 504; his bafy, 
189, 504 

Robinson, Brig.-gen. J. C. F 
(2.1). com. div., 136, 343, 416 

Robinson, Lieut.-col. G. P.(3Md. ), 
quoted 349 n. 

Eodenbough, Capt. T. P. (2 U. S. 
cav.), 450, 452 

Rodes, Maj. -gen. R. E. (2. II), 
com. div., 19, 191; May 1, 245, 
248, 252, 265; May 2, 274, 282, 
295, 298, 300, 308. 312, 314, 
322, 323, 339; May 3, 340, 341, 
346, 353, 354, 361, 378 

Ropes, J. C, author. 111 

Ropes, Lieut. Henrv F, 111, 155, 
157-159, 165, 192, 193, 200, 
201, 478 

Rosecrans, Maj. -gen. W. S. F. 438 

Ross, Capt. H. M. C, com. bafy 
(A), 501 

Ross, Col. S. B. F. 141 n., 476 n. 

Ross, Col. Samuel F (2. 1. XII), 
com. brig., 348, 356 n.-358 

Rowley, Brig.-gen. T. A. F( 1.3.1), 
26 

Rucker, Col. D. H. F, depot q.m., 
268 

Rucker, Corp'l M. ' 



T. C, cited 

Ruger, Brig.-gen. T. H. F 
(3. 1. XII), on to Rapidan, 194, 
195; at Rapidan, 198: May 2, 
324, 326; May 3, 348, 349, 352, 
354, 357 

Rush, Col. R. H. (6 Pa. cav.), 
147, 151 

Rush's Lancers, 449. See Buth, 
Col. R. H. 

Rusling, J. P. F, assist, q.m., 
quoted, 34, 478 



526 



INDEX 



Russell, Brig.gen. D. A. F 
(3. l.VI), 204, 205, 265, 396 

Russell, Capt. Harry F, aide, 11, 
301 

S 

Saber wounds, 99 n., 102 

Sabers. See Cai'aJrii 

Salem Church, battle of, 397-400 

Salm-Salm, Princess. 129 

Sanderson, Lieut. J. A. F (1 U. 
S. art'v), 349, 350 

Sawtelle, Lieut.col. C. G. F, chief 
q.m., 441 

Schenck, Maj.-gen. R. C. F, com. 
Middle dep't, 30, 31, 467. Let- 
ters, etc., to: Curtin, 469; Hal- 
leek, 460, 463, 466, 467; 
Scammon, 471; Stanton, 336; 
Wilkinson, 465 

Schimmelfennig, Brig.-gen. Alex- 
ander F (1.3. XI), 263, 287 

Schirmer, Lieut. -col. Louis F, 
com. art'v (XI), 136. 503 

Schleiter, Maj. Gustav (74 Pa.), 
288 

Schriner, Col. E. F, insp.-gen., 46 

Schurz, Maj.-gen. Carl F, com. XI 
c, 83; (1. XI) com. div., 136, 
188 n.; May 1, 249 n., 263; 
May 2. 277 n,, 285-288, 296, 
297, 303, 304, 308, 312, 314; 
May 3. 405 ; requests investiga- 
tion, 478 

Scott, Maj.-gen. Winfield F, 5. 13 

Seaver, Col. T. O. (3 Vt.), 389 

Secret service. See Information, 

Secretary, Swedish legation, at re- 
view, 179 

Secretary of War: C, see Seddon, 
J. A.; F, see .Stanton, E. M. 

Seddon, J. A. C, Sec. of War, 31, 
113, 117; conjectures of, 54. 
Letters, etc., to: Hampton, 448; 
Lee, R. E., 17, 25, 451, 454, 
498; Lee, W. H. P.. 451 

Sedgwick, Maj.-gen. John F, com. 
VI c, 18, 39 ; birthplace, 42 ; 
age, 42, 43 ; classmate, 43 ; pre- 
vious service, ib.; 191, 204, 210, 
216, 223, 225; May 1, 254, 265; 
May 2. 321, 333-335; May 3, 
345, 366, 370, 382-402; May 4. 
406-408, 410, 413-415; May 5, 
421, 424; May 6, 431; instruc- 
tions for, 178, 190, 191. 229, 
230, 239; ib.. May 1, 244, 265, 
May S, 277. 290. 320, 333. May 
3. 363. 370, 382, 403, May 4, 
411, May B, 421. Letters, etc., 
to: Benham, 412; Butterfleld, 
229, 231, 330. 331. 334, 385. 
407, 410, 421; Hooker, 407, 
410, 411, 412. 415, 421: Van 
Alen, 408. See Army corps. VI 

Seelev. Lieut. P. W. F. com. bat'v 
(2. III). 502, 244, 258. 260, 261, 
306; May 3. 343, 347, 362 n., 
368, 509; 491 

Semmes. Brig.-gen. P. J. C 
(2,2.1), 132, 233, 242, 247, 
279 397 

Seward, P. W. F, Assist. Sec. of 
State. 179 

Seward, W. H. F, Sec. of State, 
179; writes to Morgan. 436 

Sewell, Col. W. J. F (3. 2. Ill), 
com. brig., 357, 358, 365 

Shaler, Col. Alexander F(l. 3, VI), 
com. brig.. 335 

Sharpe, Col. G. H. F, in charge of 
mil. information. 47, 183 

Sharp's carbine, 25, 46 

Sharpshooters, 27, 28: Berdan's, 
ib,: 1st CO. of Mass., ib.; at 
Kellev's F'd. 90 

Shelter tent, 34 

Shenandoah Valley, Lee's commu- 
nication with, 52 ; strategic 
importance of, 122 ; possible ob- 
jective, 193 

Sickles, Brig.-gen. D. E. F, com. 
Ill c, 18. 39, 136; offends 
Howard, 41; date of commission. 



ib.; politician, 43; 129, 131, 
216; May 1, 237, 244, 255 n., 
258, 261; May 2, 272, 279-281, 
283, 287, 290, 293, 294, 298- 
301, 313, 324-326; May 3, 342, 
345, 349 n., 350, 357, 362, 364, 
367; May 4, 416; May S, 419, 
420; May 6, 428; instructions 
for, 179, 212, 229, 278; quoted 
338 n. Dispatch to Williams, S., 
69. See Army corps. III 

Sigel, Maj.-gen. Franz F, com. 
grand div., 18; assigned to XI c, 
39 ; leaves army of Potomac, 40, 
41; early career, 41; his c, 
491 

Signal corps: C, 19; F, 19, 20 

Signal stations at: Clark's Mt., 
177, 441; Banks' F'd. 180; 
Scott's F'd, 331; Franklin's 
Crossing, 180; England H., 181, 
233; Fitzhugh H., 211, 266; 
Phillips H., 181; Seddon H., 
181, 210; Buckner's Neck, 181, 
211, 233; Tvler's Hill, 211; U.S. 
F'd, 210, 233; Newton, 242; 
Dowdall's Tav., 280; east of 
Dowdall's Tav., 242. 249; 
Fred'b'g, 398, 402; Heights of 
Pred'b'g, 398, 402. For electric 
tel. sta's, see Tel, communica- 
tion, electric 

Sim, Surg. Thomas F, med. direc- 
tor, cited 373 n. 

Sims, Lieut. Robert F, com. bat'y 
(1. Ill), 275, 283, 299, 347, 
502 n. 

Skirmish at Hartwood Ch., 55, 
59-72, 117 

Skirmish on Little River Turn- 
pike, 86, 87 

Slaves, emancipation of, 3, 4, 35, 
36; impressment of. 113; 
friendly to Federals, 87, 177; 
assistance from, 183, 263, 267. 
335, 382, 442, 448, 450, 452, 
457 

Slocum, Maj.-gen. H. W. F, earlv 
career, 42, 43; 173; com. XII 
c, 18, 39. 136; com. right wing, 
184, 185; Pleasonton reports to, 
187; on Rapidan, 197, 198, 
199 n.; 210, 218: on to 
Ch'ville, 220; at Ch'ville. 221; 
May 1, 248, 252, 254, 258; May 

2, 280, 283, 293, 324, 326; May 

3, 405; May 5. 419; instructions 
for, 184, 185, 204. 216, 248, 258. 
See Army corps, XII 

Smith, Brig.-gen. William C 
(3. 3. II), 133, 387, 409, 410, 
414 

Smith, Capt. B. H., Jr. C, com. 
bat'v (II), 501 

Smith, Capt. Jacob F, 462 

Smith, Capt. J. E. F, com. bat'v 
(2. Ill), 502 

Smith, Capt. J. P. C, assist, adj.- 
gen., 276, 319 

Smith, Lieut.-col. C. H. (1 Me. 
cav,), 446, 449 

Smith. Lieut.-col. W. P. C, chief 
eng., 141, 214 

Smith, Maj.-gen. W. P. F, com. 
grand div., 18: com. IX c, 53 

Smith, W. C, cited 216 n. 

Smith's carbine, 25. 46 

Snow, Capt. Alonzo F, com. bat'y 
(provost guard), 490, 504 

Soldier's pack, 121, 142, 145, 
175. 184 

South Anna River, line of defence, 
29 

Southall, Capt. S. V. C. xiii 

Spear. Col. G. C. (61 Pa.), 390 

Spencer repeating carbine, 46 

Spies, 55, 78. 109. 267. 497, 498 

Squadrons. See Cavalry 

Stafford Court-House. depot at, 29 

Stafford Heights, army of Poto- 
mac on, 29, 31, 32 

Stahel, Brig.-gen. Julius F, com. 
XI c, 18, 41; promoted maj.- 
gen., 83 ; transferred to dep't of 
Washington, 83; 88, 177, 183, 



203, 269; annoyed by 
440; 443 n., 463" 

Stanton, E. M. F, Sec. of War, 
31; doubted Stone's lovaltv, 11; 
control of tel., 19; refers appli- 
cation, 41; 162; visits armv, 
168; 467, 470. Letters, etc., to: 
Curtin, 468; Hooker, 105, 336, 
436; Schenck, 336 

Stephenson, Gen. Luther F, xiii 

Stevens, Lieut. G. T. F, com. bat'y 
(2. I), 502 n. 

Stewart, Lieut. James F, com. 
bat'y (1. I), 502, 355, 509 

Stiles, Maj. Robert C. xiii 

Stone, Brig.-gen. C. P. F. 10. 11 

Stone, Col. Rov F (2.3.1), com. 
brig., 26, 416 

Stoneman, Maj.-gen. George F, 
com. CS.V., 39, 136; birthplace, 
42; previous service, 43; in skir- 
mish at Hartwood Ch., 64, 66- 
69, 72, 73 : attempts to cross 
Rapp'k. 146-148: 150-153, 158, 
161; examines f'ds, 163; 165; 
information from, 177, 183; at 
Kelley's F'd, 196, 201; 202, 210, 
441: May 1, 238, 267 n., 442; 
May 2. 301, 332, 443; May 3, 
359, 444, 447; May 4, 448, 449; 
May B, 450, 451; May 6, 452; 
May 7, 454, 455; May S, 456; 
raid as a whole, 438, 457-459; 
orders for, 142-144, 159, 163, 
166, 167, 188, 189, 443, 458, 
507, 508; orders from, 142, 146, 
201; plans of, 201, 202, 444. 
Letters, etc., to: Averell, 69, 72; 
Buschbeck, 148; Hooker, 72, 73, 
85, 86, 167; Pleasonton, 69, 72; 
Williams, S., 163 n., 177 

Stonewall brigade. See Paxton, 
Brig.-gen. E. F., and Funk, Col. 
J. H. S. 

Stoughton, Brig.-gen. H. E. T, 
78-80, 82, 85. Letters to Heint- 
zelman, 78, 79 

Stuart, J. E. B. 0, lieut., 13; 
maj.-gen., com. cav., 19, 21, 25, 
26 : early career, 44 ; compli- 
ments Mosbv, 83, 83, 85. 87; at 
battle of Kellev's F'd, 98, 103, 
104; 114, 115, 123. 125; 
strength of div., 134; 154, 157, 
158; at Culpeper C. H.. 188; 
cited, 193; captures staff off., 
194 ; reports Howard crossed 
Rapp'k, 195 ; pierces column, 
197: 198 n., 202; cut off, 208; 
telegraphs to Lee, 210; conjec- 
tures of, 202; on to Todd's Tav., 
218-220; at Todd's Tav., 225; 
at Alsop's, 226: on to Spottsyl- 
vania C. H., 226, 227; May 1, 
242, 245, 252, 265, 442; May 2, 
273, 298, 301, 308, 322, 323, 
326, 339; May 3. 340-342, 344, 
346, 347, 352-354. 356, 361, 
367; May 4, 416: May 5, 451; 
457. Letters, etc., to: Jackson, 
246; Lee, 85, 103; Mosbv, 84, 
85, 165 n., 166 n. ; Taylor, 425 

Suckley. Surg. George F, med, 
director, 311 

Suffolk, strategic value of, 31; 
movement to, 53, 54; siege of, 
111, 116. 118, 119 

Sumner, Lieut. E. V., Jr. F, aide, 
450 n., 454, 455 

Supply boats F, 268, 418. 489 

Swedish minister, 179 

Svkes, Maj.-gen. George F (2. V), 
com. div., 186; orders for, 190, 
214, 215, 219; Mau 1, 343, 245, 
246, 247, 250, 253, 254, 259, 
265; May 2. 271. 302, 315, 324; 
May 3, 343; May 4, 417 n. ; 
May 6, 429 

Sykes' regulars. See Divisions F 
(2. V) 



Taft. Capt. B. D. F, com. bat'y 

(A), 206 n., 491 
Taggart, Maj. C. F. F, 88 



INDEX 



527 



Talcott, Mnj. T. M. R. C, aide, 
14, 262, 263 

Tanner, Capt. W. A. C, com. bat'y 
(4. II), 501 

Ta.vlor, Capt. M. F. F, cited 430 

Tavlor, Col. W. H. C. .\iii 

Taylor, Lieut. O. B. C, com. bat'y 
(I), 500. See Eubank, Capt. 
J. L. 

Taylor, Maj. W. E. C, adj. -gen., 
14, 85, 217, 425. Dispatch to 
McLaws, 407 

Telegraph corps. See £7. S. mil. 
tel. corps 

Telegraph road, 29 

Telegraphic communication, elec- 
tric, 19, 71, 192; with Washing- 
ton, 149; to Tyler's Hill, 180, 
181; to England, ib.; toward 
Banks' P'd, 192; to D. S. F'd, 
211, 219; to gen. headq., 211; 
from Reynolds to Sedgwick, 233. 
266; to Red H., ib.: toward 
Hooker's headq., 331, 359, 425; 
toward Scott's F'd, 331; across 
Scott's F'd, 397; to Fred'b'g, 
402; with North'n press, 424; 
with Richmond, 443, 446, 447. 
See also Signal sta's 

Telescope, at Phillips H., 181 

Thomas, Brig.-gen. E. L. C 
(6. 1. II), 133, 273, 281. 282, 
292, 298. 323; 351-353, 358 

Thomas, Brig.-gen. Lorenzo F, 
adj. -gen., 168 

Thomas. Lieut. Eyan F. com. bat'y 
(1. II), 183 n., 320, 368, 509 

Thomas, Lieut. Lorenzo, Jr. F, 
com. bat'v (A), 504 n. See 
Graham, Capt. U". .1/. 

Thompson, Capt. C. C, com. bat'v 
(4. II), 501 

Thompson, Capt. James F, com. 
bat'y (2.1). 502, 347, 432, 509 

Thompson, Col. Ambrose F, q.m., 
418 n. 

Thompson, Lieut. -col. J. L. F, in 
skirmish at Hartwood Ch., 62 

Tidball, Capt. J. C. F, com. bat'y 
(2. C), 189, 322, 504 

Tilghman, Col. B. C. (26 Pa.), 
278 

Tobacco, 36, 48 

Tolles, Lieut.-col. C. W. F, chief 
q.m., 481 

Tompkins, Col. C. H. F, chief of 
art'y. 206 

Topographical engineers. See Eng. 
brigade T 

Total effective, defined, 135 

Trading across lines, 36, 37, 50, 
51, 115 

Trains C, on the march, 120, 
208 n.: II c. 208. 274, 276, 
280, 281, 284; Jones and Im- 
boden, 460, 470 

Trains F, on the march, 120, 204, 
219; loads of, 143, 145, 176; 
May 1. 244; May 2. 332: UayS. 
404, 441: May 4, 406, 407, 418; 
May 6, 480: 

I c, 178, 190, 332, 423; 
II c, heavy, 184. 203, 418; 
light, 184; III c, 178, 179, 
190, 231, 423; V c, heavy, 176, 
423; light, 203, 203; VI c, 178, 
190, 320, 402; XI c, heavy, 
176, 423; light, 175, 176 n„ 
202; XII c, heavy, 176, 266, 
423; light, 198, 203; cav. c, 
heavy, 150, 407, 408; light, 143, 
202,'2O3 n., 407 

Trans-AUeghany department C, 30 

Transportation. 44, 45 : at review, 
179: 231, 423. 487. 488; at 
Clarksburg, Vf. Va., 471 

Tremain, Maj. H. E. F, aide, 362 

Trimble, Maj.-gen. I. R. C (4. II), 
com. div., 19; 113; absent, 
133 n.; 191; May 1. 251 

Tucker, Capt. B. F. (1 Me. cav.), 
443 

Tumbull, Lieut. J. 6. F, com. 
bat'y (1. Ill), 249, 275, 283, 
294, 298, 310, 347, 502 n. 



Two-year men F. 108, 168, 169, 

416, 417, 433. 482 
Tyler, Brig.-gen. E. B. F (1. 8. V), 

36. 359, 362, 365, 367, 372 
Tyler, Brig.-gen. R. O. F, com. 

gen. art'y reserve, 504 n. 
Tyler, Capt. F. E. (74 N. Y.), 

com. reg't, cited 307 



u 

Upton, Col. Emory (121 N. Y.), 
401 

U. S. Army. See irmy of V. S. 

U. S. Military Academy, gradu- 
ates from, 4, 10, 12, 15. 16, 43, 
44. 78 

U. S. military telegraph corps, 19 



Valley district, 30 

Van Alen. Brig.-gen. J. H. F, 
aide, 336, 34t5. Letters, etc., to: 
Avcrell, 379; Butterfield, 277, 
290, 320, 321, 325, 331, 384, 
409; corps com'rs, 289; How- 
ard. 276: Pleasonton, 379; Rey- 
nolds, 315, 324; Sedgwick, 408 

Vandeventer, Col. A. S. C 
(2. 4. II), com. brig., 133 n., 
295 n., 354, 361 

Venable, Maj. C. S. C, aide, 14 

Vincent, Lieut. A. O. F, com. 
bat'y (C), 504 n. See Robert- 
.lon. Capt. J. M. 

Virginia brigades, 26, 37 

Virginia Central R. R., 29, 30, 
443-444, 448, 449, 451 

Virginia Military Institute, gradu- 
ates from, 16 

Virginia State Line, 13 

Volunteers: C, see Army of C. S.; 
F, see Army of U. S. 

von Blucher, Lieut. Gustav F, 
com. bat'y (A), 504. 176, 266 

von Gilsa. Col. LeopoldF ( 1. 1. XI), 
com. brig., 261, 285, 386, 288, 
396 

von Puttkammer, Capt. A. A. F, 
com. art'y (3. Ill), 309 n., 
310 n.: his bat'y. 502, 347, 359, 
490. 509 

von Steinwehr, Brig.-gen. Adolph 
F (2. XI), com. div., 136, 263, 
285, 286, 294, 299, 303 



w 

Wadsworth, Brig.-gen. J. S. F 
(1. I), com. div., 136, 193, 205, 

313, 355 n., 343, 347 
Wainwright, Col. C. S. F, com. 

art'y (I), 306, 369, 370. 509 
■Walker. Col. R. L. C, com. art'y 

(1. II). 500, 133. 341. 501 n. 
Walker, F. A., quoted, 355, 388 n., 

420 n., 479 
Wallace, Capt. Martin F, 463. 463 n. 
Walton, Col. J. B. C, com. TTds/i- 

ington Arfy (I), 387 
War department: C, 18, 20; F, 

xii, 10, 19, 20; visiting, 494; 

orders from, 43, 75. 77; bulletin 

from, 438: censorship by, 424 
Ward, Brig.-gen. J. H. H. F 

(2.1. Ill), 281, 325, 351, 355, 

356 
Warner, Lieut.-col. E. R. F, insp. 

of art'y, 206 
Warren, Brig.-gen. G. K. F, chief 

of topographical eng's, 21, 140; 

at U. S. F'd. 215, 216: May 1, 

237, 241, 344; May 2. 300-303, 

314, 331, 325 n., 335; May 3, 
364 n., 382, 394, 396, 403: 
May 5, 419, 420, 422; testimony 
before com., 477 

Warren, Col. E. T. H. C (3. 4. II), 

com. brig.. 133, 300, 301 
Washington, D. C, visits to, 8; 



defence of, 9 ; reported ungarri- 

soned, 180 
Washington's birthday, 34, 35 
Waterman, Capt. Richard F, com. 

bat'y (1. V), 260, 509 
Watson, Capt. David C, com. art'y, 

501 n.; com. bat'y, 501 
Watson, Lieut. M. F. F, com. bat'y 

(2. V), 245-247, 260. 509 n. 
Webb, Lieut.-col. A. S. F, assist. 

insp. -gen., 364 
Weed, Capt. S. H. F, com. art'y, 

369, 370, 404, 509; his bat'y, 

503 
Welles, Gideon F, Sec. of Navy, 50 
Wells, Capt. A. B. (8 Pa. cav.), 

cited 194 n. 
Wcstbrook, Lieut.-col. C. D. (120 

N. Y. ), com. reg't, cited 307 
West Point, N. Y., mil. academy 

at. See V. S. Mil. Academy 
West Point of the South. See 

Virginia Military luxlitiite 
West Point, Va., head of naviga- 
tion, 30; occupation of, 161, 456 
Wheaton, Brig.-gen. Frank F 

(3. 3. VI), 329, 335, 385 
Whipple, Maj.-gen. A. W. F 

(3. Ill), 63; com. div., ib., 136; 

May 1. 249, 250, 361; May 2, 

281, 293, 305, 306, 312, 313; 

May S, 342, 345: May 4. 416 
Whisky, 48 
White House, Va., head of navi- 



gatii 



30 



Wickham, Col. W. C. C (4 Va. 

cav.). 245, 274 
Wiedrieh, Capt. Michael F, com. 

bat'y (2. XI), 503, 286 n., 303, 

325, 342, 509 

Wilbourn, Capt. R. E. C, signal 
off., 318. 323, 341 

Wilcox, Brig.-gen. 0. M. C (4. 1. 1), 
132, 233; May 1, 244, 245, 347, 
253, 356; Mav 2, 373, 331; 
May S, 387, 393, 394, 396, 398, 
399; May 4, 415; May 5, 426 

Wilderness, map of, xi ; topogra- 
phy of, 177, 178 

Wilkinson, Col. Nathan F (6. 1. 
VIII), com. brig., 465 

Willett, Capt. E. D. (1 La.), com. 
reg't, 293 n. 

Williams, Brig.-gen. A. S. F 
(1. XII). com. div., 136; May 1, 
252, 260; May 2. 293, 304- 
306, 310, 313, 313, 320, 324, 

326, 327; May 3. 344, 351 n., 
357, 376, 385, 386 

Williams, Brig.-gen. Seth F, adj.- 

gen.. 11. 223, 455. Letters, etc., 

to:Benham,205.329: Butterfield, 

511; corps com'rs, 434; Couch, 

173, 203, 497; Gibbon, 510; 

Howard, 173; Patrick, 497; 

Sedgwick, 191, 239,411; Sickles, 

179; Slocum, 173: Stoneman, 

142. 143, 152, 158-160, 507, 

508 
Williams, Col. J. M. C (4. 4. II), 

com. brig., 354, 359 
Williams, Col. T. V. C (3. 4. II). 

com. brig., 133 n., 353 
Williamsburg, strategic value of, 31 
Williston, Lieut. E. B. F, com. 

bat'y (1. VI), 330, 503 
Winder, Brig.-gen. J. H. C, com. 

dep't, 448 
Winegar, Lieut. C. E. F, com. 

bat'y (1. XII). 504, 248, 253 n., 

343 n., 432, 510 
Wingfleld, Capt. J. T. C, com. 

bat'y (A), 501 
Winsiow, Lieut. G. B. F, com. bat'y 

(2. Ill), 358, 491, 502 n., 509. 

See Osborn. Capt. T. W. 
Winsor, Justin, librarian, xiii 
Winter campaign, 9 
Withers, John C, assist, adj.-gen., 

■writes to press, 121; to tel. co., 

122 
Wofford, Brig.-gen. W. T. C 

(3.2.1), 132, 208; May 1. 247, 

256; May 2. 373, 283; May S, 

397, 399; May 4, 410 



e^. 



528 



INDEX 



Woodbury, Brig.gen. D. P. F, 

com. eng. brig., 21 
Woodbury, Lieut. J. D. F, com, 

bafv (1. XII), 504 n. 
Wooding, Capt. G. W. C, com. 

bat'y (II), 501 
Woods, Lieut.-col. G. H. F, chief 

comm'y. quoted, 406, 481 
Wool, Brig.gen. J. E., 13 
Wooifolk, Lieut. James C, com. 

bat'y (I), 433 
Wright, Brig.-gen. A.R. C (5. l.I), 

132, 207, 209, 214, 220; Maj/ I, 



248, 252, 253, 256, 260, 265; 
May 2, 281, 299; May 3, 346, 
372, 405; May 4, 410, 413 

Wright, W. W. F, superintendent 
of r. r's, 12, 265. 273 

Wyndham, Col. Percv F, in skir- 
mish at Hartwood Ch., 70, 71; 
attacked by Mosby, 76 ; threatens 
retaliation, 77; at Fairfax 0. H., 
78, 80, 85 ; on Stoneman's raid* 
444, 445 ; reports to Heintzelman, 
71 



York River, navigable to West 

Point, 30 
Yorktown, strategic value of, 31 
Young, Capt. H. E. C, assist. 

adg. and insp.-gen., 14 



.vO -7-.. 





/ 


°*. 


o^ 












"-^X. A"^' 
^^9^' 

.^^% 






